Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia

The ideology of the family state

David Bourchier

POLITICS IN ASIA



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'This is an exciting and highly original work that makes a major contribution to the history of Indonesian political thinking. One great strength is the complex link between German organicist and Dutch legal thinking and romantic Indonesian nationalism. Another is the story of the impact of Japanese political thinking from the 1920s to the 1940s. This work is rich and subtle, full of intriguing historical detail and insight. It is particularly relevant now, with the current renewed burst of hostility towards Western liberal democracy in Indonesia.'

David Reeve, *University of New South Wales, Australia*

'At one level David Bourchier has given us a crucial analysis of the ideas and mechanisms behind Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" and Suharto's enduring authoritarian-developmentalist state, which between them shaped Indonesia over its first half-century. At another it is of much broader significance, in tracing the lineage into Asia of one of the more influential alternatives to parliamentary democracy thrown up by the turbulent nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Despite the undoubted successes of this democracy in Indonesia since 1998, we would be foolish to ignore the disenchantments with it and the continuing appeal of its rivals – in Indonesia as throughout Asia. This exploration of one deep alternative current is as timely now as it ever was.'

Anthony Reid, *Australian National University*

'I am thrilled to see the publication of this book. It is arguably the most important work yet produced on the genesis of modern Indonesian political ideology. While a first-rate analysis of Indonesia, it will be of interest to anyone who seeks to understand the complex ways in which political ideologies are historically formed and reshaped, in varying social contexts, and in response to the shifting requirements of power.'

Vedi Hadiz, *Murdoch University, Australia*

Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia

Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia charts the origins and development of organicist ideologies in Indonesia from the early twentieth century to the present. In doing so, it provides a background to the theories and ideology that informed organicist thought, traces key themes in Indonesian history, examines the Soeharto regime and his 'New Order' in detail, and looks at contemporary Indonesia to question the possibility of past ideologies making a resurgence in the country.

Beginning with an exploration of the origins of the theory of the organic state in Europe, this book explores how this influenced many young Indonesian scholars and 'secular' nationalists. It also looks in detail at the case of Japan, and identifies the parallels between the process by which Japanese and Indonesian nationalist scholars drew on European romantic organicist ideas to forge 'anti-Western' national identities and ideologies. The book then turns to Indonesia's tumultuous history from the revolution to 1965, the rise of Soeharto, and how his regime used organicist ideology, together with law and terror, to shape the political landscape and consolidate control. In turn, it shows how the social and economic changes wrought by the government's policies, such as the rise of a cosmopolitan middle class and a rapidly growing urban proletariat, led to the failure of the corporatist political infrastructure and the eventual collapse of the New Order in 1998. Finally, the epilogue surveys the post-Soeharto years to 2014, and how growing disquiet about the inability of the government to contain religious intolerance, violence and corruption has led to an increased readiness to re-embrace not only more authoritarian styles of rule but also ideological formulas from the past.

This book will be welcomed by students and scholars of Southeast Asia, politics and political theory, as well as by those interested in authoritarian regimes, democracy and human rights.

David Bourchier is Associate Professor of Asian Studies at The University of Western Australia and an Associate of the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University, Australia.

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Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2015
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Bourchier, David, author.
Illiberal democracy in Indonesia : the ideology of the family-state / David Bourchier.
pages cm. -- (Politics in Asia series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Indonesia--Politics and government--20th century. 2. Indonesia--Politics and government--1998- 3. Corporate state--Indonesia--History. 4. Democracy--Indonesia--History. 5. Political culture--Indonesia--History. I. Title.
DS644.B658 2014
320.509598'09045--dc23
2014013645

ISBN: 978-0-415-18022-1 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-37972-1 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Taylor & Francis Books

To the memory of Munir Said Thalib and Daniel Lev,
fighters both.

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Preface and acknowledgements

This book was inspired by the struggle against the injustices of the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto in Indonesia, which lasted from 1966 until 1998. It started as a dissertation written at Monash University in Melbourne in the mid 1990s. Over the next two decades (almost) it took on a life of its own, somewhat gallingly, as an 'unpublished PhD thesis'. It informed the work of many other scholars and was also critiqued. In order to respond adequately I would have had to write a much longer book. Suffice it to say that this revised version has benefitted from commentary and criticism by a range of scholars both in print and in personal communication.

As the unwieldy original title, *Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia*, was meant to convey, the leitmotif of the book is the history of the metaphor of state as family and how this has been deployed as ideology in Indonesia. Much of the book is about the inner workings of Soeharto's regime, focusing on the legal and ideological institutions it relied on to insulate itself against civil society. On another level the book is an intellectual detective story. Researching the ideology of Soeharto's New Order, I was led to quite unexpected places, including nineteenth-century Germany and Japan. Whatever the success of these forays beyond my disciplinary and linguistic comfort zone, I hope that they cast some light on Indonesia's place within the global flow of ideas and are of interest to students of the history of ideas in the twentieth century. Please note that the use of the term 'illiberal democracy' in the title is broadly descriptive. This book was not written in response to Fareed Zakaria's 1997 *Foreign Affairs* article that popularised the concept or to the debates it generated. The subtitle is a better guide to what the book is about.

Most of the fieldwork for this book was carried out during 1990 and 1991 when my main research was on workers' movements and legal constraints on the right to organise. This is why the book goes into some detail about the history and development of corporatism in Indonesia. After turning my attention more to the ideological underpinnings of corporatism I made several subsequent visits before and after the fall of Soeharto to conduct interviews and gather material. The book's focus on the ruling few in Jakarta may not be fashionable but it reflects the concentration of power during the period

under scrutiny. The historical chapters were based on library research conducted in Australia, the Netherlands and Germany.

If the impetus for writing this book was to contribute to political debates going on in Indonesia in the 1990s, what is its practical relevance to democratic Indonesia? My answer is that much as we would like to think that democracy is consolidated and that the New Order was an aberration, its 'family state' ideology outlived it. It remains embedded in Indonesian political discourse, and, because it is seen as authentically Indonesian, it retains an appeal among those disillusioned with the failings of the democratic system. As in the 1950s, cynicism is rife and politicians are increasingly resorting to old rhetorical formulas of the big family, harmony and consensus. Part of the motivation for publishing this book now was to stimulate debate within Indonesia about the history of these ideas.

Thanks are due to a host of people around the world who have stimulated, supported and shepherded me in the process of writing this book. My most profound thanks go to the late Herb Feith, who did more than anyone to see my original PhD thesis through to completion. His engagement, patience and encouragement, long beyond the call of duty, were an inspiration.

Others whose insights have been especially valuable are Marsillam Simanjuntak, whose scholarship and friendship helped motivate this project; Ben Anderson, whose extensive comments saved me from many a wrong turn; Dan Lev, whose advice helped keep the ideas aspect of this book anchored to social realities; and Karel Bongenaar, whose familiarity with constitutional law in Indonesia and Europe did much to illuminate some dark corners. I would also like to single out my good friends and one-time Monash colleagues Ariel Heryanto and Richard Tanter whose different perspectives both informed my approach.

Peter Burns deserves special mention for his generosity and enthusiasm after discovering that we had arrived independently at similar conclusions, especially regarding the influence of the Historical School of Law on van Vollenhoven and on legal and political thinking in Indonesia. I benefitted greatly from his comprehensive knowledge of the Leiden school of legal anthropology.

Among the many people who helped me in Indonesia with ideas and materials I want to extend my thanks to Aswab Mahasin, Hardoyo, Muchtar Pakpahan, Benny Subianto, Onghokham, Joesoef Ishak, Fauzi Abdullah, Yap Thiam Hien, Abdurrahman Wahid, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Sudharmono, Abdulkadir Besar, Slamat Bratanata, Hamid Attamimi, Mulya Lubis, Arief Budiman, Mulyana Kusumah, Arist Merdeka Sirait, Oei Tjoe Tat, Stanley Adi Prasetyo, the Soedijono family and the many helpful people at Yayasan SPES, Yayasan Perempuan Mardika and Yayasan Pijar.

For their comments and other contributions in the process of writing I would also like to thank Gerry van Klinken, Sue Blackburn, Angus McIntyre, David Henley, Michael van Langenberg, Andrew Gunawan, Adrian Vickers, Ingrid Wessell, Bill Liddle, David Reeve, Joel Kahn, George Quinn, Greg

Fealy, Paul Stange, Eva Schaarschmidt-Kohl, Anton Lucas, Merle Ricklefs, Tim Lindsey, Laine Berman, Tony Reid, Robert Cribb, Jane Drakard, Vedi Hadiz, Michael Janover and Loren Ryter. Special thanks also to the dogged hard work and generosity of John MacDougall, whose pioneering 'indonesia' email network was a godsend to Indonesia researchers everywhere.

For helping iron out the errors of fact and style I am again most grateful to Herb Feith. Sue Blackburn, David Chandler, Michael Leifer and Howard Dick also read early drafts and provided much helpful editorial advice.

Many thanks also to my Dutch colleagues Henk Schulte Noordholt, Jan Michiel Otto, Adriaan Bedner, Freek Colombijn, Bas Pompe and Theo Veenkamp. The advice I received from these and other generous people pulled in many directions and know that I will not have satisfied everyone.

For keeping my feet on the ground I am indebted to Pat Walsh, Max Lane and the other good people associated with *Inside Indonesia* magazine where I worked on the editorial team for many years.

A heartfelt thank you to my closest supporters: my mother Ray, her two sisters Alison and Jill, and Elke Kaiser whose love, patience and confidence got me through long days and nights of writing in Melbourne and Perth. And, of course, to my son Jasper for getting me out of the office and helping me see the world anew.

The Centre of Southeast Asian Studies at Monash provided a very pleasant and stimulating environment in which to develop the ideas that led to this book. I am grateful to its research director, David Chandler, for his support over the years, to John Legge and to the many students who made life there so interesting. For their generous support in helping me to turn the thesis into a book I am grateful for periods spent at the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University, the International Institute for Asian Studies, Universitiet van Amsterdam, the Institut für Asien-und Afrikawissenschaften at Humboldt University and the University of Western Australia.

Thank you also to Stephanie Rogers, Hannah Mack and previous editors at Routledge for their extreme patience and good faith.

Sections of this book draw on previously published material. Chapters 2, 4 and 6 use paragraphs from 'Positivism and Romanticism in Indonesian Legal Thought' in Timothy Lindsey (ed.) *Indonesia Law and Society* (second edition) (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2008), pp. 94–104 and 'Conservative Political Ideology in Indonesia: A Fourth Wave?' in Lloyd Grayson and Luke Shannon (eds) *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001) pp. 112–25. Chapter 8 contains short passages from 'Indonesianising Indonesia: Conservative Indigenism in an Age of Globalisation', *Social Semiotics* (8:2/3 1998), pp. 203–14. Chapter 9 draws on 'Totalitarianism and the "national personality": Recent controversy about the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state' in Jim Schiller and Barbara Martin-Schiller (eds) *Imagining Modern Indonesian Culture: The State and Cultural Politics* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996). A section of the Epilogue uses material from 'The romance of adat in the Indonesian political imagination and the

current revival' in Jamie Davidson and David Henley (eds) (2007) *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The deployment of adat from colonialism to indigenism* (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 113–29.

A note on spelling

As a rule, I have spelt Indonesian words and names according to the current spelling system introduced in 1972. The exceptions are those cases where individuals prefer the old spelling of their names (e.g. Soediman Kartohadiprodjo), where organisations existed only before 1972 (e.g. Masjumi, pangreh pradja) or in direct quotations. In many cases both spellings of names are common, and this has led to anomalies, as in the case of Suharto/Soeharto. Japanese terms have generally been spelt the way I have found them in the English and Indonesian language sources, using a line over the vowel to indicate a long sound.

1 Starting points

In 1990 I was living in Jakarta, researching the prospects for democratisation in Indonesia. The collapse of right-wing regimes in Latin America in the 1980s followed by communist regimes in Eastern Europe created a great deal of excitement, leading many to believe that Indonesia would be next. After all, Indonesia had many of the supposed preconditions, including a liberalising economy, divisions among the elite and a rapidly expanding middle and working class.[1] The extraordinary florescence of oppositional activity in the late 1980s appeared to presage the end for Soeharto's repressive military regime that had come to power a quarter of a century earlier.

Convinced that meaningful democratic gains are won through popular demands for participation rather than granted from above, I concentrated my research on groups at the forefront of the democratic movement: human rights and other NGOs, grass-roots activists, reform-minded intellectuals, students, middle-class dissident groups and Indonesia's nascent workers movement. A central issue for all of these groups was the struggle for the right to organise: to form independent unions, professional associations and political parties such as had existed in the period between independence in 1945 and the coming to power of the military.

This soon led me to examine the numerous obstacles to asserting this right, from the capillaried state security and intelligence apparatus to the labyrinthine legal system. Yet the harder I looked, and the more time I spent talking to Indonesian political activists, the more questions of ideology and discourse came to dominate. Surveillance and low-level terror undoubtedly played a crucial part in insulating the regime against its domestic critics. But for many activists a more insidious barrier to effective political action and to democratic reform was the Soeharto government's intensive, sustained propagation of an ideology that rejected the very idea of opposition, depicting it as un-Indonesian.

Even while advocating 'accelerated modernisation', Soeharto's ideologues consistently presented his New Order as a champion of 'indigenous values'. The corporatist political arrangements put in place by his regime were said to reflect a uniquely Indonesian approach to authority and decision making, one that gave pride of place to harmony and consensus. Officials frequently likened the state to a big family or village, presided over by a wise and

benevolent father figure. In Soeharto's 'Pancasila Democracy', opposition and conflict were condemned as alien notions, deriving from individualistic, Western culture.

The notion that Soeharto had rescued Indonesia from contamination by foreign ideologies and returned it to its true nature was a leitmotif of the regime's nationwide indoctrination programme launched in 1978. Over the next decade government ideologues attempted to consolidate this set of ideas into a coherent theory. Quietly at first, and then with more vigour, ideology textbooks and officials began referring to Indonesia as an 'integralist state'. The term came from a speech by Professor Supomo, a customary law expert, who in the Japanese-sponsored constitutional deliberations of 1945 had outlined his vision of a state in which harmony and reciprocity prevailed between rulers and ruled. According to the integralist theory of the state, which Supomo associated with the thinking of Spinoza, Hegel and the nineteenth-century German romantic Adam Müller – but which he stressed was also inherent in Indonesia's traditional constitutional order – all groups in society formed an organic unity. In a state based on integralist principles there would be no need for any political rights, separation of powers or indeed any distinction between state and society, violating what historian Jakob Burckhardt (1921) took to be the cardinal principle of democracy.[2]

By 1989, Indonesian officials had begun referring to integralism as Indonesia's *Staatsidee* – the central concept behind all aspects of state organisation and law, including the constitution. This innovation was greeted with some alarm in opposition circles because the 1945 Constitution provided the only guarantees – brief and ambiguous as they were – of protection against a powerful state.

Two key premises of the government's position were that Supomo's integralist theory reflected indigenous Indonesian patterns of social and political organisation, and that Supomo's ideas defined the spirit of Indonesia's 1945 Constitution. Marsillam Simanjuntak, a former student activist and independent intellectual, challenged both. In his 1989 Master of Laws thesis, Simanjuntak accused government ideologues of concealing Supomo's positive references to totalitarianism, Nazi Germany and wartime Japan in his speech. Taking a cue from the Dutch legal historian J.H.A. Logemann, who in 1962 had likened Supomo's vision to 'what we call the organic state' (1985: 29), Simanjuntak maintained that the main source of Supomo's integralism was not indigenous tradition as claimed by the New Order but rather the ideas of Friedrich Hegel. He also argued that the government's claim that the constitution embodied Supomo's ideas was a perversion of history. Drawing on transcripts of the 1945 debates and articles of the constitution, which he argued guaranteed political rights, he maintained that Supomo had been defeated in 1945 by advocates of popular sovereignty and that the constitution was therefore more democratic than totalitarian in inspiration.

Simanjuntak's audacious assault unnerved the regime's ideologues and prompted journalists, academics and public intellectuals to ask: had the New

Order wilfully distorted such a crucial episode in the nation's history? If Simanjuntak is right, shouldn't the 1945 Constitution be seen as a first step towards democracy rather than as a blueprint for authoritarianism and cultural exceptionalism?

The ensuing debates on integralism in the media and in public forums, coupled with the considerable efforts by New Order ideologues to preserve their version of history – including locking away the archival records on the constitutional debates of 1945 – convinced me that this was an issue that could provide a key to understanding not only New Order ideology in its own right but also how it related to conservative ideologies elsewhere.

Because integralism was not a new phenomenon, it was clear that any study of it would need to have a historical dimension. And because ideologies do not arise of their own accord, it would need to explain who its bearers were and what social and political purposes it served. Simanjuntak provided some helpful pointers, but his framework was a narrow one. He highlighted tantalising parallels between Supomo and Hegel's concept of the state, but did not explore the question of how a customary law specialist like Supomo may have come to be influenced by Hegel. Another limitation of his analysis was its preoccupation with terminology. Simanjuntak's contention that Indonesian constitutional lawyers shunned integralism for 40 years after 1945 rested on the observation that the term was rarely used during this time. His work implied that Supomo's concept of state organisation was exceptional, if not unique, in the history of Indonesian political thinking and that few took Supomo's ideas seriously for most of the post-independence period.

Yet as David Reeve had shown in his pathbreaking 1985 history of corporatist forms of political organisation in Indonesia, Supomo's ideas were shared and admired by a variety of Indonesian thinkers from the 1950s onwards. Reeve had taken a very different view of the significance and origins of the ideas propagated by Supomo in 1945. Far from being marginal, Reeve had located them in the mainstream 'collectivist' tradition of political thinking, which he argued had prevailed among Indonesian nationalists since the 1920s. Reeve's study was very useful in illuminating certain commonly held ideas among nationalists, including antipathy to 'Western individualism and liberalism' and a commitment to building a broadly collectivistic society in which the state would play a major role in regulating the economy. His notion of collectivism, however, was diffuse, spanning – and to some extent conflating – diverse streams of nationalist thought. If Simanjuntak's thesis suffered from its narrow frame of reference, Reeve's had the opposite problem, blurring the boundaries between Supomo's conservative integralism, Mohammad Hatta's social democratic ideas and Sukarno's radical populism.

Reeve saw Supomo as having derived his concept of integralism primarily from his study of customary law in Indonesian villages as well as from aristocratic Javanese principles of philosophy and statecraft. He emphasised the importance in Supomo's thought of the Javanese mystical notion of the 'unity of *kawula* and *gusti*'. These terms are variously interpreted as meaning

'microcosmos and macrocosmos', 'man and God' or 'ruled and ruler'. Reeve's highlighting of the cultural and historical authenticity of Supomo's vision led to criticism of his work by Buyung Nasution (1992: 3), among others, for buying into and reinforcing a tradition of scholarship on Indonesia, associated perhaps most strongly with Harry Benda (1972a), that assumed a close fit between authoritarian rule and Indonesian culture.

Attempting to make sense of these divergent accounts of the origins of the philosophy by which the government claimed to be guided, I immersed myself in the writings of the New Order's foremost theorists and defenders of integralism such as Padmo Wahyono, Abdulkadir Besar and A. Hamid S. Attamimi, and of the older generation of Indonesian lawyers and legal thinkers on whom they drew, including professors Supomo, Djokosutono, Notonagoro and Hazairin.

Reading these authors presented a paradox. Most were enthusiastic advocates of basing Indonesia's political institutions and procedures on indigenous cultural principles, yet their main frame of reference was European legal philosophy. All of them, it turned out, had studied law. Following the signposts to Europe it became clear that Hegel was only one of many thinkers on whom Indonesian integralists drew.

All were strongly influenced by the work of professors at the law faculty at Leiden University, the home of *adat* (customary law) scholarship in the 1920s and 1930s, where the first generation of Indonesian lawyers was educated. We know from the memoirs of early nationalists such as the Leiden-educated Subardjo that the Leiden scholars' 'discovery' of basic similarities between the *adat* of communities all over the archipelago excited Indonesian students by providing them with a way of conceptualising 'Indonesia' as a single cultural entity. The Leiden school contributed two other ideas that have had an enduring impact. One was the general proposition that a nation's law and government should reflect its unique culture and traditions. The other was that Indonesian culture is quintessentially communally oriented, spiritual and harmony loving – the opposite of mainstream Western culture, which the Leiden scholars, reflecting a broader malaise in interwar Europe, saw as individualistic, materialistic and conflict ridden.

Since these ideas had such a far-reaching influence in Indonesia, and underpinned the arguments of the integralists, the next step was to discover the logic behind them. This involved examining the theoretical premises of the Leiden scholars, and in particular their intellectual leader, Cornelis van Vollenhoven. Drawing on van Vollenhoven's writings in translation and a range of scholars, including legal historian Peter Burns (1989 and 2004), it became clear that the Leiden school owed much to a specific tradition of legal philosophy stemming from the German romantic movement of the early nineteenth century. This romantic tradition, which had its roots partly in Catholic teachings, and partly in the conservative reaction to the French Revolution, was anti-Enlightenment, anti-liberal, anti-individualistic and in many ways anti-modern. Its key thinkers, who included Adam Müller and Friedrich von Savigny, rejected what they saw as the 'mechanistic' philosophies and doctrines

of the Enlightenment in favour of an 'organic' conception of law, society and the state. Societies were for them not collections of individuals with inalienable human rights but harmonious wholes, bound together by the force of custom and tradition. Law, they maintained, could not be imposed from outside. Rather it had to grow organically out of the history and circumstances of specific communities – to express their *Volksgeist*. They rejected 'Western' (i.e. French) notions of democracy based on universal suffrage and social contract theory, favouring instead the notion of an 'organic state' based on a corporatist model of representation. For these reasons, this tradition of political and legal thought, like its more dynamic and forwards-looking Hegelian cousin, is often called 'organicist'.[3]

Linking the Leiden school with the romantic stream of organicist theorising helped clarify many of the assumptions of the Dutch scholars – and of their Indonesian students – about the nature of Indonesia's *Volksgeist* and about the perceived need for modern legal structures to rest upon indigenous foundations.

Organicist political theory was a fertile source of ideas for a whole range of conservative political thinkers and leaders. It made little headway in the Anglo-Saxon world, but had an enduring influence in Catholic Europe and beyond as a 'third way' – a philosophically distinct alternative to Marxism and liberalism. Indeed its adherents often regarded Marxism and liberalism (both economic and political) as equally threatening. As a social ideology, organicism appealed historically to conservative or aristocratic elites whose position was under challenge from new social forces. Emphasising the idea of society as an integrated whole and appealing to 'family', 'community' and 'tradition' was frequently a means of staving off perceived threats to the established social order posed by rising working and middle classes. It is no coincidence that organicism was strongest during periods of social upheaval: the aftermath of the French Revolution, the years after the 1848 revolutions and in the 1920s and 1930s, when parliamentarism was widely seen as incapable of preserving political stability in Europe. In each case support for organicist state ideologies and political–constitutional forms grew considerably. Right-wing Japanese corporatism in the 1920s and 1930s was inspired in part by the same set of European organicist ideas, for similar reasons.

This tradition of political thinking faded in Europe and Japan after the Second World War, but did not die out everywhere, least of all in the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies of Latin America. It was the revival of interest in Latin American and Iberian corporatism by US scholars in the 1970s that brought organicism back into the discourse of Anglophone political science.[4] Alfred Stepan (1978) argued, in *The State and Society, Peru in Comparative Perspective*, that the prevalence of corporatist political forms in Latin America could best be explained with reference to the 'organic statist' tradition of thought. Though Latin American organicism owes more to Roman law theories of association than to the *Volksgeist* theorists, it shares the main assumptions and principles of romantic organicism, including the idea that there is a natural order to society and a knowable 'common good'.

It is the task of the state, represented in this tradition as the embodiment of the whole of organised society, to shape and articulate this common interest.

Stepan suggested a useful way of thinking about organicism. He proposed that it could be understood as three things at once: a normative framework, a set of organising principles and a legitimising formula 'available' for use and adaptation. Latin American elites, he argued, had often invoked organicist formulas, including communitarian ideologies and corporatist administrative devices, in response to 'their perceptions of impending crises of modernisation and control' (Stepan 1978: 40).

Stepan's study marked a significant advance in the analysis of corporatism by charting a path between purely structuralist approaches such as that of Schmitter (1974), and the 'culturalism' of Wiarda (1973: 229–32), who saw the basis of corporatism in traditional, mainly rural, institutions. While Stepan favoured structuralist approaches over culturalist ones, he argued (1978: 54, fn.19) that 'a sophisticated analysis of political cultures includes such non-*Weltanschauung* concrete characteristics as different legal, institutional, and administrative historical traditions …'. By focusing on these often neglected aspects of the Iberian colonial heritage, and by identifying their 'cultural carriers' – most notably the legal system and the Catholic church – Stepan was able to transcend standard structural approaches without resorting to essentialising and ahistorical *Weltanschauung*-based arguments.

There is no causal relationship between organicist legacies and corporatist patterns of political organisation. In many parts of Latin America where the 'Iberian Catholic' ethos was strong, corporatism was relatively weak. Stepan (1978: 56) argued that the historical record showed that the decision to adopt corporatist formulas was almost always taken in crisis situations by elites who 'for programmatic reasons rather than for traditional cultural reasons, want to use the power of the state to reconstruct civil society along new lines' (Stepan 1978: 56). It is also significant that in some Latin American countries, such as Chile, Argentina and Brazil, there were contending liberal political traditions that acted as counterweights to corporatism (ibid.: 53, fn.18).

These ideas helped inform my working hypothesis that organicism in Indonesia was best understood as part of the structural legacy of colonialism, which was developed and used as a political–ideological formula by sections of the elite that felt threatened by populist pressures. In treating organicism more in instrumental than cultural terms I have no wish to deny that some of its promoters (including Supomo) saw it as congruous with their own genuinely held commitments to holistic philosophies. There is no doubt that Javanese cultural traditions, especially the notion of the 'underlying unity of all things' common to most strains of Javanese mysticism, helped sustain organicism and to give it some cultural legitimacy. Yet if we look at the history of organicist political ideology in Indonesia it is clear that what its leading proponents had in common was not Javanese mysticism – some of them were not Javanese at all – but rather a Dutch, or Dutch-influenced, legal education. Taking an instrumentalist approach also helps explain the attractions of

organicist formulas to pragmatic politicians like (the north Sumatran) General A.H. Nasution, a keen builder of corporatist institutions from 1957, and Soeharto's wily intelligence aide Lt. Gen. Ali Moertopo, who was responsible in the late 1960s and 1970s for dismantling political parties and forcing mass organisations into state-chartered corporatist bodies.

My scepticism about government claims of an intimate bond between organicist ideology and 'indigenous cultural traditions' stems also from a recognition of the problematic nature of 'authenticity'. I have been influenced here by the body of 'invention of tradition' literature pioneered by Eric Hobsbawm (1983) and by the post-structuralist and post-colonial writings spawned by Foucault and Edward Said.[5] The main lesson of these studies, and indeed of Mannheim's earlier conception of the sociology of knowledge (Wolff 1993), is that 'cultures' ought to be analysed with reference to the political and historical context in which knowledge about them was generated and reproduced. This why considerable space is devoted to the ways in which Dutch and Japanese scholarship helped to shape, in dialogue with Indonesians, the concept of Indonesian 'national identity'. It is also why the book goes into some detail about the politics of ideological production and reproduction in New Order Indonesia.

One of the problems of writing about the history of an ideology is that it can appear to have a momentum of its own. This was, I believe, a problem in Reeve's study, which leaves one with the impression that the New Order's corporatist political organisation Golkar had been waiting to be born since the 1920s. I have recast this picture first by associating the promotion of organicism more closely with the interests of particular social groups – in particular the elite of territorial administrators (*pamong praja*) and, from the mid 1950s, the army – and second by depicting organicism as a consistently contested stream of political thinking.[6] Organicism's 'progress' was far from inexorable. It was only ever the preserve of a minority of nationalists before 1945, and for the decade after the proclamation of independence it vanished almost entirely from the political stage. It resurfaced in a significant way only as a result of the series of crises in 1956–59, which saw key sections of the elite turn their backs on parliamentary democracy in search of a non-Marxist alternative. After a period in which conservative forces were driven onto the defensive in 1963, it was taken up again by Soeharto's New Order in 1965–66 in a situation of economic chaos and political polarisation. The collapse of the Soeharto regime saw it retreat again, only to reappear in the later Yudhoyono years.

Another potential hazard in engrossing oneself in the study of an ideology is to overestimate its significance, both as an influence on government thinking and on the population at large. I should therefore make it clear that I do not argue that Indonesia is or ever was an 'organic state'. True, Soeharto used organicist formulas to great advantage, both as a basis for state ideology and to some extent as a guide to designing institutions, but to call Indonesia an organic state would be to assume too close a fit between rhetoric and reality.

If Indonesia was the kind of harmonious family state Soeharto's ideologues said it was there would have been no need for the vast apparatus of repression. Neither would there have been the need for ideologues or for expensive campaigns to tutor Indonesians in the art of being Indonesian. The intense efforts on the part of the government to stress the harmonious nature of Indonesian society and of state–society relations stemmed from a deep fear of communal conflict and social upheaval, much of it a result of its own political and economic policies.

Scope and structure

This book is an attempt to chart the origins and development of organicist ideologies in Indonesia from the early twentieth century to the present. Because ideologies can only be understood with reference to the social groups and historical events that give rise to them, telling the story of organicism necessarily involved retracing some of the central themes of Indonesian political history. The first four substantive chapters deal with the period to 1965 while the second four concentrate on the Soeharto regime, with an epilogue surveying ideological developments in the years to 2014.

The book begins with an exploration of the origins of the theory of the organic state in Europe, concentrating mainly on the conservative romantic stream of organicist theorising in Germany and Holland. It describes how this was translated into legal philosophy and how it affected the way in which the *adat* scholars at Leiden University approached the study of culture in Indonesia and helped to shape colonial policy. The chapter then looks at how the romantic and orientalist assumptions of the Leiden school, as well as wider anti-liberal trends in interwar Europe, influenced the way many young Indonesian scholars and 'secular' nationalists came to think about culture, national identity and state organisation. Chapter 3 shifts the focus to Japan, another major, albeit neglected, source of organicist theories and formulas. It describes parallels between the process by which Japanese and Indonesian nationalist scholars drew on European romantic organicist ideas to forge 'anti-Western' national identities and ideologies. It also explores how Japanese cultural nationalism during the 1930s and the occupation reinforced nativist elements within Indonesian nationalist thought. The Japanese-supervised constitutional debates of 1945 are covered in Chapter 4, with a focus on teasing out the philosophical differences between Supomo, Sukarno, Hatta and Yamin.

Indonesia's tumultuous history from the revolution to 1965 provides the backdrop to Chapter 5. It describes how the marginalisation of the disliked *pamong praja* saw organicism relegated to the fringes of political life, before frustration with the parliamentary system led the military leadership and Sukarno to turn to organicist formulas for a solution in the mid 1950s. It analyses how each tried to use corporatist organisations and indigenist rhetoric to advance their own political agendas and how, after 1963, Sukarno

embraced parties once again, allowing the conservative coalition led by the military to claim the corporatist functional groups concept as their exclusive hallmark. Chapter 6 discusses the rise of Soeharto and how his regime used organicist ideology, together with law and terror, to de-Sukarno-ise the political landscape and consolidate control. Special attention is given to the way in which the government's lawyer/ideologues revised and deployed the state ideology of Pancasila to override constitutional constraints and justify a range of repressive political measures. The role played by Ali Moertopo and his civilian advisors in domesticating the political parties and constructing state-sponsored corporatist bodies is examined in Chapter 7. This group of 'political technocrats', like their counterparts in Pinochet's Chile, drew on administrative and ideological formulas derived from both American political order theory and Catholic social theory.

The Soeharto regime's ambitious campaigns to inscribe the Indonesian population with its conservative organicist ideology are analysed in Chapter 8. The chapter pays close attention to the machinery and individuals involved in the process of ideological production, underscoring the central role played by civilian and military lawyers. While revealing many continuities in the themes and personnel involved, the chapter shows that New Order ideology evolved fitfully, and often inconsistently, in response to particular challenges to the government's authority. Chapter 9 opens with a description of the 'thaw' of 1989–92 and examines the heated debates between regime ideologues and opposition figures over the revival of integralism. It makes the case that the social and economic changes wrought by the government's policies, particularly the rise of a cosmopolitan middle class and a rapidly growing urban proletariat, made it increasingly difficult to represent Indonesia as an undifferentiated 'family state'. The inability of the corporatist political infrastructure to cope with these dynamic new forces weakened the regime and set the scene for the collapse of the New Order in 1998.

An epilogue surveys the post-Soeharto years to 2014, looking at the repudiation of the ideological orthodoxy of the New Order and at democratisation on all fronts driven by the reform movement. While the political, legal and cultural transformation of Indonesia since 1998 is well institutionalised, democracy has not lived up to its promise, and there is again deep cynicism about the self-serving nature of the multi-party system and its politicians. There is also growing disquiet about the inability of the government to contain religious intolerance, violence and corruption, leading to an increased readiness to re-embrace not only more authoritarian styles of rule but also ideological formulas from the past.

Notes

1 The crucial collections informing debates at the time were O'Donnell *et al*. (1986) and Diamond *et al*. (1989). Also important were Stepan (1986) and Przeworski (1989), and on Africa see Chazan (1992) and Ibrahim (1986).

2 'Democracy', wrote Burckhardt (1921) 'is a world view deriving from a thousand different sources and varied according to the nature of its followers which, however, is consistent in one point: the power of the state over the individual can never be great enough to erase the distinction of state from society'.
3 The term 'integralist' is used interchangeably with 'organicist' throughout this book.
4 The manifesto of this revival was the collection of essays in Pike and Stritch (eds) (1974). See in particular Wiarda (1974) and Schmitter (1974). Important contributions to the study of corporatism since that time include Malloy (1977), Schmitter and Lehmbruch (1979), Stauffer (1977), Stepan (1978), Cumings (1983) and Wiarda (1997).
5 See in particular Foucault (1975) and Said (1995). Valuable studies on Indonesia in this vein include Philpott (2000), Kahn (1993), Pemberton (1994), Bowen (1986), Vickers (1989), Widodo (1995), Davidson and Henley (2007), Heryanto (2006) and Jones (2013). See also Dale (1990) on Japan.
6 For a fuller treatment of competing traditions of political thought during the New Order years see Bourchier and Hadiz (2003).

2 Organicism and the *Volksgeist*

Organic theories of the state are out of fashion and in disrepute. Anglo-American political science literature has tended to ignore them, perhaps because they have contributed little to liberal democratic theory or practice in English speaking countries. Contemporary European writers, while more acquainted with organic theories, tend to shun them largely because of their association with Nazism and fascism.[1] Organicist ideas have, however, contributed a great deal to the core tradition of Western political and social thought from Roman times. And they were a vital component of the thought-world of nineteenth-century European nationalism, which did so much to inspire Indonesian nationalist thinkers.

Analogies between the state and the human body go back almost as far as Western political philosophy, as do analogies between the state and the family. These analogies have been employed to different ends in different periods so it is difficult to speak about a single organicist 'theory of the state'. What I will do here is touch on some of the ways in which the notion of the 'organic state' was conceived before the nineteenth century and then look at how organicism was theorised in Germany and Holland in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Most European organicist discourse stems from the Aristotelian notion that 'the state is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part' (*Politics* I: II: 12). Within this vision, society is conceived of not as a multitude of free-willed beings but rather an essentially cohesive, integrated community within which individuals find their meaning. There is an assumption of a natural underlying order leading to a notion of the 'common good', a theme developed most notably in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The social order, in early organicist theory, is inescapably hierarchical; it is based on the feudal concept of a natural (or divinely ordained) division of labour in which rights attach to rank and status rather than to human beings as such. These basic ideas have had a lasting influence in Europe due to their partial incorporation into Roman law, medieval natural law and Catholic doctrine.

This said, there have been a range of conflicting ideas about what binds the 'whole' – which is usually equated with the state – together. If in the Roman

conception it was the absolute power of the emperor, for the Church it was the divine chain of being. Marsilius of Padua, a fifteenth-century political philosopher, maintained that the life of the organism was governed by the 'law of nature' and the 'law of reason' (Gierke 1968: 26).

There have also been quite different concepts of the proper relationship between authority and individuals among those espousing organic analogies. An important principle of Roman public law, for example, was the concession theory of association, according to which associations of individuals could be formed and continue to exist only as creatures of the state (Maitland 1968: xxx). Alfred Stepan (1978: 37–9) argued that Roman law played a vital role in perpetuating 'organic statism' both as a political theory and as a structural influence through to the modern era in Southern Europe and Latin America. He links the pattern of highly interventionist, paternalistic states and the prevalence of state-chartered 'corporations' or 'functional groups' in Latin America with the persistence of the Catholic–Roman notion that the state should be responsible for determining and enforcing the 'public good'. Yet, in Northern Europe at least, this state absolutist principle was challenged in Medieval times by the flourishing of self-confident religious and secular guilds and corporations that came increasingly to regulate their own affairs. While Gierke (1968: 27) maintains that the 'social organism' remained the fundamental political idea of the Medieval period, he also points to federalising tendencies in Middle Ages political thinking in which the 'whole' came to be conceived as the expression of its various parts rather than the parts being an emanation of the whole. The absence of any notion of the 'whole' having a will or a personality of its own led Lewis (1954: 199) to draw a sharp distinction between medieval forms of organicism and later forms linked to theories of the *Volksgeist*. He argues persuasively that the Medieval conception of the nature of community implies that the authority of the state must be limited (ibid.: 215).

The nineteenth century wave of organicist theorising of interest here often referred back to antiquity and the theories of the Middle Ages. But it was shaped by different circumstances and is conceptually distinct. It emerged as part of the conservative reaction in Northern Europe to the French Revolution and the individualist and rationalist philosophies associated with it, and as part of a new German nationalism. Humiliated by the defeat of German rulers at the hands of Napoleon's armies at Valmy (1792) and Jena (1806) and horrified by Robespierre's terror in France, the German romantics turned their backs on what they described as the 'mechanistic' Enlightenment conception of man and the universe, including natural law, social contract theory and the idea of popular sovereignty. They also opposed the trend in Germany, accelerated by the Napoleonic conquest, towards the establishment of a modern, liberal, bureaucratic regime, which they saw as undermining the traditional pattern of social relations based on obligation in favour of an artificial, impersonal relationship between the atomistic individual and the centralised state. This linking of liberalism with both alienation and absolutism

is the context in which the proliferation of communalistic philosophies in nineteenth century Europe can be understood.

Having no faith in the emancipatory potential of liberal cosmopolitanism, early German nationalist thinkers, most notably Johann Gottfried Herder, developed the notion that people are what they are not by virtue of their common membership of the human species but because they are born and brought up within the matrix of a particular culture with its own unique, historically evolved language, customs and collective memory (Barnard 1983).[2] Herder is also credited with formulating the extremely influential concept that each culturally defined nation has a distinctive spirit, a *Volksgeist* going back deep into history. These ideas, along with the conservatism of Edmund Burke, provided points of departure for romantic nationalist figures such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schelling and Adam Müller, three men who are central figures in what follows.

Müller, court philosopher to Prince Metternich and the foremost political theorist of German romanticism, developed an organic theory of the state that was both radical and conservative. It was ostensibly based on Medieval political thought but went far beyond earlier conceptions of the state and other existing theories.[3] Müller argued that the only way to escape from the dead end of individualistic rationalism and recapture a true sense of community was to revive a much expanded notion of the state. 'The chimera of natural-law,' he wrote in 1809, '… has arisen merely because the idea of the state has never been conceived in a sufficiently great and unbounded manner' (Reiss 1955: 152). Drawing on Novalis' image of a harmonious Medieval Christendom, Müller's state was an all-encompassing organic entity that embodied 'all the needs of the heart, the spirit and the body' (O'Sullivan 1983: 66–7). There was no place in such a state for the 'Roman' distinction between public and private; indeed Müller maintained that the individual could not be conceptualised outside of it (Reiss 1955: 145). Although some have represented Müller as a proto-fascist, he was not proposing a totalitarian or even a highly centralised regime. What he had in mind for Germany was a corporate state (*Ständestaat*) based on the system of feudal estates inherited from the Middle Ages, which he argued would work together for the good of the whole. 'Nature,' he wrote in 1809, 'has already solved the constitutional problem in advance in every family' (Landauer 1983: 11). Müller and Kant's disciple Fichte may well have set in train some confused, potentially dangerous, ideas, made worse by their naive neglect of the question of power, but it must also be said that they were motivated by the fear of absolutism rather than an admiration of it.

The Historical School of Law

The juridical movement associated with German romanticism was the Historical School of Law. Founded by Friedrich Karl von Savigny and his student Georg Puchta around 1815, this school flourished for several decades and

influenced legal and political philosophy well into the twentieth century. Accepting the romantic view of the nation state as an entity possessing an organic unity above and beyond the concerns of individuals, the members of this school argued that law, like language and custom, was valid only if it was the product of slow, unconscious distillation of the historical and living traditions of particular people (i.e. the *Volksgeist*). Law could not be deliberately created by legislators, nor transplanted from one context to another. It had to be *discovered*. On this basis Savigny argued strongly against efforts to introduce a Napoleonic codification of law in Prussia. Renewal and the unification of German civil law could be achieved, he argued, only through an exhaustive scholarly investigation of its historical development. The task for jurists, then, was to dig into the national culture and discern what was part of German national consciousness and what was not. The Historical School spawned a series of encyclopaedic studies from about 1810 onwards into the customs, languages and folk law of the people of Germany in an attempt to extract inherent principles on which a national legal system could be built.

By 1840, an abstruse but significant dispute over the authenticity of the reception of Roman law into Germany had split the Historical School into two hostile camps. The 'Germanists', led by Eichhorn, Ranke and the Grimm brothers, argued in favour of preserving the uniqueness of indigenous German culture and rejected any attempt to impose 'corrupt' law derived from non-German and particularly Roman sources (Eikema Hommes 1979: 198). The 'Romanists', on the other hand, led by Savigny and Puchta, had come to believe that Roman law had penetrated so deeply into the German national culture that much of it could be regarded as in tune with the *Volksgeist*.

The split was exacerbated by Savigny's penchant for abstract logic and system building, which drew him ever closer to the methods of the rationalistic Natural Law School that the Historical School had been founded to oppose. Confronted by the increasingly apparent impracticality of deriving all law from custom, the Romanists, and in particular Puchta, stressed the central role of state jurists in formulating law (Whitman 1990: 124). They were to do this not by digging into the national past but by developing legal maxims on the basis of reason from a closed system of axioms without reference to external factors such as religion, social or economic values (Gale 1982: 144).[4]

Savigny's Historical School thus set in train two sharply different approaches to jurisprudence. The first, stemming from the Germanists, emphasised the importance of historical specificity and saw law as an essential feature of social solidarity: the glue that held society together. The Romanists laid the foundations for the doctrine of 'legal positivism', developed later by Rudolf von Jhering and Georg Jellinek, which regarded law as an instrument of state authority and domination (Turner 1993: 495).

Hegel, the most famous organicist of them all, was part of the same broad project as the romantics and the jurists of the Historical School. Like them, he worked to construct a conservative alternative to what he saw as the alienating, corrosive philosophy of laissez-faire liberalism while preserving

Germany's hierarchical social order (see Mannheim 1953: 164). These men sought ways to subordinate individual liberty to a higher principle, which led them to emphasise the *Volksgeist*, historicism and state–organism analogies. But Hegel dismissed the romantics' preoccupation with the past as muddle headed and irrational. He conceived of the *Volksgeist* as a more self-conscious and rationality-seeking entity that manifests itself not primarily in the time-honoured customs of the *Volk* but in the organs of the state. The proper guardians of the national spirit were not churchmen, aristocrats or legal scholars but what he called the 'universal class' of civil servants. Only they, he argued, were able to transcend the particularistic interests of individuals and classes and devote themselves wholly to the state, to the interests of the organism as a whole. So while Hegel used many of the concepts of romantic organicist thought, he gave them quite a different complexion by harnessing them to the centralising purposes of the Prussian bureaucratic state (Averini 1972; Mannheim 1953; Marcuse 1954).

The concept of the state as an organism gained even wider currency in European political thought in the second half of the nineteenth century. Advances in biology and Darwin's theory of natural selection provided a strong impetus for the organicist line of thinking. The growing concern among the intelligentsia in Germany and France about the social dislocation and class conflict generated by industrialisation and the revolutions of 1848 also played an important part. Conservatives, who feared the destruction of the class structure and property rights, and more socially minded intellectuals who saw laissez-faire capitalism as alienating, exploitative and oppressive, sought to resist the tide of liberal individualism and return to a sense of cohesion to society. This quest, shared to a large extent by the leadership of the Catholic Church, can be seen as one of the central concerns of late nineteenth-century European political philosophy.

Organicist prescriptions

One common response to this challenge, especially (but by no means exclusively) among Catholic intellectuals, was to propose replacing or supplementing liberal parliamentarism – viewed as encouraging conflict between various 'egotistical' interests – with corporate forms of representation. Unlike Müller's medieval *Stände* based on hereditary status, these corporations or 'functional groups' would be based on social and economic interest groups such as trade unions, guilds and employers' associations. But many of these late nineteenth-century proposals, like much earlier corporate theorising, rested on the assumption that underlying the hurly burly of political life there existed an essential organic harmony waiting to manifest itself.

Key figures in the late nineteenth-century flowering of organic-corporatist theory included the Germanist legal philosopher Otto von Gierke, the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies and Marquis Rene de la Tour du Pin Chambly La Charce. The French monarchist Tour du Pin maintained that the

best way to overcome 'the interlocking evils of materialism, social antagonism, secularism, hedonistic individualism and liberalism' (Newman 1981: 9) without giving ground to socialism was to establish a system of deliberative and consultative chambers, most of whose members would be appointed by the king to represent their regions, professions and corporate organisations.

Occupational corporations and a national-level corporate assembly also occupied a key place in the political vision of Emile Durkheim, for whom they represented the institutional manifestations of what he saw as a new 'organic solidarity' emerging from the modern capitalist division of labour (see Coser 1984: xxii; Newman 1981: 7; Landauer 1983: 76–7; and Hawkins 1994: *passim*). Durkheim's application of an evolutionary perspective to social history breathed fresh life into organicist theorising. Whereas Tönnies had glorified the harmonious communitarian *Gemeinschaft* (community) of the past in contrast with the conflict-ridden and impersonal *Gesellschaft* (society) of the present, Durkheim saw in modernity the potential for a more highly evolved and differentiated form of organic integration of state and society (Coser 1984: xiv–vi). Durkheim hoped that occupational corporations would 'become in the future the basis of our political representation as well as of our social organisation', but he did not see them as facilitating popular participation in government. Rather, he saw corporations as mandatory institutions coordinated and hierarchically organised by the state. Unlike the guild socialists in England in the 1890s who advocated a functional reorganisation of society as a means of advancing the interests of the working classes, Durkheim saw corporations, representing both employers and employees, as agents of class conciliation (Hawkins 1994: 47–7).

An influential proponent of Durkheim's theory of organic solidarity in the first two decades of the twentieth century was the conservative French legal sociologist Leon Duguit. Like Durkheim, Duguit argued that modern society consisted of a multiplicity of social classes, each bound together by their work and a shared sense of social solidarity. But the 'fact' of social solidarity was so central to Duguit that he regarded it as the sovereign source of law. Rejecting legal positivism and the ideology of popular sovereignty that held sway in France, Duguit argued that laws could be regarded as valid only if they arose organically from the various communities in society. All social, or what he called 'functional', groups would be harmonised and coordinated at the national level by the establishment of a chamber composed of representatives of vocational interests, which would operate alongside parliament. Furthermore, consistent with his insistence on the absolute primacy of social solidarity, Duguit proposed that subjective rights be replaced by socio-legal duties (Eikema Hommes 1979: 285). In his system all distinctions between public and civil law, corresponding to the realms of state and society, are dissolved.[5]

Perverse as some of these ideas may sound now, it is important to note that the search for new political formulas in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s occurred at a time when liberal democracy had few defenders; 20 years after

parliamentary systems were proclaimed across Europe in the wake of the First World War, almost all had collapsed. Parliamentary democracy, with its emphasis on individual and minority rights, was widely blamed for exacerbating ethnic and class conflicts and leading Europe to the nation-splitting ideological polarisation of the Depression years. As Mark Mazower argued:

> By the 1930s the signs were that most Europeans were no longer willing to fight for it; there were dynamic non-democratic alternatives to meet the challenges of modernity. Europe found other, authoritarian, forms of political order no more foreign to its traditions, and no less efficient as organisers of society, industry and technology.
>
> (1999: 3–4)

The mood in Europe, then, was for a strengthening of the executive vis-à-vis parliaments and a move towards forms of government that stressed national unity and social solidarity over individual and sectional interests. It is only with this broader political context in mind that much of the theorising about organicism and corporatism in Europe at this time is comprehensible. It was not confined to the extreme right.

This said, European fascists were certainly attracted to organicist visions of the state. It is a relatively short step from Duguit to national socialist and fascist rhetoric about the obliteration of the boundaries between state and society.[6] It is clear that fascist movements in Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Germany drew inspiration from organicist notions of the spiritually bonded 'national community' and the corporatist political prescriptions typical of organicism. Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* encyclical of 1931, which denounced both liberalism and communism and advocated a new order built on corporate forms of organisation, is widely seen as having encouraged Mussolini in his efforts to build a corporate state (Landauer 1983: 36, 71–2).[7] This is perhaps not surprising given the fear among the ruling and middle classes of the spread of communism in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution. Organicism furnished fascist movements with an ideological formula that was at once populist, by virtue of its appeal to communitarian sentiment, and reactionary, in that it legitimised the suppression of political rights and the concentration of effective power in the hands of a small group of leaders in the name of the 'national good'.

The easy accommodation of organicist concepts by fascist political programmes points to the dangerous paradox inherent in any application of organicist prescriptions to the real world. If the common starting point of organicist theory is the idea that the various 'parts' of society are in harmony with the interests of the 'whole', the way in which those 'parts' are defined, and the role assigned to them, will depend on how the 'interests of the whole' are conceived. In the absence of political rights – which have typically been rejected both on account of their liberal premises and because they go against

the logic of organicism by implying a duality between state and society – these interests are up to those in power to determine. So while organicism typically claims to be based on the decentralised and democratic participation of semi-autonomous functional groups in government, the impulse in practice is always towards the centralisation of authority and the subordination of sectional interests or functional groups to the priorities of the leadership. This has been an issue wherever corporate systems of representation have been established. Any decisions about which functional groups should be appointed to legislative and executive assemblies, and in what proportions, are necessarily arbitrary and reflect the interests of those who have the power to decide. The consequent dependence of functional groups on the state for their existence and recognition leads in almost all cases to their representative function giving way to their control function, thereby undermining the participatory element implicit in most organicist theory.

Organicist thinking in Holland and colonial refractions

> Just as we were taught by the Dutch, so the Dutch were taught by the Germans.
> (Djokosutono 1982: 167)[8]

Conservative organicist ideas were no less influential in Holland than in France and Germany in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The leading Dutch proponents of organicism were Abraham Kuyper, the leader of the neo-Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party, the jurist A.F. De Savornin-Lohman and M.W.F. Treub, the ultra-conservative chair of the plantation owners council (Biemond 1922: 155–228; Benda 1972b: 66). Best known was Kuyper, whose political writings, including the influential anti-revolutionary manifesto 'Our Program' (1880), dwelt on the theme of the state as family/organism, and attacked the notion of popular franchise as excessively individualistic (Biemond 1922: 155–228; Furnivall 1944: 175, 229). Kuyper took a keen interest in colonial policy and was especially critical of the liberals' policy of 'free cultivation, free labour and individual possession' in Java. His doctrine of 'guardianship' and 'moral responsibility' towards the Javanese, although rejected by liberals as paternalistic religious rhetoric, favoured a move towards limited administrative autonomy for the Indies – eventually granted in the aftermath of the First World War (Furnivall 1944: 229, 268). The Anti-Revolutionary Party continued to exercise a major, and decidedly reactionary, influence over colonial policy between the wars through Hendrikus Colijn, a leader of the party and a leading voice on colonial policy for much of the 1920s and 1930s.[9]

Another prominent Dutch advocate of organicism was Professor Jacques Oppenheim, who headed the prestigious school of law at Leiden University from 1893 and taught there until the early 1920s. He is relevant here because of the legacy of his ideas in Indonesia. Several key members of Indonesia's first generation of nationalists were graduates of the law school at Leiden and

ideas about legal philosophy current at the time had a lasting impact on their thought. Although Oppenheim's writings on the state are considered arcane, even to Dutch constitutional lawyers, they were still being quoted by Indonesian lawyers and ideologues in the 1990s. More important than his direct influence, though, is the fact that he was a favoured teacher of the great legal anthropologist Cornelis van Vollenhoven, who was to have an enormous influence over a generation of scholars and lawyers at Leiden University (Otto and Pompe 1989: 237; Burns 2004: 261).

One of Oppenheim's works familiar to Indonesian ideologues is a speech delivered upon his appointment to the Leiden chair, entitled 'The Theory of the Organic State and its Value for our Times' (1893). Oppenheim tackled what he described as a pressing threat to civilised society posed by social contract theorists inspired by natural-law philosophies and thinkers such as Rousseau and Locke. In political terms, he saw himself as part of a vitally important struggle to defend organicism against the evils of 'anarchic' liberal individualism and socialism.[10] Social contract theories, he maintained, were premised on a misunderstanding about the nature of the state. Reflecting the concerns of the Historical School of Law, he argued that viable political orders could not be constructed from rational and artificial rules but rather grew slowly and organically, guided by their own peculiar historical characteristics. Only in such organic states was it possible for the state to exercise real authority and attract a genuine sense of obligation on the part of the people. In contrast, social contract theories treated the state – in the guise of legal equality – as a lifeless machine, a 'strong box' into which the people deposited their rights. States founded on such theories severed the bonds between people and their rulers. By treating the state as a 'legal person', social contract theories not only undermined peoples' respect and obligation towards their state, but also encouraged tensions between the state and the people.

Calling for the 'general extermination' of the 'false doctrine' of social contract theory, Oppenheim argued that organicism was a 'valuable, independent constitutional principle'. Although he was short on practical prescriptions, the key element of the theory was that general interests would always take precedence over those of individuals and groups. Like most organicists, Oppenheim was conservative and inegalitarian. '[T]he organism of state,' he wrote, 'cannot remain healthy unless all the parts are healthy … it suffers if any of its parts suffer, whether that be the peasant or the aristocratic cells.' Oppenheim was not, however, in favour of an all-powerful central government. His specialisation was municipal law, and the political arrangement he envisaged appears to have involved a fairly high degree of local administrative autonomy.

It was on the issue of administrative autonomy for the Indies that Oppenheim made his most notable interventions in colonial affairs. Eager to see the implementation of recommendations of the Commission for Constitutional Reform concerning administrative autonomy, Oppenheim agreed to head a government committee set up in 1921 to produce a draft constitution for the

Indies. The Oppenheim Committee included some of the foremost scholars of Indonesian law and culture: Kleintjes, Snouck Hurgronje, Oerip Kartodirdjo, the former commission chair H. Carpentier Alting and van Vollenhoven, who reportedly had a decisive role in the outcome (Otto and Pompe 1989: 241, 245). It proposed a complete constitutional reorganisation, involving extensive autonomy from the Netherlands, the preservation of indigenous customary law jurisdictions and suggested that representation in the newly established colonial legislature, the Volksraad, be based on 'corporations and communities' (*lichamen en gemeenschappen*) or, in other words, functional representation (Oppenheim *et al.* 1923). Although the reactionary colonies minister de Graaff rejected many of the proposals of the commission concerning autonomy, some of the recommendations of the Oppenheim Committee bore fruit, with the creation, in the outer islands, of regional administration based on 19 customary law communities (*adatgemeenschappen*) (Penders 1977: 125), and with the appointed component of the Volksraad being increased from 49 per cent in 1920 to 58 per cent in 1925.[11]

According to the Dutch lawyer Jacob Biemond (1922: 246–7), the composition of the colonial legislature in the early 1920s was a 'pure manifestation of organicist thinking'. Indeed Biemond enlisted the example of the Volksraad as part of his argument against liberal individualism and the 'atomistic' model of parliamentary representation more generally. 'Those to whom the idea of organic representation is somewhat unusual are probably not aware that it has already found practical application in the Dutch constitutional community, that is in the Volksraad of the Netherlands East Indies'. While, he maintained, some might be inclined to see the organicist idea of the 'federation of interests' manifest in the organisation of the Volksraad as befitting only those peoples who were not yet ready for individualistic style democracy, it was in fact the way of the future (Biemond 1922: 246–7).

The Leiden Indologist A.D.A. de Kat Angelino, in his major treatise on Dutch colonial policy (1931), also described enthusiastically what he argued was a broad trend in the West away from 'individualistic' and 'mechanistic' conceptions of politics associated with elected parliaments and the separation of powers toward a new Durkheimian 'organic democracy'. He welcomed the reforms of the early 1920s affecting the Volksraad on the grounds that they led to 'an organic composition more truly reflecting actual society than many a parliament composed too completely according to party considerations' (Kat Angelino 1931, Vol. II: 412). Assuming that the West was moving towards a more organic mode of social and political organisation, Kat Angelino argued that it was possible for Indonesia – which he saw as having maintained a kind of 'corporative Eastern democracy' analogous to the European Middle Ages – to bypass the destructive individualistic stage of development endured by Europe and go straight to 'modern' organicism under the benevolent rule of the Netherlands East Indies.[12]

This notion of 'Eastern democracy' and the possibility of bypassing individualism owes much to the scholarship of Oppenheim's student van Vollenhoven,

the man who probably contributed – however unwittingly – more than anyone to the development of the organicist element of Indonesian nationalist discourse.[13]

Van Vollenhoven and the *adat* debates

Known to his students as the 'master', van Vollenhoven was a pioneer of the discipline of legal anthropology as well as a theorist of international, constitutional and administrative law. As Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law of the Dutch Overseas Territories and as Professor of the *Adat* Law of the Netherlands East Indies at Leiden University from 1901 until 1933, van Vollenhoven devoted himself to cataloguing and analysing traditional laws and customs in various parts of Indonesia known by the generic term *adat*. He supervised at least 67 PhD dissertations on *adat* and other aspects of colonial law (Otto and Pompe 1989: 243, 249), wrote encyclopaedic studies of traditional law, customs and philosophy in the Indies, and worked hard to persuade the colonial government to preserve and protect the integrity of *adat* law. Although he paid only two short visits to Indonesia, the work of van Vollenhoven and what came to be known as his 'Leiden school' had a major impact on colonial policy and helped lay the foundations of an Indonesian national identity.

Van Vollenhoven, like the Ethical movement of which he was a key spokesperson, embodied many apparent contradictions. In common with most of his Leiden colleagues, he was unashamedly imperialist, admiring the suppression of Lombok and Aceh and advocating that the same 'firm and benevolent hand' be extended to several other parts of the archipelago (Otterspeer 1989: 215). He was a passionate advocate of the virtues of Western education and scientific progress in the Indies and routinely confronted figures such as Treub and Colijn for ignoring the welfare and educational aspirations of Indonesians. At the same time he saw the spread of Western capitalism and law as destructive, threatening to corrode the bonds of tradition and obligation that held indigenous communities together. Van Vollenhoven eludes easy depiction as either a liberal or a conservative – he might best be described as a conservative with a liberal conscience, a romantic rationalist.[14] In his *adat* studies he combined an intense, almost obsessive, interest in the details of specific local practices with a strong theoretical concern to discover and extract unifying principles. Years of sifting through vast amounts of ethnographic data led him to conclude that while Indonesia was extremely diverse in its cultures, there was 'one single Indonesian race' and a 'single basic Ur-adat common to all regions of the Indonesian culture area'.[15] This was characterised by:

> a preponderance of communal over individual interests, a close relationship between man and the soil, an all pervasive 'magical' and religious pattern of thought, a strongly family-oriented atmosphere in which every

> effort was made to compose disputes through conciliation and mutual consideration.
>
> (Alisjahbana 1975: 71)

By the early 1920s it was possible to talk about a Leiden orthodoxy, a 'Leiden conception of the Indonesian world view', which, according to Peter Burns' forensic study of the *adat* debates, was based on an assumption that:

> [a]n Indonesian community constituted a whole. It was not to be regarded as just a collection of individuals. Its internal relationships were organic. Moreover, that sense of organic relationship extended to the environment in and from which the community derived its life. … The optimal condition of the community and the individuals who were its members was static, balanced and harmonious.
>
> (Burns 2004: 115)

This depiction of Indonesian culture as the polar opposite of the West has been criticised for epitomising the vices of colonial orientalist scholarship catalogued by Edward Said (1995; Burns 1989: 99). In the same way that British and French orientalist scholars, with their curious mixture of romanticism and paternalism, exoticised their colonial charges, van Vollenhoven's legion of Dutch researchers wrote about Indonesian villages as though they were a pristine world unto themselves, unaffected by capitalism, migration or even by the power of the colonial state.[16] As Said has argued persuasively, this kind of construction of the 'East' was an integral part of colonial domination (and, indeed, of the self-definition of the West). Although there is nothing to suggest that the *adat* scholars of the Leiden school were anything but well-intentioned, their characterisation of 'natives' as fundamentally different from, and implicitly inferior to, Europeans, at once disempowered Holland's subjects, perpetuated racially based status divisions and helped to underline the necessity of colonial tutelage.

In all that has been written about van Vollenhoven, curiously little has been said about the theoretical agenda he brought to his work. It is widely acknowledged that Ernest Renan's scientific humanism had a major influence on the work of van Vollenhoven and his Leiden colleagues. Less explored is the impact on their thinking of the quite different, and in many ways antithetical tradition of the Historical School of Law of the early Savigny and his Germanist successors.[17] P.A. van der Lith, van Vollenhoven's immediate predecessor at Leiden University in the chair of colonial law and a founder of the Leiden school, eloquently endorsed the central axiom of the Historical School in his inaugural address in 1876: 'Indeed legal concepts can only win acceptance among a people when these result from that people's own concept of law, keeping pace with its development and having in the course of its history pierced it to its very marrow' (cited in Otto and Pompe 1989: 234). Van der Lith was making a case for the Dutch government to respect indigenous

legal institutions and not impose Western law on the inhabitants of the Indies, foreshadowing the trajectory, both theoretical and political, for van Vollenhoven's better known and more successful public campaigns.

Like the leading Germanist and folklorist Jakob Grimm, whom he admired,[18] van Vollenhoven was a strong advocate of *Volksrecht* (law emerging from the people) as opposed to *Juristenrecht* ('lawyer's law'). The latter was derived from alien (Roman) traditions and had, he believed, corrupted and suppressed the indigenous customs and law of the non-Roman European peoples (Van den Bergh 1986: 80). While he shared with the nineteenth-century legal positivists a concern for constructing coherent systems, his fundamental theoretical agenda was to counter the influence of lawyers' law, represented by the abstract 'conceptual jurisprudence' of scholars such as Jhering, and restore a historical dimension to the study and practice of law. Van Vollenhoven's intense interest in customary law in Indonesia (*adat*) can be understood within the context of the attempts of Germanist thinkers in Holland and Germany to discover and preserve the legal traditions of old, non-Roman Europe. His exhaustive empirical study of Indonesian folklore and customs in *The Adat-Law of the Netherlands Indies* is in the same vein as the large and extremely detailed works of the Germanists, as was his belief that law had to be discovered rather than imposed, an idea he incorporated in the title of his 1926 work *The Discovery of Adat Law*.

Lawyer and novelist Takdir Alisjahbana acutely observed that van Vollenhoven discovered in Indonesia what he set out to find: a simple, harmony-loving, self-sufficient folk, uncorrupted by 'Western' rationalism and individualism. '[A]s a European reacting against the individualism and formalism of European law', wrote Alisjahbana (1975: 72), he 'was essentially searching for certain primordial elements in ancient European customary law, such as had existed among the Germanic tribes before they were conquered by the Romans'.

Van Vollenhoven's underlying concerns are apparent in a reflective essay he wrote in 1931, two years before his death:

> The old private law of Holland and West Friesland, would have fared a good deal worse in competition with the law of ancient Rome had not Grotius in 1631 summarised and handed down this Dutch *adat* law in a clear language and lucid system. The old customary public and private law of Britain might have faced odds too heavy for it in the whirlpool of late 18th century rationalism had not Blackstone's gift for language and orderly arrangement in his *Commentaries* (1765–69) brought this law home to the educated classes at the right time, captivating their interest and inspiring their love. And was it not a copy of Blackstone which opened young Abraham Lincoln's eyes and heart to the attractiveness of this British *adat* law?
>
> (Holleman 1981: 260)

He had dreamed, back in 1901, that the Indies could serve as a shining example to the Netherlands, and the Netherlands to the world in the matter

of law.[19] In reality, the battle of the Germanists had been all but lost in most of Europe. Comprehensive Napoleonic-style civil codes had been adopted by Holland in 1838 and in the German empire in 1896, dashing the hopes of the Germanists and leaving little space for customs and tradition, except in pockets at the municipal level. In political terms then, van Vollenhoven and his followers can be seen as fighting a rear-guard action to save the people of the Indies from the same fate as the over-codified French, Germans and Dutch.[20]

The debates that launched van Vollenhoven into the public eye took place mainly in Holland between 1904 and the late 1920s. Deepening Dutch administrative control over Indonesian society and the imperatives of the Ethical Policy had forced the colonial administration to decide on the extent to which Dutch civil law ought to overrule local law and custom in Indonesia, especially regarding land tenure. Many colonial administrators and business interests, as well as liberal lawyers associated with Utrecht University, were in favour of abolishing the old racially stratified legal order and bringing the whole population of the Indies under a unified capitalist-oriented legal system. The more hard-nosed of the Utrecht camp argued that administration and business could only be conducted rationally and efficiently if everybody was bound by the same set of laws (Burns 1989: 38–9). The ethical dimension of the argument for unification, put by the administrator Nederburgh, was that placing Indonesians on the same legal footing as foreign Orientals and Europeans was the only way to give them an opportunity to escape from backwardness and compete in the modern world.

Several proposals were put forward to introduce a unified civil code, the first of them in 1904 and the last in 1923. Each time van Vollenhoven led the attack against them and each time his arguments won sufficient support among the ethical constituency in Holland – as well as among Dutch and indigenous legal bureaucracy in the Indies – to forestall the legislation. Van Vollenhoven's denunciation of a 1919 draft bill, which would have introduced Western-style land ownership throughout the colony, was likewise largely successful (Sonius 1981: xxxiv–xxxv). Just as the Germanists attacked the Romanists for their 'sin against the historical spirit' (Eikema Hommes 1979: 198), van Vollenhoven attacked the colonial authorities and their advisers for trampling on time-honoured *adat* traditions by attempting to impose alien notions of ownership, punishment and compensation on Indonesian communities. To deny indigenous communities their law and a degree of sovereignty over their land, he maintained, would not only betray the spirit of the Ethical Policy, which the Leideners had been instrumental in promoting, but would consign *adat* to the same destiny as Dutch common law, which jurists had 'squeezed … into the matrix of Roman law' (Holleman 1981: 22).[21]

Although the 'realists' at Utrecht sometimes portrayed van Vollenhoven and his Leideners as soft, if not subversive, of the foundations of colonial rule (Griffiths 1986) for their support of local land rights, the overall result of their interventions was that the legal status quo was essentially preserved, or,

as Lev (1984: 150) has argued, ossified. While in the past the central government's attitude towards *adat* could be characterised as benign neglect, after the administrative reforms of De Graff in 1925 it had official recognition.[22] Fluid, syncretic and sometimes virtually forgotten local systems of dispute resolution and punishment were codified, institutionalised and invested with new, state-backed authority, leading some observers to conclude that the system of *adat* law in Indonesia was primarily a Dutch creation (e.g. Jaspan 1965: 252; Lev 1985: 64). Even though the achievements of the *adat* lobby fell short of what they had sought, they signify a high water mark in the *Volksrecht* movement. Van den Bergh (1986: 78) suggests that, thanks to van Vollenhoven and his disciples, Savigny's Historical School had a more enduring impact in Indonesia than anywhere else.

But what was good for the *Volksrecht* movement was not necessarily good for Indonesia. Most of the Leiden School's political successes obstructed substantive change. The retention of a plural legal system by the colonial government reinforced the power of often reactionary local elites and rendered local communities in many cases even more vulnerable to outside intrusion (Lev 1985: 64, 66). Moreover, the perpetuation of a two-tier racially segregated legal system left a complex and politically awkward legacy for justice officials in newly independent Indonesia. As if the challenge posed by unifying the legal system was not enough, the inheritors of the colonial state were confronted by the problem that the Indonesian and European sides of the legal system were informed by two contradictory legal philosophies. The former, which most of them knew best and identified with, was, thanks largely to the influence of van Vollenhoven's Leideners, informed by organicist *Volksrecht* principles while the European side and the central bureaucracy was still firmly governed by a view of law as an instrument of state domination – or, in other words, by rationalist, positivist state-absolutistic legal principles parodied by van Vollenhoven as 'Byzantine-Napoleonic' (Sonius 1981: xxxv). It was this contradiction, or at least the way in which it was dealt with, which perhaps remains van Vollenhoven's most unfortunate bequest.

Organicism and conservative nationalist thought

> In Leiden student-homes and boarding houses independent Indonesia received its contours.
>
> (Harry Poeze 1989: 275)

One of the many ironies of colonial rule was that the legal–anthropological enterprise that did so much to underpin the ethnic segregation and racial stratification of Indonesia should have provided one of the keys to its demise. The 'discovery' by Dutch scholars of customary laws, social practices and histories shared by the islands of the Indies had a profound effect on the way some of their colonial students thought about themselves and, through them, on the character of Indonesian nationalism.

Before the 1920s the basis for most political movements in Indonesia was Islam, Marxism or regional nationalism. It is true that the short-lived Indische Partij (Indies Party), established in 1912 by the Indo-European E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, advocated an 'Indies' nationalism, but it had little success in generating a sense of national identity.[23] For the first two decades of the century, nobody called themselves Indonesian. Indonesians identified themselves – and were identified by their colonial masters – either by their place of origin, i.e. as Javanese, Ambonese or Sumatrans, or simply as *inlanders* (natives). Anderson (1983b: 110–12) has described how participation in a standardised education system, particularly at tertiary institutions in Batavia, helped forge bonds among young Indonesians from all over the archipelago. This process was even more acute for students in Holland for whom the sense of being different from the society around them reinforced their solidarity. One of the most influential Leiden law graduates, Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, later recounted his discomfort at being asked where he came from – not only by Europeans but also, most gallingly, by young nationalists from other colonies. The small group of students in Holland who frequented meetings of the Indische Vereeniging (Indies Association) often debated the question of what to call themselves and their land. According to Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo (1978: 120) it was students of *adat* who suggested 'Indonesia',[24] and on the initiative of Mohammad Hatta the body was renamed Perhimpoenan Indonesia (Indonesia Association) in 1922. For Ali Sastroamidjojo, another Javanese law student in Leiden and a future prime minister, the name change signified a moment of profound transformation. He recalled experiencing 'a radical mental and spiritual change in myself. Very quickly the feeling of being Javanese diminished … [I became] an Indonesian with a new country called Indonesia' (Sastroamidjojo 1979: 25).

The *adat* students had borrowed the term 'Indonesia' from anthropologists teaching Indology courses at Leiden University (Rose 1987: 18). Indeed the Leiden Indologists were their source not only for the term but also, to some extent at least, the concept of Indonesia.[25] This is not to suggest that Indonesian nationalism was invented by Dutch *adat* scholars – van Vollenhoven for one appears to have had little sympathy for it. Rather, the designation by Leiden scholars of the Indonesian archipelago as constituting a more or less discrete 'culture area' helped make it possible for their young students from the Indies to conceive of themselves as belonging to a single entity, a single 'Indonesian' nation. As soon as that leap of the imagination was made, undreamed of potentialities revealed themselves, including the thrilling, if at that time remote, prospect of an independent Indonesian state. The irony of the Leiden school's unintended contribution to Indonesian nationalism, but also its significance, was well captured by the lament of the eminent constitutional lawyer Prof Djokosutono in 1952 that it was 'tragic' that it had been a Dutchman who had discovered an Indonesian system of law (Moersaleh 1984: 436).

If the writings of the Leiden *adat* scholars helped furnish a rationale for nationhood, they also contributed significantly to the creation of a discourse

of national identity. What distinguished Indonesians in the eyes of the *adat* scholars were their shared values and cultural traits – their organic relationships, their belief in harmony, reciprocity and balance. Paternalistic and orientalist as this vision of Indonesian culture may have been, many young nationalists embraced it wholeheartedly. These descriptions provided young Indonesian scholars and nationalists with an appealingly scientific way of describing not only what they had in common but also what set them apart from the 'materialistic' Europeans. Alisjahbana, perhaps the most articulate and consistent critic of orientalist romanticism in Indonesia, wrote that it should be no surprise that the Dutch *adat* lawyers:

> succeeded in winning the hearts of the younger Indonesian jurists, thirsty for praise of the values of their society and culture which had suffered so many humiliations in the last centuries: their new awareness of the values of this legal system, handed down from generation to generation, so idyllically depicted by van Vollenhoven, gave them a great feeling of confidence in themselves and in their people.
>
> (Alisjahbana 1975: 73)

Alisjahbana was describing a process of self-orientalisation. As had happened in India, the thinking and self-imagining of many young Dutch-educated Indonesian nationalists was strongly shaped by the intellectual frameworks of their dominators (see e.g. Chatterjee 1984: 155). They adopted the same essentialist conception of 'East' and 'West' and 'the Indonesian' as appeared in the pages of the Leiden scholars' writings.

One of the most significant legacies of the Leiden school's theoretical approach was the romantic idea that every nation's institutions reflect (or at least *should* reflect) its *Volksgeist* and that Indonesia's *Volksgeist* was embodied in its own elaborate systems of indigenous law. This idea was not popular among devout Muslims, for whom divine revelation, rather than village tradition, was the source of law. Neither was the idea popular with Marxists. But among other nationalists it became influential.

Evidence of the way in which European organicist ideas were incorporated into conservative nationalist thought can be found in the writings of Indonesia's foremost *adat* law scholar Dr Raden Supomo. As the primary author of the 1945 constitution and the first republican justice minister, Supomo had a considerable influence on subsequent discourse about the legal foundations of the Indonesian state.

The eldest son of a gentry family in the Javanese heartlands south of Surakarta, Supomo was one of a very small number of Indonesians to be granted access to a Dutch-language secondary education. In 1921 he began studies at the law school in Jakarta, an institution set up in 1909 to train officials to serve in the 'native' side of the colony's ethnically segregated legal system. On graduating in 1923, Supomo enrolled at the famous law school at Leiden University. His only known political affiliation during this time was with Budi Utomo, the conservative Javanese 'cultural nationalist' organisation founded in 1908.

In Holland, Supomo studied *adat* law under van Vollenhoven and in July 1927, at the age of 24, became the second Indonesian to earn a doctorate. We know little else about Supomo's years in Leiden. He was good friends with A.G. Pringgodigdo and Soeripto, both of whom were to become important nationalist politicians, and shared a room for a while with the future vice president Mohammad Hatta. Supomo was involved in some fashion with the newly radicalised Indonesia Association (Matauch and Sumpeno 1990: 29; Soegito 1977: 20). By all accounts, however, Supomo was not a radical but an accommodationist, a consensus seeker. He is known to have had a great love of Javanese classical dance, which he practiced with some of his fellow law and Indology students. Not long after returning to the Indies in 1927, Supomo became a senior leader of the by then stagnant Budi Utomo (Ingleson 1980: 15, 69) and in 1929 took up a position as a judge at the district court in the royal city of Yogyakarta.

The clearest exposition of Supomo's theoretical perspectives in the colonial period was his address 'The connection between the individual and society in *adat* law', delivered upon taking up the position as professor in the Law Faculty in Jakarta on 31 March 1941 (Supomo 1970). This, of course, post-dated Germany's occupation of Holland, but there is no indication that the changed circumstances in Europe had any affect on Supomo's views, which had been formed over a period of some years.[26] Speaking in Dutch, Supomo argued that since law in Western countries was codified during the high tide of liberalism in the nineteenth century we should not be surprised to find it reflecting the competitive, individualistic spirit that prevailed in European society at that time. He rejected the premise that society consisted of a multitude of free and sovereign individuals. So pervasive was this spirit in the West, he said, that even corporative bodies and states acted like individuals, each trying to advance their own interests. The only thing that prevented a descent into social breakdown, Supomo argued, was that the various competing interests were kept more or less evenly balanced.

Having painted a bleak portrait of mainstream Western law, Supomo went on to say that 'since the beginning of the twentieth century a new stream of thinking has arisen in Europe'. This new consciousness was causing Europeans, he said, 'to begin freeing themselves of the vestiges of the age of individualism' and 'giving their attention to legal concepts focused more on society as a whole'. Supomo referred to a number of Dutch jurists writing in the 1930s such as I. Henri Hymans and E.J.J. van der Heyden, as well as his Hegelian colleague, J. Eggens, who taught alongside Supomo at the law faculty in Jakarta before the war (Nichterlein 1978: 72; Djokosutono 1985: 188). Eggens, he said, spoke of a new tendency in the twentieth century to see objects not as isolated units but rather as parts of a greater whole, and wholes as inseparable from their component parts. According to this 'concrete' way of thinking (as distinct from nineteenth century 'abstractions'), 'the individual isolated from society is a mere illusion, since people can only really be human when they belong to a collectivity'.

Supomo (1970: 8) also referred to the French corporatist Duguit, citing his argument that it was the state's role to forbid people from acting in any way that might limit or constrain the development of humanity in a social direction. To underline the importance of the state as an arbiter of what constituted social behaviour, Supomo quoted the German jurist Gustav Radbruch that 'legislators must always be prepared to revoke the rights of those groups who do not exercise them … in the way that they were intended' (1970: 8). The organicist conception of society implied in this 'new' stream of thought was made explicit in a reference to the French legal philosopher Louis Josserand who Supomo cites as arguing that individuals exercise their rights only in the context of the social body of which they are cells (1970: 8).

Supomo concluded that there was 'a clear tendency in the West to limit the autonomy of the individual for the good of the collectivity' and argued that this trend was manifest not only in the philosophical realm but also in the justice system and in new statute law. He illustrated this point with reference to recent developments in industrial relations law in Western countries.[27]

The main thrust of Supomo's speech, however, was that the sorts of collectivistic ideas and practices being experimented with in Europe already had deep roots in Indonesian society and were expressed in its *adat* law. Drawing on the writings of van Vollenhoven and ter Haar, Supomo argued that in *adat* law, society always came before the individual. In sharp contrast to the West, individuals were regarded in *adat* as existing first and foremost to meet the needs of society. Individuals saw themselves as part of society, and society, he added, regarded individuals as specialised parts of itself. 'In this way, social awareness and individual awareness dissolve into one another', confirming the essentially 'communal character' of Indonesian *adat* that he credited van Vollenhoven with having identified in 1917 (Supomo 1970: 11). Interestingly, Supomo uses the neologism *sifat gotong royong* (communal mindedness) interchangeably with van Vollenhoven's *sifat komunal* or *communen trek* in the original (Vollenhoven 1931: 541), suggesting that the term *gotong royong*, which later came to symbolise the quintessence of Indonesian-ness, may have been coined to provide an indigenous-sounding translation of a concept constructed by Dutch legal anthropologists.[28]

Even traders, politicians and civil servants, Supomo (1970: 16) claimed, put the interests of their friends and families above their own self-interest. They shared the same concern with communal wellbeing as, for instance, farmers. However, communalistic beliefs and practices were breaking down, especially in the cities, under the influence of modern business, education and, to some extent, Dutch civil law. So while collectivistic ideology was on the rise in the West, the trend in Indonesia was towards greater individualism. Supomo was confident, however, that with proper management, Indonesian communalism could withstand the pressures of the modern world.

Supomo's acceptance of the theoretical underpinnings of the Leiden approach to the study of law was not exceptional. Indeed – thanks largely to

the close institutional links between Leiden and the Jakarta law school,[29] the basic premises and assumptions of the Historical School of Law entered the canon of *adat* orthodoxy in Indonesia. Bushar Mohammad's 1961 textbook on *adat*, for instance, took Savigny's theory of the *Volksgeist* as the starting point for his discussion of *adat* as an aspect of Indonesian culture. 'One cannot view Indonesian *adat* law', he stated, 'outside the context of what von Savigny called the 'Volksgeist', the spiritual structure, the fundamental structure of Indonesian society' (Bushar Mohammad 1961: 41).[30] Just as other societies have their unique *Volksgeist*, he argued, Indonesia too had its own particular structure of thinking, characteristics and qualities.

Indeed so pervasive was this approach that Alisjahbana (1975: 71) would later complain that 'a whole new generation of Indonesian jurists' had grown up 'willing to accept van Vollenhoven's ideas as essentially the most satisfactory basis for a national legal system'. This acceptance, he argued, sowed the seeds of legal confusion, since the elevation of the *adat*-based principles of harmony and cooperation to almost sacred status had tended to work against the establishment of the kind of rational bureaucracy and legal system sorely needed in Indonesia. The absorption of these organicist ideas into political ideologies under both Sukarno and Soeharto was to contribute to the dissolution of principles such as the separation of powers, the rule of law and executive accountability.

The influence of the Historical School reached beyond *adat* law specialists as we can see in the autobiography of Subardjo. An influential figure in the early nationalist movement and Indonesia's first foreign minister, Subardjo writes admiringly of Savigny and Jhering and being struck by the parallel between their accounts of the imposition of alien Roman law on Germany and the situation in Indonesia. After spending several weeks in late 1927 reading about German legal theory in the Berlin Public Library, Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo (1978: 135) wrote that he had been:

> impressed by von Savigny's concept that unless law was rooted in the culture and history of a people, it would undermine the state. This was a clear sign for me that the system of Dutch law in my country had obstructed the natural growth of Indonesian *adat* law. Von Savigny's famous phrase '*Das Recht ist und wird mit dem Volke*' (law exists and evolves with the people)[31] reinforced my view that our struggle for independence must look for its strength in our nation's identity to oppose powerful alien influences.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this linking up of law, nationalism and the issue of national identity in the minds of Indonesia's pioneering nationalists. As will be elaborated further in subsequent chapters, this helped ensure that customary law concepts would play a central role in shaping not only the ideological discourse but also the political and constitutional life of the future Indonesian state.

Organicism and romantic nationalism have often been blamed for paving the way for the rise of fascism in Europe. How far conservative Indonesian nationalist thought was influenced by more explicitly fascist or national socialist ideologies is hard to say. Certainly fascist ideas were popular among many young Catholic intellectuals in Holland in the early 1920s, and remained fairly influential for a decade or so. Dutch fascists talked about 'demolishing democracy, the parliamentary system, and capitalism, while praising the monarchy, the leadership principle and corporatism as the only hope for the future' (Kossmann 1978: 600). Even the more moderate Roman Catholic State Party was strongly opposed to the idea of equality and spoke about the need for authority, tradition and hierarchy. The party looked to the pre-Second World War Portuguese government as a model and argued that the Dutch parliament ought to be representative not of individuals but of social groups (Kossmann 1978: 601).

Subardjo in his 1978 memoirs claims that members of the Indonesia Association in Holland were targeted by national socialists in the mid 1920s on account of the group's anti-colonial character. As well as being 'inundated' with Nazi propaganda, members were approached individually in an attempt to win their sympathy for the struggle against the Allies, whom the Nazis construed as colonial imperialists 'who had seized our territories and bled the German economy dry'. Subardjo recalls that he and his fellow Indonesian students 'saw some truth' in these arguments, but that they soon realised that their 'national interests and aims differed greatly'. Thereafter, Subardjo wrote, 'we ended our links with them' (Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo 1978: 201).

Although most young Indonesian nationalists involved in the Indonesia Association were, by the mid 1920s, more interested in the Leninist and social democratic variants of anti-imperialism than the fascist one, there was some common ground between mainstream nationalist ideas and early national socialist ideology, such as the linking of the evils of individualism, liberalism and capitalism. Indonesian nationalist thinking about law, and in particular the desirability of building a national legal system on the basis of customary law, may also have received a boost from national socialist ideologues who had adopted many of the ideas of the Historical School and actively promoted the notion that communally oriented Germanic law should, in the words of the Nazi Party programme of 1920, replace 'Roman law, which serves the materialist world order' (Whitman 1990: 231). An interesting connection in this regard was the prominent Leiden educated Indologist J.J. Schrieke who, as Director of Justice in the Indies, had been Supomo's immediate superior from 1930 to 1932 and again between 1938 and about 1942 (Soegito 1977; Vandenbosch 1944: 230). During the war Schrieke collaborated closely with the Nazis in Holland, drawing on the same philosophical framework as that of the *adat* lobby to argue in support of national socialist efforts to resurrect 'native' Germanic law (Nasution 1992: 103, fn.85). Constitutional scholar Buyung Nasution also noted close parallels between national socialist

ideologue Alfred Rosenberg's descriptions of the 'organic totality' of the German notion of law and Supomo's writings on Indonesian law, society and the state (ibid.). Indeed to the extent that rightwing ideas did influence Indonesian nationalist thinking it seems to have occurred largely through the medium of legal education. The teachings of the 'crown jurist of the Third Reich', Carl Schmitt, for instance, figure prominently in the writings of the influential jurist Djokosutono who had studied under Dutch professors at the Jakarta law faculty in the mid 1930s (see Djokosutono 1982).

Although the Indonesian nationalists, for obvious reasons, never went in for anything like the Nazis' doctrine of racial purity, race did play a part in defining the concept of the Indonesian nation (*bangsa Indonesia*) shared by most nationalists. Chinese, Arabs and Indians, however long they might have been living in the country, were not part of the 'imagined community' of Indonesians, who were typically characterised as *asli*, a term that, as Coppel (1983: 3) points out, means not only 'indigenous', but also 'genuine, authentic'. This perception of the Chinese as an alien race reflected their designation by the colonial government as 'Foreign Orientals', but was perpetuated by the political parties, few of which accepted Chinese Indonesians as full members before the war (ibid.).

The nationalist group most impressed with fascism was Budi Utomo's post-1936 incarnation Parindra (Greater Indonesia Party). Thanks largely to its cooperative attitude towards the colonial regime, Parindra grew to become the largest of the pre-war nationalist parties, with a membership of over 11,000 in 1939 (Benda 1958: 105; Abeyasekere 1972: 268). Its membership consisted mainly of Dutch-educated Javanese gentry and civil servants working in the colonial administration and represented the conservative end of the nationalist spectrum. Parindra's leaders, like those of Budi Utomo, had a strong sense of *noblesse oblige*, which found expression in their social, educational and economic programmes for the poor (Abeyasekere 1972). They promoted a vision of state–society relations that reflected aristocratic Javanese court culture and, not entirely coincidentally, the colonial administrative system. Many civil servants appear to have joined the party fearing that the nationalist initiative would be seized by the more outspoken, leftist Indonesian People's Party (Gerindo) or by Islamic groups, which they were inclined to oppose. While Parindra was in favour of Indonesian independence, its leaders tended to imagine an independent Indonesia as a paternalistic autocracy or, in some cases, as a monarchy.[32]

Unlike Gerindo, which strongly opposed Nazism and Japanese militarism, the Parindra leaders were quite sanguine about developments in both Germany and Japan in the late 1930s (Sastroamidjojo 1979: 81; Leclerc 1993: 13). Parindra's leaders expressed openly their admiration for 'the firmness of Hitler, the love of the German people for their leaders, party and homeland and the strength of their organisation', which they advocated as a model for the nationalists.[33] Some even encouraged the use of the German–Italian fascist salute at meetings (Confidential interviews, Jakarta, February 1991).

But Europe was far away and it is unclear to what extent they were simply attracted by the fascist aesthetic of discipline, order and leadership and how much by the ideology.

Among the younger generation of nationalists, too, Nazi ways were fashionable. Hatta was worried enough about the rising tide of fascist influence in Indonesia to write in 1939:

> We do not need to look to other countries such as India where there is a movement which openly advocates fascism. We see it in our own country. Several youth movements, especially the scouts, have taken on the attitudes of the fascists. This should not be surprising, because fascism draws on nationalist feeling. And youths who are not used to thinking through the consequences are captivated by these notions. They salute their leaders in just the same way the *Hitlerjungend* do. They love to wear military uniforms which strengthen their spirit of discipline. … We are not saying that our youth are consciously following fascism. We are only saying that the signs of fascism's poison are already apparent in our midst. … The stronger fascism grows in Europe … the stronger the fascist mentality in the colonies.
>
> (Hatta 1953: 151–6)

It must be stressed, however, that Indonesian nationalist thought during the pre-independence period was not predominantly rightwing in character. On the contrary, the movement as a whole was inspired more by Marxism and social democratic ideas – especially the notion of popular sovereignty – than it was by rightist and anti-Enlightenment philosophies. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) established a large following during the 1920s and most major leaders, including Hatta and Sukarno, were deeply influenced by Marxist theories of capitalism. Lenin and Bukharin's writings about imperialism and colonialism were especially important in framing the way that Indonesian nationalists made sense of colonialism. The idea that colonialism was the logical consequence of capitalism's need to constantly expand in search of cheap labour and new markets became an article of faith for most Indonesian nationalists and has strong residues in the opprobrium, which even today attaches to the terms 'capitalism' and 'liberalism'. This leftist-inspired identification of nationalism with anti-capitalism blended with cultural definitions of national identity that emphasised the contrast between 'Western individualism' and 'Indonesian communalism' to spawn one of the most enduring of all notions in Indonesian political thought: the idea that there is a fundamental link, even a causal link, between individualism, liberalism, capitalism, imperialism and colonialism. Soeharto's information minister, retired Lt. Gen. Ali Moertopo (Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia 1983: 201), was quite right when he said in 1980 that leftist ideologies had become so deeply ingrained in the national consciousness that to most people 'they seem indigenously Indonesian'.

By 1942 there was little agreement on what sort of a state Indonesia should become if it managed to achieve independence. Many thorny questions regarding language and identity, however, had already been dealt with. Indonesian had been declared the national language in 1928 and there was, by the time of the war, a fairly well-established sense among Indonesian nationalists of what it meant to be Indonesian. As I have tried to show above, the way this sense of national identity emerged helped ensure that nationalism and definitions of cultural authenticity would remain intricately entwined for a long time to come. In later chapters I will look at how the issue of Indonesia's 'national character' was used by various political forces for diverse ends and how it came to dominate debates about Indonesian ideology, law and politics.

Notes

1 The rise of rightwing neo-nationalist movements in Europe and Russia has rekindled interest in the romantic organicist tradition of political thought. See for example Holmes (1993 and 2000) and Mammone *et al*. (2012).
2 Although Herder occupies a key place in the development of organicist thought, there is, as Safran (1987: 8–9) argues, no inexorable movement from his notions of cultural uniqueness to 'murderous chauvinism'. Herder believed that all cultures were entitled to 'flourish fruitfully side by side like so many peaceful flowers in the great human garden' (Herder cited in Safran 1987: 8).
3 On Müller and his ideas see the chapters 'Conservative Thought' and 'The history of the concept of the state as an organism: a sociological analysis' in Mannheim (1953), Schmidt (2011), Landauer (1983: 9–11), Aris (1965), Bowen (1947), Eikema Hommes (1979), O'Sullivan (1983) and Reiss (1955). Little of Müller's work has been translated into English. His best-known book is the three volume *Die Elemente der Staatskunst* (1809), parts of which are translated in Reiss (1955: 142–72).
4 This came to be known as *Begriffsjurisprudenz* or 'conceptual jurisprudence', dominated by the German 'Pandecticists' such as Jhering. This school went in for the large-scale construction of legal principles based on the Pandects or Digests of the Justinian Code, and were primarily responsible for drafting the 1896 German Civil Code. See also Eikema Hommes (1979: 191ff).
5 On Duguit see Eikema Hommes (1979: 283ff, 384, 395); Landauer (1983: 77) and Timasheff (1976: *passim*).
6 Perhaps the most succinct formulation of which was Mussolini's slogan 'Everything in the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state' (Landauer 1983: 81).
7 '[L]et all remember,' pronounced Pope Pius XI, 'that Liberalism is the father of this Socialism that is pervading morality and culture and that Bolshevism will be its heir' *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931).
8 Germany took over from France as the dominant influence in Dutch legal thinking in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and remained so until the time of Hitler (Netherlands Ministry of Justice 1977: 4).
9 Sutherland (1979: 114) refers to Colijn as an *eminence grise* of Dutch colonial policy during De Graaff's tenure as minister of colonies (1919–25, 1929–33). He served as minister between 1933 and 1937, when repression of the nationalist movement reached its height.
10 This pairing of liberalism and socialism was common among nineteenth-century conservatives. Liberalism and socialism were, after all, children of the Enlightenment. See Holmes (1993: 2).

11 Calculated from figures in Kat Angelino (1931: 412–14). Over the same timespan, however, the proportion of elected seats reserved for Indonesians and foreign orientals rose from 12 out of 24 to 23 out of 38.
12 Jan de Wolf (1999: 312) notes that Kat Angelino's two-volume study was the outcome of an official commission in 1927 'to provide an ideological justification for the Dutch colonial effort'.
13 The term 'Eastern democracy' gained currency in the Netherlands and Indonesia through the work of B.J. Haga (*Indonesische en Indische Democratie*, The Hague: Handelsdrukkery 'De Ster', 1924).
14 Benda (1972b: 72) and Otterspeer (1989) place van Vollenhoven squarely in the liberal tradition. Van Vollenhoven's sympathy for imperialism, his paternalism, his love of tradition and his ambivalence towards liberal thinking about politics, law and economics does not seem to support this conclusion.
15 The first quotation is from an open letter signed in 1925 by van Vollenhoven (among others) cited in Burns (2004: 83). The second is Burns' paraphrasing of an article van Vollenhoven wrote in 1920. See Burns (2004: 14).
16 On the creation of the myth of the traditional Indonesian village as 'a small republic, a self sufficient organic framework' see Breman (1980).
17 Van Vollenhoven's biographer identifies Ernest Renan and C. Snouck Hurgronje as major influences, Sonius (1981: xxxi–xxxii) notes that he admired the English, French and Greek romantic poets while Burns (2004: 228) stresses the importance of the great Leiden jurist Hugo de Groot (Grotius). Otto and Pompe (1989: 237–9) add the professors Land, De Goeje, Oppenheim and Wilken to the list. Burns (2004), Alisjahbana (1975: 72) and van den Bergh (1986) link him with the Historical School, but Burns (2004) is the only other scholar to have explored its significance in shaping the content and character of his work.
18 Van Vollenhoven held Jakob Grimm in high regard and used the title of Grimm's *Von der Poesie im Recht* (*The Poetry of the Law*) for a paper on *adat* he presented in Jakarta in 1932 titled '*De poëzie in het Indisch recht*' (published in *Indische Tijdschrift van het Recht*, p. 136) (Djokosutono 1982: 94).
19 See van Vollenhoven's inaugural address quoted in English in Otto and Pompe (1989: 238).
20 de Wolf (1999: 318) similarly links Leiden ethnologist J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong's advocacy of the idea of an 'ideal archaic Indonesian culture' distinct from the West with his domestic political concerns, citing his membership of *Nederlandse Volks Beweging*, a political organisation that sought to preserve the cultural authenticity and social solidarity of the Netherlands after the Second World War.
21 Van Vollenhoven was equally disparaging of Islam's universal pretensions, both as a threat to the survival of *adat* and to the colonial order in general, but on this score he found fewer causes for disagreement with the authorities. His antipathy to Islam, which he shared not only with the colonial regime but, as Lev (1985: 66) reminds us, with indigenous elites as well, help account for the gravity with which legislators viewed his sometimes quixotic prescriptions.
22 The revised constitution of 1925 saw the dropping of the Repugnancy Clause (Burns 1989: 104, fn.152) and the creation of regional administration based on customary law communities.
23 On 'Indische' nationalism see Reid (1982) and Takashi Shiraishi (1981).
24 'Students of *adat* law' technically included everyone who enrolled for a doctoral diploma in 'Indies Law' at Leiden University. According to Sudjono, who graduated with a Leiden law degree in 1930, '*Adat* Law' was one of the four subjects that students needed to pass in order to graduate with the title Meester in de Rechten (Master of Law) (Soebagijo 1983: 53).
25 'Indonesia' was first used by the German ethnologist Adolf Bastian in 1884 to describe Island Southeast Asia (Vlekke 1961: 6).

26 Supomo gave a little-known speech in 1937 in which he contrasted the individualistic West with the communalistic East and stressed the lack of conflict between individual and group in Indonesian law 'because the soul of the group is identical with the self'. 'Hidup Hoekoem Bangsa Indonesia [Indonesisch rechtsleven]' delivered to the 5th Rapat Besar Persatuan Taman Siswa, 7–11 July 1937 Mataram [Yogyakarta] cited in Attamimi (1995: 125).
27 Supomo was probably referring here to the constitutional reforms in The Netherlands of 1922 and 1938 granting some legislative authority to corporatist 'industrial boards' comprising both workers and employers (Kossmann 1978: 596–7). In 1945 he envisaged the setting up of something similar to the Dutch industrial boards (*bedrijfsraad*) in Indonesia (Kusuma 2004: 477–8).
28 Note that it was *adat* scholar F.D. Holleman's 1935 speech 'De Commune Trek in het Indonesisch Rechtsleven (The communal trait in Indonesian village life)' that popularised the notion that *adat* was quintessentially communal (Henley 2007: 95).
29 Van Vollenhoven's student ter Haar was the first head of the Jakarta law school, a position that his close associate Supomo took over in 1941. While the two scholars had their differences with van Vollenhoven, they are both widely seen as having followed in his footsteps (Sonius 1981: xxxix, lviii, 29).
30 I would like to thank Peter Burns for bringing this text to my attention.
31 Savigny's original sentence was '*Das Recht wird nicht gemacht, es ist und wird mit dem Volke*' (Law is not made, it exists and evolves with the people) (Rinkes *et al*. 2009: 33).
32 Monarchists included R.P. Singgih, a Leiden law graduate, and R.A.A. Soemitro Kolopaking, who studied Indology and agriculture in Leiden and who later served as *bupati* of Banjarnegara from 1926 until the Japanese invasion (Sastroamijojo 1979: 66; Darmosugito 1982: 285).
33 Parindra's official newspaper, *Soeara Oemoem* (24 March 1938) quoted in Leclerc (1982: 67). Abeyasekere (1972: 263, 270) also refers to the admiration by senior Parindra figures of Hitler and of the Nazis' 'unity and strength'.

3 The allure of Japan's 'family state'

There are good reasons to include a chapter about Japan in a study of organicist political thought in Indonesia. Novelist and social commentator Y.B. Mangunwijaya (1994) argued that the Japanese shaped the way a whole generation of army officers – Soeharto's generation – thought about politics and society. Richard Tanter (1991) also demonstrated the relevance of the Japanese model of militarism to understanding what he called the 'totalitarian ambition' of Indonesia's military in the 1980s. More important than the institutional legacy of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia are the ideologies and assumptions the Japanese brought with them. I begin with a short but necessary detour into the world of cultural nationalism in Japan, highlighting parallels between the Japanese experience and that of the conservative Indonesian nationalists discussed in the previous chapter. Japanese cultural nationalists referred to the same body of European anti-liberal, anti-Enlightenment philosophy and of romantic Orientalist depictions of the East as the mirror image of the West: harmonious, spiritual and collectivistic. During the occupation the Japanese made a major effort to encourage intellectuals, politicians and cultural figures to look to 'indigenous tradition' as a source of inspiration, amplifying and popularising, ironically, many of the ideas of the Dutch *adat* scholars. They also introduced the idea of the totalistic 'family state', which found an important place in Supomo's thought and in Indonesian conceptions about state–society relations more generally.

Nationalism, ideology and law in Meiji Japan

Just as European orientalism helped define the notion of the West, Japanese constructions of the West helped shape ideas of national identity in Japan. In the period between the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the Second World War, Japanese thinking about identity underwent a major upheaval. The most dramatic disjuncture in rhetoric and ideology occurred between the last decades of the nineteenth century, when Japanese intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi spoke about leaving Asia and entering Europe, and the first decades of the twentieth century, when the preoccupation was with a return to Asia (Najita and Harootunian 1989: 714). The relevant period for our purposes, the 1920s

and 1930s, was marked by an extraordinary upsurge of cultural nationalism, referred to variously as culturalism, nativism or 'Japanism' (Yoshino 1992).

Japan's rulers from 1868 were under pressure to create a state apparatus that could deal effectively with the dominant European and American powers. Faced with the problem of how to modernise along Western lines without undermining the authority of the Tokugawa state, the Meiji rulers looked to Bismarck's Prussia. They were impressed by Prussia's 1871 defeat of France, and by Bismarck's success in managing a rapidly industrialising, highly centralised economy, while suppressing a bourgeois revolution (Dale 1990: 241; Williams 1994: 122–32). The Meiji rulers reorganised the army along French and Prussian lines, constructed a centralised bureaucracy and introduced a range of other innovations, including compulsory schooling, a Prussian-style police force, a post-office system, a central bank and a network of railways. In 1889 the Imperial Constitution established a bicameral parliament presided over by a powerful monarch.

The Meiji constitution was based on the principles of the nineteenth-century German *Rechtsstaat*, which implied equality before the law and a formal commitment to administration under an orderly and public system of laws. Unlike the concept of rule *of* law common in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, however, the legal principles adopted by Japan did not impose on legislators any limitations (such as 'natural law') that they did not themselves create. This approach, which stemmed from a view of law as an instrument of state control, also allowed the emperor to issue sweeping ordinances 'for the preservation of public order' and the 'welfare of his subjects'.

More problematic was Japan's adoption of a modern civil code. While the Meiji oligarchs recognised the need for one, they were also aware that the granting of rights to citizens posed a potential danger to the state and to the hierarchical social order on which it rested. This issue led to anguished debate between supporters of popular sovereignty who supported the adoption of a French-style civil code incorporating a natural law approach to human rights, and more conservative anti-natural law jurists who argued that the notion of citizens' rights contradicted the doctrine that the emperor was the absolute 'essence of sovereignty' contained in the Meiji Constitution (Horio 1988: 66–7, 80–2; Sansom 1962: 445–8).

This argument about rights, which lasted for over 30 years, was partly resolved by the rejection of the French inspired draft and the adoption in 1898 of a civil code modelled on the German one, which afforded fewer citizen's rights (Horio 1988: 82). More importantly, the state shielded itself from the potentially subversive implications of the civil code through the Imperial Rescript on Education issued by the emperor in 1890. This brief edict linked service to the state with defence of the imperial throne and defined the emperor as not only the ultimate wielder of political power but also 'the living manifestation of all the spiritual values and moral tenets directly inherited from his Imperial ancestors'. Although the edict's constitutional status was unclear, the emperor's name lent it a sacred aura, enabling Meiji statesmen

to use it to 'ideologically override the "mere legalisms" of a civil code' (Horio 1988: 67).

Central to the edict, and to Meiji ideology generally, was the concept of the *kokutai*, sometimes translated as 'national political essence'. *Kokutai* encompasses a range of ideas, from the myth of the 'unbroken line of Emperors from time immemorial' to the notion of 'national traditions and customs'. But as Carol Gluck (1985: 144) has argued, its precise meaning is overshadowed by the ideological uses to which it has been put. *Kokutai* had been used in the late Tokugawa period as a rationale for imperial restoration and in the early Meiji period to inspire national feeling and loyalty to the emperor. After the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–5 had boosted national confidence, *kokutai* was increasingly described as not only 'immutable' but also superior to the essences of other nations – '"more" unique … ageless, continuous, and secure in its ancestral tradition'. By 1900 the *kokutai* had come to define the Japanese nation and separate 'them' from 'us' (ibid.: 145–6).

The Imperial Rescript was inculcated in the population largely through moral and ideological instruction in schools. For three hours a week students had to learn to recite it from memory and study elaborate charts and interpretations of it (ibid.: 149, 154). The standard commentary, which served as the official interpretation of the Rescript for many years, was written in 1890 by Inoue Tetsujiro who had just returned from six years studying philosophy in Germany. In it, Gluck (1985: 129) writes: 'Inoue fabricated the rudiments of the family state ideology from Confucian analogies of ruler to father and Western organic theories of the state'. The idea of the 'family state' (*kazuko kokka* or *kokkashugi*), which held that there was a deep spiritual bond between the emperor and his subjects, was to become a crucial theme in the ideology of Imperial Japan.[1]

Inoue's commentary aimed to build up the Japanese population's patriotism and nationalism. By representing Japan as a small country surrounded by enemies while at the same time praising the virtues of the Japanese family state, Inoue helped redefine what it meant to be Japanese. But in delineating the 'national', Inoue also identified anti-national elements in Japanese society. These so-called 'metaphorical foreigners' included Christians and, later, socialists. Interpreted in this light, the Rescript could be 'held up against the individualists, socialists and other metaphorical foreigners to declare them beyond the pale of patriotism and outside the bounds of civil morality' (ibid.: 135).

Although Japanese intellectual and cultural life remained cosmopolitan and diverse, the rising tide of nationalism during the first two decades of the twentieth century took on an increasingly anti-Western hue. 'Western conceptions of legal reason and rational cultural norms, often conveyed in the idiom of progress, rationalism, modernisation', wrote Najita and Harootunian (1989: 714), 'came under scrutiny and were invariably modified but more often rejected as extensions of structures of power aimed at expanding Western interests'. At the same time there was a sustained effort to formulate an endogenous approach to philosophy, psychiatry, folklore and state theory,

led, in most cases, by Japanese scholars educated in Europe. In general terms, this involved comparing supposed Western traits with Japanese ones. Westerners were typically characterised as individualistic, rational, intellectual, rigid, logical, rights-oriented and materialistic, while the Japanese were communal, emotional, intuitive, flexible, ambivalent, duty oriented and spiritual. Thinkers such as Kawakami Hajime counterpoised an essentialised conception of Western individualism with the Japanese consciousness of the family state and represented this contrast as evidence of the uniqueness of Japanese culture. He argued that in Japan there was an 'absolute identity of the individual's "private" interest with the national "public" interest, affirming the indivisibility of the individual, the nation and the Emperor' (Dale 1990: 209–10).

Important also was the exaltation of traditional Japanese agrarian culture, best expressed in the works of the folklorist Yanagita Kunio. Yanagita collected an extensive array of folk stories and traditional customs and distilled from them, in 1911, a conception of a prototypical 'common Japanese man' rooted in a primeval national consciousness (ibid.: 208). Like his contemporaries in Leiden, Yanagita identified the distinctive feature of the Japanese (and, more broadly, Asian) folk as communitarianism held together by a system of mutual assistance. Strikingly analogous also was his view that Western capitalism and centralised bureaucracy threatened this 'Asian *gemeinschaft*' and that agrarian communalism had to be preserved against their corrosive influence (Najita and Harootunian 1989: 750–4).

Nativism, corporatism and pan-Asianism

The socially disruptive modernisation programmes of the Meiji state led many Japanese thinkers to embrace cultural nationalism. This trend was evident from the late nineteenth century, but it was only towards the end of the liberal Taishō era (1912–26) that it took on a serious political significance. Rising unemployment and intensifying class and ideological conflict in the early 1920s had produced an atmosphere of crisis. Partly in response to the small but growing support for communism, the government, backed by big business and the military, responded with a sharp move to the right. The sweeping Peace Preservation Law was passed in 1925, which saw many thousands of leftists arrested and charged with 'attempting to change the *kokutai*'.

Encouraged by the government's rightward shift in the mid 1920s and deeply shaken by the world depression, there was an enormous growth in interest in nationalist cultural and political alternatives to the 'decadent Westernism' of the Taishō period. The 1920s and 1930s saw a veritable flood of 'nativist' writing, which took on an increasingly militant, chauvinistic edge. Not all of it was rightwing. Some leading cultural nationalists of the 1920s, like the philosopher Kita Ikki, were strongly influenced by socialist ideals and looked forward to an agrarian-based society in which capitalist institutions – especially the large conglomerates – had been banished. Indeed there was a

constant tension in 1920s and 1930s nationalism between a desire to beat the West at its own game of modernisation and a longing to preserve the communalistic values associated with traditional village life. Nationalist writers were united, however, in their rejection of cultural cosmopolitanism and their criticism of the divisiveness of party politics. This was blamed largely on the Western-inspired constitutional structures, and led many intellectuals (e.g. Rōyama Masamichi and Ryū Shintarō) to stress the importance of occupational groups (corporations) and economic classes, rather than individuals or parties, as the basic units of society (Fletcher 1982: 160). Many also attacked foreign political conventions for having surrounded the emperor with self-serving civilian politicians, denying him his true role as the father and spiritual leader of the Japanese people. The idea that Japan's *kokutai* was being denied led some nationalists to look to the army as the only force capable of liberating the emperor from his shackles and restoring the 'natural' imperial order. This in turn provided the justification required for the emergence of a repressive military-dominated government in the period after 1936.

Another feature of 1920s and 1930s nationalist writing, fanned by the expansion of Japan's territories in China, was the growth of the idea that Japan shared with the rest of Asia a discrete 'Asian' identity, invariably described in agrarian, communalistic terms. Just as Japan's *kokutai* had been partially submerged by Western ideas and culture, so too had the national spirit of other Asian nations been suppressed by Western capitalism and colonialism. Although cultural nationalist writers disagreed about what ought to be done about this, there was growing sympathy for the extremist position of Kita Ikki, who saw it as incumbent on Japan – by virtue of the fact that it had maintained, through its emperor system, the 'Asian spirit' – to engage the Western powers in an 'ultimate war' that would cleanse Asia of Western influences and 'create a new civilisation based on the revival of all Asia' (Najita and Harootunian 1989: 718–21). In the 1930s, government propagandists had an obvious interest in promoting the views of thinkers like Ōkawa Shūmei, who advocated Japan's leadership in the liberation of the colonised countries of Asia 'to realise their own indigenous popular spirit' (ibid.: 729–34; Ōkawa Shūmei 1943: 37–40). These sentiments found expression through the Pan-Asiatic Movement, which was formed in 1936 and which included several non-Japanese, including at least one Indonesian, Abdul Madjid Oesman, on its committee (Penders 1977: 343). While scholars like Ōkawa may not have envisaged Japan's later military conquest of Southeast Asia, their thinking provided the underpinning for such slogans as 'Asia for the Asians'.

A classic statement of 'Japanism' and perhaps the best illustration of the way in which the writings of the cultural nationalists were co-opted for government propaganda is found in the extraordinary document known as the *Kokutai no Hongi* (*Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan*) (Monbusho 1949). Commissioned in the mid 1930s, this document was written by a professor of Japanese classics at Tokyo Imperial University and twice rewritten, once by a group of scholars specialising in the study of the 'national

spirit' and again by the chief of the Bureau of Thought Control of the education ministry (Hall 1949: 5–6). Over two million copies were printed and distributed by the powerful education ministry to schools and universities where it was compulsory reading for students and teachers alike. The *Kokutai no Hongi* was constantly referred to in public speeches and quoted in the ceremonies of national holidays and school assemblies (Hall 1949: 10). There was little opportunity for intellectuals to question its contents because by the time it appeared in March 1937, academic freedom was severely impaired (Horio 1988: 79). The text is recognised as the most influential and most heavily promoted of all prewar writings on *kokutai* (Morris 1963: 46). Examining it also helps illuminate the organicist assumptions that informed Japanese government policies in Indonesia during the occupation.

A central theme of the *Kokutai no Hongi* is its wholesale rejection of Western ideologies including socialism, anarchism, communism and liberalism; these are held to be expressions of individualism:

> Since the days of the Meiji, so many aspects of European and American culture, systems, and learning, have been imported … too rapidly. As a matter of fact, foreign ideologies imported into our country are the main ideologies of the Enlightenment that have come down from the eighteenth century, or extensions of them. The views of the world and of life that form the basis of these ideologies are a rationalism and a positivism, lacking in historical views, which on the one hand lay the highest value on, and assert the liberty and equality of, individuals, and on the other hand lay value on a world by nature abstract, transcending nations and races [i.e. universalism]. Consequently importance is laid upon human beings and their groupings, who have become isolated from historical entireties, abstract and independent of each other.
>
> (Monbusho 1949: 52)

Ideologies and theories derived from individualistic thinking, the *Kokutai no Hongi* argues, set 'individual against individual and classes against classes, and foment many problems and disturbances in national and social life' (ibid.: 182). Liberalism, in particular, is linked to egoism and blamed for giving rise to a chasm between rich and poor (ibid.: 181). Such theories were fundamentally out of step with Japanese culture, which is built on harmony between man and nature, man and God, between husband and wife, between parents and children and in communal life (ibid.: 97).

Enlightenment theories, moreover, fail to grasp the nature of the relationship between the emperor and his subjects:

> The relationship between the Emperor and his subjects is not an artificial relationship [which means] bowing down to authority, nor a relationship [such] as exists between master and servant as is seen in feudal morals … An individual is an [entity] belonging to a State and her

> history which forms the basis of his origin is fundamentally one body with it.
>
> (ibid.: 80)

The Japanese state claimed to transcend all divisions and dichotomies by virtue of the family relationship between the emperor and the people. Masao Maruyama (1963: 36) has said that 'Japanese fascism' rested upon 'the family system extolled as the fundamental principle of the State structure'. The state was 'always considered as an extension of the family; more concretely as a nation of families composed of the Imperial House as the main family and of the people as the branch family' (ibid.). In classic organicist terms, the *Kokutai no Hongi* represents Japan as 'one great family nation, [comprising] a union of sovereign and subject, having the Imperial Household … as the head family of the subjects and the nucleus of national life' (Monbusho 1949: 83, 90).

In keeping with conservative organicist theory elsewhere, the Japanese version accepted social inequality as an intrinsic part of the natural order:

> In each community there are those who take the upper place while there are those who work below them. Through each one fulfilling his portion is the harmony of a community obtained. … This applies both to the community and to the State. In order to bring national harmony to fruition, there is no way but for every person in the nation to do his allotted duty and to exalt it.
>
> (ibid.: 98)

Individuals, the text continues, in a Hegelian vein, 'are essentially not beings isolated from the State, but each has his allotted share as forming parts of the State. And because they form parts, they consistently and intrinsically unite themselves with the State' (ibid.: 134). This sentiment was neatly captured in the propaganda slogan of the 1930s, 'extinguish self in the service of the state' (McCormack 1982: 31).

The *Kokutai no Hongi* goes on to attack liberal constitutional theory and to argue that the unique benevolence of the emperor makes all rights, separation of powers and checks and balances redundant. The rights guarantees in the Japanese constitution are not there 'to protect the inherent rights of the people from the ruler' but are rather 'the fruit of the Emperor's fond care for his people' (ibid.: 166).

The echoes of German nationalist thought in the *Kokutai no Hongi*, and in nativist tracts of the post-1890 period in general are not coincidental. It was not only the Meiji statesmen who looked to Germany for inspiration but also Japanese nationalist economists,[2] intellectuals and philosophers. As Dale (1990: 214) has argued, the whole scholarly enterprise devoted to elaborating Japanese concepts of uniqueness 'is immensely indebted to the theoretical world of German nationalism'. While there is a danger of making too much

of this point, it is quite clear that the German nationalists' rejection of 'Western' Enlightenment theories of rationalism and the universalistic postulates of Roman law in favour of a *Volksgeist*-based moral and legal order remained a crucial point of reference in the struggle by early twentieth-century Japanese nationalists to formulate a response to the 'West' (and, incidentally, to the rationalistic, universalistic legal heritage of Japan's 'Rome': China). Many of the leading cultural nationalist writers were well versed in the works of Fichte, Herder, Hegel, Tönnies, Nietzsche and Heidegger and drew heavily on their works (Najita and Harootunian 1989: 743–9; Dale 1990: 215–18, 221).

The influence of European theorising about law and the state was most explicit among the scholars associated with the New Order Movement in the late 1930s, many of whom shared an institutional affiliation with Nishida Kitaro's 'Kyoto School' (Fletcher 1982: 3; Maruyama 1963: 317–18). New Order intellectuals advocated a corporate state like Mussolini's, in which 'a single, national political organisation based on occupational units would replace political parties and lead to a "Japanese form of one nation, one party"'. The scholars of the Kyoto School openly admired European fascism and, according to Najita and Harootunian (1989: 741), came closer than any other group in 'defining the philosophic contours of Japanese fascism'.

The 1930s saw a drift towards the kind of state envisaged by these scholars. Partly in order to mobilise the population behind the state, partly out of a fear of the incendiary potential of Marxist ideas, the interior ministry established or lent support to a number of corporatist mass organisations (McCormack 1982: 32). These included the Reservist Association, the Air Raid Defence organisation, sporting and cultural organisations, as well as special bodies for the mobilisation of youth, women, educationalists and the mass media (ibid.: 30). Given the great importance placed on the indoctrination of young people, it is not surprising that one of the largest and most powerful of these corporatist bodies was the Japanese Young Men's Association, which by 1934 is estimated to have had approximately 2,400,000 members (Deva 1942: 52). Like their Italian and German counterparts, recruits were subjected to intensive indoctrination coordinated by the propaganda department – itself inspired by the German example (Kurasawa 1990a: 497; Deva 1942: 52). While these mass organisations often attracted enthusiastic support, most of them were closely integrated with the bureaucracy (McCormack 1982: 32).

The ideas of the New Order scholars also underpinned Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro's proclamation of a cultural and economic 'New Order' in East Asia in 1938, the forerunner of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', announced soon afterwards. In July 1940 Konoye's government, hostage to the military, took the last great step towards the absorption of civil society into the state by suppressing labour unions and forcing the liquidation of political parties. All parties were dissolved, ostensibly voluntarily, into a new non-party body called the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Described by Konoye as a 'national, all embracing, and public spirited' organisation whose 'activities extend to the whole life of the nation', the Imperial Rule

Assistance Association resembled the Fascist Grand Council of Italy; it was structured along corporatist lines, it was headed by appointed non-party figures and had branches 'in every prefecture, city and village' (Deva 1942: 86; see also Maruyama 1963: 301–2).

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was, however, nothing like Mussolini's *Partito Nazionale Fascista* or Hitler's NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party). Its absence of popular mass support, a charismatic leader and the lack of a radical disjuncture with the past has led many to argue that the term 'fascism' should not apply to prewar Shōwa Japan.[3] The system in Japan was more bureaucratic, more top-down, less internally disruptive than in Italy or Germany, so they are best kept theoretically distinct. Several alternatives have been suggested, such as 'Emperor system fascism' or simply the 'Emperor system' but these are at once too specific and too vague to be of use as analytical categories. More helpful are the descriptions of the prewar Japanese system by Duus and Okimoto (1979) as well as Cumings (1983: 282–3), as a form of managerial or conservative corporatism, which, although derived from European models, was transformed by its new cultural and political milieu. These descriptions not only reveal something of the internal organisation and character of the Japanese system but also help open the way for comparisons between corporatism in Japan and the systems that emerged in other parts of East and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, after the Second World War.

Indonesian nationalism and prewar Japan

Japan's defeat of Russia's Baltic squadron at Tsushima in 1905 dealt a serious blow to European military dominance in East Asia and to the myth of European supremacy. Accounts by early Indonesian nationalists highlight this first victory by an Asian nation over a European power in modern times as having been a tremendous inspiration and an enduring symbol of the potential of other Asian peoples to overcome European colonial domination and humiliation (Djojohadikusumo 1973: 40; Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo 1975: 16; Pringgodigdo 1984: x). Japan's successful programme of industrialisation from the turn of the century likewise provided a powerful counterexample to colonial myths, not only in Indonesia but across the region, about the innate inferiority and backwardness of the 'Asian races'.

Before 1920, Japan was for Indonesians primarily a symbol – distant and little understood – of feistiness, modernity and a possible future. Most people's direct experience with the Japanese was limited to their dealings with Japanese traders and prostitutes in Indonesia. Despite the privileged legal status accorded them by the colonial regime in 1899, the Japanese appear to have been better liked by indigenous Indonesians than the local Chinese (Vlekke 1961; Djojohadikusumo 1973: 111–12; Persada Senior 1990).

In the 1920s and 1930s, Japan became increasingly interested in Indonesia's coal, oil and rubber. The South Manchurian Railway Company, which played

a vital role in Japanese conquests in China, assembled a large body of literature about Indonesian culture and law, assisted by Japanese ethnologists such as Mabuchi Tōichi.[4] The Japanese state meanwhile began actively promoting a positive image of Japan among the Indonesian populace. Lawyer Sam Suhaedi (1990a: 35), who grew up in Bandung, remembered films about Japan being shown free of charge in the mid 1930s, and several writers have recalled how the Japanese acquired a reputation in society at large as polite and trustworthy (Suhaedi 1990a: 38; Sjahrir 1948: 161). But it was Japan's growing military might – and Dutch apprehension in the face of it – which appears to have most impressed Indonesians. In the 1930s, when the colonial government's attitude towards the nationalist movement was at its most uncompromising and repressive, Japan was one of the only bright spots on the nationalist horizon. Sutan Sjahrir, the social democratic nationalist, wrote to his wife in 1936 and 1937 from exile on the remote Moluccan island of Banda:

> It is little surprise that our nationalist groups have been paying so much attention to Japan, especially as the grievances against white colonial rule mount and the pressures increase, while the Japanese project a benevolent attitude and have even granted autonomy to Korea. Indeed this strategy to win the sympathy of the Eastern nations is quite understandable.
>
> I truly did not expect the Japanese to have been so successful in winning over our common people, as well as the middle groups and civil servants. These groups are looking more and more towards Japan as a place to send their children to study and to develop culturally. In recent years it has become fashionable to holiday in Japan. … Not only here, but all over Indonesia and all the way down to the *kampungs* in the most remote areas, people have faith in Japan's might, against which the Dutch are powerless, absolutely powerless … Even Hafil [Mohammad Hatta] has been openly sympathetic to Japan of late.
>
> (Sjahrir 1948: 100–1, 160–1)

Despite the fact that the Dutch kept tabs on Indonesians who were seen to be close to the Japanese, several Indonesians managed to visit Japan in the 1930s, including prominent nationalist figures such as Mohammad Hatta, Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, Dr Sutomo and Gatot Mangkupradja as well as a host of lesser known journalists, businesspeople and students (Soebagijo 1983: 147). Such visitors from Southeast Asia received considerable attention from Pan-Asianist and ultra-nationalist groups in Japan. The first Indonesian students to arrive in Japan, Jusuf Hasan and Abdul Madjid Oesman, were hosted by the extreme rightwing Black Dragon Society, which was associated in Japan with political violence and assassination and advocated Japanese military expansion into Asia and Russia. Under the leadership of Tōyama Mitsuru, this group convened the first Pan-Asiatic Conference in 1933 in Tokyo, to which delegates from all over Asia were invited, including several anti-colonial

exiles resident in Japan such as Rash Behari Bose.[5] The Black Dragon Society and the allied Greater Asia Association also backed the first Indonesian nationalist association in Japan, Indonesia Ryū-gakusei or 'Serikat Indonesia' (Indonesian Union), which was set up the same year (ibid.: 148).

The interest of the government in building ties with Indonesians was obvious from the way in which successive visitors were feted. When Parada Harahap, the proprietor of the small Indonesian language daily *Tjahaja Timoer*, led a two-month commercial mission to Japan in 1933 he was hailed in the media as the 'Press King of Java' (ibid.: 148). When Mohammad Hatta arrived soon afterwards on a business trip with his uncle he was surprised to be greeted by crowds of journalists and dubbed the 'Gandhi of Java' in the Japanese press. He was looked after in grand style by Iwata Takeo, an expert on the Indonesian nationalist movement and a representative of the militarist Greater Asia Association (Rose 1987: 69; Soebagijo 1983: 148). He dined with the deputy chairman of the Japanese parliament and was invited to visit universities, schools and factories. However, after being invited to survey Japan's conquests in Manchuria and meet with the radical rightwing War Minister General Araki Sadao, Hatta began to find the attention unwelcome, and perhaps dangerous, and left for the Indies.

Others were more enamoured of their Japanese hosts and their overtures. Gatot Mangkupradja, a close colleague of Sukarno and a senior figure in the 'non-cooperative' nationalist party Partindo, arrived in Japan as part of Parada Harahap's delegation and attended the 1933 Pan-Asiatic Conference. Although he could not follow the proceedings, he met with Pan-Asiatic leaders and was reportedly 'much impressed by the pro-Indonesian views expressed there by General Araki, the best known representative of the radical Kōdōha faction of the military' (Anderson 1972: 420). Encouraged by these pronouncements, Gatot returned to Indonesia and engaged Japanese residents in Java in discussions about Japan and the future of Indonesia (Soebagijo 1983: 146).

Leiden law graduate and future foreign minister Subardjo lived in Tokyo with his wife for nearly a year in 1935–6 as a correspondent for the Semarang based *Matahari* newspaper. In his autobiography (Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo 1978: 198), he wrote with evident enthusiasm of his encounters with some of the leading ideologues of the time. 'The thing that interested me most', he wrote, 'was the new way of thinking in Japan about the state and society'. One of his closest friends in Japan was Professor Toyo Ohgushi, one of the authors of the *Kokutai no Hongi* and a member of the National Spirit Cultural Research Institute, a government think tank. Toyo had recently returned from a long period of study in Germany and Subardjo recalls long discussions they had in German. Toyo bemoaned the way in which Western theories, and in particular the legal thought of positivists like Jellinek and Laband, had dominated in Japan at the expense of historically evolved indigenous conceptions of power. Toyo was a fierce opponent of liberal lawyers in Japan who argued that the emperor was constitutionally subordinate to the state. He

maintained, both publicly and to Subardjo, that Western concepts of power could not be reconciled with Japan's *kokutai*, which was based on 'the historical continuity of the Emperor's dynasty, and thus of the Japanese state … and the intimate and continuous relationship between the Emperor … and the people' (Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo 1978: 198).[6]

Subardjo writes also of his relationship with Fujisawa Chikao, a former professor of political science at Kyushu Imperial University who later headed the research department of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Described by de Mendelssohn (1944: 165) as 'one of the leading intellectuals of Japanese totalitarianism who has contributed much to the shaping of the monopoly party's present ideology', Fujisawa impressed Subardjo with his learning and his fluent Dutch. Subardjo tells of a long discussion he had with Fujisawa about 'the new spirit rising in Japan' he had written about in a book, 'which at that time had captured the attention of younger military officers'. In a booklet that received wide distribution in English in 1942 under the title *The Great Prophecy of the Dawn of a New Age*, Fujisawa argued that it was incumbent on the emperor:

> to reconstruct the fundamental vertical order, once present among the nations in remote antiquity; by doing so he wishes to transform the present day lawless, chaotic world where the weak are left to fall prey to the strong, into one large family community in which perfect concord and consummate harmony shall prevail.
>
> (Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo 1978: 198)

In a passage striking for its correspondence to a landmark speech that Supomo would make three years later to the committee in charge of preparations for Indonesian independence, Fujisawa stressed the importance of the Shinto notion of *Musubi*:

> the dynamic principle of one in many and many in one, and it is beyond controversy that this cosmic truth can win over all mankind in due course, supplanting the modern ego-centred ideologies which are confronted with imminent bankruptcy. … In the light of what has just been explained one can well understand that capitalist individualism prevalent in the United States runs counter to the cosmic truth. … Dictatorial Communism elevated to the official doctrine of Soviet Russia proves likewise irreconcilable with the cosmic truth since it tends to disregard personal initiatives and merely exercises bureaucratic control of the state. … It is noteworthy that the guiding principle of National Socialist Germany and of Fascist Italy have much in common with the *Musubi* principle.
>
> (De Mendelssohn 1944: 168–70)

While Subardjo, who had spent some of his time as a Marxist, found some of the sentiments expressed by his hosts a little too chauvinist and reminiscent of

the Nazis for his liking, he appears to have been genuinely sympathetic to their rejection of liberalism and Western constitutionalism and their efforts to 'return' Japan to its true personality as a family state.

One of the few groups Subardjo appears to have been free to talk with about more prosaic matters, such as problems at home with the Dutch colonial government, were Japanese naval officers (Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo 1978: 210–14). Indeed the navy took a very active interest in Indonesian affairs, hosting parties for visiting nationalist figures as well as sponsoring the establishment of the Japan–Indonesia Friendship Society (Soebagijo 1983: 150). Subardjo's meetings were to stand him in good stead during the occupation when he played a pivotal role as an intermediary between the Japanese military authorities and the nationalist leadership. Jusuf Hasan, the Sumatran student who had been an active propagandist in Japan in the 1930s, later claimed (apparently reliably) that several pro-Japanese Indonesians, including himself, Subardjo and Subardjo's close friend and fellow Leiden law graduate A.A. Maramis, were recruited by Vice Admiral Maeda and his intelligence aide Shigetada Nishijima early in 1941 to carry out fifth-column work against the Dutch.[7]

The Japanese authorities clearly went out of their way to cultivate as broad a range of Indonesian (and other Asian) nationalists as they could. In 1939 four leaders of the federation of Islamic organisations, the Great Islamic Council of Indonesia (MIAI), were invited to a large Islamic exhibition in Tokyo, a propaganda exercise that was attended by delegates from all over the world (Benda 1958: 104; Soebagijo 1983: 150). But it was the conservative non-Islamic politicians, especially from Budi Utomo and Parindra, who the Japanese seemed most interested in and who, in turn, looked most favourably on Japan.

The Parindra leaders viewed the rise of fascism in Germany and Japan with some enthusiasm and positively looked forward to an invasion that would drive out the Dutch (Sastroamidjojo 1979: 81). Parindra leader Mohamad Hoesni Thamrin was in touch with the Japanese consul-general in Jakarta who directed spying activities in Indonesia and was believed by Dutch intelligence to have been the main conduit for Japanese support for the party. This support, according to the Dutch police, included direct financial contributions to Parindra (Abeyasekere 1972: 273–4). Three other Parindra politicians, Dr Sutomo, Soekardjo Wirjopranoto and Raden Sudjono, had also visited Japan in the mid to late 1930s. During his visit, Dr Sutomo, a newspaper owner who had founded the Indonesian People's Union, which later merged into Parindra, accepted an invitation to the residence of Tōyama Mitsuru, the leader of the Black Dragon Society. Soekardjo, a lawyer who had represented Budi Utomo in the Volksraad and who later headed Parindra's political, press and propaganda section, was also well treated by his Japanese hosts (Soebagijo 1983: 148; Darmosugito 1982: 291; Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo 1978: 207). No prewar Indonesian politician, however, developed more intimate relations with the Japanese than Sudjono, a Javanese Leiden law graduate who lived in

Tokyo for four years from 1938, working at the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages. Sudjono later described his years in Japan with great warmth and praised the teachings of such ultra-nationalist ideologues as Ohgushi and Fujisawa. He was well enough trusted by the Japanese authorities to join their invasion force with the rank of captain and went on to liaise between the Japanese authorities and the nationalist leaders during the occupation (see Soebagijo 1983; van Breman 1999: 374–5).

Parindra's pro-Japanese stance, its social conservatism, its cultural nationalism, its strong foothold in the bureaucracy and, as Pluvier (1974: 217) noted, its 'preference for a corporative society' made it an attractive ally for the Japanese. The loyalty of the Parindra leaders, however, was not matched by their mobilisational skills, and while they were looked after by the Japanese, their time in the sun did not last for long.

Japan in charge

When the Japanese invaded Indonesia in March 1942 it took them only a few weeks to defeat the Netherlands Indies army, which had been trained and equipped to deal with internal dissent. Indonesians could hardly believe their eyes as the colonial edifice came tumbling down. The Japanese soldiers were surprised also at the ease of their victory and the extraordinary welcome they received from the Indonesians. The battle-hardened troops were in many places greeted as heroes. In Java this owed much to propaganda that identified the Japanese as the 'yellow men from the north' who the legendary king Joyoboyo had prophesied would one day deliver the land from servitude.

Most nationalist groups that had survived the repression of the 1930s also saw the Japanese as liberators. Parindra leaders openly rejoiced, while nationalist figures from the other mainstream parties accepted Japanese promises that they would be allowed to organise freely and that Indonesia would soon take its place as an independent nation within the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Even nationalists, as well-educated and familiar with Japan's record in China as Subardjo, appear to have fully expected early progress towards independence. A poignant relic of this hope is the 'Indonesian Independence Act' and the draft constitution that Subardjo, Maramis and Supomo wrote soon after the arrival of the Japanese.[8] The draft constitution, dated 4 April 1942, is significant both for the insight it provides into the thinking of these pro-Japanese nationalists, and as a prototype for the 1945 Constitution. The Independence Act envisaged the creation of a provisional Indonesian government headed by the commander of the Imperial Japanese Army who would exercise 'all the authority which according to Dutch East Indian law belongs to the Netherlands supreme command (King and Ministers) or to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies'. This government would appoint a commission of experts to formulate a final constitution that would 'respond to the communal aim of *Asia Raya* [Greater Asia] based on the

principles of Cooperation and Coprosperity under the benevolent guidance of *Dai Nippon* [Great Japan] as elder brother in the Family of Asiatic Nations' (Kusuma 2004: 553). In the meantime the Volksraad would be abolished and legislative power taken over by the Japanese commander acting as 'head of state'. The entire colonial bureaucracy, however, including all departments and the judiciary, as well as all procedures, laws and Indonesian government personnel were to be maintained intact unless explicitly ordered by the head of state.

The draft constitution describes something akin to a constitutional monarchy. Indonesia would be 'reigned over and governed' by a head of state bearing the royal title '*Jang Dipertuan Maha Besar*'. The 74 article draft provided for a bicameral parliament with both houses elected separately by the people. It also contained – perhaps surprisingly given the tone of Supomo's speech delivered in 1941 to the Law Faculty of the University of Indonesia – a fairly extensive list of citizen's rights, guaranteeing, for instance, habeas corpus and protections against arbitrary arrest, search and other violations of personal privacy by the state. In most other respects it is the same as the 1945 Constitution, with large sections of it being reproduced verbatim in the later, streamlined, document.[9]

Insofar as Subardjo, Supomo and Maramis were concerned to protect the interests of the *pangreh pradja* – the indigenous administrative elite – they need not have worried. The first law passed by the Japanese Military Administration in Jakarta declared that 'All government authorities and their powers, along with all laws and statutes of the previous government will be recognised as valid in the interim, as long as they do not conflict with the regulations of the Military Government' (Reid 1986: 11).

But hopes among the centrist and rightwing Indonesian nationalist politicians that the Japanese would announce the formation of a provisional Indonesian government were soon dashed.

Corporatism in the service of Japan's war

Once the Japanese army and navy had consolidated their control over the country under three separate commands, they turned down the screws. The military administration in Java closed the legislature, banned the national anthem and the national red and white flag, imposed tight censorship and proscribed all independent political activity. Politically homeless politicians were given the choice of remaining outside the political process as 'neutral observers' or joining new organisations created by the Japanese to serve Japanese purposes. A handful of them associated with Sutan Sjahrir opted to stay out of formal politics. But most nationalist politicians and religious leaders decided to cooperate.

Japan had two imperatives in Indonesia. One was to manage the orderly administration of the country to enable the extraction of the raw materials and food it needed to prosecute the war. The other, which increased in

urgency as Japan started to lose ground to the Allies, was to mobilise the population to defend the country against attack. In Japan and in occupied China the problem of how to combine mobilisation and control was tackled by the creation of mass organisations (for youths, women and other groups) which, while quite popular and dynamic, were also closely supervised by the bureaucracy. The same formula was applied by the military administration in Indonesia.

Within a fortnight of the Japanese seizure of power in April 1942, the propaganda department, working with Parindra politicians, set up the Triple A Movement. Headed by the Parindra journalist Sjamsoeddin, and staffed at the regional level by several Parindra figures,[10] the Triple A Movement was intended to be a united front organisation embracing all sections of Indonesian public life – social, cultural and political. While its anti-Western propaganda attracted widespread support, its campaign slogan: 'Japan the Light of Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia, Japan the leader of Asia', proved less than appealing. Sukarno, who had just been returned from exile in Sumatra and had been persuaded to join the movement in July, was unhappy with the movement's overtly pro-Japanese message. He managed to convince the Japanese that if they wanted to mobilise popular support they would have to do so by tapping nationalist, rather than pro-Japanese, sentiment. He was in favour, however, of maintaining the various groups that were participating in the movement, as well as the principle of a monolithic united front structured along corporative lines (Pluvier 1974: 218).

In March 1943 a similar organisation called Poetera (Centre of People's Strength) was formed. It was headed by Sukarno (the 'Great Leader'), Mohammad Hatta, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro the respected educationalist and Haji Mas Mansur, a former chairman of the modernist Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah. Poetera, like the failed Triple A Movement, aspired to be all encompassing. It included a wide range of the political and non-political nationalist associations based in Java and Madura. There was always a tension, however, between its primary purpose as a vehicle to rally Indonesian support for the Japanese and the nationalist agenda of its leaders. Ultimately Poetera achieved little more than its predecessor, either for the Japanese or the nationalist movement. Its leaders were divided among themselves and obstructed by mistrustful Japanese authorities as well as by conservative *pangreh pradja* who had always seen the nationalist movement as a menace (Anderson 1972: 27–8; Pluvier 1974: 219–20).

The Japanese therefore set about the task of mobilising support among the population themselves. The military administration's propaganda department created a number of new mass organisations based on similar bodies established in Japan. The paramilitary Young Men's Association (Seinendan), set up in April 1943, inducted young men between the ages of 14 and 25 into a programme that included military exercises, mass drills and anti-Allied propaganda. By mid 1945 it reportedly had over half a million members. For younger students an organisation called Gakutotai concentrated on basic military training and

propaganda. Older men aged between 25 and 35 were organised into an auxiliary police, intelligence, fire and air-raid organisation called the Vigilance Corps (Keibōdan), which by the end of the occupation had over a million members (Lebra 1977: 97). Finally, at least 25,000 young men were selected for service in the Heiho, an auxiliary force trained to fight alongside the Japanese army and navy. Training these young, largely uneducated bachelors helped instil in many of them a strong fighting spirit, but also a respect for obedience, uniformity and force (Anderson 1972: 25–7; Kahin 1952: 107–10).

Aware of the potential of Islam as a means of mobilising the masses, the Japanese administration attempted to apply the principle of 'combine and rule' – shoehorning diverse groups into single government-sponsored bodies in order to channel their energies and control their direction – to the prewar Islamic organisations. The longstanding schism between modernist and orthodox streams of Islam, however, made this effort problematic. Moreover, while the Japanese could represent themselves as anti-Christian, they had little success convincing Muslim leaders that they were fighting a *jihad*. After initial efforts to unite all Islamic groups into a new body failed, the Japanese-created Department of Religious Affairs attempted to recognise the MIAI as the peak Islamic organisation. The MIAI was happy to support the Japanese, but, being modernist-dominated, drew little support from traditionalist Muslims. In October 1943 the Japanese dissolved it and replaced it with what Anderson (1972: 28) referred to as a 'typical occupation portmanteau organisation' called Masjumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims). While Masjumi excluded the more outspoken Muslim nationalist politicians from the prewar period, it represented both modernist and traditionalist Muslim opinion and was perhaps the most successful product of Japanese political engineering in Indonesia (Benda 1958: 150–94; Pluvier 1974: 220–2, 251–3).[11]

When the war turned against Japan in early 1944, the occupation authorities in Java intensified their mobilisation campaign. Poetera was dissolved and replaced in January 1944 by a grand council known by its Japanese name Djawa Hōkōkai (Java Service Association). Modelled on the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Japan (Kurasawa 1991: 40) and with direct counterparts in other parts of the empire[12] the Djawa Hōkōkai was the largest and most comprehensive of the political bodies constructed by the Japanese. Sukarno and the head of the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama, Kyai Haji Hasjim Asjari, acted as its principal advisers and public spokesmen, but it was headed by the Japanese head of the military administration. At the top level the Djawa Hōkōkai threw together 'conservative *prijaji* administrators [members of Java's bureaucratic elite], nationalist politicians of every stripe, traditionalist and modernist Islamic notables, professional men and regional elites' (Anderson 1972: 29). Unlike its Indonesian predecessors (but in common with its Japanese parent), the Djawa Hōkōkai was well integrated with the entire administrative apparatus (Sutherland 1979: 152).

The introduction to Indonesia and other occupied territories of the Japanese system of neighbourhood organisation and surveillance, known as *tonarigumi*,

helped ensure that virtually everyone was drawn into the orbit of the Djawa Hōkōkai. The neighbourhood associations consisted of 10–20 households, headed by a neighbourhood chief, who was made responsible for reporting on activities in his area, disseminating government propaganda and, in the guise of promoting *gotong royong*, enforcing the requisitioning of supplies of food and labour demanded by the Japanese. Indonesia was the only country outside Japan where the *tonarigumi* system was preserved after the war (Elsbree 1953: 126–7; Anderson 1972: 29; Pluvier 1974: 254).

Mass organisations representing occupations, industries, sports, women and youth were all incorporated into the Djawa Hōkōkai, setting in place a corporatist pattern of political representation that was to be emulated in later years. Djawa Hōkōkai's militant arm, the Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard Corps) started out as a propaganda body but soon grew into a highly motivated, highly indoctrinated urban force of about 80,000 youths, which was to play a vital role in the revolution (Reid 1986: 17).

Another crucial part of the mobilisation effort was Peta (Defenders of the Homeland) a 66,000-member volunteer army formed in October 1943 after a dramatic, stage-managed request by Gatot Mangkupradja written in his own blood Lebra (1977: 98–101). Because Peta was designed to produce guerrilla fighters who would resist an Allied attack, recruitment and training was organised locally and Indonesians were assigned as battalion commanders. This fact, and the harsh discipline and intensive propaganda the young recruits were subjected to, was to have a lasting influence on the structure and character of the Indonesian army. Peta-trained officers inculcated with Japanese military values formed the nucleus of the national army, which emerged during the revolution. Values of obedience, order and hierarchy instilled into Soeharto's generation of military leaders during the occupation did much to shape their view of society, and helps explain the emphasis on regimentation in the 'political, economical, social, military, and cultural engineering' undertaken by the New Order (Mangunwijaya 1994: 79–80).

After the failure of the Triple A movement, the Japanese realised that their Parindra friends were not well-known or popular enough to use in their mobilisation campaigns, and therefore came to rely more on such respected nationalist figures as Sukarno and Hatta and Muslim leaders such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Hasjim Asjari. Their pre-war admirers, however, were well-looked after, and in some instances given important roles to play. Sudjono, who was fond of wearing a Japanese sword, was given a job at military headquarters and was later appointed to the pseudo-parliamentary Central Advisory Council created in late 1943, as was Gatot Mangkupradja. Soekardjo Wirjopranoto was appointed editor of the government-sponsored daily *Asia Raya* and later as the principal adviser to the propaganda department, replacing the mercurial Sumatran lawyer Muhammad Yamin (Darmosugito 1982: 291; Benda 1958: 282). Soekardjo's work earned him a three-month trip to Japan in August 1943 as part of a delegation led by the senior Parindra

figure Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo,[13] which also included Parada Harahap and Supomo (Benda 1958: 250).

Subardjo, meanwhile, played a key role from 1943 as an adviser to the Naval Liaison Office, which was under the control of Rear-Admiral Maeda and his intelligence officers (Kahin 1952: 115–19; Anderson 1972: 46–7 *passim*). Maeda, who was to become sympathetic to Indonesian independence, had in October 1944 set up a controversial school and meeting place for leading nationalists in Jakarta called the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka. This school was dominated by the Kaigun (Japanese Navy) group of older generation nationalists, led by Subardjo. Most of its members, i.e. Iwa Kusumasumantri, Raden Pandji Singgih, Johannes Latuharhary and Maramis, had studied law with Subardjo at Leiden in the 1920s.[14] Subardjo's close ties with several influential Japanese and his high status in the nationalist movement helped him to become a key intermediary between Sukarno, Hatta and the Japanese (Nishijima in Reid and Oki 1986: 254ff). Subardjo and his circle went on to play an important part in politics after 1945.

Propaganda, ideology and identity

Between 1942 and 1945 the Japanese also changed the way Indonesians thought about themselves. Japanese rule was characterised by public rituals, theatrical gestures, rousing broadcasts and military discipline that was in total contrast with the aloof, technocratic style of Dutch rule (Anderson 1972: 31–2). Youths who had been told to be quiet and diligent were suddenly encouraged to take part in parades, in military drills, in mass gymnastics or shouting anti-British and American slogans. Nationalist leaders who had spent years in jail were talking on the radio every day, urging support for the Japanese and speaking of independence. The impact of the occupation went so deep that youth leader and future vice president Adam Malik (1982: 12) later spoke of a 'radical spiritual revolution' having taken place among the population.

The Japanese saw propaganda as central and put a great deal of effort into it. They could not afford a repeat of their unhappy experience in China and Korea, where harsh repression and fiercely pro-Japanese propaganda had succeeded in inflaming anti-Japanese sentiment (see Thomas 1981: 631; Kurasawa 1990a: 486). The propaganda department was one of the most important arms of the military administration in Jakarta, with responsibility for a wide range of activities including radio broadcasting, newspaper publishing, sponsoring cultural activities, the production and dissemination of films, plays and songs, as well as more explicitly political tasks such as the creation of organisations like the Triple A movement (Kurasawa 1990a, 1991).

As Kurasawa (1991: 61) has argued, the propaganda department had long-term and short-term goals. The long-term plan was to assimilate Indonesian society to that of Japan. To this end the administration introduced Japanese

language teaching at all levels, alongside such themes as Pan-Asianism, moral instruction, Japanese history and the history and culture of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. Mass publications such as *Asia Raya* contained articles praising the emperor and 'disseminating dogmatic lessons about *Nippon Kokutai* (Japanese state philosophy)' (Suhaedi 1990b: 69). The articles dwelt on the contrast between the corrupt, egoistic West and the spiritual East (Reeve 1985: 60). Japan's short-term goal, which increasingly took precedence, was to rally support for more immediate goals such as increasing food production, recruiting forced labour and defending Java. For these purposes the Japanese relied increasingly on arousing nationalist sentiment. In doing so, they also helped to promote and consolidate a particular definition of Indonesian identity that reflected their own mindset. In accordance with the guidelines in the secret handbook called *Ideological War in the Southern Area*, compiled by the general headquarters of the Japanese army in October 1941, a great deal of attention was given to rediscovering and reviving indigenous values, which would not only boost national pride but also reveal, beneath the corrupting patina of Western influence, basic similarities between Indonesian and Japanese culture (Kurasawa 1990a: 487).

Schools, along with the army, had long constituted 'the most pervasive tutelary apparatus of the state' in Japan (Gluck 1985: 147) and schooling was likewise recognised as 'the most profound of all means available to propaganda' in Japan's Southeast Asian territories (Elsbree 1953: 103). Schoolchildren in Java were drilled with lessons about the importance of the 'Japanese spirit' and given doses of Japanese-style moral instruction. The greatest impact of the Japanese education system in Indonesia, however, was its role in forging and popularising a sense of national consciousness. Unlike in Korea, where the use of Korean was severely restricted, the Japanese made Indonesian the universal language of instruction in schools. As Reid (1985: 19–21; 1982: 292–8) has described, the Japanese also sponsored the wholesale rewriting of history by figures such as Sanoesi Pane and Muhammad Yamin – the top Indonesian adviser at the propaganda department – in a way that projected the Indonesian nation back into the mists of time and turned the bandits, rebels and villains of the standard Dutch primers into national heroes. First in line were Prince Diponegoro, Tuanku Imam Bonjol and Teuku Umar, the leaders of the three major colonial wars fought by the Dutch in the nineteenth century, the Java War (1825–30), the Padri War (1821–38) and the Aceh Wars (1873–4).

The desire of the Japanese to foster a sense of national identity that rested on nativist and Pan-Asiatic foundations was perhaps clearest in the propaganda department's creation in October 1942 of the Popular Education and Cultural Direction Centre (Poesat Keboedajaan). In a speech to open the centre, the Japanese propaganda chief outlined its tasks as being to eliminate Western culture (e.g. democracy and art for art's sake), which does not accord with 'Eastern-ness'; to get to know, recognise and develop authentic Eastern culture that has a 'continuous 5000 year tradition' and finally to mobilise the

nation for total war (*Keboedajaan Timoer*, No. 1, 1942: 2–3). The man chosen to head the centre was Sanoesi Pane, a novelist who wrote much about his empathy with other Asian cultures and with pre-Islamic traditions in Indonesia. An article he wrote in its journal, *Keboedajaan Timoer* (*Eastern Culture*) in 1944 helps illustrate the way in which concepts of national identity, inspired in large part by anti-liberal political and legal philosophies in the West, were reinforced and revitalised by Japanese imperatives. Sanoesi blamed individualism in Western culture, as well as the idea of dualism between humans and nature, for having led, via materialism and positivism, to social contract theory, which formed the core of liberal state philosophy. 'Parliaments in liberal states', he argued, 'are nothing more than stages on which one group fights with another. … The state becomes the instrument of the strongest groups'. Individualism in the realm of economics and international politics, he wrote, 'has caused a malaise, a crisis, caused millions to be unemployed, caused colonialism, conflicts over markets, raw materials. Anarchism at home and anarchism abroad'. Greater East Asia, however, under the leadership of Dai Nippon, was 'struggling to replace individualism and rationalism in philosophy with an awareness of the unity of mankind and nature, as God's creations'. Sanoesi then drew a parallel between Japanese conceptions and the Javanese concept of *manunggalnya kawula-gusti*, or 'the unity of ruler and ruled' and argued that both, by transcending rationality, had overcome the dilemmas inherent in Hegel's dialectics and had come to know what Kant maintained was unknowable: *Dinge an sich*, nature in its true form. Using this logic, Sanoesi argued – as many Japanese nationalist philosophers had done before him – that while British empiricism and American pragmatism were out of tune with Eastern philosophy, German idealism was not. Like the propaganda chief, Sanoesi maintained that he was engaged in a 'truly total … war with the philosophical, economic, political, moral foundations which originated especially in the Allied countries' (Sanoesi 1944).

More importantly, the propaganda department emphasised 'indigenous tradition'. While sections of the nationalist movement had long looked forward to a revival of the collectivistic ethos associated with traditional society (as refracted through the lenses of *adat* scholarship) this idea, this harking back to an idealised agrarian or feudal past, had never dominated nationalist discourse to such an extent. A profusion of articles in journals such as *Keboedajaan Timoer* and *Asia Raya* extolled traditional culture. These appealed to sections of the nationalist movement and the general public, but are best understood as responses to Japanese policy implemented in many of their Greater East Asian territories. A similar set of priorities operated, for instance, in the Philippines, where the occupation authorities (while sponsoring baseball and the showing of Hollywood films!) exhorted their subjects to 'excavate the cultural gems of the Filipinos as found in their original racial characteristics and pure Filipino traditions unaffected by the impact of Occidental civilisation' (Elsbree 1953: 106).

A typical article from *Keboedajaan Timoer* about Indonesia's 'indigenous constitutional order' illustrates well the feudalistic representation of the past that the Japanese favoured:

> In the golden age of our ancestors, government and administration was always based on the civilisation and the customs passed down to us … with the result that our authentic qualities were always well maintained. … With the coming of the Dutch, who wanted to make slaves of us, the character of our traditional constitutional order was little by little demolished … To prevent the people from being unified, the colonial government reduced the *pangreh pradja* from leaders of the people to mere colonial clerks, and this went very much against the understanding that had been in place since the days of our ancestors when the *pangreh pradja* had been the parents and nursemaids of the people, or, in other words, leaders, protectors and instructors of the people in the broadest sense.
> (Moeladi 1944)

In this system, the author maintained, people were all 'members of the house of the state'. In order to return Indonesia to its true personality, he urged his readers to look to Japan, 'because only in *Dai Nippon*, which was free from Allied domination, were Eastern characteristics preserved in a pure form'.[15]

Besides the obvious propaganda advantage to the Japanese in promoting a view of indigenous Indonesian culture, which linked Indonesia spiritually with Japan, the Japanese appear to have had a genuine interest in encouraging nationalists to base a constitutional order on Indonesian traditions. One of the first advisory bodies set up by the Japanese was called the Research Council on *Adat* and Past State Organisation.[16] Established in November 1942, it included a glittering cast of nationalist figures including Sukarno, Hatta, K.H. Mansur, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro as well as Parindra figures Sudjono and Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, *pangreh pradja* spokesman Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo, and several top Leiden-educated scholars including the Islamologist Professor Husein Djajadiningrat, the lawyer and educationalist T.S.G. Moelia and the traditional literature expert R.M. Ngabhi Poerbatjaraka (Gunseikanboe 1944: 17, 293, 453). Supomo, then the highest Indonesian legal official in the Japanese administration, was appointed as the committee's expert on traditional customs.

The council was charged with the broad task of advising the military government on 'the smooth functioning of military administration' as well as 'researching and studying traditional customs and institutions with a view toward providing reference materials for the administration of Java' (Benda *et al.* 1965: 133–5). In the 12 months to November 1943, when it was dissolved into the Central Advisory Council, it appears to have worked on a number of issues, from language policy (Kurasawa 1990b: 185) to more general constitutional questions. Dewantoro stated in March 1943 the council's intention to investigate 'the possibilities of creating a society which is based on the

customs of our own nation, before our life and way of life were damaged because of pressures of the European spirit' and in his memoirs claimed that it had 'prepared for independence on the quiet' (cited in Reeve 1985: 63). The few available records of the council's proceedings seem to confirm this. Dewantoro's contributions and a series of speeches to the council by Supomo address a range of administrative and management issues, including 'the future industrialisation of Indonesia, transmigration, Indonesian law, the role of minorities, education, illiteracy and unemployment' (cited in Reeve 1985: 63–4). Supomo spoke, as he had before the occupation, of the strong sense of unity and collectivism among villagers in Indonesia. Dewantoro, whose collectivism combined elements of Javanese, Indian and Theosophical thinking, highlighted the virtues of 'Eastern Democracy' and the 'feeling-of-family' that characterised Indonesian society in contrast to divisiveness brought about by the influence of Western individualism, intellectualism, materialism and capitalism (Reeve 1985: 64).

Supomo's transition from late colonialism to the Japanese occupation, both in career terms and intellectually, appears to have been remarkably easy. When the Japanese arrived, Supomo was employed as a professor at the law school in Jakarta and as a bureaucrat in the justice department. Only a month after the invasion he was put in charge of drafting statutes in the justice department. In October 1943 he was appointed top adviser to the department and in June 1945 was made its head (Soegito 1977: 71). He also served as a judge in the Supreme Court. Besides these positions and his job in the adat research council, Supomo was appointed in December 1942 as head of the Japanese Law Research Association, which was set up to facilitate research in Indonesia about Japanese law (Gunseikanboe 1944: 159). It may have been in connection with this work that Supomo was selected to take part in a four-month study tour of Japan late in 1943. On his return Supomo expressed his gratitude for having had the opportunity to meet with legal officials and, most interestingly, his delight 'at the readiness of the Japanese legal experts to work together with legal experts from other countries in the Co-Prosperity Sphere to draw up a new legal order in tune with the aims of *Dai Nippon*' (*Djawa Baroe* I, 22, 15 November 1943).

From an interview he gave to *Keboedajaan Timoer* in 1944, Supomo's experience under the Japanese seems simply to have confirmed his antagonism to individualism and the 'spirit of liberalism' (*Keboedajaan Timoer* III, Jakarta 1944). The only real difference between his University of Indonesia speech on the individual and society in 1941 (discussed in the previous chapter) and his 1944 interview was the emphasis given in the latter to the Pan-Asiatic (and orientalist) concept of Eastern-ness. Exposure to Japanese culture, he argued in 1944, with its 'quintessential Eastern qualities' could provide Indonesia's alienated, Western-educated intellectuals 'with an awareness of our own national personality and our own culture at a higher level and in a wider context'.

There was a remarkable congruence between the image of Indonesian culture and identity generated by the Leiden school and its Indonesian

students, and the discourse about 'Eastern culture' promoted by Japanese cultural nationalists. This may seem surprising, given the different political complexions of these groups and the different political interests to which these conceptions were harnessed. But if we look at them all as part of the conservative, communalistic, anti-liberal stream of thinking that arose in Europe in reaction first to the French Revolution and later to the social dislocation and alienation wrought by industrialisation, the connections are more apparent. It is only when viewed in this light that we can explain how, when the Leiden law graduate Subardjo visited Tokyo, he found himself on the same wavelength as Japan's most militant rightwing nationalists. It is only when we recognise the shared philosophical underpinnings of historical jurisprudence, romantic nationalism and the varieties of nationalist corporatism that are often lumped together under the rubric of fascism that we can understand why a figure like Supomo, who never strayed far from the orthodoxies of the Leiden school, could find such a receptive environment for his ideas about state and society in the Japanese occupation.

I am not of course suggesting that the Dutch Leiden scholars (other than J.J. Schrieke) were sympathetic to fascism, or that there was anything inevitable about the way in which Fichte and Savigny met Inoue Tetsujiro and Fujisawa Chikao in Indonesia. But there is much about Indonesia that can only be understood if we are aware that there was a stream of thought in the prewar world, with adherents from both the left and the right, which rejected liberalism and which looked forward to a society in which communalistic indigenous traditions assaulted and dislocated by the foreign presence were revived. Because of the peculiar conjunction of events that brought Japan to Indonesia, these ideas prospered.

Notes

1 The military counterpart to the Rescript on Education was the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors. Issued in the name of the Emperor in 1882, it is redolent with corporeal imagery: 'Soldiers and Sailors, We are your supreme Commander-in-Chief. Our relations with you will be most intimate when We rely upon you as Our limbs and you look up to Us as your head' (cited in Bellah 2003: 33).

2 Williams (1994: 121) argues for 'the unrivalled importance of the German Historical School for any Westerner who would grasp the nature of national economics, in its German or Japanese guise'. The Historical School of Economics, which was developed mainly in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century, highlighted the specificity of time and place rather than economic laws. It informed the thinking of most participants in the Dutch debates over *adat* and land rights, especially the agricultural economist and former student of van Vollenhoven, J.H. Boeke (Kahn 1993: 81, 92–7).

3 For a review of the literature on this question see McCormack (1982). Notable dissenters from this position include Masao Maruyama and Barrington Moore.

4 On the prewar Japanese ethnography of Indonesia see Shimizu (1999) and van Bremen (1999: 369–76). The research activities of the South Manchurian Railway company are detailed in Young (1966). Subardjo was astonished at the size of the Indonesian collection at the South Manchurian Railway Company library he

visited in 1935 or 1936: 'Without exaggeration I can say that it would have been no problem to write a dissertation in Tokyo about adat law in Indonesia, about any aspect of history, culture or politics in Indonesia. I would not have had to return to Leiden to get a Doctor of Laws degree' (Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo 1978: 204).

5 Indonesian delegates included Jusuf Hasan, Abdul Madjid Oesman, Gaos Mahjuddin, Ruslie and Gatot Mangkupradja (Soebagijo 1983: 144–5).

6 Patricia Pelley (2002: 140–1) observed that Vietnamese anticolonial intellectuals in the early twentieth century were similarly enthusiastic about the idea of the *kokutai*.

7 Kanahele (1967: 17–18). This is confirmed in Nishijima's account in Reid and Oki (1986: 252). Nishijima's list included also Tadjoeddin Noor (a Leiden-educated lawyer and future parliamentarian representing the PIR), Samsi Sastrawidagda (a graduate of the Rotterdam Business School and Indonesia's first finance minister), Douwes Dekker (a founder of the Indische Partij in 1912) and Mohammad Yamin (ibid.).

8 The full draft, including contemporaneous English versions, is printed in Kusuma (2004: 550–78). According to Kanahele (1967: 31–2), Muslim politician Abikoesno surprised many by producing a blueprint for the composition of a 'transitional' Indonesian government under Japanese auspices very soon after the Japanese landing in Java. The draft constitution was probably written at the same time. See also Reid and Oki (1986: 259).

9 It is not known whether these documents were drafted on the basis of specific assurances from the Japanese that Indonesia would be granted autonomy after a period of Japanese rule or whether they were an attempt by Subardjo, Supomo and Maramis to sell the Japanese a plan intended to assure them that there was a group of nationalists who could be trusted to channel radical nationalist sentiment into an acceptably stable and conservative direction. Either way, the authors displayed a high degree of optimism about the intentions of the Japanese.

10 Regional leaders included the lawyer Djody Gondokusumo, the first vice chairman of Parindra (in West Java), and K.R.M. Tumenggung Wongsonegoro, a former commissioner to the central leadership of Parindra (Surakarta). See Anderson (1972: 417, 456–7); Penders and Sundhaussen (1985: 6–9).

11 Masjumi did not survive the war, but its efforts to unite modernist and orthodox Muslim groups inspired the formation of a party of the same name on 7 November 1945 (Noer 1987: 44–7).

12 The Djawa Hōkōkai closely resembled the Concordia in Manchuria, the Kalibapi in the Philippines, the Hsin Min Hui (New People's Society) of North China and the Dobama (National Service Association) of Burma (Recto 1946: 102). Shimizu Hitoshi, the civilian head of the propaganda section of the propaganda department in Java, had been a senior staff member in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Kurasawa 1991: 40).

13 Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo had been the *pangreh pradja*'s top representative in the Volksraad. Soon after the Japanese invaded he was appointed as the top Indonesian official in the interior ministry and in 1943 was the Resident of Jakarta.

14 Iwa Kusumasumantri graduated from the Leiden law school in 1925 and later edited the newspaper for which Subardjo was the Tokyo correspondent (Anderson 1972: 422–3); Raden Pandji Singgih (Leiden 1922) was active in Budi Utomo and Parindra and was appointed as a senior adviser (*Sanyo*) to the Labour Department in 1944 (Reid and Oki 1986: 268); Johannes Latuharhary (Leiden 1927) was a senior member of Parindra from Ambon who worked in the 'government affairs' section of the Japanese military administration (Darmosugito 1982: 285–6); and A.A. Maramis (Leiden 1924), mentioned earlier, sat on the Consultative Council of the Poetera (Anderson 1972: 428).

15 A wealth of similar statements taken from newspapers including *Asia Raya*, *Soeara Asia*, *Tjahaja* and *Sinar Baru* are reproduced in Darmosugito (1982).

16 This council was called Kyūkan Seido Chōsakai setchi no ken tsucho, or in Indonesian, Panitia Pemeriksa Adat dan Tatanegara Dahoeloe. A body with a similar name and purpose, the Provisional Commission for the Investigation of Taiwanese Old Customs (Rinji Taiwan Kyūkan Chōsakai) had been established in Taiwan in 1901 (Tsu 1999: 198).

4 1945
Organicism versus rights

After a long and bloody battle, American forces occupied Saipan in June 1944 and it became clear to the Japanese that they were losing the war. This development, and the replacement of Prime Minister Tojo by General Koiso Kuniaki, strengthened the hand of those in Tokyo who favoured granting independence to Indonesia. Continued opposition to the idea from the Japanese navy, however, made Prime Minister Koiso's long-awaited statement about the government's plans for Indonesia cautious. On 7 September 1944 he told the Diet that the inhabitants of the East Indies, whose 'cooperation with local military governments has been truly something to behold' would be granted independence 'in the future' (Benda *et al.* 1965: 259). A number of minor administrative reforms were soon implemented to give Indonesian advisers more input into the central administration and the bans on flying the Indonesian flag and singing the nationalist anthem, imposed early in 1942, were lifted in Java and Sumatra. Six months later the commander in chief for Java, whose administration had been pressing Tokyo to take a softer line on independence, finally announced the establishment of the Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence,[1] which was inaugurated amid considerable pomp on 28 May 1945.

The 62-member committee (henceforth referred to by its Indonesian initials BPUPK) was given wide terms of reference that included formulating recommendations about the form of government, the management and jurisdiction of the new independent nation as well as producing a draft constitution. Its decisions would be relayed to Tokyo for scrutiny, and, subject to approval, passed onto a (promised) Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee for possible ratification (*Kan Pō* No. 66 May 1945: 9–10, 38–9; Anderson 1961: 9; Benda *et al*. 1965: 267).

What sort of a state the Japanese envisaged (and how much their considerations mattered to the Indonesian delegates) changed with the progress of the war. The setting up of the committee appears to have been designed to give the appearance of progress towards independence so that, when the Allies landed, the poverty stricken population would fight alongside the Japanese rather than against them. As the military situation deteriorated, the Japanese came to the position that an early declaration of independence would

serve their long-term interests. In the words of a foreign affairs ministry assessment written in 1944, 'if independence is granted by us, then half the victory can be acknowledged as ours' (Benda *et al.* 1965: 242). How far the Japanese tried to determine the outcome of the proceedings of the committee is difficult to say. Eight Japanese served as 'special members', but did not have voting rights and do not appear to have intervened openly in the committee proceedings. The government insisted that the deliberations take place within a framework of establishing a state 'with Greater East Asian State characteristics' (*Kan Pō* No. 66 May 1945: 38–9), i.e. that it should adhere to the broad ideological and organisational principles promoted by the Japanese administration.

The main way in which the Japanese helped determine its outcome was through their judicious selection of members. First of all, because there was disagreement within the ranks of the Japanese how large Indonesia should be, membership of the BPUPK was restricted to Javanese and those who had spent the occupation working with the 16th Army in Java.[2] The list of delegates, which had been announced on 29 April – the emperor's birthday – was a mix of conservative senior civil servants such as Supomo, Soemitro Kolopaking and Soetardjo and older-generation secular nationalist politicians including Sukarno, Hatta, Yamin and Subardjo. It was chaired by the veteran Budi Utomo politician and medical doctor Radjiman Wediodiningrat, with the Japanese governor of Cirebon as his deputy (Elsbree 1953: 94; Gunseikanboe 1944: 377). The committee contained no representatives of youth groups (partly because many had by that time begun to turn against the Japanese), only two women[3] and – somewhat incongruously given Japanese support for political Islam during the later part of the occupation – only seven people from distinctly Muslim political groups (Anderson 1961: 21).[4] It is also important to remember, especially in the light of the democratic backlash that occurred just after the Japanese surrender, that none of the pre-war leftist organisations were represented either. The delegates were, by and large, the most senior political and bureaucratic officeholders in the Japanese administration and so could be relied on not to undermine the system that had facilitated their rise to power. The Japanese were keen to get credit from the Indonesians for helping to facilitate independence and had no wish to ignite a social revolution.

Despite considerable uncertainty among the delegates about how the victorious Allies would treat them and the question of Indonesian independence more generally, they approached the political and ideological debates during the 12 days the BPUPK sat in plenary session with gravity and a sense of mission. They were, after all, deliberating on what sort of a state Indonesia should be. At the same time they realised that the constitution that they had been asked to draft was an emergency, interim document that would be revised when Indonesia was fully independent and when a discussion of the issues by a more broadly representative body would be possible.[5] None of the participants imagined that their hurried effort would see Indonesia almost into the

twenty-first century, let alone that it would ever come to be revered as a sacred artefact. The resurrection of the wartime constitution in 1959, and its endurance to the present (albeit with major revisions following the fall of Soeharto), give the constitutional debates of 1945 lasting significance. Such records of the BPUPK proceedings that survive, therefore, are crucial sources for recurrent and continuing contests over the ideological foundations of the Indonesian state. For this reason, and because the wartime debates illustrate neatly the enduring tension in Indonesian politics between organicist and rights-oriented conceptions of state organisation, it is worth looking at them in some detail.

State and society in the constitutional debates

The first sitting of the BPUPK, which lasted from 28 May until 1 June, concentrated on what kind of state would be established in Indonesia, what its boundaries would be, and on what philosophical foundations it should be built. Several people spoke during the five-day sitting, but the record of the speeches is patchy. For several decades, discussion of what was said in the BPUPK debates revolved around texts published in the first volume of Muhammad Yamin's *Preparatory Documents for the Constitution of 1945* (Yamin 1959). Long considered unreliable, Yamin's collection was discredited following the discovery in the 1990s of fresh archival evidence that revealed that he had edited the documents to exaggerate his own contribution to history.[6] Tight restrictions on access to the archives imposed by Soeharto's ideological gatekeepers, however, meant that it was not until 2004 that an accurate collection of known stenographic records, assembled by constitutional lawyer A.B. Kusuma, was able to be published.

A key issue in the debates was the question of Indonesia's philosophical foundation, referred to in the proceedings either as the *Staatsidee*[7] or *dasar negara* (basis of the state). Since this legal concept tends to be taken for granted by Indonesian and European commentators and glossed over by Anglophone writers unfamiliar with Continental legal philosophy, some comments about why so much time and energy were spent debating it are in order. The notion of the *Staatsidee* is central to the positivist approach to constitutional law (represented by figures such as Jellinek and Hans Kelsen) that dominated mainstream legal thinking in Germany and Holland before the Second World War and has been dominant in Indonesian legal practice ever since. According to this doctrine, the state constitutes a hierarchy of laws (called legal norms) each deriving its authority from a higher level of law. At the peak of the hierarchy is the *Staatsidee* (or in Kelsen's formulation, the *Grundnorm* or 'basic norm'), a fundamental principle from which all laws derive their logic and purpose, as does the state itself. Once agreed upon by the founders of a state, the *Staatsidee* is theoretically beyond question. It was therefore not only moral and philosophical problems that were at stake in the early debates of the BPUPK but significant constitutional issues as well.

Supomo, who delivered a major speech to the committee on the third day of the proceedings, insisted that the question of Indonesia's *Staatsidee* receive top priority because all else flowed from it, including the question of whether Indonesia should become a republic or a monarchy, a unitary state or a federation, and what sort of relationship should exist between religion and the state. Supomo was an authoritative figure in the BPUPK who had more input than anyone else to drafting the 1945 Constitution. The text of the 31 May address was to become a key coordinate in later Indonesian organicist discourse.

Early in his speech, Supomo recalled the words of the Japanese chief of the general affairs department urging the delegates to bear in mind that nations were living beings. Delegates should, therefore, be careful not simply to imitate other government systems – except, the Japanese general said, where they provided genuinely exemplary models – but rather adapt any future system of government to the specific character of the nation and its circumstances (Kusuma 2004: 125).[8] This was, Supomo argued, very germane advice, which he translated immediately into the key axiom of the Historical School. 'A state's internal organisation is intimately related to its legal genealogy (*Rechtsgeschichte*) and its social structure' (ibid.).[9] Whatever form of government was adopted would therefore, he said, have to take its cues from the unique social circumstances prevailing in Indonesia, while at the same time 'taking into account the demands of the times, including, for example, Indonesian aspirations within the Greater East Asian sphere' (ibid.).

On this basis he rejected theoretical approaches to state organisation based on liberalism or Marxism. The former, which he linked with Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Spencer and Laski, proceeded from the assumptions of individualism and rested on the idea of a social contract among individuals. This was clearly untenable in Indonesia, he argued, because individualistic principles in Western Europe and America end up dividing and alienating people from one another and from society. Individualism on a national level, he maintained, always gives rise to imperialism, greed and exploitation. Supomo portrayed Marxism in equally bleak terms as a theory rooted in antagonism between groups. Marxists, he explained, think of the state as a tool that the economically dominant class uses to oppress subordinate groups and advocate that the working classes rise up and seize power and become in turn the oppressors of the bourgeoisie. While a dictatorship of the proletariat may suit the Russians, he said, it would be altogether out of step with Indonesia's traditional social character (ibid.). The tradition of political thought most in tune with Indonesia's patterns of organisation, Supomo argued, was 'integralism' (*teori integralistik*),[10] which he traced to the work of 'Spinoza,[11] Adam Müller, Hegel and others'. In this theory, the task of the state is 'not to guarantee the interests of either individuals or groups, but rather to protect the interests of the whole society'. The state, Supomo argued, was coterminous with 'the social order as a whole', in which:

> all groups, all parts and all members are bound tightly to one another to form an *organic* unity in society. The crucial feature of a state based on this way of thinking is the all-embracing character of national life. The state does not favour the strongest or the largest group, and does not place too much store on the interests of individual, but rather looks after the well-being of *all* aspects of the life of the nation as *an indivisible whole*.
>
> (Kusuma 2004: 124–5)

To illustrate what he meant by integralist theory, Supomo gave two examples of states in which it was manifest, namely Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The German state, prior to its surrender, was based on the principle of 'totalitarianism' (*alam pikiran negara totaliter*), a term that Supomo used interchangeably with 'integralism'. This was expressed, Supomo elaborated, in the National Socialist precept of *das Ganze der politischen Einheit des Volkes* (the totality of the political unity of the people). He also referred with approval to the Nazi leadership principle in which the leader had unlimited authority over his people (*ein totaler Führerstaat*), as well as the *Blut und Boden Theorie*, the idea that the nation draws its strength from its shared 'blood' and 'soil'. In order that his listeners were left in no doubt about his point, he continued: 'Honoured gentlemen, the principles inherent in the national socialist approach of unity between the leaders and the people and of unity within *the state as a whole*, fit together well with the eastern way of thought' (Kusuma 2004: 126). Supomo's praise for the Japanese system, if less surprising, was also fulsome. At the core of the Japanese state, Supomo said, 'was the abiding spiritual and temporal unity of the Most Esteemed Emperor, the state and the whole Japanese people. The Emperor is the spiritual focus of the entire populace. Underpinning the state is the family principle [*kekeluargaan*]' (ibid.). Japan's emphases on unity and the family principle, he said, were likewise 'very compatible' with traditional patterns of Indonesian social organisation.

As Indonesia's foremost *adat* law scholar, Supomo then summarised the key features of 'Indonesian culture' in the highly romantic, orientalist terms that by then formed a standard part of the discourse of national identity among many older generation nationalists. Supomo spoke of the basic impulse among Indonesians and in Indonesian culture toward the 'unity of life' in both the corporeal and spiritual realms. This entailed a unity between the microcosmos and macrocosmos, between servant and lord (*kawulo dan gusti*), between the people and their rulers. Individuals, he said, could not be conceived of as separate from other people, from the outside world or indeed from living beings as a whole. 'This', Supomo said, 'is the totalitarian concept, the Indonesian integralist concept which is manifest in the traditional constitutional order' (ibid.).[12]

Evidence of this harmony between rulers and ruled, Supomo said, could be found in Indonesian village life, where village heads 'always consulted with

their people' in order to 'preserve the spiritual bonds between the leaders and the people as a whole'. In this atmosphere of unity, 'all groups in society are encompassed by the spirit of *gotong royong* and the family principle'. On the basis of this evidence, Supomo concluded that:

> if we are to establish an Indonesian state in accordance with the Indonesian character and social structure, our state must base itself on the integralist *Staatsidee*, in which the state unites with the entire people and stands above all groups in every field of endeavour.
>
> (Kusuma 2004: 127)

Unsurprisingly, Supomo rejected the idea of legal safeguards or human rights guarantees to protect individuals from the abuse of power:

> [A]ccording to the integralistic understanding of 'state', as the unity of the constituted people, there will be no dualism between 'state and individual', there will be no conflict between the structure of the state and the laws relating to individuals, there will be no dualism between state and civil society [*Staat und staatsfreie Gesellschaft*], there will be no need for basic rights or human rights [*Grund-und Freiheitsrechte*] for the individual against the state, because individuals are organic parts of the state, each with their own position and responsibilities to contribute to the glory of the state, and because the state is not a coercive body or a political giant standing outside the sphere of individual freedom.
>
> (ibid.)

Sensing discomfort with the implications of his concept, Supomo urged his audience not to worry about the possibility that the 'integralist or totalitarian state theory' would cause the government 'to disregard the existence of groups as groups or individuals as individuals. That's not the point of it!' (Kusuma 2004: 128). Arguing (after Eggens and others) that integralism, unlike individualism, is concerned with 'the concrete and the real, as opposed to the abstract', Supomo assured his listeners that the state would:

> recognise and respect the existence of real groups, but all people and all groups must be aware of their position as an organic part of the state as a whole, with the responsibility to uphold unity and harmony among all the various constituent parts.
>
> (ibid.)

Although the concept of power is often absent from organicist discourse, it is clear that Supomo envisaged a system in which the leader's authority was unlimited by constitutional checks and balances. Leadership, as he pointed out, addressing the question of whether Indonesia should be a republic or a monarchy, was the *sine qua non* of the integralist system. Supomo said that he

was not especially worried whether the head of state resembled a king, a president or a *Führer*, or whether he would be appointed for a limited term or installed as a hereditary ruler, provided that he was a 'true leader' (Kusuma 2004: 131) capable of transcending all group interests. A leader would be to the nation what the village head was to the traditional village, both an interpreter of the popular will and someone capable of giving shape (*Gestaltung*) to the peoples' sense of justice' (Kusuma 2004: 132). In the strangely optimistic atmosphere that appears to have pervaded the assembly, Supomo could then say, without irony, that 'If the Indonesian Head of State could manifest these traits, he would be like the *Ratu Adil* [the messianic 'Just King'] which the entire Indonesian people long for' (ibid.). The people, he said, 'would be enjoined to love and devote themselves to their leader and the state' (Kusuma 2004: 130). Whether or not Supomo was among the six delegates who eventually voted in favour of a monarchy, his language suggests that he envisaged a state presided over by a wise and benevolent sovereign who would be at once the head of state and the head of government.

On the basis of this speech some scholars have portrayed Supomo as a fascist. But there is little else about his writing or behaviour to suggest that that he seriously looked forward to the establishment in Indonesia of Japanese- or German-style regimes. Neither is there any evidence of the racism and chauvinism espoused for instance in India by Hindu nationalist admirers of Hitler and Mussolini. What Supomo wanted more than anything was to preserve the aristocracy-linked administrative apparatus of the colonial era intact. His 'integralist state' is best seen as an attempt to ward off both political Islam and those within the nationalist movement who were inspired by democratic principles, which he saw, quite rightly, as a threat to the social status quo inherited from the Dutch colonial state and maintained, in large part, through the Japanese occupation.

The following day, 1 June 1945, Sukarno presented his famous 'Pantja Sila' (Five Principles) speech in which he enunciated the formula he argued be adopted as the *Staatsidee*, or *Philosophische grondslag* (philosophical foundation) as he put it, of the independent state. It was an animated, playful speech, fully in keeping with Sukarno's historic role as the architect of unity within the nationalist forces. He teased previous speakers who had, it seems, not only disagreed seriously about the basis of the state but also allowed themselves to get bogged down in procedural technicalities and doubts about the capacity of Indonesians to take over the running of the state. Sukarno implored his listeners to put their qualms aside, seize the historic opportunity for independence that lay before them and worry about the details later on (Kusuma 2004: 150–3).

Sukarno's five principles – nationalism (*Kebangsaan*), internationalism or humanism (*Internationalisme atau peri-kemanusiaan*), joint deliberation and representation (*Musyawarah dan perwakilan*), social welfare (*Kesejahteraan sosial*) and belief in God (*Ketuhanan*) – were designed in such a way as to accommodate all the conflicting opinions so far expressed, most particularly

between those who wanted Indonesia to be an Islamic state and the majority of the delegates who did not.[13] If necessary, he said, they could be reduced to three principles: socio-nationalism, socio-democracy and belief in God. And if people were still not happy, these three could be compressed further into a single principle, *gotong royong*, which he explained was a 'pure Indonesian' term meaning solidarity, commitment of 'all to all'. 'How magnificent! A *Gotong-Royong* State!' he declared, to applause from the committee members (Kusuma 2004: 165).[14] After being slightly reworded and rearranged to give 'Belief in the One God' the top position, Sukarno's five principles were adopted as part of the preamble to the constitution, where they were declared to be the basis of the Indonesian state.[15]

Sukarno and Supomo are often represented as belonging to the same political camp within the BPUPK (see e.g. Reeve 1985: 68–74; Besar 1984: 114–17). This is true insofar as both were opposed to the idea of an Islamic state, both regarded it as important to bring all political philosophies together under a single ideological umbrella, both endorsed collective over individualistic or liberal forms of representation and both favoured a strong, authoritarian state. Yet their starting points were very different. For Supomo, a nation's *Staatsidee* was, by definition, grounded in its fundamental patterns of social, cultural and political organisation. The more faithfully a nation's *Staatsidee* expressed its people's basic traits, the more united, harmonious and glorious the state would be. Thus, for Supomo, the crucial task of the BPUPK was to attune the state philosophy as far as possible to what he saw as the purest manifestation of Indonesian political culture: the traditional village.

Sukarno had a different view of what constituted a state's philosophical foundation. For him, a nation's philosophical foundation, or as he put it, its *Weltanschauung*, was not something that could simply 'manifest itself' or which lay waiting to be discovered, but rather an ideology that had to be consciously created and fought for. This was evident in the way he talked about the *Weltanschauung* of other nations. He did not, like Supomo, assume an umbilical connection between the character of a people and the character of their state. Other countries' experience had demonstrated that political philosophies were the product of rational thought and political struggle. Describing the Soviet Union's basic philosophy, for instance, he recounted how Lenin had formulated and tested his ideas long before the 1917 Revolution. The same was true, he said, of Hitler and Sun Yat Sen's philosophies. And this also applied to the political philosophy that he himself had been developing for the past quarter of a century.

In explaining his five principles, Sukarno did not take traditional Indonesian village culture as his primary touchstone but rather those aspects of nationalist thought from around the world that he saw as the most progressive. His measure of what was worthwhile was not the degree to which foreign philosophies approximated indigenous ones, but rather what ideas could most usefully be adopted, wherever they may come from, to build a new Indonesia. Sukarno was quite willing, for example, to acknowledge the influence of such

European thinkers as Ernest Renan and Otto Bauer. He also freely admitted his intellectual debt to Sun Yat Sen, whose 'Three People's Principles' of nationalism, democracy and socialism were made the basis of the Chinese state in 1912. 'Internationalism' and 'social welfare' were likewise principles that Sukarno did not try to claim as indigenous in inspiration. Even the principle of 'joint deliberation and representation', the tenet with the most nativistic ambience, he described in language far removed from the quiet harmony of Supomo's organicist concept: 'There are no truly dynamic states whose legislatures do not resemble heaving, boiling craters[16] in which different opinions are thrashed out. … In our legislature too there will be almighty struggles' (Kusuma 2004: 161). This is not to say that Sukarno did not think it important to incorporate nativist imagery in his rhetoric – the central place of *gotong royong* is an obvious case in point. But Sukarno saw indigenous culture more as the raw material for his designs rather than providing a model to be aspired to. He therefore felt free to dispense with the placid image of Indonesian culture constructed by the *adat* scholars in favour of a more robust, future-oriented and socialist flavoured one. In fact he made a point of rejecting Supomo's family principle, with its feudal overtones, as 'a static concept'. '*Gotong royong*', he said, was 'a dynamic concept … denoting a collective strenuous effort, sweating together … for our common happiness' (Kusuma 2004: 165; Nasution 1992: 98–9).

The general point here, then, is that despite some similarities in their prescriptions, Sukarno and Supomo grounded their positions in different intellectual traditions. They were, in some respects, on opposite sides of the argument between romantic conservatism and the Enlightenment. While Supomo's approach was grounded in the organicist assumptions of the Historical School and its successors, Sukarno was a modernist, humanist thinker. While Supomo saw inherent value in tradition and in the 'traditional' social status quo, Sukarno was a believer in the power of ideas, properly mobilised, to transform society and culture. Instead of preserving or justifying Indonesia's 'feudal' social structure and attendant philosophies, Sukarno condemned 'aristocratic nationalism' and dreamed, as he put it in his 1933 tract *To Reach a Free Indonesia*, of 'a total transformation of the character of society' (Sukarno 1966: 267).[17] It is important to make this distinction here so as not to fall into the trap of conflating Supomo's brand of conservative organicism, later adopted by elements within the leadership of the Indonesian army, and later still by New Order ideologues, with what might be called Sukarno's revolutionary or egalitarian collectivism, which was influenced by Leninist and Jacobin ideas.[18] While the two shared some of the same collectivist, romantic and even organicist vocabulary, they had different beginnings and different ends.

The BPUPK's first sitting finished on 1 June, and the body did not reconvene until 10 July. The intervening six weeks saw the initiative flow from the Japanese administration towards the nationalists favouring early independence. In the absence of clear instructions from Tokyo, the Japanese authorities

became uncertain what to do as they watched the BPUPK transform itself from a time-buying mechanism into a political institution with a life of its own. The nationalists inside the committee and, more urgently, outside it, smelt Japan's defeat and took advantage of every opportunity to test the limits. A subcommittee headed by Sukarno, established during the first sitting to examine proposals concerning the future constitution, set about encouraging all kinds of groups to make suggestions about the text. On 22 June Sukarno's subcommittee met in Jakarta with 29 other BPUPK members and formed an executive and drafting committee.[19] This group of nine drafted a preamble for the constitution containing a formulation of the Pancasila, which stipulated that the Indonesian state was 'based on Belief in God, with the obligation of practicing sharia law for the adherents of Islam'. Opposition from Christians and from Muslims worried that this could lead to fanaticism led to the phrase relating to sharia being quietly deleted on 18 August. While there were few objections to this at the time, the deletion was later to become the source of protracted and ongoing debate over the legitimacy of this deletion and the broader question of the state's responsibility for upholding the tenets of Islam (Elson 2009).

Meanwhile Supomo, who was not included in Sukarno's subcommittee, set his own plans in motion. On 15 June he joined six other senior members of the BPUPK to write an extraordinary letter to the Japanese military commander claiming that since the BPUPK had not been able to reach agreement about 'problems relating to the formation of an independent government', it was vital that the procedures be changed. Instead of continuing the debates, the seven delegates proposed that an 18-article interim constitution, appended to the letter, be agreed to by the government. If adopted, this would have seen the establishment of a three-person National Leadership Council chosen by the 2,000 or so most prominent Indonesians collaborating with the Japanese,[20] which would take over from the Japanese all governmental powers except for defence. Assisted by an appointed Supreme Advisory Council, this triumvirate would rule Indonesia with absolute executive and legislative power. Three months after the end of the war, the Leadership Council would 'form' a people's representative body that would do what the BPUPK was set up to do, namely decide on the type of state and draft a new constitution (Kusuma 2004: 192–7).

Since the letter bore the signatures neither of Sukarno, Hatta, nor any of the Muslim representatives, it is fair to assume that this effort to short circuit the debates and establish what amounted to a dictatorship under Japanese protection was carried out without the consent, and probably without the knowledge, of the full committee. The signatories, apart from Supomo, were Subardjo, Singgih, R. Soewandi and R. Sastromoeljono, as well as Supomo's former *Adat* Research Council colleagues Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo and Husein Djajadiningrat,[21] all but two of whom were aligned with Budi Utomo or Parindra and all of whom probably shared Supomo's conservative, aristocratic vision for Indonesia. The politics of their move is unclear, but may well have been a response to the increasingly explosive demands for immediate

independence by youth groups all over Java, who many older generation nationalists feared might 'bypass their leadership and come into open conflict with the Japanese' (Anderson 1961: 51–5). Encouraging the Japanese to foreclose the debates appears to have been calculated to negate the possibility of the delegates succumbing to pressure during the next sitting to steer the constitutional deliberations towards a more populist, radical and perhaps Islamic outcome.[22] The signatories may well have been uncomfortable with the way in which the issue of monarchy had received such short shrift so far. The fact that both the 15 June letter and the transitory provisions of the interim constitution stressed the need for further discussion on the monarchy/republic issue suggests that they wanted to see – or thought that the Japanese wanted to see – monarchy given a better chance.

Drafting the constitution

As it happened, the military commander allowed the second (and final) sitting to go ahead on 10 July as planned. Lasting eight days, it was devoted to drafting a constitution and deciding on general policy issues to do with citizenship, territory, religion, finance and defence. In this short time, the constitution went through several stages of drafting and amendment. At a meeting of 11 July, speakers made preliminary statements about what they hoped the constitution would look like and a committee of 19, headed by Sukarno and including one Japanese, was formed to oversee its production. To expedite the process, and probably also to exclude those people who had spoken in favour of a more comprehensive, rights-oriented document, Sukarno delegated the work of drafting the constitution to a seven person subcommittee chaired by Supomo. Drawing on the April 1942 draft constitution discussed in the previous chapter, it took this subcommittee only a day to produce a draft of a little over a thousand words, which was tabled on 13 July for discussion by the full Sukarno committee. After some minor amendments it was presented to the plenary committee for debate on 14 July and on 16 July it was accepted. It was this version, stripped of its references to Greater East Asia, which was finally adopted on 18 August 1945, the day after Sukarno and Hatta had proclaimed Indonesia's independence.

The main institutions under the 1945 Constitution – and here I use the past tense because the multiple amendments made after the fall of Soeharto changed it substantially – were an extremely strong presidency, a super-parliamentary body called the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and a legislature called the People's Representative Council (DPR). The MPR, which included all members of the DPR, was required to meet at least once every five years to formulate policy guidelines and elect a president, with no limits imposed on presidential tenure. Government ministers were appointed by, and responsible to, the president. The legislature had the right to propose draft laws, but these could only be ratified with the assent of the president, giving him or her effective veto powers. Where necessary the president could issue executive

decrees, which, to remain valid, had be endorsed by the legislature during its next sitting. The weak position of the DPR was marginally compensated for by the stipulation that, because DPR members were simultaneously members of the 'superior' MPR, the president could not dissolve the legislature. Joint membership also made it possible for DPR members to call the president to account before an extraordinary session of the MPR if the situation demanded it. The constitution did not prescribe a separation of powers. This, however, was implied in the official elucidation[23] that specified that the Supreme Court must be independent of the executive, even though it had no power to test the constitutionality of legislation.

Many fundamental issues that would normally be defined in a constitution were relegated in the 1945 Constitution to be 'regulated by statute' by future governments. Some have attributed this to a lack of time, but, given that the 1942 draft was quite specific about a range of provisions, including citizens' rights, protection of the individual against the state and the regulation of the judiciary, it is clear that the vagueness of the 1945 Constitution was deliberate. Among the matters left unresolved were the structure of the legal system, the appointment of judges, provisions governing the declaration of states of emergency and the entire question of political rights. The document contains no indication how large the MPR and DPR should be, nor, more egregiously, how they should be constituted. The only stipulation in this regard was that the MPR should comprise the entire membership of the DPR, supplemented by 'representatives of regions and groups'.

The 1945 Constitution took its shape from the draft produced by Supomo's drafting subcommittee, whose members included Supomo's Leiden colleagues from the 1920s Subardjo, Maramis and Singgih, the patrician Javanese lawyer K.R.M.T. Wongsonegoro, as well as Muslim leaders Haji Agoes Salim and Sukiman Wirjosandjojo.[24] The composition of this group, as Sukarno was no doubt aware, predisposed it to a strong, centralised, non-Islamic state favourable both to the Japanese and to himself. Supomo, Singgih and Wongsonegoro were aligned with Parindra, with its long record of praising strong leadership (Abeyasekere 1972: 270), while Subardjo and Maramis were admirers of the Japanese style of rule. Sukiman was the only one who is known to have spoken in favour of democracy and political rights in the BPUPK (see Kusuma 2004: 374–6). Conspicuous by his absence on the Supomo subcommittee was the Minangkabau lawyer Muhammad Yamin, the most knowledgeable constitutional scholar in the committee. Either because of his argumentative nature or because of pressure from the Japanese – who had removed him from his position as adviser to the propaganda department the year before – BPUPK Chair Radjiman explicitly refused him permission to join the drafting committee, shunting him off to Hatta's finance committee instead (Kusuma 2004: 294–6).

Putting aside Yamin's later efforts to doctor the 1945 transcripts to paint himself as the key author of the constitution, it is evident from the authentic records that his contribution was significant. The proposal that membership

of the MPR and the DPR be concurrent, for instance, appears to have been his. Yamin is likely also to have been responsible for the stipulation in the constitution, which was to take on particular significance in the late 1950s, that the MPR be comprised of regional representatives and 'groups' representing the society. He refers in this context to the 1936 Constitutions of Russia and China, both of which, as Reeve (1985: 69–70) points out, had assemblies based on corporatist principles, although he might just as well have taken his cue from the organically constituted Volksraad or the Djawa Hōkōkai. Although Yamin was something of a maverick ideologically, his BPUPK speeches in favour of executive accountability and popular rights reflect the influence of US-style constitutionalism and social democratic ideas far removed from Supomo's 'integralism'. He argued for the 'group' representatives in the MPR being directly and freely elected by the people, that ministers be responsible to the legislature, that the separation of powers be upheld and that a bill of rights be appended to the constitution (Kusuma 2004: 273–85, 381–2).[25]

None of these suggestions was accepted by Supomo's subcommittee. Indeed the draft constitution produced by Supomo contained nothing at all about popular political rights or general elections.[26] Maria Ulfah Santoso, the only woman member of the Sukarno committee, was the first to protest against the absence of basic rights in the constitution. Supomo dismissed her complaint with the extraordinary remark 'There's no need, because the Indonesian State is based on popular sovereignty [*kedaulatan rakyat*]' (Kusuma 2004: 315). In saying so, Supomo had performed a remarkable philosophical sleight of hand. The 'integralist' approach he had outlined in his 31 May speech belonged to a tradition fundamentally opposed to the Enlightenment idea of popular sovereignty and its corollary, a social contract. However, aware that the notion of popular sovereignty had the backing of Sukarno and a large number of other delegates, Supomo imposed on it an absolutist, Hobbesian reading in an attempt to achieve the same ends he had argued for in his earlier speech. This new tack was also apparent in his response, in the same 13 July session, to the Ambonese lawyer Latuharhary, who argued that Articles 21 and 22, which stipulate that the DPR could not resubmit a piece of draft legislation in a given sitting of parliament if it had been rejected either by the DPR or by the president, did not guarantee popular sovereignty. Supomo told him 'I don't agree, because the president, not the DPR, is the manifestation of popular sovereignty' (ibid.). Supomo knew well that popular sovereignty had to reside in an institution (the MPR in this case) rather than in a person, but his answer indicates who he envisaged having the upper hand.

Unfortunately the archival sources do not include any further discussion about rights prior to 14 July, but Sukarno's speech of that date indicates that opposition to the exclusion of rights was by no means limited to the two figures mentioned above. 'When copies of the draft constitution were distributed', Sukarno recounted, 'a large number of members came to our committee to ask why it was that in the constitution, in the constitution we had drafted, there was no mention of human rights, no citizens' rights' (Kusuma 2004: 345).

Sukarno then launched into a long and fiery polemic, quite different in tone from his Pancasila speech, pleading with the delegates to accept that citizens' rights had no place in Indonesia. He attempted to discredit rights – 'the source of the catastrophes occurring in the world' (Kusuma 2004: 349) – by locking them into the individualism–liberalism–capitalism–imperialism–colonialism syllogism. This allowed him to associate rights with everything from class exploitation to colonial oppression and world wars. Uncharacteristically for this stage of the proceedings, Sukarno also attempted to win over the delegates by arguing that a rejection of rights was in line with the 'Greater East Asian ideology' (Kusuma 2004: 353).

One delegate Sukarno did not convince was his Sumatran colleague Mohammad Hatta, who responded immediately with a firm rebuke. Pointing out that he, too, had spent the past 20 years working against individualism in the economic sphere – a reference to his long advocacy of socialism and of cooperatives – Hatta warned that were the right to free speech not guaranteed in the constitution there was a chance that Indonesia would end up with the sort of 'cadaver discipline' he argued was evident in Germany and Russia. Hatta envisaged a strong, interventionist, welfare state, but warned that granting the state unlimited powers would pave the way for a dictatorship (Kusuma 2004: 355). One way to guard against this, Hatta suggested, would be to include articles guaranteeing 'the right to associate and to hold meetings, to correspond freely and so on'. Most likely in response to Supomo's arguments, Hatta warned that the principle of popular sovereignty could be misused by the state 'especially in constitutions like this one, in which popular sovereignty resides in the People's Consultative Assembly [MPR] which in turn entrusts its power to the president … ' (ibid.). The president, he stressed, must not have the constitutional freedom to establish a dictatorship. Anticipating that his suggestions would be construed as 'smelling of individualism', Hatta said that even in collectivist systems people needed rights to enable them to express themselves and to form organisations.

Supomo responded with a long extemporaneous speech in which his main defence against Hatta was that constitutions have to be internally consistent, and that to include rights guarantees in the constitution would introduce discordant elements (Kusuma 2004: 357). While rights guarantees were very appropriate in liberal states, he said they would be completely out of tune with the spirit of the constitution as specified in the preamble, which at that time still committed Indonesia to being part of the Greater East Asia family (Kusuma 2004: 358). There was also a danger, Supomo argued, that the inclusion of political rights would introduce 'specific', binding elements into what was otherwise a highly general and flexible constitution, which he observed was 'similar in character to, but shorter than, that of Imperial Japan' (Kusuma 2004: 360). In addition to these 'technical' objections, Supomo took a swipe at Hatta's personal commitment to the collectivist consensus in a way that later became a standard means of discrediting opponents of organicism. The fact that Hatta had raised the possibility of the government acting in an

arbitrary way towards its citizens, he said, indicated that his thinking was still coloured by individualism (Kusuma 2004: 366–7). If this were going to happen, Supomo then said, no article in the constitution was going to prevent it. Supomo went on to argue that it was inconceivable that in a system built on the family principle (which by this stage had taken the place of integralism and totalitarianism) people would be forbidden to associate, to organise and to speak out. In any case in such a system people do not ask what their rights are but rather what responsibilities they have as members of 'their family, their village, the region, the state, Greater East Asia and the world' (Kusuma 2004: 367).

Several other speakers, including the left-leaning newspaper editor Liem Koen Hian[27] and Sukiman, argued in favour of including political rights in the constitution and, in the case of the latter, for guarantees that the MPR be directly elected (Kusuma 2004: 392–5, 374–6). Still Supomo, who was the dominant voice on constitutional matters, refused to be swayed, insisting that political rights and the matter of elections – indeed the whole question of whether the MPR would be elected or appointed – were minor issues. With the apparent backing of Sukarno, Supomo also rejected a fresh call by Yamin (Kusuma 2004: 380–6) to introduce a range of democratic rights to guard against the future emergence of absolutism, arguing that Yamin's demand that ministers be responsible to parliament would involve making them dependent on public opinion and that this was tantamount to advocating a parliamentary system (Kusuma 2004: 388–9). Yamin's proposal that the High Court be given power to test the constitutionality of legislation he spurned on the grounds that the constitution did not recognise the doctrine of the separation of powers, a rejection that was to be echoed by defenders of executive power for decades to come.[28]

Late in the afternoon of Saturday 14 July, Supomo came up with a compromise solution on rights, citing the concerns of 'many of the members' who he said had 'not yet understood the meaning of the family principle'. He proposed the words 'Laws governing the freedom of the population to organise and associate, to express themselves either orally or in writing and so forth, will be determined by statute' (Kusuma 2004: 402). This solution would, he said, avoid granting individual rights while making it incumbent upon future governments to address the question of rights. Supomo said that Hatta's much more explicit proposal – 'People's right to express themselves orally or in writing, as well as their right to organise and associate, is recognised by the state and will be determined by statute' – would be unacceptable because it implied an antagonistic relationship between the people and the state. Supomo's formulation (minus the first two words) is recorded as having been accepted unanimously by the committee and was adopted as Article 28 of the constitution (Kusuma 2004: 403).[29]

Simanjuntak (1989: 238–9) argued that the inclusion of Article 28 was a decisive victory for Hatta, Yamin and the other advocates of rights because it guaranteed the right to organise and to speak freely and thereby destroyed

the logic of Supomo's integralist system. Had Hatta's formulation been accepted this would have been the case, but the wording of the Article in its final form is more than a little ambiguous. Certainly it left the way open for future legislators to pass statutes guaranteeing the right of Indonesians to associate, organise or express themselves, but at the same time it did nothing to prevent these rights being legislated away. Indeed the term 'rights', which Hatta had proposed, does not appear in Supomo's version, having been replaced with 'freedoms'. So, while Article 28 was an achievement of sorts for the rights advocates, it was not in itself the knockout blow to the integralist system that they were aiming for.

It is not easy to gauge just how far to attribute the virtual absence of guarantees of citizens' political rights in the constitution to the Japanese and how much to the dominant nationalist figures in the BPUPK. The fact that Supomo was also primarily responsible for drafting the 1949 and 1950 Constitutions, both of which are much more democratic than the 1945 Constitution, suggests that the wishes of the Japanese – or at least Supomo's perceptions of what the Japanese wanted – were a decisive factor. This would accord with the widely held image of Supomo as a biddable bureaucrat. But it is not clear that the Japanese *were* pressing to have rights excluded from the Indonesian constitution. Two years earlier, at the height of their power, they had approved the constitution of the Second Philippine Republic, containing an extensive list of citizen's rights and protections against arbitrary government actions as well as impeachment provisions and the separation of powers (Zaide 1990: 1–19). Emphasis on direct Japanese pressure also obscures the degree to which Supomo's 1945 vision is compatible with his view of state–society relations delineated in his 1941 speech at the University of Indonesia, discussed in the previous chapter.

The point here, then, is that Supomo, and probably Sukarno as well, did not need much convincing. Both took advantage of the opportunities the Japanese occupation presented, with its authoritarian and tightly circumscribed political structures. Supomo's concern was to preserve intact the privileged position that the *pangreh pradja* had enjoyed under the colonial order, Sukarno's to draw together the divergent nationalist forces into a powerful front against the main threats Indonesia faced, especially the restoration of Dutch colonial rule. Neither of them wished to see political Islam, which had prospered during the Japanese occupation, get the upper hand in the new dispensation. The fact that the 1945 Constitution had little to say about popular political rights probably owed as much to the outlooks and aspirations of leaders such as Supomo and Sukarno as to Japanese pressure.

This does not mean, however, that the Indonesian Constitution should be seen as realising Supomo's integralist vision. The key factor that makes it implausible to represent the constitution as integralist is its stated commitment to the principle of popular sovereignty, a principle that contradicts the idea that the state and society are essentially one and the same. Neither Supomo's 31 May speech nor the draft constitution his subcommittee produced on

12 July contained any reference to popular sovereignty. Supomo accepted its incorporation only because support for it was so widespread among the delegates, and after doing so was forced to change the way he argued quite radically. It is remarkable that while many of the arguments that took place in the BPUPK, especially over rights and representation, reflected the tensions between integralism and popular sovereignty, Muhammad Yamin appears to have been the only delegate to recognise them explicitly as mutually exclusive.

The failure to deal with the contradictions between integralism and popular sovereignty during the BPUPK debates meant that *both* concepts were embraced by the constitution in ways that laid the foundations for later disagreements and confusion about what the 'founding fathers' had intended. Fundamental to popular sovereignty is the tenet that the legitimacy of government depends on the consent of the governed, and this necessitates some mechanism by which the public is *consulted* – usually regular general elections. Yet the 1945 Constitution, while stating that sovereignty is in the hands of the people and providing for a parliament whose name, the 'People's Representative Assembly' recalls the popularly elected legislatures of democratic states, made no mention of elections or parties and did not specify that the mandate of either the legislature or the MPR be renewed periodically. Lack of clarity surrounding decision making is another result of the awkward way in which these two streams converged in the constitution. Article 2 (3), which specifies that all MPR decisions be made on the basis of voting, emanates from the democratic 'popular sovereignty' tradition. The concurrent emphasis on the concept of *musyawarah*, with its clear reference to 'village-style' consensual decision making, had its origins in the integralist tradition. These dual imperatives left the door open for future governments to avoid putting issues to the vote where a 'consensus' decision was more likely to produce the desired outcome.

Complicating this unhappy marriage of political philosophies in the 1945 Constitution was a collision of legal principles. The colonial legal and administrative order inherited by independent Indonesia followed positivist legal principles in which there was a clear hierarchy of written laws to which everyone, including state officials, was subordinate, at least in theory. A constitution, according to the positivistic framework within which Supomo and the other BPUPK delegates where working, is the highest of all laws and should be a model of clarity. Supomo, however, insisted on maximum brevity and, in some cases, maximum ambiguity. He also imbued the constitution with a fluid and personal concept of authority in which relations between rulers and ruled were governed not by fixed rules consistently applied but by a diffuse paternalism. Nowhere is this more evident than in the official elucidation of the constitution, written by Supomo in July 1945 and subsequently adopted as part of the main text:

> The most important aspect of government and state life is spirit (*semangat*) – the spirit of state officials, the spirit of government leaders.

> While the wording of this Constitution is intentionally familistic, if state officials and the leaders of government are individualistically inclined, the Constitution will of course be meaningless in practice.

Inconsistencies between what might be called the positivistic hardware and the organicist software of the constitution have been the source of much legal confusion over the years. Ambiguous wording and the emphasis on such concepts as the family principle, *musyawarah* and *semangat* in the constitution allowed future governments great latitude, leaving advocates of a constitutional state bound by laws – referred to in Indonesia as the *Rechtsstaat* – struggling to find a foothold.

A plenary meeting of the BPUPK on 16 July voted to adopt the constitution, with Yamin, characteristically recalcitrant, the only member refusing to give his assent.

Proclaiming independence

Events moved quickly over the four weeks between the last session of the BPUPK and the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945. With the Allies demanding Japan's unconditional surrender in late July and the Russians expected to enter the war, the Japanese government resolved to give Indonesia its independence by early September. On 7 August, the day after Hiroshima was incinerated, the commander of the Southern Area Armies in Saigon announced the establishment of a new Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI)[30] consisting of 22 members, eight of them selected to represent the outer islands, which the Japanese now agreed should be part of Indonesia. The new body consisted mainly of people from the same groups that had been represented in the BPUPK, middle-aged non-Islamic politicians and administrators who had worked closely with the Japanese. On 9 August, Sukarno, Hatta and Radjiman were flown to Saigon where the Southern Area commander, Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, officially swore in Sukarno and Hatta two days later as chair and deputy chair respectively. The main job of the PPKI, scheduled to meet for the first time on 18 August, was to put the final touches to the constitution drafted by the BPUPK and to present it to a parallel Japanese committee for approval.[31]

Intense bombing of Japanese cities and a second atomic blast forced the Tokyo government to surrender unconditionally on 15 August. For a second time in less than five years the Indonesian population watched as a seemingly invincible regime crumbled. For the next few weeks the Japanese military administration was to take orders from the Allies' Southeast Asia Command headquartered in Ceylon, who instructed it to maintain the status quo until the Allied forces arrived to formally receive its surrender. Expectations of independence were running high, however, especially among the radical youth groups, and the Japanese were aware that the situation could spin out of control if they publicly cancelled preparations for independence.

In the two days after Japan's surrender the Indonesian nationalist leaders who had been working with the Japanese were caught in a vice. Should they risk offending the Japanese by declaring independence unilaterally or rather risk offending the youth groups by continuing to cooperate with the Japanese? The youth leaders demanded that Sukarno and Hatta make a bold declaration of independence outside the framework of the Japanese appointed PPKI. When the older generation politicians refused to take this risk, the youth leaders tried to force them to act by abducting Sukarno and Hatta in the early hours of 16 August to a small town west of Jakarta, on the pretext that a Peta and Heiho uprising planned for the next day would put them in danger. Fearful that the initiative would pass to the activist youth groups, Vice-Admiral Maeda, head of the Japanese Navy's Liaison Office in Jakarta, guaranteed that the Japanese would not stand in the way of a declaration of independence by Sukarno. That evening Sukarno and Hatta were escorted to Maeda's house where most of the PPKI members had assembled and late on the night of 16 August, Sukarno, Hatta, Subardjo, Maeda and three other senior Japanese officers prepared the wording of a declaration acceptable to both the Japanese and to the older generation nationalist leadership.

The following morning, 17 August 1945, a small group of nationalist leaders gathered in front of Sukarno's house to hear him read the two-sentence declaration of independence beneath the red and white flag: 'We, the people of Indonesia, hereby declare Indonesia's independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be executed in an orderly manner in the shortest possible time'. The text was signed by Sukarno and Hatta 'in the name of the people of Indonesia'. The Japanese military administration, who were worried about the reaction of the Allies to this breach of their orders to maintain the status quo, did not initially permit any official announcement of the declaration to the outside world. But this was hardly necessary as the news spread like electricity throughout the country, changing it forever.

It is ironic that the 1945 debates should have become such an important point of reference in Indonesian political history. The participants were, after all, predominantly middle-aged conservative males appointed by the Japanese with an interest in preserving the social order in which they enjoyed privileged positions. As the initiative passed to the revolutionary youth in August 1945 even Sukarno played down the significance of the BPUPK, referring to it merely as an 'army government committee' (*Asia Raya* 7 August 1945 in van Klinken 2002). The brief constitution it produced was effectively redundant within weeks and the *in camera* debates that preceded it were consigned to the archives. It was only because of the multi-dimensional crisis of the 1950s that Sukarno and the army revived the wartime constitution and the Japanese sponsored debates of 1945 became relevant again.

A key schism highlighted here is between solidarist and pluralist visions of politics. The solidarists sought unifying ideologies and looked forward to a

strong, interventionist state under a traditional or charismatic leader. They made little distinction between state and society and denied the need for political rights. The pluralists also wanted a strong, interventionist state but one based on a distinction between state and society in which citizens enjoyed political rights and limits on executive authority. This is familiar territory. The contribution of this chapter has been to delineate two varieties of solidarism, one deriving from anti-Enlightenment romantic conservatism, the other based on leftwing revolutionary collectivism. It is only with this understanding that we can negotiate the complexities of anti-liberal politics in the turbulent 1950s and beyond.

Notes

1 The Indonesian name was Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan, also known as Dokuritu Chōsa Jumbi Iin or Dokuritu Zyunbi Tyoosakai.
2 Only six members of the BPUPK had been born outside of Java. The BPUPK's terms of reference were initially restricted to Java but Java was referred to in Japanese announcements as 'the centre of the Indonesian region' (*Kan Pō* No. 66 May 1945: 38–9).
3 These were R. Siti Soekaptinah Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito, a long-time women's rights activist who had represented Parindra before the war and headed the Women's Association during the occupation, and Raden Aju Maria Ulfah Santoso Wirodihardjo, a Leiden-educated lawyer who had worked as a civil servant in the colonial regime. During the Japanese occupation Maria Ulfah had held high positions in the Women's Association, but was also close to Sjahrir's circle (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1993: 109–12, 122–6; Anderson 1972: 437).
4 See Kusuma (2004: 84–6) for a full list. Two youth leaders, Soekarni and Chaerul Saleh, turned down offers of seats because they saw the committee as a tool of the Japanese (Anderson 1961: 18–19).
5 See Sukarno's comments about the 'interim', 'revolutionary' nature of the constitution in Kusuma (2004: 479).
6 The convoluted and intriguing history of the BPUPK archive is told in Kusuma and Elson (2011). Soeharto's ideologues had an interest in maintaining Yamin as the authentic source because it helped sustain their contention that Sukarno had not been the original author of the Pancasila (even though Yamin said elsewhere that Sukarno had been!). Kusuma, who was responsible for uncovering much of the new material, critiques Yamin and other accounts, including incorrect official histories, with forensic verve (2004: 1–82). Yamin's later self-aggrandisement does not detract from his important contribution to the 1945 debates.
7 This German word is also used in Dutch. I retain the German-style capitalisation throughout the text because that is how it normally appears in Indonesian sources.
8 The chief of the General Affairs Department at that time was Major-General Nishimura. Nishimura had as late as 16 May still been insisting that it was pointless to talk about '*Indonesia Merdeka*' (A Free Indonesia) as a future hope since Japan had already liberated Indonesia (Darmosugito 1982: 140).
9 Supomo's use of German legal terminology throughout his speech, and its incorporation into the official elucidation of the 1945 Constitution, indicates how taken for granted German was as the language of constitutional law at the time.
10 Given the unfamiliarity of this term, Marsillam Simanjuntak (1989: 59) concluded that Supomo probably coined it himself. This is unlikely. There is a stream of

Catholic thought calling itself 'integralist', which has helped inspire conservative or rightwing social, political and religious movements in various parts of the world since the early twentieth century. The term is believed to have been coined by the French Catholic monarchist Charles Maurras who was a leader of the far-rightwing, anti-democratic Action Française. There was in Portugal an 'Integralist' school active from 1913 that sought to restore the nation's Roman Catholic monarchist tradition (Atkinson *et al*. 2013). In Brazil there was a Catholic, fascist-style party between 1932 and 1938 that called itself the Ação Integralista Brasileira (Brazilian Integralist Action) (Williams 1974: 435–52). The AIB was the most successful fascist movement in Latin America before the Second World War with up to 200,000 activists (Griffin 1993: 150–2). See Hennessy (1979: 258–61) for a comprehensive list of literature on 1930s '*integralismo*'. A later example that drew on the same set of ideas was the Integralist movement based in the Catholic University of Santiago in Chile in the early 1970s. Known formally as the 'Society for the Defense of Tradition, Property and the Family', the Integralists attacked liberalism and Marxism and 'proposed a return to a Thomistic concept of the "common good" to be determined by corporate interest groups in conjunction with an authoritarian central leader'. The Chilean Integralists have been described as the single most important contributors to the ideology of the Pinochet regime (Merill 1991).

Closer to Supomo's intellectual world were the Dutch Integralists, who, under the leadership of the Catholic priest M.A. Thompson, led a movement in the first part of the twentieth century against socialist ideas, against 'modernism' and against Dutch leaders 'who had been praised elsewhere for their contribution to what was called Catholic emancipation' (Kossmann 1978: 492). While Thompson lost influence after Pope Benedict XV liquidated the Integralists' power bloc in Rome, 'the Integralist rancour appeared to be still smouldering in the Netherlands' during the interwar years when, Kossmann (1978: 493) remarks, 'it was not unnatural for Thompson's followers to affiliate themselves with Fascism'. Supomo's predominantly Catholic mentors in Leiden would certainly have been acquainted with Dutch Integralists and their Rome-based counterparts (known also as the Integralists or as Soladitium Pianum, Solidarity of Pius), but whether Supomo was is an open question.

It is striking that almost all political movements outside Indonesia that call or called themselves 'integralist' were Catholic, anti-socialist, anti-liberal, traditionalist and authoritarian if not aligned with fascism.

11 It is not clear why Supomo included Baruch Spinoza here, as he does not fit comfortably even into the broad set of ideas encompassed by Müller and Hegel. There are no other references to Spinoza in Supomo's published writings. See Simanjuntak (1994: 132–9 and sources cited therein) for a survey of aspects of Spinoza's thought that Supomo may have considered worthy of emulation.

12 While 'totalitarian' is the closest translation of Supomo's '*totaliter*', it misses the spiritual resonances that Supomo clearly had in mind here. Note that 'totalitarian' did not always have the negative connotations it gained during and after the war. Gramsci (1986: 147, fn.33) for instance, used it in the early 1930s in a neutral sense to mean 'all-embracing and unifying'. Hoffman (1939: 34–5) argued that the ideal of what the Italian Fascists called *Lo Stato totalitario*, i.e. 'a state in which all persons are enlisted and all have a consciousness of membership', did not differ in essence from the ideal of the democratic state.

13 Sukarno's Pantja Sila appears to have been inspired by the Kuomintang's *San-Min Chu-I* (Three People's Principles): Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism, which he refers to in his speech (Kusuma 2004: 162). The currency among nationalists of Sukarno's principles before he pronounced them is indicated by the adoption of 'Belief in God, humanity, democracy and social justice' as the four principles of the *Kenkoku Teishintai* (Unit Dedicated to Upbuilding the Country), a nationalist

guerrilla group set up at the beginning of 1945 in North Sumatra by Inoue Tetsuro (Reid and Oki 1986: 199–200). The Pantja Sila may also have been designed to eclipse the Panca Dharma ('Five Duties') oath of allegiance to Japan repeatedly propagandised by Sukarno and referred to with approval in Supomo's 31 May speech (Arjoso 1995: 5).

14 While this speech later came to be commemorated as a national holiday, it was not given any publicity by the press or the radio at the time (Abdulgani 1964: 367).

15 The five principles as they appear in the preamble are: *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (belief in the One God), *Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab* (a just and civilised humanity), *Persatuan Indonesia* (Indonesian unity), *Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/ perwakilan* (democracy led by wisdom and deliberation/ representation), *Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia* (social justice for the entire Indonesian people).

16 Sukarno's actual words here were '*kawah Tjandradimuka*', the crater into which the *wayang* figure Gatotkaca was plunged as a baby to fortify him.

17 Sukarno's antipathy towards the Supomo/Parindra variety of nationalism is well illustrated in this passage from the same source:

> And aristocratic nationalism? Aha, this also still has many adherents. The adherents of this nationalism are indeed generally aristocrats, whose blood is aristocratic, whose customs are aristocratic, whose hearts are aristocratic – everything physical and spiritual about them is aristocratic. They are still living in the traditions of feudalism, they are steeped in feudal traditions according to which they are the 'heads' of the people, and they are the 'banyan tree' which shelters the people … [I]n their ideals, in a Free Indonesia, it is they who should be the 'heads', it is they who must continue to be the ruling class, – they! who since ancient times, since Hindu feudalism and since Islamic 'feudalism', to be sure, have been as the 'banyan tree' that sheltered the 'lower ranks'.
>
> (Sukarno 1966: 306, 1965: 322)

18 Logemann (1985: 28) Nasution (1992: 98) and Lubis (1993: 4–6, 82, 163) emphasise the theoretical similarities between Sukarno and Supomo. Reeve (1985) and Simanjuntak (1989) tend to also, although both are careful to point out the contradictions in Sukarno's thought between 'his more dynamic and Marxist side … and his attraction to order, harmony and unity' (Reeve 1985: 33).

19 The members of this executive and drafting committee were Sukarno, Subardjo, Hatta, Yamin, Maramis, Wachid Hasjim, Muzakkir, Hadji Agoes Salim and Abikoesno. Yamin was the only member who was not included in Sukarno's original sub-committee (Kusuma 2004: 213; Anderson 1961: 26–7).

20 It was proposed that the franchise would be limited to the Indonesians listed in the military administration's Who's Who: *Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa* (Gunseikanboe 1944).

21 Kusuma (2004: 192). Subardjo's participation in this plan is puzzling, since he was also involved in Sukarno's subcommittee that was due to report back to the plenary session of the BPUPK.

22 The formation of a militant new youth group called *Angkatan Baru Indonesia* on the same day as the letter was drafted can only have increased the sense of apprehension among the more conservative nationalists (see Anderson 1961: 55–6).

23 The elucidation is an edited version of a speech Supomo made to the BPUPK on 15 July 1945. Its existence was announced in the Indonesian State Gazette (*Berita Repoeblik Indonesia*) No. 7 1946. When the 1945 Constitution was revived in 1959, the elucidation was regarded as part of the constitution and this was confirmed by Resolution 20 of the MPRS in 1966.

24 Kandjeng Raden Mas Tumenggung Wongsonegoro was a senior Parindra politician and Theosophist who was at the time the vice-resident of Semarang. He served as the justice minister in the Natsir cabinet (1950–1) and as first deputy prime minister in the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet (of which he had been formateur) from 1953 until his resignation in 1954, whereafter he headed the Java-based fraction of the Greater Indonesia Party (PIR) known as 'PIR-Wongsonegoro'. Haji Agoes Salim was a Dutch educated Muslim nationalist who became widely known as a leader of the rightwing faction of Sarekat Islam. During the occupation he had a high honorary position in the Poetera and later served as deputy foreign minister under Sjahrir (to whom he was related) from 1946–7 and in 1948, foreign minister. Sukiman was an Amsterdam educated medical doctor and, like Subardjo, a former head of Perhimpoenan Indonesia in Holland. He had also been a leader of Sarekat Islam. In November 1945 he chaired the new Masjumi, which by 1947 had become Indonesia's largest party (see Anderson 1972: 435–6, 447–8, 456–7; Feith 1962: *passim*).

25 Later in the proceedings (15 July) Yamin argued in vain for guarantees that would protect individuals' liberty, their residences, their right to move their place of residence, to speak, to write, to think, to organise and to associate (Kusuma 2004: 385). Daniel Lev has suggested that Yamin was proposing an essentially American model (Personal communication, 25 April 1993).

26 See the draft constitution printed in Kusuma (2004: 316–23).

27 Liem Koen Hian had been the leader of the pro-Republic Partij Tionghwa Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese Party). He was the editor of the Chinese language daily *Sin Tit Po* based in Surabaya and in 1948 represented the Republic of Indonesia at the Renville negotiations (Anderson 1972: 431, 452–3; Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1993: 134–8).

28 Pompe (2005: 15) notes that this exchange is 'broadly recognised as a pivotal event in Indonesian constitutional law' in contemporary Indonesia.

29 Article 28 read: 'The freedom to organise and associate, and to express opinions orally, in writing and through other means, shall be regulated by statute'. Unambiguous guarantees of a broad range of citizens' rights were added to Article 28 only in August 2002.

30 The Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or Dokuritu Zyunbi Iinkaai was formally established on 12 August 1945.

31 This and the next few paragraphs draws mainly on Anderson (1972: Chapter 4) and Ricklefs (1981: 197–9).

5 Revolution, democracy and corporatist antidotes

The Japanese surrender and the proclamation of independence unleashed popular energies that alarmed not only the Allied forces and the returning Dutch, but also many nationalist leaders. Successive Republican governments tried to hold back the tide of revolution, but they did this by channelling energies into a new democratic party system rather than by attempting to preserve 'feudalistic' concepts of rule, which had been discredited by their association with the Japanese and the highly unpopular *pangreh pradja* elite. It was only in the years after 1956, when both the army and President Sukarno were expressing frustration with their lack of a formal role that organicist ideas began to be considered seriously again.

This chapter explains how, despite the repudiation of conservative groups and their ideologies, organicist ideas were kept alive in the 1945–56 period and how they came to inform the political debates and political structures after 1956. Indonesian legal experts are an important part of this story because it was they who furnished the corporatist formulas that Sukarno and the army leader General Nasution used to displace parliamentary democracy. Corporatism was nevertheless a contested concept, with radical and conservative forces attempting to frame and use it to their own advantage. The aim here is to show how organicist ideas based on Continental European constitutional theory informed the debate, especially on the conservative side, and how this helped to shape the political vision and strategies of military figures who went on to become key ideologues of the early New Order.

Organicism swept aside

After the proclamation

Although the terms of their surrender required that the Japanese should maintain the status quo in Indonesia and thus prevent any further moves towards independence, the Japanese military leaders in Jakarta were slow to apply the brakes. A meeting of the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI) scheduled for 18 August went ahead without interference. At that meeting the 22 appointed members, joined by five others, put the finishing

touches to the Investigating Committee's draft constitution and formally approved it. As well as dropping references to Greater East Asia the delegates resolved, with remarkable alacrity, to prune the stipulation in the preamble that all Muslims should observe Islamic law. That afternoon the committee appointed Sukarno and Hatta as president and vice president.

The following day the committee met again under its new name, the Indonesian National Committee (KNI), and decided on an administrative structure for the new state, one that closely followed that of the Japanese. On 22 August a basic political structure was established with a 'quasi-legislative' Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) in Jakarta to assist the president and provincial National Committees. The new KNIP, with 137 members, was much more politically inclusive than the PPKI, but it still consisted overwhelmingly of men who had occupied prominent positions during the Japanese occupation. The influence of Japanese corporatist organisational principles is clearly reflected in contemporary accounts of the makeup of the KNIP. It included 'nine pangrèh pradja, three police, nineteen civil servants, four businessmen, twelve doctors, two teachers, four lawyers or judges …'.[1]

An even stronger indication of the importance of the Japanese legacy of political organisation was the formation on 23 August of the PNI-Staatspartij (State Party). Apparently established at Sukarno's initiative, the short-lived PNI-Staatspartij was designed to mobilise the population behind the new government. As Anderson (1972: 93) points out, 'the single most important aspect of this PNI was its direct continuity with the Hōkōkai'. Indeed it was the Djawa Hōkōkai, supplemented by several youth leaders close to Sukarno and Hatta as well some from the circle of Leiden-educated lawyers associated with Subardjo's navy group. The five-member general leadership of the PNI included Iwa Kusumasumantri, Maramis, Sudjono and Gatot Tarunamihardja, another Dutch trained lawyer who had cooperated closely with the Japanese. Like the Djawa Hōkōkai, and its Japanese parent, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the PNI-Staatspartij was to have incorporated occupational groups, cooperatives, mutual help organisations and neighbourhood organisations.[2]

The political winds, however, had already changed, leaving the PNI-Staatspartij looking like the Japanese relic it was. Internationally, fascism was virtually dead; control of the oceans and the airwaves was now in the hands of the victorious Allies and especially of the United States, with its rhetoric of democracy, freedom and self-determination. Domestically, the youth groups originally mobilised by the Japanese had taken a distinctly anti-Japanese and anti-fascist turn since mid 1945. One immediate beneficiary of both this groundswell and the new international environment was Sutan Sjahrir, the social democratic intellectual whose dismay at the pro-Japanese sentiment of his fellow nationalists was recounted in Chapter 3. Sjahrir's decision to avoid cooperation with the Japanese and his leadership of the (largely information disseminating) anti-Japanese underground made him a popular and 'clean' figure in a sea of compromised politicians. During the occupation he had built a reputation as a person who understood the tides of opinion in the

Western world and this gave him appeal to students and other younger intellectuals, especially in Jakarta. When he seized the moral high ground and attacked the Staatspartij as 'fascist' and its leaders as Japanese collaborators there were plenty of youth groups and sympathisers of the underground who supported him. Sjahrir also had on his side the persuasive argument that no government headed by Sukarno would be recognised as credible by the victorious Allies.

Impressed by Sjahrir's substantial, albeit largely amorphous, support from below, and anxious to avoid upsetting the Allies, Sukarno announced on 31 August that the formation of the Staatspartij would be 'postponed'. The failure of the KNIP leadership to sustain the state party for more than a week indicates how rapidly the political centre of gravity had shifted away from the nationalists who had collaborated with the Japanese. This was also reflected in the inability of Sukarno's presidential cabinet, announced on 4 September, to assert its will. The embryonic government had no military apparatus to enforce its decisions and therefore had to face the reality that it would survive only if it recognised the depth and diversity of political feeling in the streets. Although the rapidly ascendant Sjahrir forces were only a little less elitist in their approach than the older generation nationalist leaders, they were much more prepared to accept the mushrooming of political groupings of the time as a positive manifestation of democracy. For the next year or two, nationalist leaders were to be exposed – to an extent unprecedented before or since – to the raw pressures of popular opinion.

Sjahrir's meteoric rise was legally recognised on 16 October with the issue of Decree no. X. by Vice President Mohammad Hatta. This decree brought the period of direct presidential rule to an end and transferred supreme legislative authority from the presidency to the KNIP. Day-to-day running of the KNIP was entrusted to a working party presided over by Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, the leftwing intellectual and former Gerindo leader who had been released from a Japanese prison only two weeks earlier. Together these socialist leaders established their democratic credentials and distinguished themselves from their Japanese-influenced fellow politicians, proclaiming that 'the formation of parties may now begin quite freely'.[3] On 3 November a government proclamation, again signed by Hatta, explicitly affirmed the freedom of people to organise themselves into parties in preparation for a general election, which was expected to take place in January 1946 (Nasution 1992: 21).

The tempo of constitutional improvisation was maintained in the next fortnight in what Anderson (1972: 167) described as a 'silent coup'. On 11 November Sukarno's largely discredited cabinet was made responsible to Sjahrir's KNIP. On 14 November that cabinet resigned and Sjahrir formed a cabinet in which he was prime minister. The introduction of the position of prime minister and the principle of ministerial accountability to 'parliament' – the KNIP – marked a decisive break with the constitution of August, though this was not formally revoked (see Pringgodigdo c.1946). As well as the prime ministership, Sjahrir took on the foreign affairs and interior

ministries, while Amir Sjarifuddin became minister of defence and information. Supomo was replaced as justice minister by Suwandi, a respected notary associated with Sjahrir's circle (Lev 1973: 21).

The new mood of the country was expressed in Sjahrir's pamphlet 'Our Struggle', which was distributed widely among *pemuda* groups in November (Departemen Penerangan 1950: 50). In it Sjahrir bitterly attacked politicians who had cooperated with the Japanese and stressed the importance of ridding the political system of the 'remnants of Japanese fascism'. He denounced the stream of nationalism that he argued was 'built on hierarchical feudalistic solidarism: in fact on Fascism, the greatest enemy of world progress and of our people' (Sjahrir 1968: 28). Sjahrir's uncompromising rejection of fascist politics and ideology and his clearly expressed defence of socialism and of democratic institutions and procedures had enormous appeal – not least because the Japanese occupation had caused terrible hardship. Sjahrir's democratic vision of a state that protected 'the fundamental rights of the people, namely the freedoms of thought, expression, religion', and guaranteed popular participation in the 'formation and determination of the structure of the state and its government, the right to elect and be elected in all state institutions' (Sjahrir 1968: 29) set the ethos of Indonesian politics for a decade.

The revolution: popular currents and countercurrents

While Sjahrir's championing of democracy and the right to organise was consistent with his democratic principles, it was also a case of accepting reality. Freed from surveillance by the Japanese secret police and elated by the spirit of independence, new groups and parties were emerging all over the country. There was little the government could do to stop them. A bigger worry for Sjahrir were the multitude of irregular armed groups that emerged spontaneously in the months between the Japanese surrender and the establishment of military control in Java by British forces. These, he feared, would undercut the authority and viability of his government in the eyes of the victorious Allies, who he was convinced held the key to Indonesia's independence. Most of the young men and women who joined these units had received some military training from the Japanese, or at least drilling and propaganda. Their spirit is expressed by the slogan '*Merdeka atau Mati!*' (Independence or Death!). The determination of these militant youth, known as *pemuda*, helped demonstrate to the world the commitment of the Indonesian people to independence. But the reality that Sjahrir's government faced was that the Allies were supporting the return of the Dutch to the colony they saw as theirs. Sjahrir saw himself as having no choice but to negotiate, first with the British who took control of major urban centres and then with the Dutch who arrived after them.

Tension between the adherents of a strategy of negotiation (*diplomasi*) and armed struggle (*perjuangan*) lasted throughout the revolution, prefiguring

broader struggles between legalism and revolutionary élan, which persisted throughout the first 20 years of the history of independent Indonesia.

The boldness of the revolutionary forces, and the inability of the central government to control them, was dramatically illustrated in the Battle of Surabaya on 10 November 1946, when a ceasefire negotiated by Amir Sjarifuddin, Sukarno and Hatta broke down and several thousand Indonesians were killed in a fierce clash with British air and ground forces. In the consciousness of the pro-*perjuangan* forces Surabaya became a potent symbol of heroism and sacrifice.

In other areas popular uprisings were directed against the local aristocratic and administrative elites who had been compromised first during the Dutch period and especially in the Japanese occupation. The patterns of these 'social revolutionary' movements were different in different places (Kahin 1985). In Aceh and East Sumatra royal and *adat* elites were deposed and replaced by Muslim and intelligentsia figures (Reid 1979; Morris 1985). In the Pekalongan area of north Java numerous *pangreh pradja* officials were removed or killed and replaced by the leaders of Islamic and communist youth groups.[4]

Although the central government continued in most cases to rely on the bureaucratic apparatus of the old colonial state, it too contributed to the decline of the power of the *pangreh pradja* by abolishing the local natives-only law courts, which they had traditionally controlled, and removing their policing powers, already significantly diminished by the Japanese. The effect of these pressures from below and above was to cause the *pangreh pradja* – renamed *pamong praja* (guides of the realm) to soften their elitist image (Sutherland 1979: 154) – to suffer a sharp decline in status during the revolutionary years. Divested of the power and privileges provided by the Dutch and Japanese colonial regimes, high-ranking *pamong praja* were very conscious of their vulnerability to popular pressures and in general kept a low profile. They knew all too well that there was no sympathy among the newly empowered young people – most of them organised into Muslim, nationalist and leftist groups – for doctrines that stressed the primacy of social harmony and the father–child relationship between a quasi-hereditary administrative class and their loyal and grateful subjects.

Although Sjahrir's *Our Struggle* had affirmed support for social revolution, his fear of anarchy combined with his commitment to portraying Indonesia to the Americans and British as a responsible nation ready for independence brought him increasingly into alliance with the forces that had an interest in preserving the status quo. This was partly a result of the crystallisation of the militant anti-negotiation forces under the leadership of the national-communist Tan Malaka. Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perdjuangan (Struggle Union), formed in January 1946, openly opposed Sjahrir's Socialist Party government and called for social revolution, armed struggle and the seizure of foreign property (Rae 1993: 72–3). Tan Malaka was arrested in March 1946 but his followers in the Persatuan Perdjuangan, which included youth leaders and many irregular military units, as well as an assortment of Japanese era politicians such

as Muhammad Yamin, Subardjo and Iwa Kusumasumantri, continued to pressure the government to abandon its negotiations. On 27 June 1946, immediately after Vice President Hatta had revealed in the Republican capital of Yogyakarta that the government was talking with the Dutch about establishing a federal Indonesia, Tan Malaka's followers kidnapped Sjahrir and held him for four days. Instead of siding with the rebels as they had hoped, President Sukarno chose the Hatta-Sjahrir side, declared a state of emergency, secured Sjahrir's release, and arrested several of the Persatuan Perdjuangan leaders.

This, however, enraged many of the Republic's militia units, which, since the formation of the People's Security Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat) in October 1945, had been left virtually free to develop their own policies, strategies and structures (Jenkins 1983a: 16). Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin's distrust of the mainly Japanese-trained commanders of the army, including its elected leader General Sudirman, was openly reciprocated. On 3 July 1946 army units freed many of the Persatuan Perdjuangan leaders and demanded that Sukarno dismiss Sjahrir's cabinet and that Sudirman take over responsibility for security affairs. But Sjahrir, with Sukarno and Hatta's support, recognising this as the attempted coup that it was, arrested the leaders of the movement. That action put an end to the Persatuan Perdjuangan as a significant political force.

Negotiations with the Dutch reopened in mid September 1946 and in November an agreement was initialled in Linggarjati in which the two sides agreed to work towards the establishment of a United States of Indonesia under the Dutch Queen. The treaty recognised Republican control over Sumatra, Java and Madura, but envisaged that Kalimantan and the eastern Indonesian islands, reoccupied by the Dutch shortly after the Japanese surrender, were to comprise two Dutch-sponsored federal states. Linggarjati was highly unpopular in the Republic-controlled urban centres. Severe disagreements over its ratification by the KNIP, and especially within Sjahrir's leftwing coalition, forced Sjahrir to resign. He was replaced as prime minister by Amir Sjarifuddin in July 1947.

But it was only months before a similar fate befell Amir. Shortly after he came to power the Dutch broke their side of the Linggarjati bargain and invaded new areas of Java and Sumatra, seizing strategic installations, oilfields and plantations. This act of aggression internationalised the Indonesian issue, making it arguably even more important for the government to play to an American gallery. Amir's conclusion of the Renville Agreement in January 1948 recognising the Dutch military gains did a great deal to draw international opinion to the Republic, but it was immensely unpopular at home and precipitated Amir's fall.

Amir's resignation in January 1948 left the Republican government – now under Mohammad Hatta's prime-ministership – with little domestic support. Sudirman's Japanese-trained fighters, who now numbered more than quarter of a million, continued to oppose the Renville Agreement, as did Amir's own

leftwing forces who now formed themselves into a new anti-Hatta coalition, the People's Democratic Front. Hatta's new emergency cabinet depended mainly on the authority of President Sukarno and on the 22,000 strong Siliwangi division, formed in West Java, which had evacuated to the Republican capital of Yogyakarta under the command of the Dutch-trained Colonel Abdul Haris Nasution.

Pressed hard by the radical–nationalist military groups and the leftwing forces of Amir Sjarifuddin but also in the opposite direction by an America alarmed by communist successes in Czechoslovakia and China, the Hatta cabinet shifted to the right. This became particularly evident after all the major leftwing groups amalgamated into the reactivated Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in August 1948 following the arrival in Yogyakarta of veteran PKI leader Musso from the Soviet Union. A major showdown was triggered when PKI supporters, most of them belonging to military formations slated for demobilisation by Hatta, took over power in Madiun in East Java. Musso's declaration of a revolt against the Sukarno–Hatta government in Madiun on 18 September was met by a bloody assault led by Nasution's Siliwangi troops. The takeover and subsequent attack on Madiun resulted in over 10,000 people killed. Amir, who had declared himself a long-time secret communist and thrown in his lot with Musso, was arrested and later shot by troops loyal to Hatta (Leclerc 1993). The suppression of the Madiun revolt demonstrated the Sukarno–Hatta government's anti-communist character in a way that directly undermined Dutch claims to the contrary and led in 1949 to a decisive US intervention on Indonesia's behalf (Kahin 1994: 64–5).

The Dutch did not foresee the change that the Madiun affair wrought in American perceptions of the Indonesian conflict. Believing that the communist revolt had left the Republic weakened and arguing that the Republic had violated the conditions and spirit of the Renville Agreement, they decided to deliver a coup de grâce. On 18 December 1948 they captured Yogyakarta and arrested almost the entire Republican cabinet, as well as Sukarno and Sjahrir. The gambit failed. Only days after the attack, the United States ceased funding Dutch operations in Indonesia. In January 1949 the UN Security Council 'demanded the release of the Republican cabinet, the establishment of an interim government and a full transfer of sovereignty by 1 July 1950' (Ricklefs 1981: 219). An upsurge in domestic sympathy for the Republic saw an erosion of Dutch authority in the federal states. The Indonesian leaders of the states of Pasundan (West Java) and Eastern Indonesia resigned in protest and the Sultan of Dutch-occupied Yogyakarta made it clear that he would not cooperate with the Dutch. Even militarily the Dutch found themselves on the defensive as guerrilla activities were stepped up in many areas of Java and Sumatra under the leadership of Soedirman and, increasingly, his second in command, Nasution. By April 1949 the Dutch gave in to these twin pressures and agreed to negotiate a transfer of power.

The internal dynamics of the revolution were complex. The primary political cleavage in the months following the proclamation of independence

was between those forces that had collaborated with the Japanese and those that had resisted. The mushrooming of new parties, however, and the emergence of a host of contentious issues – whether the Republic should make concessions to the Dutch, whether foreign property ought to be seized, whether Islamic forces deserved a greater role in government, which local guerrilla forces ought to be incorporated into the mainstream army – saw lines of allegiance become much more tangled. These complexities were compounded by regional diversity and the virtual inability of the Republican government to exert anything but moral authority in places far from its Yogyakarta base.

The revolution had a profound effect on the psyche of the Indonesian nation. Old structures and constraints crumbled and a large segment of Indonesia's youth was swept into the vortex of political life. As Anderson (1972) has illustrated, for many *pemuda*, the struggle for national liberation was entwined with a powerful sense of personal liberation. The revolution gave birth to an enduring *pemuda* mindset that valued courage, heroism, force, disrespect for authority and camaraderie. Intrinsic to the *pemuda* ethic was a belief that a person's *semangat* – or revolutionary spirit – rather than one's parents' social standing or one's level of education, was the measure of one's worth. Riding the wave of revolutionary egalitarianism, many nationalist leaders asked people to call them '*Bung*' (brother) in place of more status-laden terms. While the old bureaucracy remained more or less intact in most places, its colonial odour and weakened policing powers had left it with little authority. Power, especially in the early revolution, belonged largely to the autonomous military formations and – to a lesser extent – political parties.

The revolutionary experience of the army was particularly significant in the light of later events. For several hundred thousand highly committed but mostly poorly armed youths, the revolution was primarily a physical struggle against foreign domination. Most found it difficult to reconcile their almost religious devotion to 100 per cent independence with the major concessions – especially of Republican-held territory – the government leadership made to the Dutch. The schism between the guerrilla forces and the civilian government widened after the cabinet allowed itself to be captured in December 1948. This came to be portrayed by the military as an act of weakness, even cowardice, on the part of the civilian leadership – final vindication of their opposition to negotiation. Adding to the distrust of civilian politicians, it created the foundations of a mindset in which the military saw themselves as the ultimate guardians of the Republic.

Parliamentarism ascendant

But it was neither *pemuda* groups nor the military who emerged victorious from the revolution. The decisive victories were won on the diplomatic front and it was figures most closely associated with the diplomacy side of the revolution – above all Hatta – who had most say in deciding what form the post-1949 state would take. They were interested in containing the

revolutionary fervour that was sweeping the country and ensuring a smooth and legal transition of power to a government dominated by civilian politicians who shared their social democratic values and perspectives. Their commitment to gradual, rather than revolutionary change, and their constant battle to portray the infant Republic to the outside world as responsible, kept them in conflict with the radical *pemuda* and military groups and in alliance with socially conservative forces – represented by the *pamong praja*, Nasution's Siliwangi forces and figures like Supomo – who wished to see a transfer of power from the Dutch with a minimum of disruption to existing social and economic structures.

In 1945 it was the authority of social democrats such as Sjahrir and Hatta that secured legal recognition of political parties and put Indonesia on the road to parliamentary democracy. Their advocacy of a democratic political system created the conditions in which debate could flourish and political forces could compete openly for popular support and political power. Political parties and democratic procedures became an integral part of capital city politics from November 1945. The proliferation of parties in the months and years that followed both reflected and fostered popular support for parliamentary democratic procedures. In another concession to parlimentarism, ministers were made responsible to parliament in direct contradiction to the increasingly irrelevant 1945 Constitution.

Even Sukarno, then playing an enormously important role as the principal unifying figure of the diverse coalition of Republican forces, felt compelled to accept constraints on his powers. On each of the three occasions during the revolution that Sukarno assumed a degree of presidential control approximating that allowed to him in the 1945 Constitution, he accepted that these were strictly temporary interventions sparked by crises rather than exercises of his prerogative.[5] This represented a victory for Sjahrir's pluralistic political philosophy against Sukarno's revolutionary collectivism and Supomo's conservative organicism. By the time Hatta was appointed prime minister in January 1948 – a position he retained until the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 and held for a further eight months under the federal constitution – there was a 'fairly broad consensus at the government level' that a parliamentary system was desirable (Reeve 1985: 89).

This commitment to democratic forms was maintained during the negotiations in July 1949 between the Republican leadership and the representatives of the federal states. It was agreed that the Republic of the United States of Indonesia would include the principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament and comprehensive constitutional guarantees of human rights (Reeve 1985: 89). In August–November 1949 Hatta led the Republican delegation to the Round Table Conference in The Hague where the terms of the transfer of sovereignty were negotiated among the Dutch, the Republicans and the leaders of the federal states. One outcome was a highly democratic draft constitution.

The federal constitution of 1949 is often portrayed as reflecting Dutch and US priorities more than Republican Indonesian ones. But there was no

serious opposition to it among the Indonesian delegates. The federal states in particular, aware of their potential marginalisation at the hands of the triumphant Republic, supported the principle of cabinet responsibility to parliament contained in the new constitution.

It was a measure of the degree to which a parliamentary system, as opposed to a presidential system, had come to be regarded as legitimate and unthreatening to the social order that Supomo himself took a major role in drafting the federal constitution. For all his continuing strong reservations about individualism and liberalism, Supomo was convinced of the inevitability of Indonesia having a parliamentary system with which he conceded Indonesian political leaders were more familiar (Supomo 1948: 32–7). Aware that his Japanese-tainted 1945 Constitution was indefensible, both internationally and domestically, Supomo now argued (1948: 37) that 'the important determinant of government stability is not so much its constitution as its politics'.[6]

The final transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949 marked the birth of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS), a federal state in which the Yogyakarta-based Republic of Indonesia was only one component. But the federal system crumbled quickly as the spirit of the triumphant Republic spread through the previously Dutch-controlled areas. One by one the 15 non-Republican member states came under the control of groups that favoured mergers with the Republic of Indonesia or the RIS.

As the momentum for a unitary state gathered pace, an agreement was reached in May 1950 that delegates from the Republic and the surviving federal states would work together under RIS Justice Minister Supomo to draw up a fresh constitution that would serve until Indonesia had held its first elections. The government remained keen to impress the Western world (and friendly democratic neighbours such as India and Burma) with its commitment to democratic freedoms. But the factors that shaped the Provisional Constitution of 1950 were mainly domestic. The new constitution was, if anything, more democratic than the 1949 document. The unitary Republic was to be presided over by a president and vice president (Sukarno and Hatta) with largely ceremonial powers, with the government headed by a prime minister accountable to an elected parliament. Not only was the cabinet responsible to the parliament but the parliament was invested with the power to topple the government. The Provisional Constitution included all the human rights provisions included in the RIS Constitution that had been based on the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[7] It also included key economic provisions of the 1945 Constitution stipulating state control of the country's 'natural riches' and those 'branches of production … which vitally affect the life of the people' as well as state responsibility for providing for the welfare of the needs of the poor.

The adoption of the new constitution on 17 August 1950 confirmed the ascendancy of Hatta's social democratic vision and for the next eight years Indonesia was a fully fledged parliamentary democracy. Although the period

saw seven cabinets rise and fall, successive prime ministers and most party leaders remained committed to democratic norms and to legal procedures. Economic policy bore the mark of Hatta's technocratic approach, with most cabinets pursuing a pro-Western investment stance while using protectionist policies to encourage the growth of domestic industry and the rise of a new group of indigenous (non-Chinese) businesspeople. On the other hand there were persistent affirmations of the need to steer an 'actively independent' foreign policy. This found its proudest expression in the Asian–African Conference held in Bandung in April 1955, which prefigured the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement.

While the war had left Indonesia within the American sphere of influence, it managed, in Hatta's phrase, to paddle between two reefs. With India, it was a leading voice among states that refused to become members of US or Anglo–American-formed military alliances.

Parliamentary democracy's survival until 1959 was partly a function of the ethnic, religious and ideological schisms in the Indonesian polity. With no single political force strong or well-organised enough to impose its will on the spectrum of political forces, parliamentary politics provided a minimally workable mechanism for the coalitions between parties and factions necessary to hold governments together.

But the view that parliamentary democracy was possible only because of Hatta and Sjahrir's political victory, or because nobody was powerful enough to kill it, underestimates the degree of attachment to democratic rights and freedoms among both politicians and the population at large. Benda depicted the period of parliamentary democracy as a time when Indonesia allowed itself to be seduced by alien ways, a theme that proved to be highly appealing to government leaders after 1958 and again after 1965 (see Benda 1972a). But the parliamentarians of the 1950s were not without experience of representative institutions. As Cribb (1994: 76) has pointed out, the legislature of the 1950s was composed mainly of figures with experience gained in the various parliamentary institutions of the original Republic of Indonesia and the federal states. It was also heir to a significant tradition of nationalist assembly of the 1920s and 1930s. Mass political parties, politically affiliated unions, cultural groups and youth organisations had been an integral part of the nationalist movement since the 1920s, involving hundreds of thousands of people. The alien seduction thesis does not explain the rapid and spontaneous expansion of parties and other mass organisations during the revolution.

The freedoms guaranteed by the 1950 Constitution confirmed what was assumed by most politically active people, that membership of political organisations and participation in the political process was part and parcel of '*Merdeka*' (freedom). There is every indication that Indonesians relished the new freedoms just as much as their contemporaries in India and Japan. Newspapers flourished, the law courts functioned independent of executive influence and political parties became centrepieces of a large array of associated organisations including labour unions as well as peasant, women's, youth and

cultural groups. All of these took part in campaigning for the frequently postponed elections eventually held in 1955.

A measure of the legitimacy and prestige of democratic ideals is the fact that the party manifestos, most of them written between 1946 and 1953, express almost universal – albeit in some instances diffuse – support for democracy and human rights (Feith 1962: 38). All parties gave strong support to the preparation of an election bill in 1952–3 and the elections of September and December 1955 were carried out in a free and open atmosphere in which the fundamentals of parliamentary democracy were rarely questioned. Sukarno himself occasionally expressed a yearning for a political system closer to 'Indonesia's cultural traditions'. But he defended the parliamentary system during the revolution, at the time of the coup attempt by military figures in October 1952 and until 1956. He presided over a parliamentary system for well over half his tenure as president.

Evidence of popular consensus on the question of democracy also comes from the Constituent Assembly, the body constituted on the basis of the December 1955 poll. The Constituent Assembly's task was to draft a permanent constitution to replace the Provisional Constitution of 1950. Unlike the 1945 debates, which had taken place in pressing circumstances among a small, Japanese-appointed assembly, the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly were protracted, comprehensive and governed by scrupulously democratic procedural rules. While this allowed a wide range of opinions to be considered, it slowed down the rate at which decisions could be reached. After three years of debate the assembly was locked in disagreement over the proper relationship between Islam and the state. But as Buyung Nasution demonstrated in his detailed study of the debates (1992), the assembly had shown itself to be strongly supportive of democratic principles, incorporating into its draft constitution comprehensive human rights guarantees and a range of checks and balances on executive authority.[8] While a few members (notably the PNI's Soeripto)[9] argued in favour of organicist notions of state organisation, they constituted only a small minority and did not affect the outcome of the deliberations.

So the revolution and the parliamentary democracy period saw organicist political philosophies decidedly marginalised. The emancipatory dynamic of the revolution, the erosion of the authority of the *pamong praja*, the discrediting of political ideologies reminiscent of Japanese ones and the high status of democratic discourse combined to convince political leaders that there was little electoral mileage in political programmes based on traditional or 'feudal' conceptions.

If the main line of cleavage in the 1945 debates was between varieties of solidarism and rights-based social democracy, the political and ideological dynamics were more complex during the parliamentary years. The period was marked by multiple polarities and frequently changing alliances. Arguments between Muslim and secular nationalists were often centre stage, as were arguments about regional challenges to central authority. But the most

important line of cleavage, reflecting in part the new global rivalries of the Cold War, was between conservatives and radicals. In the new dispensation, social democrats such as Hatta and Sjahrir now found themselves on the conservative side of politics. The 'conservative' camp can be broadly characterised as anti-communist, relatively pro-US and in favour of gradual reform towards a welfare state within a capitalist framework. It included the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party), the modernist Muslim Masjumi, much of the military leadership, especially outside Java, and most of the *pamong praja*. The model of conservatism they stood for was a modern, technocratic one that supported stability, constitutionalism, law and order and economic development. For as long as this side of politics was dominated by Hatta and the prestige of democracy lasted, most conservative forces were content to support parliamentarism rather than solidarist political ideologies and forms.

On the 'radical' side were the Indonesian Communist Party, Murba (Proletarian Party), various *pemuda* groups, some radical–nationalist officers, a powerful faction of the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and, after 1952, Sukarno. They wanted government to be more in tune with the spirit of the revolution, were against attempts to attract foreign capital and wanted stronger links with communist and with new emerging states. Impatient with the legalism and gradualism that characterised Hatta-minded governments of the period, they wanted bolder leadership, a higher international profile for Indonesia and a style of politics that relied more on populism and mass mobilisation.

Towards a revival of organicism

Although organicism may have been unpopular and unviable in the turbulence of the revolution and in the competitive atmosphere of the parliamentary period, it is to this latter period that we must look to discover how some groups became attracted to organicism. I will concentrate here on the two politically significant groups that were drawn to organicist political philosophies during the 1950s and which became central to the revival of conservative organicism as an alternative to both liberal democracy and Sukarno's left populist collectivism in the late 1950s: the upper ranks of the *pamong praja* and elements of the army leadership associated with Nasution.

Yearning for respect: the *pamong praja*

In the parliamentary period territorial administrators (the *pamong praja*) no longer had reason to fear being attacked by *pemuda* groups, but many of their insecurities remained, especially because appointments and promotions within the civil service became increasingly politicised (Sutherland 1979: 155–8). The rise and fall of coalitions dominated by the PNI and Masjumi respectively saw large numbers of positions filled by supporters of those parties as well as a rapid growth in the size of the civil service.[10] Apart from depressing salaries

and reducing the professionalism of the service, the influx of new blood created tensions within the *pamong praja* whose *esprit de corps*, especially in Java, rested on a shared aristocratic, mystically oriented, anti-Islamic ethos. Many of this old school of territorial administrators resented the disruptive effects of the proliferation of party organisations in 'their' towns and villages, especially in the 1953–5 period when the parties expanded their grassroots activities in preparation for the elections (Kartohadikoesoemo 1965: 257). What had once been virtual fiefdoms, in which *pamong praja* officials exercised both executive and judicial authority, now became arenas for political competition between parties and social forces that they had once helped the Dutch and the Japanese keep under firm control. In early 1957, a parliament dominated by their old adversaries from the nationalist movement went so far as to pass the Decentralisation Law (Law No.1 1957), which created a system of locally elected regional heads who would share the authority of interior ministry-appointed governors. If this law had not been overturned in 1959, the *pamong praja* would have suffered a terrible new blow (Sutherland 1979: 156–7; Legge 1961).

The interest of sections of the *pamong praja* in conservative organicist philosophies in the 1950s expressed a longing for the good old days of *rust en orde* (tranquillity and order), a world in which farmers farmed, merchants traded, rabble-rousers were punished and rulers were respected. This yearning for a lost world is evident in the writing of the *pamong praja* elder and one-time Volksraad member Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo. His 1953 book *Desa* (*The Village*), which received wide distribution to civil servants through ministerial networks, condemned the way in which people had been 'drugged' by 'individualistic' Western democracy. It dwelt at length on how to restore the old bonds between rulers and their subjects. Like Supomo in 1945, Soetardjo argued that 'indigenous Indonesian democracy', which he equated with the principle of *manunggalnya kawulo-gusti* (the union of servant and lord), was not only more appropriate for Indonesia but also better attuned to the demands of the post-individualistic modern age (Kartohadikoesoemo 1965: 126–34, 165). Drawing heavily on the writings of the Leiden scholars, he maintained that the institutions and procedures of *adat* reflected a holistic world view that, if translated into national political terms, could transcend the divisiveness wrought by party politics and the corrupting effects of liberalism.[11]

The main political vehicles for organicist ideas in the first half of the 1950s were the Greater Indonesian Unity Party (PIR) founded in December 1948 in Yogya and the much smaller Parindra, which emerged in November 1949. Both had direct links, in terms of membership, temperament and ideology, with the large pre-war Parindra.

The core of the PIR's membership were senior civil servants from Java and aristocrats from the outer islands affiliated with the Dutch-created federal states of the 1946–9 period. Many of them had, until the party's formation in 1948, been non-party figures or aligned with the PNI, but became alarmed by what they saw as its shift to the left in that year (Sastroamidjojo 1979: 154).

Several lawyers who had been members of the pre-war Parindra, including Wongsonegoro, Latuharhary and Supomo, became members of the PIR, the latter two joining its political section in 1950.

Thanks to the relatively high proportion of the Indonesian political leadership with aristocratic backgrounds and the heavy representation of the former federal states in the 1950 parliament, the PIR was well represented, with 17 seats out of 232. This was enough to make PIR the third largest single party in the parliament prior to the elections (Feith 1962: 381). The PIR secured several powerful portfolios through the early 1950s. Wongsonegoro, who led the party from 1950, served as justice minister in the Natsir cabinet, education minister in the Sukiman cabinet and first deputy prime minister in Ali Sastroamidjojo's first cabinet from July 1953 until his resignation in October 1954. The powerful interior department in Ali's first cabinet was occupied by the party's deputy head, Hazairin, who had recently been appointed as professor of *Adat* and Islamic Law at the University of Indonesia. Former Parindra heavyweight Soemitro Kolopaking had served as a PIR minister in the Sukiman cabinet (Feith 1962: 180). In the seven cabinets of the 1950 and 1957 period 11 cabinet positions went to the PIR.

Reflecting the conservative orientation of its membership, the PIR stood for the 'restoration of rural stability on a traditional basis' (Feith 1962: 144). The party's official history and political position statement describes its formation as a response to the conflict between parties in the period to 1948. It saw itself as the product of a desire among 'many prominent people and social groups' to see all the parties get together with non-party groups and 'cooperate for the good of the nation' (ibid.). Comparing political party programmes in the early 1950s, Feith noted that the PIR and the Parindra were the only parties that expressed reservations about democracy. PIR declared itself to be in favour of a 'democratic basis which accords with the condition and spirit of Indonesian society as it really is' and argued that majorities must not prevail against the principles of humanity and decency. Democracy was not a matter of public accountability or popular participation in government but on the placement, as the party motto put it, of 'The right man in the right place'. Governance by officials and leaders of 'refined feelings' and 'nobility of spirit', Wongsonegoro argued, was in tune with 'the spirit of the East', with 'democracy *à la* Indonesia' (Yamin Vol II 1959: 358–61 cited in Samuel 1971: 247).[12]

Conflict over the economic policies of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet led to divisions between two groups within the PIR. Wongsonegoro's faction, with its Javanese support base, supported the policies of the PNI prime minister who boosted indigenous Indonesian businesses in a way that accelerated the rate of inflation dramatically. Hazairin, who had the backing of most of the outer island party members, saw the inflation as hurting the interests of exporting regions in the outer islands. This division, which foreshadowed the more profound schism between the Java-based parties and the outer island-based parties in 1956–8, caused the PIR to split in October 1954 into the

PIR-Wongsonegoro and a Sumatra-based PIR-Hazairin, which contested the 1955 general elections separately (Feith 1962: 380–2; Sastroamidjojo 1979: 268–9). The lack of popular support for their traditionalist prescriptions in an age of mass politics was brought home dramatically when each was reduced to a single seat in the 257-member post-election parliament.

Parindra, which reconstituted itself in November 1949 under the leadership of the Javanese *priyayi* and prewar Parindra leader R.P. Soeroso, was likewise supported mainly by the upper rungs of the civil service, almost exclusively in Java. Although Parindra was closer than PIR to the mainstream PNI in its condemnation of free market capitalism and social injustice, it was similarly ambivalent about democracy, declaring itself to be in favour of 'regulated democracy' (*demokrasi teratur*) (Feith 1962: 39). Perhaps because of Parindra's relatively significant representation in parliament before the elections (eight members in 1951) Soeroso was represented in every cabinet from 1950 until 1956. The fortunes of the party reached their high point on the eve of the 1955 elections when they secured two portfolios in the cabinet of Burhanuddin Harahap, with Soeroso as minister for public works and power and Professor Suwandi as minister for education. But they failed to win any seats in the 1955 elections and virtually disappeared from the political scene after the resignation of the Burhanuddin cabinet in March 1956.

By late 1955, then, both Parindra and the PIR(s) had failed. Political philosophies built upon the aristocratic idea that people's best interests could be looked after by 'benevolent guardians steeped in the art of leadership' (Samuel 1971: 246) had inspired no more than a few hundred thousand voters out of nearly 38 million. This confirmed their leaders' distaste for parliamentary democracy and the party system, and added to the pool of political figures in Indonesia who would later support its overthrow.

Nasution, IPKI and the armed forces

Much more successful than PIR and Parindra in transforming politics in an organicist direction was a group of politicians, intellectuals and senior army officers who coalesced around Abdul Haris Nasution. The story of this group is closely related to the complex history of military politics in the 1950s and of Nasution's fluctuating fortunes. The Indonesian military started out as a loose assemblage of commanders and their followers with little central coordination. Establishing central control over the military remained a major preoccupation for national governments and the military leadership itself from the time of the revolution until 1958.

The most obvious of many schisms in the army was between the Japanese trained officers on the one hand, and the former Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) officers on the other. The Dutch-trained Nasution emerged early in the revolution as commander of the Siliwangi division of West Java, which sided with the Hatta administration's policy in 1948 of rationalising the army. But what Hatta admired as professionalism, the bulk of the non

ex-KNIL forces – the principal targets of Nasution's streamlining measures – saw as evidence of his Dutch-mindedness. Nasution's appointment as army chief of staff in 1949 only deepened the antagonism between the central command dominated by Dutch-educated officers and the less educated ex-Peta officers who were closer in spirit to the revolutionary *pemuda*. Intra-military tensions came to a head in 1952 when a majority of parliamentarians, backed by ex-Peta commanders, demanded the removal of Nasution and several of his associates from the leadership of the army. Indignant at what they saw as 'civilian meddling' in army affairs, a group of officers close to Nasution surrounded the parliament and tried to force its dissolution. But Sukarno, whose sympathies were with the ex-Peta officers, refused to dissolve the parliament and suspended Nasution, thereby defeating the military's first open challenge to democratic rule.

Nasution held no military position for three years, but he was not idle. In May 1954 he and a group of fellow officers and ex-officers formed IPKI, the League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence, an anti-party party that would contest the coming elections. This group, and its central figure Nasution in particular, was instrumental in translating the kind of conservative organicist vision represented by Supomo in 1945 into a political programme that would contribute to the demise of parliamentary democracy and the rise of the corporatist 'functional group' concept in Indonesian politics in the second half of the 1950s. It is therefore important to touch on the ideological influences and political milieu of its founder.

Much has been written about Nasution's illustrious military career, both by scholars and by Nasution himself. I am interested here in the influences that shaped his thinking about politics, a topic on which Nasution himself said little, preferring to portray himself as non-political. Penders and Sundhaussen (1985: 65–6) point to several influences, including Sukarno, whom he first met while working as a teacher in Bengkulu, and Kemal Ataturk, who was revered in Nasution's region of Sumatra. When he was 22, Nasution moved to Bandung, where he joined the Dutch army and where, in 1940, he was accepted as a cadet officer in the KMA Royal Military Academy.[13] While in Bandung he came into close contact with Parindra families and in about 1941 he married Sunarti, the daughter of the senior Parindra politician Soenarjo Gondokusumo.[14]

The impact on Nasution's thought from the conservative and authoritarian stream of nationalism characteristic of his new social milieu received little attention before Barry Turner explored the subject in detail in his 2005 dissertation *Nasution: Total People's Resistance and Organicist Thinking in Indonesia.* Turner describes the warm social ties that Nasution developed with Bandung's *pamong praja* elite and how his political viewpoints were influenced by the senior Parindra politicians in his wife's family circle both before and during the Japanese occupation (Turner 2005; Penders and Sundhaussen 1985: 6–11, 66–7). Some of these took place at the house of his father-in-law in Bandung but more important were the talks about politics that Nasution

had with his wife's uncle R.P. Soeroso when they lived together in Yogyakarta in 1948.[15] Soeroso at the time was responsible for administering the *pamong praja* throughout the infant Republic and was a strong advocate of the administrative elite (Turner 2005: 174–6). Exactly how much he absorbed is unclear, but Nasution's preoccupation with order, his defence of *pamong praja* interests, his antipathy to political Islam and communism, his suspicion of political parties in general and his doubts about parliamentary democracy are all consistent with the outlook of the Parindra elders.

Japanese influence on Nasution may also be more important than has been recognised. His Parindra friends, especially in the early occupation, were the most pro-Japanese of all Indonesian political groupings.[16] Nasution's experience in Japanese paramilitary organisations has been played down in assessments of his thinking, though he spent more time in Japanese formations than in the KNIL. He was an important leader of the Japanese-run Priangan Youth Corps (Barisan Pemuda Priangan), and, after it was abolished in 1943, underwent military training run by the Youth Corps (Seinendan). Later he worked as a military instructor for the Youth Corps, the Vigilance Corps (Keibōdan) and was appointed as deputy commander of the Bandung battalion of the Barisan Pelopor. The Japanese policy of mobilising the entire society for war formed the basis of his later strategy of 'total people's war', which was to become a central part of Indonesian military doctrine.[17]

When Nasution and a group of fellow officers formed IPKI in 1954, it was perhaps not surprising that he saw natural allies in the *pamong praja*, the Javanese aristocracy and the most conservative nationalist parties such as PIR. While most of the leaders of the party were military men – either retired or decommissioned for having participated in the coup attempt of 17 October 1952[18] – it also found a constituency among the royal families of Yogyakarta and several senior *pamong praja* figures in West Java (Sundhaussen 1982: 89).[19] The most significant link with the conservative nationalists, though, was Soemitro Kolopaking, a previous member of the PIR executive (political section) who was appointed general chairman of the IPKI executive. Although IPKI also included people with PSI and Murba connections (Nasution 1983: 255) its earliest and most important bond, as Reeve (1990: 161) has shown, was with the PIR.

IPKI's platform spoke of Indonesian society as a 'harmonious unity'[20] and highlighted the disarray the parliamentary system had brought to Indonesia. Its pre-election manifestos called for a return to the *spirit* of the Proclamation of Independence and the 1945 Constitution. IPKI's campaign statements were novel in that they attacked no particular party or policy but parties and '-isms' in general. Indeed IPKI leaders spoke of IPKI as a 'movement' rather than a party. Claiming to support only the Pancasila, they can be regarded as among the first – the Jesuits may have beaten them to it – to appropriate 'Pancasila' as a symbol of anti-partyism, as various other opponents of parliamentary democracy did in the late 1950s.[21] This anti-party stance led many of their opponents, especially the PKI, to accuse them of wanting to

establish a military dictatorship. In an attempt to appeal to military forces and civilian elites in the outer islands, which resented the way in which decisions on even minor matters required approval by Jakarta, IPKI manifestos also called for greater regional autonomy as well as salary rises for civil servants (Nasution 1983: 469).

Nasution took a close interest in law and constitutional issues.[22] His most inspirational and important teacher about law and government was Professor Djokosutono, the eminent *adat* and constitutional law expert who in April 1950 became professor of law and social sciences at the University of Indonesia. Djokosutono is rarely mentioned in standard histories of Indonesian politics. When he is it is usually for his formulation of the 'middle way' doctrine that Nasution would use after 1958 to stake out claims to military participation in political life. Yet his influence, both on Nasution and on Indonesian political structures in general, went well beyond this. Jenkins (1984: 229) credits him with having 'provided much of the theoretical framework for Guided Democracy' established under the auspices of both Sukarno and the army from July 1959. Thirty years after his death in September 1965, he continued to be revered by many key New Order ideologues, lawyers and administrators.[23]

A rotund, shy, yet charismatic man, Djokosutono came from a privileged *pangreh pradja* Solo family in Solo. Like his friend Supomo, who was one year his senior, he received a Dutch secondary education before moving to Batavia in about 1925 to attend the newly opened law faculty where he appears to have remained as a teaching assistant until the Japanese occupation. During the occupation he worked as a high official in the justice department, probably under Supomo. He was in great demand after 1945 to provide tertiary training to the officials of the new state. In 1946 he helped found the Political Science Academy in Yogyakarta to train administrators and would-be officials in overseas missions. When Gadjah Mada University was founded in 1949 Djokosutono became its first chair of the faculty of law and social and political sciences, but later the same year he returned to Jakarta.

If Djokosutono's teaching in Yogyakarta and Jakarta placed him at the centre of a web of influential civilian bureaucrats, he was also a mentor to a generation of military and police lawyers and administrators. In 1946 he had helped set up the Police Academy at Mertoyudan, near Malang, which later moved to Yogyakarta and in 1950 to Jakarta. In Jakarta he renamed it the Police College[24] and, taking over from Supomo, served as its dean for most of the 1950s (*Forum Keadilan* No. 24, October 1990: 68). In 1952 he taught at the new Military Law Academy[25] in Jakarta, which trained virtually all of Indonesia's large corps of military lawyers, including many who were to play crucial parts in constructing army-sponsored corporatist organisations after 1957 and, later on, Soeharto's New Order.[26] In 1962 he was instrumental in setting up a Military Law College where Military Law Academy graduates could obtain full law degrees.

Nasution first met Djokosutono in 1951 and frequently sought his views on constitutional issues and legal problems in the years that followed (Nasution

1983: 169–70; Jenkins 1984: 229). They stayed in close touch in the early 1950s through Djokosutono's 'loyal student and assistant' Basaruddin Nasution, who served under Nasution until 1952 as the head of the army justice directorate (Nasution 1983: 169–70). Basaruddin was one of the few officers who maintained close contact with Nasution during what he described as his 'leper years' between his removal from the position of army chief of staff in 1952 and his reinstatement in 1955, a time when Nasution read widely and thought a lot about his political future (ibid.: 215). During these years, Jenkins (1984: 229) has argued, Djokosutono helped Nasution develop the main elements of his political thought:

> [A] belief in strong government, constitutionalism, and army participation in decision making … into a cogent and coherently argued philosophy, one that was built around a return to the 1945 Constitution and the need for a close and continuing military involvement in nonmilitary affairs.

This is not to say that Djokosutono had a rightwing agenda, although he was very preoccupied with legal order. His thinking was strongly influenced by his teachers at the law faculty, and by the German traditions of constitutional law they were steeped in.[27] One former student said that Djokosutono's followers were referred to half-jokingly as belonging to the Vienna School of Hans Kelsen, the Berlin School of Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend and Herman Heller, the Historical School of Savigny, or the 'Legal Dogmaticists' (Moersaleh 1984: 434). From the evidence of a published collection of notes from his lectures on constitutional law in the first half of 1956, Djokosutono had serious doubts about the appropriateness and viability of the liberal 1950 Constitution (see Djokosutono 1982). He argued that Indonesia's 'ruling class' had been too quick to adopt 'abstract' European conventions such as parliamentarism and universal suffrage after 1945. This excessive concern with imitating Western models had led to an unhealthy situation in which the parliament had too many powers compared to the executive. Drawing on Carl Schmitt and the political sociologist Herman Heller (and, simultaneously, on the antithetical Germanist theoretical tradition of Jakob Grimm and van Vollenhoven), Djokosutono argued that it was imperative that constitutional structures should reflect the prevailing 'natural and cultural' conditions of society ('*Natur und Kulturbedingungen*') and 'real power factors' rather than abstract ideals (Djokosutono 1982: 119, 134–6).

Djokosutono is better understood as a legal technician than an ideologue. Like Schmitt in 1930s Germany, he saw law primarily as a tool of power and the role of constitutional lawyers as adjusting the legal architecture to suit the prevailing political conditions. At the same time he held that Indonesia's legal structures should more faithfully reflect the country's *cultural* patterns, which he spoke about in terms strongly redolent of the Leiden *adat* scholars such as van Vollenhoven, ter Haar and Haga whom he quoted frequently and with approval.

The two 'real power factors' that Djokosutono was most concerned were not being adequately accommodated under the 1950 Constitution were the army and Sukarno (see e.g. Djokosutono 1982: 11). In the years between 1956 and 1959 he played an important role as a supplier of political, legal and doctrinal formulas, which would help legitimise the increasingly prominent political profile of both Nasution's army and the president. In October 1957, for example, he summoned a range of theories to make a case that the 1950 Constitution was no longer valid and that Sukarno could rule with the same authority as William I, the absolute monarch of the Netherlands from 1815–40 (Djokosutono 1957: 36–43).

Nasution began to argue for a return to the 1945 Constitution as early as 1955 (Lev 1966: 207). The 1945 Constitution held two attractions for Nasution. Its provision for a strong presidency and five-year terms would ensure greater stability. And its provision for 'regional representatives and groups' to be included in its highest organ, the MPR, could make it easier for non-party, non-elected forces to take a role in government. Although the elucidation of the 1945 Constitution specified that this was intended to provide for the inclusion of economic groups such as cooperatives and trade unions, Nasution appears to have seen this as the best chance the military had to gain a legal foothold in the government.[28]

The political sea-change: democracy undermined

The results of the long-awaited elections had an enormous impact on Indonesian political life, as much because of who lost out as because of who did well. Four parties gained roughly equal shares: PNI (22.3 per cent), Masjumi (20.9 per cent), Nahdlatul Ulama (18.4 per cent) and the PKI (16.4 per cent).

One surprise was the poor showing of several parties representing influential elite constituencies. IPKI's leaders were disappointed and frustrated that only four of their 167 candidates won seats.[29] Likewise Murba, which had been strongly represented in the pre-election parliament and which many had expected to win almost as many votes as the PKI (Herb Feith, personal communication). This was a major blow for a group that enjoyed the support of many prestigious figures such as Yamin and which, because of their association with the youth groups that pressured Sukarno to proclaim independence, felt that they deserved a better fate than as a small rump party in parliament. The PSI, which commanded the loyalty of a sizeable proportion of the most highly educated, was decimated too. It won only 2 per cent of the vote and five seats.

The biggest shock for the anti-communist forces as a whole – that is to say the army, Masjumi and parts of the NU and PNI as well as several of the smaller parties – was the high vote of the PKI. Although the PKI's strong electoral showing was not rewarded with a place in cabinet, their 39 seats in parliament and their large and well-organised youth, labour and peasant organisations were seen as a significant threat by most of the established

parties, especially after increasing their vote in the Constituent Assembly elections later the same year.

The cabinet formed on the basis of the election outcome, headed by the PNI's Ali Sastroamidjojo, was based on a coalition between PNI, NU and Masjumi. But disappointment with it set in quickly, as did divisions within it. The PNI and NU had gained a large part of their vote in Java, as had the PKI, while the result had confirmed Masjumi as the voice of the outer islands. Tensions between the government in Jakarta and the civilian and military elites in the main export commodity-producing areas of Sumatra and Sulawesi, which had been brewing for several years, reached new levels of threat within a few months of the foundation of the post-election cabinet. At issue was the central government's failure to address mounting economic and administrative problems in the regions and its reluctance to provide them with a share of the budget commensurate with their substantial contribution to the national economy. By 1956 Masjumi had become extremely frustrated with the marginalisation of its representatives in cabinet and the government's continuing neglect of the regions (Kahin and Kahin 1995: 50–3).

Centre-region tensions were also developing into a major issue for the military. The commanders of most of the country's seven military regions had been strong since the revolution. In the early 1950s several of these outer island 'warlords' stepped up their illegal trade with Singapore, partly in response to the rising rate of inflation that hurt the commodity-exporting regions. When Nasution was reappointed army chief of staff in November 1955 he caused a great deal of resentment by trying to reassert central control, restructuring military territories and rotating regional commanders (ibid.: 56). This was manifest most dramatically in October 1956 when the former deputy army chief of staff Lt. Col. Zulkifli Lubis moved Siliwangi division troops from several parts of West Java in an abortive attempt to stage a coup in Jakarta against Sukarno and the prime minister, but above all against Nasution.

By October 1956 it was clear that the elections had failed to create the stable, unified and purposeful government that many had expected. Regional challenges and the Zulkifli Lubis coup attempt had highlighted the government's loss of authority. In these circumstances President Sukarno, who had long been unhappy with his own marginal status under the 1950 Constitution, began staking claims to a larger political role. One of his principal preoccupations was with uniting all political and popular forces to revive the revolutionary élan of 1945. This, he believed, would enable the nation to concentrate its energies on 'reclaiming' West Papua from the Dutch – a goal that loomed increasingly large and Holy Grail-like over Indonesian political life from the mid 1950s.

In the second half of 1956 Sukarno began speaking more frequently about the cultural inappropriateness of the parliamentary system, contrasting 'individualistic' Western democracy, in which '50 per cent plus one are always right' and 'Indonesian democracy', which stressed leadership and was based on social solidarity and *gotong royong* (Feith 1962: 515).

To strengthen his position vis-à-vis the parties, Sukarno surrounded himself with radical revolutionary *pemuda* and an overlapping group who called themselves the Angkatan 45 (Generation of 1945). These included several non-party figures such as the former Tan Malaka follower Chaerul Saleh and the revolutionary period Student Army (TRIP) leaders Achmadi and Major Isman. As Feith (1962: 516) pointed out, what attracted Sukarno to these men was their radical nationalism, their prominent roles in the revolution and their lack of ties to parties such as the PNI, Masjumi, NU and PSI, whose members had sat in cabinets repeatedly. To the extent that Sukarno's new allies had party links they were with the PKI, which had had no representation in any of the post-1949 cabinets, and Murba, which had always prided itself for its daring revolutionary spirit.

On Youth Pledge Day, 28 October 1956, Sukarno launched a new phase of his attack on the parliamentary system. Having just returned from long visits to the Soviet Union and China, he told his audience of youth organisations that 'we made a very great mistake in 1945 when we urged the establishment of parties'. He dreamed, he said, that they had been buried.[30] Two days later he announced that he wanted a 'guided democracy' and that he had a *konsepsi* (concept) of how this should be achieved. It was to be another four months before he disclosed what that was.

As power gravitated to Sukarno, advocates of a parliamentary system and regional autonomy in Jakarta were increasingly on the defensive, leading Hatta to resign as vice president in December 1956. This precipitated a further deterioration in relations with the provinces and helped firm up an emerging alliance of military and civilian opponents of Jakarta's rule in the regions, especially in West and North Sumatra. This led in late December 1956 and early 1957 to a series of peaceful seizures of power of new councils led by local military commanders who took control out of the hands of the Jakarta-appointed civilian governors. These local 'coups' were typically accompanied by statements affirming their instigators' loyalty to the Republic but attacking the national military leadership and the 'corrupt' and 'self-serving' civilian parties. Jakarta's initially conciliatory response to these councils strengthened them and encouraged army officer groups to imitate their tactics in other parts of Indonesia (Feith 1962: 536). The regionalists were also encouraged by the support they received from important elements within Masjumi, PSI and (against Nasution's wishes) IPKI.

In response to the challenge of these military-led councils, Nasution convinced Sukarno that the best way to prevent the country falling apart was to agree to declare martial law. The proclamation, signed by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo on the eve of his resignation on 14 March 1957, empowered the military 'to take measures of any kind whatsoever … when it considers them necessary in view of the immediate emergency situation' (Kahin and Kahin 1995: 67).

Martial law legalised many of the actions local military commanders had taken against their enemies, including the PKI, banning their activities and arresting their leaders. The army's new powers also gave it a freer hand to

prevent government initiatives that they disagreed with, such as the anti-*pamong praja* decentralisation law mentioned earlier.[31]

Nasution's army was further strengthened after its seizure of control over Dutch assets early in 1958 and its defeat of the CIA-backed regional rebellions in 1957 and 1958. The sudden enrichment of much of the officer corps and the unexpectedly fast vanquishing of the PRRI-Permesta[32] rebellion helped a great deal in overcoming the divisions that had plagued the army since independence. The main losers were the political parties that had sided with the regional rebellions, Masjumi and the PSI. Hatta too was a major loser. It had seemed for a time in 1957 that pressure from the regionalists would catapult him into leadership of the government, but the defeat of the rebellions ruled that out definitively.

Hatta's defeat as a political force marked an important turning point for conservatism in Indonesia. Nasution, rather than Hatta, now became the figure to whom anti-communists looked.[33] Hatta's temperate brand of social democracy, which had stressed the centrality of popular sovereignty and parliament, gave way to a very different stream of conservatism, one that owed much more to organicist traditions.

The hectic and chaotic events of 1956–8, then, marked the end of an era. Legalism and constitutionalism, the sacred cows of the democratic period, lost their importance quickly. Already by mid 1957 the main non-communist parties had been eclipsed by what seemed like a four-way contest between the communists, Sukarno, Hatta and the regionalists. By the middle of 1958 the political centre of gravity had shifted decisively away from the cabinet to the army and Sukarno. Most of the parties now found themselves outmanoeuvred by forces that had little stake in preserving the parliamentary system. The military leadership, regarding itself as the saviour of national unity and as the legitimate guardian of the state, wanted a role in government far beyond what the 1950 Constitution allowed them. They were especially keen, as were the PNI and the NU, to curb the power of the PKI, which had emerged as the strongest single party in Java in the provincial elections of 1957.

Sukarno was victorious in another sense, in as much as his 'guided democracy' formula was seen to have defeated the 'liberal democracy' he was denouncing. But he had a whole range of interests to balance. Despite his 'bury the parties speech' he saw some value in the parties with their direct connection to the people, but wanted a system in which he himself played a much greater role. He realised that he needed to appease the military if national unity was to be preserved but had no intention of allowing himself to become a tool of the army. The way to achieve this, he figured, was to create a new system that would give greater voice to his new allies among the *pemuda*, ex-revolutionaries, Murba figures and, increasingly, the PKI.

Organicism into the mainstream: 1957–63

In the four months following his October 1956 announcement that he had a 'concept', Sukarno consulted his advisers and the main political forces,

including the military, about a political format that could feasibly replace the party dominated system. There were two central elements of Sukarno's proposal, revealed on 21 February 1957. He proposed the creation of an all-party '*gotong royong* cabinet', which would include the PKI. In addition he sought the appointment of a high-powered advisory body called the National Council (Dewan Nasional) constituted along corporatist lines to ensure that it acted, in the president's words, as a 'reflection of society' (Lev 1966: 23). But the resistance to bringing the PKI into the cabinet was such that Sukarno was eventually forced to backtrack on this proposal. On the National Council he had greater success. It was eventually inaugurated on 12 July and included the chiefs of staff of the army, navy and airforce, the police chief, the attorney general, the three deputy prime ministers, 14 regional representatives and 21 'functional group' representatives of labour, peasants, youth, former armed revolutionaries, national entrepreneurs, artists, journalists, women, Generation of 45-ers, religious scholars and citizens of foreign extraction (Reeve 1985: 118). Both bodies would be chaired by the president himself and run according to the principles of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* (deliberation and consensus) rather than voting.

The National Council was an important innovation in itself and became the principal forum for discussion of further changes in the political–constitutional order. Djokosutono's role in relation to those discussions was important. In Lev's words (1966: 215–16), he 'provided justifications, constitutional formulas, and scholarly background materials for whatever the Council decided. He was for a while a one man legislative reference service'. He also advised Roeslan Abdulgani, who apart from managing the National Council was Sukarno's spokesman on ideological issues.

The practice of constituting representative bodies along occupational lines was not a new one in Indonesia. It had been used in the Volksraad, the Djawa Hōkōkai and Sukarno's *Staatspartij*, and had been alluded to in the 1945 Constitution. The term 'functional groups' (*golongan fungsionil*) and functional groupism as a constitutional theory, however, were most likely introduced by Djokosutono, who was well versed in European corporatist literature (Wahyono 1984: 72). Sukarno's consultations with Djokosutono did much to help the president give institutional form to his ideas of a guided democracy and to counter the criticisms of party leaders who attacked functional representation as undemocratic and likely to lead to fascism (Lev 1966: 219).

On 7 October 1957 Djokosutono made an extended defence of functional representation to the National Council.[35] He argued that many liberal democracies had focused on political rights at the expense of economic, social and cultural democracy, resulting in a growing gap between rich and poor. Despite efforts to compensate for growing disparities of wealth and privilege through social welfare legislation, the fundamental contradictions within liberal democracy had led it into a deep crisis. This crisis was exacerbated by anarchy caused by unbridled competition between ideologically delineated parties and narrowly self-interested pressure groups.

The experience of European countries had shown, Djokosutono argued, that this crisis had been addressed by two structural innovations. One was to strengthen the authority of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature and the second was to adopt a system of functional representation. This involved creating advisory councils – analogous to the National Council – representing groups such as workers, farmers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, consumers and the middle classes. He used several terms to describe these groups, including *Belangengroepen* (interest groups) and *functionele groepen* (functional groups). Such groups, supplemented by various experts, would collectively manifest the public interest and provide non-party political advice to the government. An example of this kind of council was the Weimar Republic's *Reichswirtschaftsrat*, a kind of 'economic parliament' subordinate to the ordinary parliament (Landauer 1983: 62–5).

Djokosutono described functional representation as underpinned by 'what Catholics call the principle of subsidiarity', according to which the state allows individual functional groups control over their own activities (Djokosutono 1957: 8).[35] The government's role is to regulate the various groups and ensure that their interests accord with the general interest. This, Djokosutono explained, required either a 'repressive capacity' enabling the government to undo decisions by functional groups that conflict with the general interest, or a 'preventative capacity' enabling it to appoint civil servants to positions in the functional group organisations. Given the poorly developed state of functional groups in Indonesia, it would be out of the question to allow them the degree of autonomy that they enjoyed in Western Europe.

Admitting that the 'corporative' system he was describing was controversial because of its associations with Mussolini, Djokosutono asserted the socialist credentials of functional groupism, citing the Austro-Marxian Max Adler and the Dutch socialist van der Goes van Naters. No sooner had he done this, though, than he went on to link functional groupism, and the related idea of functional decentralisation, with the conservative philosophy of Kuyper's Anti-Revolutionary Party in Holland. Kuyper's slogan '*souvereiniteit in eigen kring*' (sovereignty in one's own sphere), he explained, was the Dutch formulation of the principle of subsidiarity.

Djokosutono's 1957 arguments clearly drew heavily on the tradition of European organicism that had been passed onto Indonesian students in the law schools in Jakarta and Leiden. Supomo had spoken in similar terms in his 1941 address to the law faculty in Jakarta about the crisis of liberalism and the historical trend towards restructuring state–society relations along corporatist lines guided by organicist principles. Thanks partly to the continuities between pre- and post-independence legal education and to continuities in teaching staff, the organicist intellectual lineage did not wither away in Indonesia as it did, for the most part, in Europe after the Second World War.

One important aspect of the resurgence of organicist ideas in Indonesian political life after 1956 was the way in which Sukarno and his radical allies picked up organicist references that had been associated in the preceding

years with a 'feudal' fringe. In the second half of 1957 Sukarno gave several remarkable speeches, which blended the rhetoric of revolution with organicist imagery including the harmonious orchestra, the 'state as a living organism' and even the Javanese phrase beloved of PIR aristocrats *manunggaling kawula-gusti* (the union of ruler and ruled) (Reeve 1985: 137–8). Taking to the extreme his penchant for synthesising opposites, Sukarno insisted that unity and harmony were essential for the 'dynamic–dialectical' process of revolution (ibid.: 138). His new tack reflected on the one hand his preoccupation with overcoming the divisions between the parties and on the other his sense of needing to maintain his radical appeal if he was to avoid becoming a prisoner of the army.

Sukarno's now frequent references to the importance of returning to Indonesia's 'national personality' saw indigenist rhetoric – especially the idea of *gotong royong* – come to stand for opposition to parliamentary democracy. For those at both ends of the radical–conservative spectrum the image of the communalistic village provided a counterpoint to what they saw as the divisiveness of the existing political system.

This does not mean that 'Indonesian identity' stood for the same thing for radicals and conservatives. For many radicals, calling for a return to a *gotong royong* society was a way of declaring their opposition to the whole system of Western-derived law in Indonesia, which many saw as overly positivistic, individualistic and preoccupied with statutes and precedents. In a 1957 speech to the Constituent Assembly Roestama Ikrat of the small leftist-Javanese party Permai quoted Supomo's scholarly works to argue that '*adat* law should become the source of our legislation [which] should be more Indonesian in nature, instead of adapting ourselves to Western laws as under [the] colonial government'.[36] The PKI saw an ally in Professor Djojodiguno – head of an *adat* studies institute in the law faculty of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta – who argued that Western law should be replaced with living, unwritten law emerging directly from Indonesian culture and reflecting the people's sense of justice (Herb Feith, personal communication).[37] Such arguments were deployed against the 'legalism' that characterised the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly and had led to criticisms of Sukarno, especially by Sjahrir and his sympathisers, for acting beyond his powers. For conservatives, meanwhile, such as those groups aligned with the *pamong praja* and the army, a return to a more 'Indonesian' political system promised strong, decisive government at the centre, military participation in government and a reduction of party influence in the towns and villages.[38]

After the declaration of martial law in March 1957, the military took an increasingly assertive stance against the parties – especially (though quietly) against the PKI. Using Sukarno's rhetoric of *gotong royong*, anti-partyism, national unity and the notion of functional-groupism, the army leaders initiated the forming of a series of military-led Cooperation Bodies (Badan Kerjasama). On 17 June 1957 they formed the Youth–Military Cooperation Body, which involved army officers working directly with the youth organisations of the

major parties (Reeve 1985: 119). They created a Worker–Military Cooperation Body in December 1957, a Press–Military Contact Bureau in January 1958 and a Peasant–Military Cooperation Body in September 1958 (ibid.: 119, 144). The most important of these bodies, the Worker–Military Cooperation Body, was led by Military Law Academy graduate Lt. Col. Amir Moertono, a prominent proponent of the functional groups concept who was later to become a leading figure in the New Order's corporatist Golkar. In January 1958 they established a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (FNPIB) as a coordinating body for the Cooperation Bodies. In September 1958 Nasution described the FNPIB as the only legitimate mass organisation.

Sukarno responded to the FNPIB initiative by appointing his own people, such as Chaerul Saleh to the Front's leadership, and also managed to curb its influence both at the national and regional levels (Lev 1966: 223–4). Many of the party-aligned mass organisations also resisted the attempts of the military to bring them under the control of one or another of the Cooperation Bodies. The PKI-linked youth and worker organisations fought particularly hard to maintain their independence. In fact the only party organisations that the military successfully brought under its control were the veterans' groups (Lev 1966).

Despite the limited success of the Cooperation Bodies, the military was riding high in late 1957 and 1958. Their control of the nationalised Dutch enterprises had given them a major stake in the economy and they had considerably enhanced their power, prestige and coherence following the successful suppression of the regional rebellions. Greatly enriched, and basking in the glory of its victories, the army came to represent itself as the one force with the backbone and clear-sightedness to hold the country together. But they were aware that the political situation was volatile and they feared that Sukarno might lift martial law, leaving them with few formal powers.

To secure their influence, the military sought ways of guaranteeing participation in the highest policymaking bodies (Penders and Sundhaussen 1985: 133). In November 1958 Djokosutono, in cooperation with Nasution, formulated a doctrine that came to be known as the 'middle way'.[39] According to this doctrine, the army declared itself to be more than just a 'dead tool of the state'. Rather, it would steer a middle course between domination of the government (as in Latin American dictatorships) and complete disengagement from politics (as in Western Europe). Its role in the revolution and in suppressing various subsequent threats to the survival of the state, the argument went, entitled it to a permanent political role in the legislative, planning and executive branches of government and also in the bureaucracy and the diplomatic corps (ibid.). While the 'middle-way' concept was in one sense just a description of reality, it also laid the foundation for an elaborate doctrine by which the military was to claim full rights to participate in government.

Late 1958 saw a series of negotiations, bluffs and threats both inside and outside the National Council about the shape that 'Guided Democracy' would take. Tension was particularly marked between the large parties, which

wanted to preserve a role for themselves, and Sukarno, who wanted to establish a functional group-based National Front under his own leadership that would develop into 'a nationwide mass organisation of the radical nationalist left, absorbing the support once given to political parties' (Lev 1966: 222). What he envisaged would later become 'the single legitimate political organisation in the country, performing the major functions of political tutelage and mobilisation' (ibid.).

Nasution responded to the tension by persuading his associates in the army leadership to push for the reintroduction of the 1945 Constitution, an option that Sukarno had initially rejected. IPKI formally proposed the idea on 30 January 1959 and Sukarno decided to endorse it. Soon afterwards the PNI and NU also supported the idea.

On 22 April the president, supported by the cabinet, asked the Constituent Assembly to end its deliberations and authorise a return to the 1945 Constitution. After the assembly voted against the proposal on three successive occasions, a group of parties, including IPKI, Murba and the PKI,[40] moved that the assembly dissolve itself (Penders and Sundhaussen 1985: 136). On 5 July 1959 Sukarno unilaterally dissolved the Constituent Assembly and reintroduced the 1945 Constitution by decree.[41] That date is now seen to mark the formal inauguration of Guided Democracy.

Sukarno's Independence Day speech of 17 August 1959 was the ideological counterpoint of the decree of 5 July. Called 'The Rediscovery of Our Revolution', and later the *Manifesto Politik*, it called for a 'revival of the spirit of the revolution, for social justice and for a "retooling" of the institutions and organisations of the nation in the name of ongoing revolution' (Ricklefs 1981: 255). As 'Manipol', the Manifesto was hitched to 'USDEK', standing for the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian identity. Manipol-USDEK then became part of an intensive programme of indoctrination. Vague as it was, Feith (1967: 368) argued that it gave people something to cling to in a rapidly changing environment.

The new cabinet appointed after the 5 July decree was headed by the president himself, with Djuanda Kartawidjija named 'first prime minister'. Its composition reflected the balance of forces that would dominate politics for the next three years. Almost a third of its members were from the armed forces. It also included a large number of Sukarno's personal followers, including members of the National Council, which was subsequently reconstituted as the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA) (Reeve 1985: 163). No leading party figures were included in the cabinet, and ministers who had been associated with any party were forced to resign their membership (ibid.: 163). With the strong support of the army, Sukarno dealt the parties two further blows with Presidential Decisions Nos. 6 and 7 of September 1959. The first cancelled the decentralisation law of 1957, greatly reducing party influence in regional administration and restoring the status of the *pamong praja*. The second, drawn up by Djokosutono, 'simplified' the party system, leading in

the course of the next year to the banning of all but ten parties, including the influential PSI and the large Masjumi.[42] Functional groupism was further consolidated with the establishment in March 1960 of a new all-appointed legislature, the Gotong Royong People's Representative Council (DPR-GR), about two-thirds of which consisted of functional group representatives, including the military.

The resurrection of the wartime constitution in July 1959 confirmed what had existed informally since the defeat of the regional rebellions a year or so earlier: an alliance of Sukarno and the military in which the parties played virtually no part. Nasution and the other military leaders were willing to go along with Sukarno's radical rhetoric and his often sharply anti-Western foreign policy as long as he was willing to abide by their demand that the PKI be excluded from cabinet and allowed them continued control of their new plantations, mines and other ex-Dutch businesses. Sukarno, in turn, was in the military's debt for having crushed the regional rebellions and for having supported the anti-party manoeuvres that had helped make him so powerful. They had in common a belief in strong central leadership, a distrust of politicised Islam, a conviction that parliamentary democracy and liberalism were proven failures in Indonesia, and a commitment to building a political system in which functional representation played a larger role.

In 1960 the two partners joined forces to press the party-linked youth and labour organisations into nationwide functional groups. But they had little more success than the army had had in its earlier attempt to do the same thing with its Cooperation Bodies. The combined weight of Sukarno and Nasution could not convince the youth organisations to merge themselves into a pro-government Youth Front. Similar resistance also foiled the ambitious attempt of labour minister Ahem Erningpradja to fuse all party-aligned unions into a worker's functional group called OPPI (United Organisation of Indonesian Workers). The PKI, which stood to lose control over its powerful SOBSI union federation,[43] put up the strongest fight, likening the proposed OPPI to Hitler's *Arbeiterfront*.[44]

It was only months before Sukarno changed his position on functional groups, apparently seeing that the army leaders stood to gain more from their creation than he did. He was especially annoyed by the military's efforts to exclude communists from the upper ranks of the corporatist organisations it was creating and by the army's use of martial law powers to harass and intimidate the PKI in the regions. To regain the initiative and ensure that he was not left without a support base himself, Sukarno went back to supporting parties. In late 1960 he coined the slogan 'Nasakom': the unity of nationalist, religious and communist forces. This was significant not only for the oxygen it provided to the three largest parties, the nationalist PNI, the religious NU and the communist PKI but also, as Reeve (1985: 173) pointed out, in that it did not include the military or make any reference to functional groups. Functional groupism continued to figure in Sukarno's speeches until 1962. But he came to rely more and more on the Nasakom parties (especially the PKI) in

his campaigns such as the one to win control of West Papua, which went into high gear in December 1961. The parties, in turn, embraced the rhetoric of Nasakom to assert their own claims to increased influence. By 1963 functional groupism, which had started life as Sukarno's concept, had become associated almost exclusively with the military. Nasakom, which had originally been intended to supplement the functional groups concept, had come to symbolise opposition to it and to anti-communism.[45]

Pemuda-ism once more – and polarisation: 1963–5

A new phase that Feith and Castles (1988) call 'late Guided Democracy' set in soon after Indonesia's success in forcing the Dutch out of West Papua. In the last stage of the 'struggle for West Irian', between December 1961 and the middle of the following year, President Sukarno combined mass mobilisation, international brinkmanship and, against Nasution's advice, military action to force the Dutch out of the territory they had retained in the sovereignty negotiations in 1949.

Both the campaign itself and its outcome did much to strengthen the president in his contest with the leaders of the army. In March 1962 he was able to dislodge General Nasution from his position as army chief of staff, putting the more compliant Lieutenant General Yani into that post and leaving Nasution the less powerful positions of armed forces chief and defence minister. He also deprived the army of its martial law powers from 1 May 1963 and reorganised the military body responsible for coordinating the Papua campaign into a 'Supreme Operations Command' called KOTI, staffed by officers loyal to Yani as well as several civilians and non-army personnel (Crouch 1978: 54–5).

Sukarno's success in forcing the Dutch out of West Papua owed much to support from the Kennedy administration. US–Indonesian relations had been poor for a number of years before 1961, having been soured greatly by Washington's clandestine support for the regional rebellion in early 1958 (Kahin and Kahin 1995). After the defeat of that rebellion the Eisenhower administration saw the army leadership as its natural ally. But it was alarmed by the inroads the Soviet Union was making in Jakarta. When General Nasution visited Moscow in 1959 and gained a promise of military supplies, Washington decided to boost its military support for Indonesia.

That same logic of competition with the Soviets led the US in 1961–2 to pressure the Dutch to give up their control of West Papua. By 17 August 1962 Indonesia's victory over the Netherlands was complete. Under a formula worked out with US help, the Dutch agreed that West Papua would pass into Indonesian hands by May the following year.

Having helped Sukarno to realise his goal to 'liberate West Irian', the Kennedy administration believed it could now press the Indonesian government to turn its attention to economic management, and particularly to the task of controlling inflation. The IMF offered to fund an economic stabilisation

programme, which had the active support of Djuanda and the initial agreement of Sukarno. But leftwing parties, including the now Beijing-aligned PKI, were critical of the reductions in subsidies on various commodities that the programme entailed (Mortimer 1974: Chapter 5).

By this time, however, the prospective formation of the new state of Malaysia had come to dominate Indonesian politics. As envisaged by Britain and Malaya, this new state would include not only Malaya and Singapore but also the three British territories of Northern Borneo: Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei.[46] But in December 1962 a rebellion broke out in Brunei, directed against both Brunei's Sultan and the Malaysia plan. The Indonesian government expressed support for this rebellion almost immediately and in January 1963 Sukarno declared that Indonesia would launch a 'confrontation' against the Malaysia scheme. By the middle of 1963 Indonesia had committed a great deal of prestige to the effort to foil the Malaysia proposal, but the British and Malayan governments remained determined to press ahead with it and, before the outcome of a United Nations determination of local opinion, announced that the new federation would be formed on 16 September.

Between May and September the governments of the US, Japan and the Philippines sought to head off the looming contest. China, on the other hand, was in full support of the Indonesian opposition to the Federation of Malaysia, which they saw as an attempt to entrench Western capitalism and military power in the region.

In domestic politics the question of whether to accept the proposed new state became closely entwined with the question of whether to push ahead with the IMF-endorsed economic stabilisation programme. The two options came to be seen as mutually incompatible. Eventually Sukarno took the left-nationalist path of pursuing the confrontation with Malaysia. Two days after Malaysia was inaugurated, organised crowds attacked the Malaysian embassy and set fire to the British embassy in Jakarta. On 25 September Sukarno declared that he would crush the new state.

That decision was to have profound consequences for Indonesia. There was now no question of Indonesia being granted the loan that was part of the IMF stabilisation package. In addition, trade ties with Malaysia were cut, making it impossible to use Singapore as the entrepot it had long been, leading to a major loss of export revenues. The new phase of confrontation put Indonesia on a collision course with the West. Sukarno was staking his reputation on a cause that was essentially unwinnable, forcing him to put a great deal of energy into sustaining the pretence that the campaign was succeeding and costing him a lot of the prestige he had gained by his successful confrontation with the Dutch over West Papua.[47]

Domestically Sukarno now became more fully aligned with the parties in general and the PKI in particular, urging them to compete with one another to mobilise mass support behind the goals of the government. Membership of mass organisations had swelled rapidly in the early 1960s, the PKI's Peasant Front claiming 5.7 million members in July 1962 and SOBSI nearly 3.3 million

later that year. The PKI itself claimed over two million members, making it the largest communist party in the non-communist world (Ricklefs 1981: 259). Sukarno actively encouraged the PKI, including many communist figures in the National Front and supporting the party's anti-Western cultural and social campaigns. Following the death of the moderate Djuanda in November 1963, Sukarno's foreign minister and intelligence chief Subandrio became the president's right hand man and led the government further into alliance with the PKI and with China. In late 1963 Sukarno called for more rapid implementation of land reform measures that had been made law in 1960, leading the PKI to embark on a programme of 'unilateral' direct actions against landlords and pro-landlord bureaucrats, which generated a powerful backlash from the NU and parts of the PNI in many parts of rural Indonesia.

So the period after September 1963 was one of sharp polarisation along right–left lines. As the PKI and its mass organisations grew more assertive, a new anti-communist and anti-populist alliance crystallised. Led by prominent army figures, this included elements from the NU, PNI, Murba and the *pamong praja* and also people from Masjumi and PSI who had supported the rebellions the military had suppressed. Such was the military's fear of the PKI that it was prepared to set aside its anti-party attitudes and special dislike of the Masjumi and PSI and cooperate with any group that would help it hold back the left tide.

Yet the army leadership continued to cling to its organicist vision of state–society relations and to develop its functional group doctrines. Important army ideologues in the early 1960s included Military Law Academy graduates Colonel Sutjipto[48] and Lieutenant Colonel Abdulkadir Besar.[49] Nasution relied on Sutjipto in particular, who he described as a 'consistent student' of Djokosutono, to help him formulate his ideas about functional groups (Nasution 1985: 198–201). Djokosutono's influence is evident in Nasution's June 1962 speech at Andalas University in West Sumatra when he spoke about the decline of liberalism and the trend toward 'functional democracy' in the West (ibid.).[50]

Functional groupism was a key ideological weapon in the army's battle with the left and the concept of *karyawan* or 'functionary' was a central part of it. It was used to refer to the many thousands of military appointees to civilian positions such as mayors or managers of state enterprises. They were said to be performing '*kekaryaan*' or 'functional' duties in which the military, according to Nasution's doctrine of territorial management, were obliged to participate. In 1963 the military set up a whole command structure within the army general staff to coordinate and supervise what it called the *kekaryaan* activities of its staff.[51]

Karyawan was also the term favoured by army ideologues for employees of all kinds, whether they be plantation managers or day labourers. The promotion of this term, with its classless connotations, in place of *buruh* (worker), grew directly out of the army's efforts to contain the influence of the communist

unions, especially among the several hundred thousand workers employed directly by military-run state enterprises.[52] In the late 1950s the military had formed many *karyawan* (worker and management) associations, especially in the state-owned tea and rubber plantations. From 1959, these associations were grouped into an organisation called State Enterprise Karyawan whose leadership consisted largely of graduates from the Military Law Academy (Boileau 1983: 40–1). As this body came under increasing pressure from its communist rival SOBSI, the army created a political organisation called SOKSI (Union of Indonesian Socialist Karyawan Organisations).

Formed in May 1960, SOKSI was the army's most important functional group organisation and the major vehicle for the army's organicist vision (Boileau 1983: 40; Reeve 1990: 166). Its main political purpose was to confront the power of the PKI by recruiting as many workers as possible to its ranks and by promoting (and enforcing) a rival conception of worker–employer relations, one based on the principles of *kekaryaan* and the family principle. By 1963, SOKSI controlled a network of 60 national-level mass-based functional organisations and by 1964 claimed to be operating in all provinces (Boileau 1983: 41; Reeve 1985: 192). Several civilian groups also joined SOKSI, but as Boileau (1983: 42) notes, this was due more to the protection from the PKI that the army-sponsored organisation offered than to a belief in the army version of functional groupism. As politics tilted to the left, however, SOKSI found itself increasingly on the defensive.

A second important organisation formed to combat communist influence was Sekber Golkar (the Joint Secretariat of Functional Group Organisations). This body, established in October 1964 by a group of army-linked figures and conservative intellectuals – including, again, former students of Djokosutono[53] – was formed as a coordinating body for the activities of functional group organisations within the National Front. Like most other anti-communist bodies at the time, Sekber Golkar declared 100 per cent support for President Sukarno while pushing its own anti-communist agenda through the *karyawan* doctrine (Reeve 1985: 243).

Neither SOKSI nor Sekber Golkar, however, was very strong in 1965. Organicist philosophies and formulas had little place in the public language of that feverish year. The dominant formal theme of politics in the first nine months of 1965 was competition between nationalist, religious and communist parties to contribute to the struggle against the proclaimed enemy: *Neo-kolonialisme*, *Kolonialisme* and *Imperialisme* (Nekolim) The dominant informal themes were economic decline and right–left polarisation. In many ways Sukarno's exhortations to revive the dynamic *pemuda* spirit of the revolution had done just that, and, as in the revolution, organicism sank from view. In contrast to the revolutionary years, however, the conservative forces in the early 1960s were stronger, more self-confident and more conscious of their common interests. Many military officers, some *pamong praja* officials, some Muslim traders and landholders and sections of the urban intelligentsia were stirred into a new anti-communist activism. But most parts of that

intelligentsia were passive victims of the damage and uncertainty caused by spiralling inflation.

Looking at the timespan between the proclamation of independence and the rise of the New Order in terms of the fate of organicist ideologies, one can discern three periods. Between 1945 and 1956 organicism had a low public profile despite continuing support for it in *pamong praja* circles. This was a time when commitment to parliamentary democracy was widespread and parties were strong. Conservatism in this period was defined largely by the ideas of Hatta: social-democratic, technocratic, constitutionalist and pro-Western. The second period may be said to date either from 1957 when Sukarno and the army began to experiment with functional groupism, or from the defeat of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in mid 1958, which put an end to the hopes of the Hatta forces.

In this period organicist rhetoric and corporatist formulas were centre stage. One central event here was Sukarno's formation of the National Council along corporatist lines in early 1957. A second key event was the reintroduction of the 1945 Constitution in July 1959, also by a combination of Sukarno and army forces. Yet, as I have argued, Nasution and Sukarno had different agendas. Nasution used the functional groups concept to extend army participation in government and to contain the influence of the PKI. Sukarno used it create a sense of forward movement. He sought to unite the mass followings of the parties behind him, and to give the PKI and other radical groups a greater role in government. In 1960 the contradiction between Nasution's conservative corporatism and Sukarno's radical collectivism came to a head, leading the president to turn away from the functional groups concept and revive the parties. But it was not until 1963 that the two parties in government began to concentrate principally on fighting each other. So the third period, between 1963 and 1965, was one in which right–left polarisation pushed organicist ideologues and ideologies into retreat.

However, the work the army intellectuals had done before 1963, with the help of constitutional experts such as Djokosutono, had laid important foundations. The organicist formulas and doctrines developed by army ideologues and lawyers in the 1956–63 period were to have a profound influence on the way the military restructured the political environment after it seized power in 1965–6.

Notes

1 *Sinar Baroe* (Semarang) 27 August 1945, quoted in Anderson (1972: 91).
2 According to the leftwing Sajuti Melik, the sole member of the general leadership who had not collaborated with the Japanese. See Reeve (1985: 79–80).
3 *Merdeka* 2 November 1945, cited in Anderson (1972: 176).
4 Raden Pandji Singgih, who was Chōkan (Resident) of Malang in East Java, was among those killed by *pemuda* at the beginning of the revolution (Nishijima in Reid and Oki 1986: 268). For a succinct account of the 'Tiga Daerah' rebellion of 1945 in Pekalongan, see Lucas (1985). In 1947 *pamong praja* in the East Javanese Residency of Bojonegoro also came under attack (Ward 1974: 55).

5 Sukarno assumed the full presidential powers available to him under the 1945 Constitution for brief periods in 1946 (the 3 July crisis), 1947 (the collapse of the Sjahrir government in June) and 1948 (the fall of Amir Sjarifuddin's Cabinet in January) (Reeve 1985: 88–9).
6 Supomo's acceptance of parliamentarism also reflected, no doubt, his disposition to adjust himself to the 'spirit of the times' (a phrase he often used) and possibly his hope of becoming Indonesia's first post-transfer-of-sovereignty justice minister. In 1947 Supomo found in Savigny's comment 'Law is a living thing, a thing which always moves' an appropriate justification for his change of heart (Supomo 1959: 20).
7 The 1950 Constitution went beyond the UN Declaration and the 1949 Constitution by explicitly guaranteeing the right to demonstrate and the right to strike (Article 21) (Nasution 1992: 28). Article 83 also made ministers more accountable to the parliament by enabling the parliament to force their resignation (Abdulkadir Besar 1972: 531). See the full text of the 1950 Constitution in Nasution (1992: 487–510).
8 For a summary of his findings see Nasution (1994).
9 The aristocratic K.R.M.H. Soeripto was a good friend of Supomo from their days studying *adat* law together under van Vollenhoven in Leiden. Indonesia's political arrangements, he maintained in a 1957 speech to the assembly, had to be in tune with village life, which, drawing on the authority of *adat* law experts, he argued was still based on the communal *gotong royong* or family spirit. Like Supomo in 1941, he argued that the West itself was moving towards a more collectivistic model. Soeripto concluded that 'The spirit of the national character, the spirit of Indonesian society, is collectivistic; in accordance with this national character, this collectivistic spirit of Indonesian society, we ought to draft a new constitution of which the spirit is also collectivistic' (Nasution 1992: 101–2).
10 The civil bureaucracy grew from about 250,000 in 1940 to about 2,500,000 in 1968 (Emmerson 1978a: 87).
11 Although he had never studied law formally, Soetardjo was well versed in the literature of the Leiden scholars and professed 'along with most – if not all – legal experts in Indonesia' to be a devoted admirer of van Vollenhoven (Kartohadikoesoemo 1965: 83). Soetardjo's writing about 'corporative legal communities' in village Java and Bali (probably added to the book in 1964) argued that the European idea of 'functional decentralisation' was already well established in rural Indonesia (ibid.: 61–6).
12 Such was the acceptance of human rights in the early 1950s that even this most conservative of political parties declared itself in favour of 'upholding the basic human rights and freedoms as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (Kementerian Penerangan 1954: 233).
13 For detailed biodata to 1964 see Nasution (1964: 153–7).
14 Soenarjo Gondokusumo was the brother-in-law of the founder of Parindra, Soeroso. He was one of a handful of large indigenous exporters in the 1930s. R.P. Gondokusumo is not to be confused with Djody Gondokusumo (born 1912 in Yogyakarta), another prominent Parindra politician, who from 1953–5 served as justice minister representing the *Partai Rakyat Nasional* (National People's Party). Penders and Sundhaussen's biography of Nasution (1985: 6, 9) wrongly identifies Djody as Sunarti's father.
15 Turner (2005: 175–6); Interview, Marsillam Simanjuntak, 16 February 1991; Penders and Sundhaussen (1985: 67).
16 Penders and Sundhaussen (1985: 9) claim that when the Japanese invaded, Nasution was in danger of arrest on account of being a junior KNIL officer. He reportedly escaped this fate thanks to a letter of recommendation presented to the Gondokusumo family by a Japanese 'general'.

17 Nasution (1970: 11–14); Angkatan Darat (1967: *passim*). Anderson (1995) also describes how Nasution was influenced by the strategy and organisation of the Peta army.
18 Under the electoral law, no serving military officer could hold office in a political party (see Sundhaussen 1982: 90). Nasution himself was a 'non-active' colonel at the time. See Nasution (1983: 255ff) for his own account of establishing IPKI and his experiences touring as a political campaigner.
19 The Bogor branch of IPKI was headed by Ipik Gandamana, whose later appointment as interior minister provided IPKI with important bureaucratic support. The head of the Paku Alam royal family of Yogyakarta was listed as number three on the IPKI ticket for the Constituent Assembly elections in December 1955.
20 *Manifest IPKI No. 1*, Appendix 27 in Nasution (1983: 466).
21 In language very similar to that adopted by the New Order 11 years later, IPKI promised in 1955 to 'implement Pancasila correctly' (Panggabean 1993: 217). On the Jesuits see Chapter 7.
22 Turner (2005: 31) attributes this largely to Nasution's experience of the period of military administration late in the revolution when the military and the *pamong praja* governed their regions independent of the civilian leadership of the Republic.
23 My main sources on Djokosutono are two collections of essays devoted to his memory, *Cinerama Hukum …* (1971) and *Guru Pinandita: Sumbangsih untuk Prof Djokosoetono SH* (1984). The range of contributors to these volumes and the adulatory tone of the essays are testimony to the extraordinary influence of the professor among lawyers, ideologues, police, administrators and technocrats who rose to positions of great influence after 1965. Djokosutono published very little himself after his collaboration with Supomo on a two-volume historical study of *adat* law politics: *Sejarah Politik Hukum Adat* published in 1954 and 1955.
24 *Merdeka* 19 June 1986. Djokosutono took over from Supomo. For an account of Djokosutono's role in helping build up police institutions and philosophies, see Djamin (1984).
25 The Military Law Academy was founded in Jakarta on 20 August 1952 by Defence Minister Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. Djokosutono is regarded as the academy's mentor. See Djaelani (1973) and Korps Perwira Mahasiswa (1969).
26 For the first year of its operations the Military Law Academy was known as the Military Justice School. It changed its name on 2 October 1953 because it regarded itself as almost on par with the Djokosutono's Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at the University of Indonesia. Turner observes that the degree of effort the Indonesian army put into legal education for its officers is normally found only among armies of occupation, such as the US forces in Germany or Japan after the Second World War. 'By the mid 1990s', he writes, 'the number of senior officers in the Legal Corps of the TNI was second only to the Infantry Corps and considerably higher in number than the other arms corps (Artillery, Engineers and Cavalry)' (Turner 2005: 232).
27 Djokosutono's supervisor in the final stages of his doctorate was the Hegelian J. Eggens (Djokosutono 1964: 3).
28 Nasution (1985: 198) claims to have consulted Djokosutono about the constitutional status of the armed forces but it is unclear who first arrived at this interpretation of the constitution.
29 These included one in Central Java and three in West Java, where IPKI had a lot of support from the Bandung-based Siliwangi division (Sundhaussen 1982: 90; Nasution 1983: 265).
30 See the translated extracts of Sukarno's speech 'Let Us Bury the Parties' in Feith and Castles (1970: 81–3).

31 The army's defence of the *pamong praja* in the late 1950s reflected the increasing confluence of interests between the two forces. One important way in which this was manifest, McVey (1994: 9) writes, was in the tendency for high *priyayi* families to link themselves to the officer corps by marriage.
32 PRRI, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia was a counter government proclaimed in February 1958 in Padang, West Sumatra. The PRRI rebels joined forces with Permesta, a regional movement proclaimed in March 1957 in Makassar, Sulawesi.
33 I am grateful to Herb Feith for this and many other insights in this chapter.
34 The full citation for the speech is Uraian Prof Dr. Djokosutono pada Sidang Dewan Nasional tanggal 7 Oktober 1957, 'Persoalan Jang Mengenai Perwakilan Fungsionil dan Pergeseran Kekuasaan di Indonesia', Dewan Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta 1957. Thanks to David Reeve for providing me a rare copy of this speech. The National Council speech parallels a lecture he gave earlier the same year at the University of Indonesia, which is excerpted in Wahyono (1984: 72–80). My summary draws partly on this second source.
35 A key concept in what Stepan (1978: 35) called organic statism in Latin America, the Catholic principle of subsidiarity was also to become a recognised part of Pancasila discourse in the 1980s (see entry in *Ensiklopedi Populer Politik Pembangunan Pancasila* 1988).
36 Paraphrased in Nasution (1992: 102–3).
37 A Dutch trained *adat* law scholar, Djojodiguno combined Javanism and anti-Westernism with a legal philosophy built on the romantic ideas of Savigny. See Hooker (1975: 293–4).
38 Sarwono Djaksonagoro's paper titled 'The Village as a Model' excerpted in Feith and Castles (1970: 198–200) provides a succinct statement of the 'feudal' ideals prevailing among the Javanese *pamong praja* elite in the late 1950s. *Adat* lawyer Mohammad Nasroen's 1957 book *Asal Mula Negara* also put the case for a political order based on traditional village values and institutions.
39 Nasution (1971: 48). Sukarno is known to have consulted with Djokosutono about military 'problems' as early as January 1957. See *Duta Masyarakat*, 5 January 1957 cited in Reeve (1985: 158).
40 Realising that there would be no more open elections and fearing precipitous action by the military, the PKI had by this stage decided that its interests were best served by throwing its lot in with the president. Since February 1957 Sukarno had become increasingly accommodating towards the PKI, arguing that they deserved to be included in his National Front and supporting their demands for land reform.
41 According to sociologist Thamrin Thomagola (2001) this decree was drafted by Djokosutono.
42 See Departemen Penerangan … (1961: 423–9), Lev (1966: 216), Reeve (1985: 164). This was supplemented by the Presidential Decree on Party Simplification issued in July 1960. Masjumi and the PSI were banned in August 1960 because of their support for the regional rebellions. The ten legal parties after August 1960 were PNI, NU, PKI, Partindo, PSII Arudji, Partai Katolik, Murba, IPKI, Perti and Parkindo (Pradjoto 1983: 48).
43 SOBSI, the All Indonesia Central Workers Organisation, claimed a membership of 2,661,970 by 1956, made up of 39 national unions and hundreds of local ones.
44 *Basis* 11, Year 9, August 1960 (cited in Reeve 1985: 170).
45 This paragraph draws mainly on Reeve (1985: 167–74).
46 On the politics of Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia see Mackie (1974).
47 Thanks to Herb Feith for his detailed comments on this section.
48 Colonel Sutjipto was in 1962 chief of staff of the Supreme War Authority (Peperti). He was a vocal army ideologue after 1965.

49 In 1962 Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Abdulkadir Besar was Assistant 1/Intelligence, armed forces directorate of social and political strategy under Nasution, with whom he was closely allied. He is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 8.
50 Recounting this 1962 speech in his 1985 memoirs, Nasution claimed to have 'taken over this line of thinking long ago, since Basyarudin and Lt. Col. Sucipto became my closest legal advisers' (1985: 201). Since Basyarudin Nasution became Nasution's main source of legal advice in 1952, it is possible that he was familiar with Djokosutono's thinking about functional groups well before Sukarno popularised the concept in 1957.
51 This was known as SUAD IV and was headed by Brig. Gen. Soedjono (Reeve 1985: 186, 271).
52 On the origins and political uses of the word '*karyawan*', see Leclerc (1972).
53 Founding members of Sekber Golkar included Police Brig. Gen. Awaloeddin Djamin (Reeve 1985: 284). Awaloeddin graduated from the Police College in 1955 where he studied under Djokosutono. In the years after 1966 he was one of the New Order's most important ideologues and a key Golkar figure (Reeve 1985: 284–5, 305n).

6 Against politics
Soeharto in power

The army's seizure of power in October 1965 brought what Benedict Anderson (1983a: 485) has called the 'accelerando of mass politics' of the late Guided Democracy period to a decisive, violent end. By March 1966, hundreds of thousands of Indonesians had been killed, the huge communist party had been destroyed and the process of concentrating power in the hands of an army-controlled state had begun. Over the next five years, most parties, unions, mass organisations and other popularly supported forces had been hobbled or co-opted by Soeharto's ruling group, leaving few sources of extra-state political power. The main institutional beneficiaries of this transformation of the Indonesian political landscape were the army and the *pamong praja* – those forces that had felt most threatened by popular participation in the 1950s and during Guided Democracy. Given the historical attraction of the administrative elite and important sections of the army leadership to conservative organicist ideology as an alternative to multi-party democracy and radical populism, it is perhaps not surprising to find Supomo's ideas resurfacing in the ideological vacuum left by the abandonment of Sukarno's mobilisational politics, economics and foreign policy. This chapter examines how Soeharto came to power and highlights the important, underestimated contribution of former students of Djokosutono in shaping the legal and ideological contours, as well as the structures, of the New Order state.

Soeharto makes his move

In the small hours of Friday, 1 October 1965, a group of middle-ranking officers from Sukarno's palace guard murdered six of Indonesia's top generals and seized several strategic buildings in central Jakarta, including the state-run radio station. Indonesians awoke that morning to hear Lieutenant Colonel Untung announcing that members of a 'CIA backed Council of Generals' had been arrested by his 30 September Movement for planning a coup against Sukarno. Towards midday he broadcast a pronouncement that all power was now in the hands of a 'Revolutionary Council' consisting of a broad assortment of military officers and pro-Sukarno civilian political figures, including

four low-ranking communists. For reasons that remain obscure, Maj. Gen. Soeharto, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), whose name had been left off the assassination list, moved quickly to marshal his forces. By the end of the day he had taken over the key installations from Untung's troops. With the radio transmitter in his hands, he was able to prevent the broadcast of an order by Sukarno for all troops to be confined to their barracks and for Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudro to take over administration of the army. Instead Soeharto announced that he himself had assumed leadership of the army and that he would crush the 'counter-revolutionary' 30 September Movement and safeguard the president (Sundhaussen 1982: 196–209).

Soeharto wasted no time. Over the next two days shock troops under his command routed the mutineers in Jakarta, and also in Central Java, where several battalions of his Central Java based Diponegoro Division had sided with Untung. Crushing the 30 September Movement was the most straightforward step in Soeharto's rise to power. He still had to contend with significant sections of the armed forces, especially in the air force and navy, and also in the army's East and Central Javanese divisions, which remained loyal to Sukarno. Just as problematic – at least at first – was the army's only serious competitor, the PKI, with its several million cadres, its ubiquitous mass organisations and its finely honed command structures.

Soeharto and his allies soon realised that the Untung coup, and their role in defeating it, had to be played for all they were worth. Even while the coup was being put down, they dubbed the 30 September Movement 'Gestapu', a menacing sounding acronym that, with the help of an intensive propaganda campaign led by the army's newspapers, quickly came to stand for treachery against the nation. The horror of the generals' killings was amplified by gruesome photographs on the front pages as well as grisly, fabricated, tales of sexual mutilation.[1] Although initial reports portrayed the coup as an intra-military affair, evidence of peripheral communist involvement was seized upon to represent the events of 1 October as a full-blown coup attempt by the PKI and their 'Chinese puppetmasters'. Sukarno's low-key response to the killings, and his refusal to condemn the PKI, were also used to implicate the political and military forces that continued to align themselves with him.

Demonising the 'Gestapu forces' was one part of Soeharto's strategy; mobilising anti-communist energies against them was the other. The day after the coup Brig. Gen. Sutjipto, chief of the political section of KOTI and one of Soeharto's inner circle,[2] convened a meeting of militant young anti-communist leaders where the 'Action Command to Crush Gestapu' (KAP-Gestapu) was formed. KAP-Gestapu's first rally on 4 October demanded that Sukarno ban the PKI and its mass organisations, a call that was taken up by the NU (*Angkatan Bersendjata* 6 October 1965). With the PKI clearly on the defensive and with military endorsement assured, KAP-Gestapu – its ranks swelled by tens of thousands of young Christian and Muslim students and activists – staged a major demonstration on 8 October, which culminated in the ransacking

and torching of the PKI headquarters (Crouch 1978: 141). Soon afterwards the smaller anti-communist parties (IPKI, Partindo, Partai Katolik), encouraged by the army, made public statements demanding the dissolution of the PKI.[3] By mid October the military had sponsored the foundation of another youth group, the Indonesian Student Action Front (KAMI), which was to play a major part in galvanising support for Soeharto (Crouch 1978: 165).

While the anti-PKI – and less explicitly, anti-Sukarno – movement gained momentum in Jakarta, Soeharto set about extending his control over the army's national apparatus. His point of departure was a 2 October statement by Sukarno requesting that Soeharto, as Kostrad commander, 'restore security and order'.[4] Soeharto interpreted this order in the broadest possible terms, establishing, on 10 October, an Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order known as Kopkamtib. By setting up Kopkamtib, Soeharto bestowed on himself, and the commanders of all military regions, virtually unlimited powers to deal with any individuals or groups deemed to have been involved in the coup.

Within the next week, a hurricane of violence was unleashed against members of the PKI and its mass organisations throughout the archipelago in which hundreds of thousands of mostly poor villagers and plantation workers were knifed, shot, strangled or beaten to death.[5] The fact that most of the violence was carried out by civilians and followed different patterns from place to place has led some observers to account for it in terms of local rivalries born of political polarisation, religious enmity, ethnic tension and class hatreds. But it is likely that no more than a few hundred people would have died had it not been for the explicit encouragement of local army commanders and the intervention of Kostrad and RPKAD troops responsible to Soeharto. Shrill exhortations to eliminate the 'traitorous', 'barbaric', 'atheistic' PKI in army newspapers created an atmosphere in which it was widely assumed that one had a right, even a duty, to join the killing (see e.g. *Api*, 7 November 1965 in Bourchier and Hadiz 2003: 30–1).

That Soeharto's forces decided that the only way to defeat the PKI was to kill or imprison its members suggests their fear of the party's popular base, the sophistication of its internal organisation and of the fact that it had twice before – in 1927 and 1948 – risen from the ashes with remarkable speed.[6] It also betrays the depth of insecurity in the ranks of the army leadership about their own ability to win popular support. The terror generated by the killings, torture and mass arrests of late 1965 was not restricted to members of the PKI and their families. Even those who had nothing to do with the PKI were left in no doubt about what one risked by disobeying the central authorities. The pivotal place in New Order propaganda of the symbol of the 'G30S/PKI' (a fusing of the 30 September Movement and the PKI) served not only to perpetuate the myth that Soeharto rescued Indonesia from an imminent communist takeover but also to keep alive the memory of the bloodbath. Even decades after the events no accusation was more dreaded than that of having been 'involved in G30S/PKI'.

If Soeharto's resort to terror reflected his insecurity so did the use he made of law. Though no legalist himself, Soeharto realised early on how effective the rhetoric of law could be as a means of staking out his territory. Lacking the charisma, the oratorical skills or the mass following of Sukarno, Soeharto attempted to undermine the aging president over the next year and a half with a series of legal manoeuvres. The other incentive for the Soeharto forces to make a show of legality was the hope that this would help build domestic and international legitimacy for their cause. However brutally the army's troops were behaving in the villages, many saw promise in Soeharto's stolid pronouncements on law and order because of the sharp contrast they made to Sukarno's revolutionary bravado, his sloganeering, his agitational foreign policy and his economic mismanagement.

To guide him through the political and legal minefield he faced after the coup, Soeharto relied on several advisers. Most accounts highlight the influence of a core group of intelligence, finance and operational officers with strong personal ties to Soeharto. This group of 'palace generals', perhaps best personified by Soeharto's long-time intelligence aide Ali Moertopo, are frequently characterised as freewheeling types and unconcerned with 'legal–rational' structures and processes. Much lower profile, but equally important, were a number of cool-headed military lawyers and politico-bureaucrats associated principally with KOTI's political section, G-5, described as the armed forces' 'brains trust' before it was disbanded in 1967 (Oei 1995: 180). Key advisers from this group were the KOTI G-5 chief at the time of the coup, Brig. Gen. Sutjipto, his deputy Military Police Brigadier General Soenarso, and the head of the 'special affairs' section of KOTI G-5 Colonel Sudharmono. Other important KOTI G-5 figures who became part of Soeharto's team were the Military Law Academy graduates Lieutenant Colonel Ali Said and Lieutenant Colonel Ismail Saleh (Pangaribuan 1995: 21). These figures understood the inner workings of the state's legal and constitutional apparatus and played a vital role in planning and stage managing Soeharto's ascent to the presidency. Military lawyers around Soeharto went on to play an important part in not only devising the political and legal architecture of the New Order but also its ideological underpinnings. As I will show, many of the constitutional arguments of the New Order drew directly on organicist philosophies of law and politics described in earlier chapters and nurtured in the military law academies in the 1950s and 1960s.

One of Soeharto's preoccupations in 1965–6 was to legalise the powers he had granted himself by establishing Kopkamtib days after the coup. His first major success came on 16 October, when Sukarno reluctantly appointed him army commander and KOTI chief of staff (Crouch 1978: 161). Two weeks later Sukarno formally recognised Kopkamtib and on 6 December signed a presidential decision expanding the organisation's authority 'to restore the authority and integrity of the government through physical-military and mental operations'.[7] The same decision brought the territorial military apparatus down to the village level under the command of Kopkamtib, laying the foundations for its later emergence as a crucial instrument of military rule.

Integral to Soeharto's 'legal' strategy was his construction of a nationwide apparatus to interrogate, process and, where expedient, to prosecute and try the hundreds of thousands of leftists the army arrested (and planned to arrest) after the coup.[8] Seeing the civilian justice system and the police force as politically unreliable, Soeharto drew on the resources of the military's own police and legal apparatus. As early as 10 October, Sutjipto, acting under Soeharto's authority, issued a directive to all regional military commanders ordering the immediate formation of teams of investigators to 'investigate all the arrested/prisoners to acquire the necessary materials/information to exterminate the adventurers of the September 30 movement'.[9] On 29 October central and regional investigation teams were formally established by Soeharto in his capacity as Kopkamtib commander and put under the command of his aide Soenarso. Soeharto's control over the entire process of identifying, interrogating, classifying and physically managing prisoners furnished him with a vital weapon to establish his power base both in the capital and in the provinces.

The cases of those prisoners whose interrogations turned up evidence that could be useful in trials were passed onto specially constituted teams of prosecutors responsible to a central prosecution team formed by Soeharto on 13 October and formally established on 8 November. Appointed and staffed primarily by members of the army justice inspectorate, these teams' principal duties were to 'study and analyse all information, reports, and the results of the investigations in the capital and in the provinces, and from these to give political and legal suggestions on the settlement of cases to the KOSTRAD Commander [Soeharto]' (Kopkamtib n.d.: 60; Notosusanto and Saleh 1968: 213). In order to 'simplify and speed up' the processing of civilians, who would normally be outside the jurisdiction of the military courts, Soeharto issued a special directive stating that 'it is best if these cases are investigated and tried by the military court(s) of the Army'. By the same stroke of his pen, Soeharto gave himself the right to decide which civilians were to be tried by the military courts.[10]

The first targets of the interrogators were senior PKI figures who had escaped execution after the coup. In late November, Lieutenant Colonel Durmawel Achmad, a high-level army prosecutor, wrested a 'confession' from Politburo member Njono that PKI chairman Aidit had played a major role in organising the coup (Crouch 1978: 102, 161).[11] Under pressure from Soeharto, Sukarno agreed on 4 December 1965 to establish an Extraordinary Military Tribunal, giving Soeharto 'or senior officers appointed by him' full authority to determine the composition of the court and to decide who it would try.[12] Njono's trial, the first of about 200 in the next four years (Mortimer 1974: 418), got under way in Jakarta in February 1966.

While President Sukarno was prepared to sanction legal action against those involved in the coup attempt, he refused to ban the PKI. Sukarno had staked his entire political fortune on the Nasakom state ideology and he knew that without the PKI he could not survive for long. The contest over the party's legal status therefore took on enormous political significance. Only a week after the

coup, Sutjipto issued a directive instructing the army's regional commanders to ban 'temporarily' all activities of parties and mass organisations 'involved in the 30 September Movement'. Soeharto's endorsement of this instruction angered Sukarno, who sacked Sutjipto from his powerful position in KOTI and demanded that the order be withdrawn (Sundhaussen 1982: 214).[13] Tensions mounted over the next few months, with Sukarno and the army leadership at loggerheads. Street clashes between pro-Sukarno and pro-army student groups led by KAMI intensified, especially in January, after demonetarisation measures exacerbated the already spiralling inflation, causing prices for everyday goods to skyrocket.[14] RPKAD backing for the anti-Sukarno student demonstrators became more and more explicit and by February the situation in the capital had become so tense that many expected sections of the military to take direct action against the president.

On 11 March RPKAD troops, their insignia removed, surrounded the presidential palace, where a cabinet meeting was in progress. Alarmed, Sukarno flew by helicopter immediately to his palace in Bogor, where he was visited by three generals sent by Soeharto who managed to convince him to sign an order giving Soeharto authority to 'Take all measures considered necessary to ensure security and calm and the stability of the running of the government … for the sake of the integrity of the nation and the Indonesian Republic' (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003: 32). Although Sukarno clearly did not intend to delegate political authority to the army commander, Soeharto made it his passport to power. In a semantic masterstroke, the Soeharto forces dubbed the document 'Supersemar', an acronym of *Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* (Order of 11 March) identifying Soeharto to his Javanese audiences with Semar, one of the most powerful and popular characters in *wayang* (Holt 1967: 144–5).

Upon reading the letter the same day, Sutjipto assured Soeharto that it gave him enough power to issue a decree outlawing the PKI, to which Soeharto replied: 'Draft one then'.[15] Sutjipto – aided by his former Military Law Academy classmate Sudharmono and Sudharmono's young assistant in KOTI G-5, Lieutenant Moerdiono – quickly drew up the prohibition and the following day, 12 March 1966, Soeharto signed 'on Sukarno's behalf' the decree declaring the PKI illegal and ordering the dissolution of the party and all its affiliated organisations. To highlight the significance of this act, Kostrad troops and anti-communist youth groups, now identifying themselves as part of the 'Generation of 66', immediately staged a show of force in the city centre. The president was infuriated, and tried to withdraw the order. This was not an issue, however, over which Sukarno's supporters in the navy, air force and police forces were willing to get into a fight with the army, and so the order stood. Maintaining the initiative, army leaders, supported by student demonstrators, demanded that Sukarno dismiss 15 of his ministers who had been antagonistic to the army. When he refused, Soeharto ordered RPKAD troops to the palace on 18 March to arrest them. In the next few weeks, thousands of PKI members and Sukarno sympathisers were purged from the bureaucracy, the legislature and the armed forces, especially from the air force, marines and

police. Although Sukarno remained president, Soeharto now clearly had the whip hand.

The ascendancy of the Soeharto forces was evident during the first post-coup general session of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS), held between 20 June and 5 July 1966. The purged assembly (now chaired by General Nasution, who Soeharto had pushed aside soon after the coup)[16] rubber stamped over 30 resolutions, one of the most important of which was Resolution 9, which endorsed Supersemar, formally bestowing on Soeharto the executive and emergency powers that until then he had held only as a 'gift' from Sukarno (Feith 1968: 1). Other resolutions directly undermined Sukarno's authority by overturning many of his laws, curtailing his powers as president and banning the promotion or dissemination of Marxist and Leninist teachings – which implicitly included Sukarno's cherished Nasakom doctrine. Because Sukarno showed few signs of taking such restrictions seriously, the assembly passed Resolution 5, requiring the president to give a full accounting to the assembly of the causes of the '30th September Movement-PKI affair and its epilogue, as well as the economic and moral decline' during his term as president (Crouch 1978: 202; Sudharmono 1967). Sukarno's unapologetic reply seven months later provided the formal justification for the withdrawal of his mandate as president in a special session of the MPRS in March 1967 and the appointment of Soeharto as acting president.

Military interests, military perspectives

Between March 1966 and 1969, the military continued to purge the state apparatus of so-called 'Old Order' elements and quell isolated armed resistance movements. But as the army's principal enemies and competitors were vanquished, Soeharto's energies were increasingly focused on the more complex and demanding task of laying the foundations of a new political and economic order. His immediate imperatives were to consolidate his control over the army, to extend military control over the political system, and to attract urgently needed Western financial assistance to help turn around the rapidly deteriorating economic situation. Before examining how Soeharto achieved these objectives, however, I will review some of the basic factors that informed military thinking about politics and society.

The declaration of martial law in 1957, the army's takeover of Dutch enterprises and its defeat of the regional rebellions had given the army a major stake in the government and the economy and a strong sense of entitlement. This had been encapsulated in the 'middle-way' concept, which was embroidered by Yani and others in the early 1960s in an attempt to reinforce the military's gains and reduce their dependence on Sukarno. At the First Army Seminar, held at the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) in Bandung in April 1965, the army affirmed that it had a dual role as both a 'military force' and as a 'socio-political force'. In its latter capacity the army's activities covered 'the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields'

(Crouch 1978: 25). This claim was expanded at a second Seskoad seminar run by the army intellectual and Nasution ally Lieutenant General Suwarto[17] in August 1966, where the doctrine of the armed forces' 'dual function' (*dwifungsi*) was formalised. The new formulation went well beyond previous claims, declaring that the army 'cannot remain neutral towards the course of state policy, the quality of the government, and the safety of the Pantjasila state and society. The military … is concerned with all fields of social life' (Angkatan Darat 1966: 19).

A second feature of military thinking was its profound distrust of political parties and pluralistic politics. Open competition between parties, military leaders believed, had fuelled the regionalist sentiment that had nearly torn Indonesia apart in the 1950s. Just as threatening to the military was that democratic freedoms had allowed the rapid expansion of the PKI and spread class hatred among the country's millions of workers and poorer villagers. What is more, it had facilitated the growth of militant Islam. The army's history of suppressing Muslim rebellions and the fact that most of its officers came from non-Muslim or *abangan* (Javanist, spiritually syncretist) backgrounds had bred a tradition of antipathy to Muslim political aspirations (McVey 1971: 138–9; Jenkins 1984: 6–12). Overall, then, army leaders came to see the expression of popular energies as inherently dangerous not only to the physical integrity of the state but also to the social structure, within which they occupied a privileged position.

The leadership's aversion to democratic politics was of course strengthened by its failure to compete as a political force in an open political system. The army's real power at the local level rested on the control networks they had constructed since 1957 alongside – and in many cases inside – the state's administrative apparatus. On the national level also, the army's influence derived from its access to the levers of the state rather than on support from below. This gave it much in common with the *pamong praja*, which it came increasingly to see as its natural ally, both socially and politically. Like the *pamong praja*, the army had come see itself as the legitimate guardian of the state, and political parties as its misbegotten siblings.

A third conclusion the army leadership had reached by about 1963 was that Sukarno's attempt to make Indonesia the 'lighthouse' of the global struggle against imperialism and colonialism had failed. Rather than making Indonesia an example to the new emerging nations, Sukarno's politics had led the country to economic ruin, diplomatic isolation and military humiliation. The only way out of this blind alley, it resolved, was to accede to the realities of geopolitical power in the region and to the US and Japanese economic interests that dominated it.

The emergence and spread of this viewpoint is closely related to the intimate ties it had developed with the United States since the early 1950s. More than 4,000 Indonesian officers were trained at Fort Benning, Fort Bragg and Fort Leavenworth between 1950 and 1964, the vast majority after 1958 (McVey 1972: 169; Mrazek 1978, II: 92–3). As Sukarno moved to the left in the 1960s,

the US came to look upon the Indonesian military as an important ally, not only against the president and the PKI but against the spread of communism in the eastern hemisphere more generally. Although Indonesian army leaders went along with Sukarno's anti-imperialist rhetoric, many did so with a wink to their American friends. The classic example was General Achmad Yani, who, on his return from studies in the US in the mid 1950s, had set up the National Military Academy in Magelang as a smaller model of West Point, almost duplicating its structure, curriculum and organisation (Evans 1989: 39).

Another star pupil of the American programme was Suwarto, who went on to become the key inspiration at Seskoad in Bandung, itself modelled on Fort Leavenworth. Suwarto brought into Seskoad several Western-trained social scientists and economists associated with the economics faculty at the University of Indonesia to lecture on modernisation and economic development and refine the army's defence doctrines (McDonald 1980: 34; Reeve 1985: 186). While this cross-fertilisation has often been interpreted as part of an American project to groom an elite of pro-Western state managers, it also owed much to Djokosutono. In the wake of the sudden departure in January 1958 of the doyen of the pro-Western economists, Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, to join the PRRI rebellion in West Sumatra, Djokosutono took on the role of acting dean and custodian of the economics faculty and encouraged several graduates of this faculty to teach at his Military Law Academy.[18] It was at Seskoad, however, during Suwarto's tenure from 1958 to 1967, that the principal nexus was established between the army leadership and civilian technocrats, which was to become one of the hallmarks of the New Order. Soeharto, who had studied under Suwarto from October 1959 until late 1960 (Southwood and Flanagan 1983: 35; McDonald 1980: 33–4), took him on after October 1965 as an adviser. He is seen as having played a vital role in the early New Order as a bridge between Soeharto, the technocrats and the Americans.

The great attraction of US PhDs, such as Widjoyo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Subroto and Sumarlin,[19] to the military leaders was that they offered a practical way out of the economic chaos of the late Sukarno years. Inflation in 1965 had topped 500 per cent and peaked at over 1,500 per cent in mid 1966 (Hill 1994: 57, 88). The nation's economic infrastructure, moreover, was crumbling, real GDP per capita was shrinking and debt levels were out of control. Indonesia was in the humiliating position of being regarded by international development economists as a 'chronic dropout' (Hill 1994: 54). The solution offered by the economists was essentially to abandon Sukarno's autarchic ideals and reintegrate Indonesia into the capitalist world economy. It involved applying a package of stabilisation measures financed by large infusions of foreign aid, tight fiscal management, a reduction of state subsidies, a de-nationalisation of important sectors of the economy and an opening up of Indonesia to direct foreign investment. If this meant giving in to the 'Nekolim' forces Sukarno had railed against, and sacrificing a degree of sovereignty over national economic policymaking, then this was a price that the military, and

many of their civilian supporters, were willing to pay in order to avoid a further decline into bankruptcy and decay. The examples of the already burgeoning Taiwan and South Korean economies, and Rostow's promise of eventual economic 'take off' into self-sustaining growth, helped to ease fears that joining the US- and Japanese-dominated economic system would result in a new form of colonialism.

Many military leaders were also attracted by the vision of a technocratic society inherent in the modernisation theories being promoted by American-trained economists and social scientists at the time. Particularly influential were the ideas of Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset. Bell's argument that the increasing complexity of modern societies required a transition from ideology-based politics to a consensual political framework overseen by expert managers had obvious appeal to the military. Lipset's work likewise helped convince military leaders that adopting a Western-designed economic strategy did not necessarily entail embracing pluralistic or democratic norms.

In fact some military ideologues recognised the functionalist assumptions underpinning modernisation theory, quite rightly, as having much in common with organicist notions of state organisation. Both are concerned with wholes, which are represented in biological terms as either 'healthy' or 'unhealthy' (functional or dysfunctional), depending on their ability to sustain and reproduce themselves. Abdulkadir Besar, the first post-Supersemar secretary general of the MPRS, used the following quote from the American political scientist Carl Friedrich in support of his argument that Supomo's organicist ideas continued to be relevant to constitutional life in Indonesia:

> When several parts that are distinct and different from each other compose a whole, bearing a defined functional relation to each other which establishes a mutual dependence of these parts upon each other so that the destruction of the one entails the destruction of the whole, then such a constellation shall be called a system.
>
> (Besar 1972: 493; Friedrich 1963: 25)[20]

The military leadership and their civilian economists were well aware that to achieve their aims they would need a strong state, insulated from the pressures of popular politics or public opinion. This would involve transforming the political system from a means of mobilising popular sentiment to a means of dampening and containing it. The New Order's top priority would be to strengthen the administrative hierarchy to enable the smooth implementation of centrally directed policies. Crucial to this enterprise would be the two institutions with least stake in the preservation of the party system and best able to act as administrators, the army and the *pamong praja*. In a sense, the political history of the next 20 years was the story of the strengthening of those institutions at the expense of the political parties and of civil society.

Populist residues and democratic expectations

Prescribing a strong state was easier than building one. When the army leadership found itself in command after Supersemar it had to come to terms with a highly mobilised, highly politicised society. It was to require years of negotiation – albeit increasingly one-sided – between the army leadership and the various organised forces and poles of opinion in society before the parameters of a new political system could be worked out and military dominance institutionalised.

The first and most obvious cause for concern on the part of the Soeharto group was the enormous reservoir of Sukarnoist sentiment in the armed forces and in society at large. This was reflected in the dilemma posed by the question of whether to bring Sukarno before an Extraordinary Military Tribunal. Soeharto wanted to discredit Sukarno by implicating him in the coup attempt. Such was Sukarno's following, however, that pronouncing him guilty in court stood a good chance of instead discrediting the official version of the coup and with it the army's claim to power. Therefore although Soeharto ordered Soenarso, the Chief of Kopkamtib's Central Investigations Team, to interrogate Sukarno about his involvement (*Tempo*, 2 October 1992), he decided to concentrate the blame on the PKI and to attack Sukarno's credibility in a more backhanded way by using the trials to expose the corruption and licentiousness of his senior ministers/associates. Several of Sukarno's ministers had, after all, been arrested on the grounds that their 'good faith in assisting the president' was in doubt.[21]

There was a similar anxiety about the public reaction to reversing some of Sukarno's more popular postures, especially in the realm of foreign policy. Outspoken opposition to colonialism and imperialism, expressed most famously in Sukarno's telling the Americans to 'Go to hell with your aid!', had become such a part of Indonesia's sense of its own identity by 1965 that the new leadership spoke little about its new status as one of the United States' closest allies in the fight to contain Asian communism. While privately supporting America's intervention in Vietnam, for instance, Indonesia remained publicly opposed to it, maintaining diplomatic relations with Hanoi well after severing ties with China in October 1967 (Mrazek 1978, II: 194). The new leadership's concern to maintain the appearance of continuity with aspects of Sukarno's ideology was well illustrated also by the peculiar political directive issued by the army in June 1967, which listed among the principal 'enemies of the New Order that must be opposed … 1) Nekolim 2) Capitalism 3) Feudalism 4) Dictatorship 5) Atheism 6) Liberalism 7) Racialism 8) Extremism … ' (Mrazek 1978, II: 189–90). Although some of this vocabulary was soon to disappear, the army leadership was clearly wary about sloughing off too much too soon.

Pulling in the opposite direction were the coalition of civilian supporters of the New Order who regarded themselves as part of the Generation of 66. These were the students, lawyers, intellectuals, cultural figures and journalists who had participated in, or sympathised with, the demonstrations by the

various army-sponsored Action Fronts. While many of the leaders of these Action Fronts later came to view their faith in the army as naive, their enthusiasm for the New Order before 1968 was genuine. Among the non-victimised middle classes the spirit was one of optimism and renewal, of casting off the old orthodoxies and joining the 'modern' world. This mood was evident at the KAMI seminars on the economy at the economics faculty at the University of Indonesia, at which students – fresh from puncturing tyres and painting anti-Sukarno slogans on the walls – cheered on top technocrats who spoke frankly about the economic crisis and outlined their plans for the development of the country (Nitisastro 1984; Paget 1967).

A similar optimism prevailed at several seminars organised by civilian lawyers between 1966 and 1968 on constitutionalism, the rule of law and human rights.[22] Anger at Sukarno's deviations from the constitution and his regime's contempt for legality had been among the key issues that had galvanised the Action Fronts. Members of the Bar Association, Peradin, who had a professional interest in seeing the independence of the courts restored, also tended to support the New Order in its early days. However incongruous this may seem against the background of the massacres, most student activists and lawyers appear to have taken at face value statements by the new regime that it was dedicated to upholding the rule of law and ensuring the constitution was implemented in a 'pure and consistent' way. The trying of figures accused of involvement in the coup seemed to many to confirm the commitment of the New Order to legal methods. When civilian lawyers got together at seminars, then, their discussions concentrated on the mechanics of restoring a democratic, legally accountable state rather than whether such a change was necessary or viable.

There was also a perception among what remained of the intelligentsia that the New Order stood for human rights. Many took heart, for instance, from the formation in the MPRS of an ad hoc committee in 1966 with a mandate to draw up a charter of human rights.[23] In December the same year the pro-New Order Indonesian Jurists Association, Persahi, issued a call for the adoption by the MPRS of the United Nations Declaration and the introduction of human rights as a compulsory subject in schools and universities.[24] Similarly illustrative of the idealism and confidence of the times were the debates that took place at a human rights seminar, convened in Bandung in 1967, over how the 1945 Constitution might be amended to strengthen its human rights provisions – a proposition that would come to be regarded as unthinkable in later years.[25] The prominence of law/constitutionalism in New Order discourse thus derived not only from its serviceability as an ideologically neutral alternative to Sukarnoism, but also from the perceived need to garner legitimacy among the educated civilian groups that helped bring Soeharto to power.

The third force that the New Order had to come to terms with was the political parties. Many of the party leaders, especially from the Christian parties, the NU, the rightwing of the PNI and from the banned Masjumi, had played vital roles in legitimating the campaign against the PKI and in

legitimising the New Order. They looked forward, if not to a return to the freedoms of the 1950s, at least to a more open environment than had existed under Guided Democracy. They also enjoyed substantial support in society, which the New Order leadership could ill afford to ignore. Despite the anti-party fervour of some of Soeharto's allies, therefore, it was impossible at the time for the army leadership to disregard or outlaw the parties. Instead the New Order, at least in the early years, had to find a way of appeasing them with promises of elections and a meaningful role in government. This contributed to the New Order's constitutionalist and relatively democratic rhetoric in the early years.

These factors presented Soeharto and the army leadership with a number of problems. One was to work out a political format that reconciled the demands of their allies for democracy, rule of law and constitutionalism with their vision of a strong, military dominated, managerial state. If parties were allowed to compete in elections, how could the ideological rivalries and Islamic claims on the state that had long characterised Indonesian politics be contained? A second problem the New Order leadership faced was one of legitimacy. It was all very well to outline its pragmatic, programme-oriented strategies for modernisation, but this discourse, derived from the social science literature from the heartlands of liberal capitalism, had no positive historical resonances. How was it then to present itself to the wider public, especially the more nationalist elements, in a way that established its credentials as historically 'authentic'?

Bringing organicism back in

It was in the context of these kinds of questions that organicist concepts began to find their way into New Order thinking and rhetoric. The main promoters of organicist ideas in the early New Order were military lawyers as well as some older generation *adat* scholars determined not to see the New Order give in to pressures from its civilian supporters for a more liberal oriented political and constitutional system. All were linked with some section of the coalition of conservative anti-party forces in the 1950s, whether PIR, the *pamong praja* or Nasution's group. Perhaps more importantly, all had close connections with the Military Law Academy, one of the main institutional bases in the early years of the New Order for anti-liberal, centrist, organicist interpretations of law and constitutionalism. It is the arguments of these conservative anti-liberals I focus on here, because even though they were looked upon at the time as rather out of step with the modernising temper of the Generation of 66, they were ultimately more important than those of the reform-minded lawyers in shaping the ideology, legal philosophy and political structures of the New Order.

The military were attracted to organicism because it provided them with arguments against the multi-party system. Its vision of the state as the embodiment of the common interests of society also helped provide the

rationale they needed to justify the subordination of partisan and sectional interests and other potential countervailing sources of power to the military dominated state. It was later to be used more explicitly as the legal–philosophical rationale for *dwifungsi*. There was also a close affinity between organicist ideas and the 'totalising' character of military language and doctrine. After 1966 in particular we see a profusion of concertina acronyms expressing the all-embracing nature of the military's concerns, one of the earliest and common being IPOLEKSOSBUD, denoting the ideological–political–economic–social–cultural 'sphere'.[26] These totalising neologisms were useful weapons in the military's drive to extend its hegemony, both ideological and political.

The New Order leadership were reluctant to define themselves in explicit ideological terms. Ideology and slogans, many felt, ought to go the way of Sukarno. Besides, the New Order's economic imperatives and demobilisational policies did not lend themselves to rousing slogans. This was one reason why Soeharto and his advisers relied so much on the rhetoric of law. The New Order leaders were aware, however, that promises of modernisation and constitutionalism alone would not provide the regime with the flexibility and historical legitimation that it needed. It was to solve this problem that the New Order chose, at first tentatively, to place its bets on the symbol of Pancasila. The problem was that Pancasila carried with it a lot of Sukarnoist ideological baggage. Pancasila had been an integral part of Sukarno's Manipol-USDEK doctrine and his 'Five Talismans of the Indonesian Revolution' proclaimed in 1965.[27]

Superscribing Pancasila

One important way in which Soeharto's regime attempted to forge an ideological identity, which was at once historically authentic and distinguishable from that of the Sukarno regime, was to claim and reconstitute the Pancasila in its own image. This was not a matter of starting from zero, because 'Pancasila' had already been appropriated by Catholic and army-sponsored groups under Sukarno as a badge of opposition to communism and therefore also to some extent to the prevailing Manipol-USDEK doctrine. But neither was it easy, because Pancasila was still intimately linked to the person and philosophy of Sukarno. We see from 1966, therefore, a concerted effort on the part of pro-New Order ideologues – well captured by the title of a University of Indonesia symposium 'Return to the Rails of Pantjasila'[28] – to prise Pancasila from its author.

Among the most able and prolific ideological technicians of this period was Soeharto's adviser Sutjipto, who wrote several short books and newspaper articles between 1966 and 1968 providing the official position on the coup and explaining the new ideological and legal stance of the new regime.[29] Sutjipto's agenda was clear in the opening paragraph of his evocatively titled book *From the Humus of Dry Fallen Leaves, New Shoots Sprout*, in which he identified the cause of Indonesia's problems as 'ideological deviation, that is

betrayal of Pantjasila' (Sutjipto 1967: 1). While acknowledging Sukarno's role in 'unearthing' the state philosophy in 1945, Sutjipto accused the president of betraying his original principles by distorting the Pancasila to accommodate the 'atheistic' PKI. He stressed (Sutjipto 1967: 2) the need to 'free our thinking of the poison of the emotional–mythical cult of individualism which contrives to merge the person of Bung Karno and the Pantjasila, … the Indonesian revolution, … and the Republic of Indonesia'. The way forward, Sutjipto argued, lay in recognising that the Pancasila did not adhere to the person of Sukarno but was instead the property of the nation. The clear implication was that the New Order forces, uncompromised by the corrupting influences of power and political debts, were far better suited than Sukarno to guard the integrity of the original state philosophy.

In remoulding Pancasila, the emphasis was on a return to origins – not only to 1945 but to Indonesia's cultural roots. Although Sukarno had also linked Pancasila backwards to a collectivistic notion of 'tradition', he had highlighted the dynamic, populist aspects of village culture. The 'indigenous values' promoted by pro New Order ideologues were those that the organicist lawyers and scholars who were associated with conservative anti-party forces had propagated since the days of Supomo: namely hierarchy, harmony and order. Thus when Sutjipto addressed the question of how to interpret the idea of '*kerakyatan*' (people-ness, populism) in the Pancasila, he took his cue from Supomo's archaised vision: 'Essentially the notion of *kerakyatan* derives from Indonesia's indigenous view of life as manifest in the centuries old sayings and lore of Indonesian *adat* preserved and bequeathed to us by our ancestors' (Sutjipto 1966: 10–11). Quoting several Minangkabau and Javanese sayings, including the familiar '*manunggaling kawulo lan gusti*' beloved of the conservative PIR aristocrats, he presented a picture of the traditional constitutional order in which there was no domination of one group by another, and no sense of separation between the rulers and the ruled (ibid.). The linking of the Pancasila with this static, organicist image of tradition paved the way for the repudiation of all political ideologies and practices that the government declared were inconsistent with it.

Another prominent figure calling for the Pancasila to be cleansed of accretions and Western taints was Soediman Kartohadiprodjo, professor of law at the University of Indonesia from 1953 and one of the most influential professors at the Military Law Academy from about 1966 until his death in 1970.[30] Like Supomo and Sutjipto, Soediman regarded *adat* law as the repository of the authentic Indonesian spirit. In an article on the Pancasila in June 1966, he stressed that it was all the more important to preserve and foster *adat* principles given, as he put it, the past success of 'Dutch heroes' such as van Vollenhoven, the orientalist Snouck Hurgronje, ter Haar, Logemann and J.F. Holleman, in protecting *adat* against the impact of Western ideas. The 'determined struggle' of these *adat* scholars, Soediman (1970: 102) argued, had made Indonesia 'the only newly independent nation in Asia to have a law system [i.e. *adat*] of its own which is in accordance with its personality'. This achievement had,

however, been tragically undermined by 'Indonesians swallowed up by Western thinking', among whom Soediman saw Sukarno as a major, if not the major, culprit.

Much of Soediman's ire was directed at the way in which Sukarno had twisted the Pancasila to suit his purposes during the Guided Democracy years, making a mockery of the 'deliberation and consensus' (*musyawarah* and *mufakat*) specified in the fourth tenet. But he went further, criticising Sukarno for having got it wrong in 1945 as well. Soediman argued that since most of Sukarno's Pancasila speech to the BPUPK referred to the indigenous tradition of 'consultation and consensus', he was wrong to have appended the word 'democracy' to his original formulation of the fourth tenet. A return to the authentic familistic spirit, Soediman insisted, would involve dropping this reference to 'democracy'. Almost as distasteful to Soediman was the fifth tenet: social justice. If we look closely at Sukarno's 1945 speech, he argued (1970: 43), it is clear that the fifth tenet really ought to be read as 'happiness'.

Even though not all of Soediman's suggestions were taken up, the general thrust of his and Sutjipto's prescriptions certainly were. Under the guidance of New Order ideologues the Pancasila was gradually drained of revolutionary, leftist, Sukarnoist resonances and infused with the traditional familistic spirit – of organic wholeness, harmony, stillness. Its scope was also expanded. While retaining its status as the state philosophy, the Pancasila came to be defined as embodying the essential and eternal character of the Indonesian nation, making it directly analogous with the Japanese notion of the *kokutai*. Pancasila was to become so all-encompassing that any criticism of its tenets could be constituted as an affront to the Indonesian people as a whole.

Enthroning Pancasila

> Pancasila is the legal basis of authority. Hence, any political action based on the norms of Pancasila ideology is in accordance with the law and legitimate.
> (Yoga Soegomo 1986: 16)

None of this would have been particularly significant if it had not been for the simultaneous elevation of the Pancasila to become the supreme symbolic centrepiece of the New Order state. Under Guided Democracy the Pancasila had retained its formal status as the state philosophy, but was never developed into a state ideology in the same way as Sukarno's Nasakom and Manipol-USDEK doctrines. Under the New Order it was made to serve as the guiding principle not only for ideological discourse but for the entire 'life of the state'.

The notion that the Pancasila could be made to represent the fundamental essence and ordering principle of the Indonesian state derived largely from the ideas of the legal philosopher Professor R.T.S. Notonagoro,[31] who lectured at Seskoad in the early 1960s. Notonagoro (1959: 13–14) had developed a theory in the 1950s of the Pancasila as the *Staatsfundamentalnorm* (basic constitutional norm), which in the positivist tradition of Continental legal

philosophy represents the highest principle of law, the principle to which all else must submit.[32]

Notonagoro's concept provided the basis for the New Order's first major law on Indonesia's legal structure, MPRS Resolution 20/1966.[33] This resolution did three important things. First it legalised Sukarno's 5 July 1959 decree returning Indonesia to the 1945 Constitution, which until that time had no solid legal basis. Second it established a clear hierarchy of 'legal products', from the constitution down to presidential decisions, ministerial instructions and so on. This was intended to restore order to the chaotic administrative legacy of the Sukarno years by reinforcing bureaucratic lines of command. The third feature of the resolution was its designation of the Pancasila as the supreme legal principle: 'the source of all sources of law', which could not be altered by any government authority without destroying the state itself.

This resolution cemented in place contradictory streams of constitutional thought that had characterised the constitution since the debates of 1945. I noted in Chapter 4 the tensions between the positivistic 'hardware' and the organicist 'software' of the constitution born of Supomo's insistence on the centrality of concepts such as the family principle, *musyawarah* and *semangat*. In specifying a strict hierarchy of laws, in which every law derived its authority from a higher one, Resolution 20 affirmed the positivist legal principles upon which the administrative bureaucracy had originally been built by their colonial forebears. Its formal installation of the Pancasila – defined in indigenist terms – as the highest legal principle, however, gave primacy to the organicist element. The view of law and authority in the organicist tradition of scholarship on which New Order definitions of the Pancasila drew had little in common with the insistence on impersonal, rational principles characteristic of the legal positivist tradition. Organicist constructions favour a much more fluid and familial concept of authority, in which relations between the rulers and their people are governed not by black letter law but by a paternalism resting on the concept of the 'public good'.[34]

The enshrining of the 'spirit of the Pancasila' as the *Staatsfundamentalnorm*, then, formally subordinated the entire 'positive' legal and constitutional apparatus of the state to a logic in which written law counted for little. The machiavillian Ali Moertopo summed up the formula: '[T]he sovereignty of the State is subordinate to that of the law, but the law itself is subordinate to the moral ideals embodied in Pancasila' (1972b: 20).

Resolution 20 was politically useful to the government. Its imposition of a strict ranking of laws allowed the government to claim to be committed to upholding legal principles. At the same time the elevation of the Pancasila as the supreme and immutable legal postulate gave the government the flexibility it needed to impose its own reading of the individual articles of the 1945 Constitution. As Soediman (1970: 100) argued, 'So we have to interpret and order all the provisions of our constitution and all aspects of our constitutional life on the basis of thoughts inspired by the familistic spirit, that is, by the Pantjasila'.

Pancasila-ising the constitution

Popular sovereignty

One provision of the constitution that many organicist lawyers close to the government had trouble with was its declaration that Indonesia was a state based on popular sovereignty. Article 1, clause 2 of the 1945 Constitution read: 'Sovereignty is in the hands of the people, and is exercised in full by the People's Consultative Assembly' (the MPR). Despite this, and despite the fact that the concept of popular sovereignty had long formed a part of nationalist thought in Indonesia, it was seen by several constitutional lawyers as problematic because of its association with the liberal democratic tradition. Soediman was blunt. He argued (1970: 43) that because the notion of popular sovereignty was derived from an individualistic tradition of political thought, it 'conflict[ed] with the spirit of Pantjasila philosophy' and ought simply to be dropped from the lexicon of Indonesian politics.

More complex was the argument put by S.T. Hazairin, a senior professor at the Military Law Academy who in the 1950s had been a leader of the PIR, interior minister as well as an *adat* and Islamic law professor. Hazairin (1985: 21) maintained that because in the preamble of the constitution the terms nation (*bangsa*), people (*rakyat*) and state (*negara*) were used synonymously, there was no constitutional basis for distinguishing popular sovereignty from state sovereignty.

> It is clear that the Preamble depicts the Indonesian State as encompassing the entire unity of the life of the Indonesian Nation or the Indonesian People formed since the proclamation of its liberation from the shackles of colonialism[.] [T]his equivalence of State, Nation and People points also towards the equivalence between the sovereignty of the State and the Sovereignty of the people: the Popularly sovereign State of the Republic of Indonesia. (*Staatssouvereiniteit* is the same as *Volkssouvereiniteit*.)[35]

Acknowledging that this line of thinking was 'perhaps at odds with existing constitutional theories' Hazairin argued that this very discordance reflected Indonesia's uniqueness, 'a uniqueness of which we should be proud' (ibid.). Hazairin had graduated in *adat* law studies in Jakarta in 1936 and it was the *adat* tradition of scholarship that informed his writings about what 'Pancasila Democracy' – the name given to the Indonesian political system by the MPRS in 1968[36] – should look like. He wrote at length about Pancasila Democracy as a 'higher manifestation' of '*adat* democracy', a notion popularised in the 1920s by the Dutch Indologist B.J. Haga (Hazairin 1985: 53–67). Like many other scholars steeped in the Leiden tradition,[37] Hazairin represented Western and Eastern political cultures as diametrically opposed to one another. Western civilisation was founded on individualistic Greek–Roman philosophies that had eventually given rise to political and economic structures based on

conflict and competition. Traditional Indonesian culture, on the other hand, was essentially communal and cooperative. It had no concept of class struggle or struggle between groups competing for power. If Western rulers exploited their people for their own selfish ends, rulers in Indonesia 'always fulfilled their duties in looking after the public interest by consulting with the people via their elders' in an *adat* congress. The MPR, Hazairin (1985: 39–50, 53–6) argued, represented the modern manifestation of the *adat* congress, and should be governed by *adat* principles.

Another important lawyer to apply himself to the task of 'interpreting and ordering' Indonesian constitutional life in the early New Order period was General Nasution's colleague Colonel Abdulkadir Besar. Abdulkadir had studied under Djokosutono at the Military Law Academy and graduated from the more advanced Military Law College in 1963. He served as a senior army intelligence officer in the early 1960s and in June 1966, when Nasution was appointed to chair the MPRS, Abdulkadir took on the position of MPRS secretary general. Abdulkadir tackled the question of popular sovereignty in 1968 by arguing that its definition depended on the organising principle of the state, which, in Indonesia's case, Abdulkadir pronounced, quoting Supomo, was the family principle.[38] The 'family state-concept', as he put it, was 'an understanding of the state as being at one with its entire people, transcending all groups in all walks of life'. Its fundamental tenets, he argued (Besar 1972: 495), again following Supomo, were 'the principles of unity between the leaders and the people and of unity within the state'. These governed Abdulkadir's whole approach to constitutional theory, but are most directly relevant here because they underpin his argument that the concept of the 'popular will' in Indonesia is conceived not in terms of the will of the majority represented in parliament, as in liberal countries, or the will of a minority that presumes to speak for the collectivity, as in communist countries, but as the will of the entire people as manifest by the MPR. The MPR, in other words, was not so much a 'representative' body as the very essence of the popular will. Its decisions were therefore totally binding and beyond criticism (Besar 1972: 498, 534).

Voting procedures

If the constitution was an emanation of the familial spirit, and if this implied 'unity within the state', it followed that any elements within the constitution that allowed for the possibility of disunity must somehow be mistaken. Such was the logic of the organicist lawyers, including Abdulkadir, when assessing the validity of Article 2, clause 3 of the constitution, which states 'All decisions of the People's Consultative Assembly will be taken on the basis of a majority vote'. Abdulkadir argued that decision making on the basis of majority votes belonged to the individualist tradition and had no place in Indonesia, where only unanimous decisions were held to be valid. Indeed it went against the spirit of the times globally, since 'consultation leading to consensus', he argued (after Djokosutono), was a 'big phenomenon in the twentieth century'. This system,

he maintained, 'does not use voting, does not recognise majorities and minorities and does not recognise oppositionism' (cited in Nasroen 1971: 26). Attempting to explain the anomaly, Abdulkadir Besar (1972: 500) suggested that the authors of the constitution must have been in a hurry and overlooked the problem. Other prominent supporters of the principle of unanimous decision making in the early New Order period included General Nasution, West Sumatran law professor Mohammad Nasroen[39] and one of the army's top ideologues, Lieutenant Colonel Darji Darmodihardjo (cited in Purbopranoto 1982: 127–8). An MPRS Resolution in favour of unanimous voting in all legislative institutions at the national and regional level was signed by Abdulkadir in March 1968.[40]

Judicial independence

The issue of the separation of executive and judicial powers in the constitution likewise presented the New Order's ideologues with a challenge. The official elucidation of Articles 24 and 25 on judicial power stated: 'Judicial authority is independent, meaning that it is free of executive influence'. Most lawyers had despaired at Sukarno's wilful interference in the legal process[41] and looked forward to a new order in which the principle of the separation of powers was clearly established. Organicist lawyers such as Soediman, Hazairin and Abdulkadir Besar, however, flatly rejected the doctrine of the separation of powers – commonly referred to as *trias politica* in Indonesia – branding it (as, ironically, Sukarno had) as a product of the liberal individualistic tradition of political thought.

Authority in a Pancasila Democracy, Hazairin (1985: 48) argued, should mirror that in *adat* communities, where leaders were responsible for all aspects of government and welfare 'without any trias politica, without any differentiation between public and private spheres, without any sharp differentiation between legal norms, moral norms and spiritual norms'. Soediman (1970: 196), too, maintained that, in contrast to the West, power in Indonesia was essentially undivided. It was therefore natural that all functions of government, including the judicial function, should be controlled by the president. Abdulkadir Besar (1972: 501–2, 522–4), meanwhile, solved the problem of judicial independence by arguing that what the authors of the constitution actually meant was not that there should be a separation of powers, as in Montesquieu's theory, but rather a 'division of powers' between the various sections of the government. The family-state concept, he maintained, facilitated 'cooperation' between the highest government institutions. As was to become clear in 1970, when rule-of-law advocates lost their battle with the government to guarantee judicial independence and Supreme Court powers of review over legislation, it was the anti-separation of powers position that the New Order leadership favoured.[42]

Political and human rights

Then there was the question of rights. Article 28 of the constitution stated 'The freedom of the population to organise and associate, to express themselves

either orally or in writing and so forth, will be determined by statute'. Sukarno's banning of Masjumi and PSI in 1960 and Murba in 1965, as well as the restrictions imposed on the publication of critical or 'non-socialist' writing, the screening of Western films and the broadcasting of 'decadent' pop music, had all contributed to a strong commitment among supporters of the New Order to a restoration of rights and freedoms for those not on the left. There was also strong support for human rights from senior pro-New Order civilian lawyers, including Ismail Suny, the popular professor of law at the University of Indonesia, as well as Yap Thiam Hien, Harun Al Rasjid, Suardi Tasrif, Sumrah and Buyung Nasution (see Damian 1970; Fakultas Hukum 1966). But while the opinions of figures such as these went down well at university law seminars, they did not have much influence with the New Order leadership. Neither did they impress the organicist lawyers.

Soediman Kartohadiprodjo was incensed at the renewed talk of human rights, insisting repeatedly in 1967 and 1968 that the familistic interpretation of the constitution made it fundamentally incompatible with human rights (see e.g. Sumrah 1970: 17–9). 'It is extremely dangerous', he stressed, to interpret Articles 27, 28 and 29 in the constitution (concerning equality before the law, the right to employment and a decent livelihood; freedom to organise and of expression; and freedom of religion) as providing the kinds of human rights that they have in the West. This was precisely the kind of thinking that, he argued (Sumrah 1970: 99), 'very nearly saw us fall into the PKI's trap'. Soediman launched a stinging attack on Ismail Suny's defence of human rights in 1966 and on a pro-human rights keynote address given by Sumrah in November 1967, accusing him of not understanding the Pancasila and of being a 'traditional' intellectual 'influenced by individualism, liberalism and socialism' (Soediman 1970: 68–73). Implementing human rights in Indonesia, he argued, would not only 'go against our souls', it would ignore the MPRS's own injunction to implement the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila in a 'pure' way.[43] To counter accusations that he himself may have been guilty of 'misreading' the constitution, Soediman (1970: 75) summed up succinctly the position of the organicist lawyers: 'We should not be too fussed with the wording of the 1945 Constitution, it is *the spirit which underlies them* which we should pay attention to'.

Soeharto was more restrained in his pronouncements, but it is clear that his position was much closer to that of Soediman than to the reformists. In 1967, and several times afterwards, Soeharto emphasised that Pancasila Democracy was 'based on the family principle and *gotong royong*' and that the exercise of political rights in a Pancasila Democracy had therefore to be interpreted in the light of the Pancasila (Lubis 1993: 174–5). The implications of this became evident in 1968, when the government ensured the defeat of the 1966 Human Rights Charter during the pivotal MPRS session of that year, turning what to many had been a beacon of hope into a 'footnote in history' (Pradjoto 1983: 34).

An insight into the way in which political and human rights were regarded within the army dominated legal system can be gained from a contribution to

the Military Law Academy's 1969 yearbook by Lieutenant Colonel L.S.M. Panggabean (1969), a senior military lawyer. Written against the backdrop of mounting protests against the New Order in the wake of the 1968 MPRS session, Panggabean lashed out at students and others who accused the government of not honouring human rights and the rule of law. He pointed out that most of the rights guaranteed in the constitution were social rights, and that constitutional provisions on the freedom to organise and speak were only general in nature, and were 'still awaiting regulation by statute' (ibid.: 131–2). People who used human rights slogans did so only to attract support for themselves, he told his audience of budding prosecutors and judges, and 'to spread hatred against the government' (ibid.: 133). Like Soediman, he argued that this kind of negative talk was very dangerous because it paved the way for a PKI comeback. 'Justice', he argued, 'is a relative concept', and besides, it had to be understood that 'to overcome an abnormal situation the government has to use abnormal means' (ibid.: 132–3). Panggabean (ibid.: 130) also attacked people who criticised the regime on rule-of-law grounds for harbouring the misconception that law and political power stood somehow in an antagonistic relationship to one another. 'Doesn't the New Order strive towards the upholding of the Pancasila and the UUD45 [1945 Constitution] in a pure and consistent way?' he asked. 'Aren't we a country based on law? Therefore power is not in opposition to law but in partnership.'

My purpose in surveying the opinions of some of the foremost proponents of organicist theories of politics and law in the early New Order has not been to suggest that they represented the public face of government policy. Indeed many of the opinions discussed here were seen as anachronistic by reform-minded elements among the New Order's urban constituency, who were much more interested in putting Indonesia on the road to economic and political 'modernity' than invoking tired old *adat* nostrums. Neither did the regime's technocratic advisers have much sympathy with the family principle, either in its economic or its political sense. It is important, however, not to ignore organicist arguments, because their adherents included some of the main legal architects of the regime. Exploring their ideas can help reveal the logic behind some of the government's basic legal engineering as well as provide an insight into the set of assumptions that underpinned 'Pancasila Democracy'. Organicist lawyers in the early New Order helped define an ideological position for the government that enabled it to represent itself in terms that were at once culturally 'authentic', anti-Marxist, anti-liberal, anti-party, anti-mass mobilisation, anti-revolution and anti-class struggle. As ideologues they helped to legitimise the government's manipulation of the constitution and as legal technicians they wrote the laws. Some indication of the importance of their services during the early New Order can be found in a confidential 1981 assessment by Kopkamtib chief of staff General Widjojo Soejono (1981: 11): that if the government had not had the flexibility to interpret the constitution according to the family principle, 'there would have been an accumulation of problems which would one day have reached boiling point and led to a serious social upheaval'.

Functional representation as an organising principle

A further important aspect of the organicist tradition of political thinking embraced by the New Order was the principle of functional representation. This was not novel; the military had promoted the concept of functional representation since at least 1957. The army leadership in the early New Order period were attracted to it, and the view of society as a coherent whole on which it was premised, for essentially the same reasons that Nasution had been in the 1950s. There was, in this vision, no place for ideologies or political movements that promoted separatism, exclusivism or class conflict, i.e. regional rebels, Islamic extremists and communists: the main enemies of the state as perceived by the military. More specifically, it enabled the military to represent itself as one among many 'functional groups' in society with a right – according to the army's reading of the 1945 Constitution – to representation in the MPR. The army's claim to a permanent 'non-military' role in society was also inextricably meshed with the functional group concept.

As explained in the previous chapter, virtually every political organisation sponsored by the military after mid 1957, from the Cooperation Bodies to SOKSI and Sekber Golkar, was based on the concept of functional representation. These organisations' establishment of an array of functional groups for workers, farmers, fishermen, women and youth had been central to the army's strategy to compete with the PKI. This pattern was carried seamlessly into the early New Order period with Sutjipto's Action Fronts, which comprised sections not only for students and intellectuals but also for women, farmers and other groups (Oey 1979: 82).

There is a good case for seeing the army leadership's attachment to the functional groups idea as the defining feature of its thinking about political organisation. Soeharto himself seems to have been especially favourably disposed. Three of the five men Soeharto appointed to advise him on political affairs in March 1966 – Sutjipto, Major General Soeharto and Major General Daryatmo – were among the foremost exponents of the army taking an active role in 'civilian' functional groups and of the importance of army's *kekaryaan* or non-military functions. Sutjipto, who has been described as 'the brains behind the army's socio-political role' (Oei 1995: 307) had been secretary to the army's functional groups umbrella body (FNPIB), and actively defended the army's involvement in non-military activities in his newspaper articles between 1966 and 1968 (Reeve 1985: 311). Major General Soeharto had served as deputy head of the army's inspectorate general of territorial and people's welfare, which took over supervision of the army's main functional group organisations following the dissolution of the FNPIB in 1961 (ibid.: 181–2, 271). And Daryatmo, who Soeharto had put in charge of the same inspectorate general as soon as he took over control of the army in October 1965, had been 'extensively involved in the promotion of SOKSI' during his tenure as North Sumatra military commander from 1963 to 1965 (ibid.: 271; Bachtiar 1988: 92–3). Only three months after the coup Soeharto affirmed his

commitment to the functional groups concept by creating an Army Karyawan Corps Command (Reeve 1985: 271). In addition, Soeharto urged the armed services from at least 1966 to 'provide all possible facilities' for the development of the functional groups organised in Sekber Golkar (Bresnan 1993: 96). Thanks to encouragement from the top, the number of organisations affiliated with Sekber Golkar climbed steeply from 64 in 1965 to 128 in 1966, and to 252 in 1967 (ibid.).

Since the MPRS, which the New Order inherited from the Sukarno era, already contained a number of appointed functional group representatives, it was easy for the army leadership to maintain and extend the system. After purging the communists and their supporters from the MPRS, Soeharto filled their seats with appointed representatives of army-sponsored student and graduate groups including KAMI. Perhaps sensing the resistance the issue might generate among the political parties, Soeharto also made it an early priority to formalise the principle of appointing functional group representatives to the nation's highest representative institutions. This was achieved during the June–July 1966 session of the MPRS. MPRS Resolution 22 stated that 'the MPR [and] the DPR will be filled by people representing groups in society … comprising parties, mass organisations and functional groups' (*Ketetapan-Ketetapan MPRS* c1967: 69–70). To clear up any doubt that this meant that the military would be represented in government, MPRS Resolution 24/1966 asserted that 'The non-military function of the ABRI [Armed Forces] members, as citizens and Pancasilaist revolutionaries … must be acknowledged and its continuance guaranteed' (Jenkins 1983a: 24).

It was still unclear though, what sort of a political system could be constructed and how power would be shared. How, in particular, could the army conduct a general election and remain on top? This was one of the central questions discussed at the Second Army Seminar at Seskoad in Bandung, where senior army officers gathered in August 1966 to chart the political and economic priorities for the next two years. Under the guidance of Seskoad commander Suwarto, the officers proposed to change the electoral system from the proportional representation system used in the 1950s to a single constituency one. This, they calculated, would reduce the power of the party leaders and make way for the election of non-party figures. Building on MPRS Resolution 22, they also advocated that only half the membership of representative institutions should be composed of political party representatives, the other half being made up of members of functional groups. Of these, half would represent the armed forces, giving the military 25 per cent of seats in the MPR, the DPR and the regional parliaments (Bresnan 1993: 89–90).

Finding a political format

Important though the Seskoad seminar in Bandung was in determining the priorities of the New Order, its political prescriptions reflected more the views of a group of hard-line officers associated primarily with the West Java based

Siliwangi Division than they did those of Soeharto and his immediate group. These figures, the so-called 'New Order Hawks', included Brigadier General H.R. Dharsono, the commander of the Siliwangi Division, and Brigadier General Kemal Idris, to whom Soeharto had entrusted control of the elite Kostrad forces. The Hawks saw themselves as the vanguard of the New Order and pushed for comprehensive de-Sukarnoisation and the rapid establishment of new political structures that would exclude the major parties, especially the PNI and NU, which they saw as corrupt and patronage ridden.[44] Their vision of politics was strongly influenced by a group of PSI aligned civilian intellectuals under the spell of American modernisation theorists such as Daniel Bell, Lipset and, later, Samuel Huntington. Blaming Indonesia's ills on an overdose of politics and ideology, they looked forward to the construction of a 'non-ideological', technocratic polity in which rational economic planning and economic development would take priority over party politics.[45]

Soeharto and his closest allies shared the Hawks' dislike of parties and of Sukarno, but they feared the destabilising potential of dispensing with the shibboleths of Sukarnoism and abolishing the parties too precipitously. Besides, Soeharto and his circle of central Javanese generals had never been close to the mainly Sundanese Siliwangi leadership. This reflected to some extent old suspicions between the central Javanese Diponegoro Division, dominated as it was by less educated Japanese-trained officers, and the more sophisticated, professionally oriented, Dutch-trained leadership of the Siliwangi Division (see Feith 1968: 2).

These differences came out into the open after the parties, especially the large, Java-based PNI and NU, put up a vigorous protest against two bills presented to parliament in mid 1967 implementing the recommendations of the Seskoad seminar, i.e. single-member constituencies and legislatures made up of only 50 per cent elected party representatives. Deciding that he could not afford to alienate the parties, Soeharto agreed in July 1967 to retain the system of proportional representation. Soeharto's compromise in turn raised the hackles of the radically anti-party Hawks, who wanted to destroy the influence of the large parties and use the army's power to push through rapid political restructuring to facilitate modernisation and economic development (Jenkins 1983a: 25). They lent their support in mid 1967 to an 'Independent Group' of non-party civilians, which they hoped could become the army's partners in power, and, later, without Soeharto's permission, tried to establish a 'non-ideological' two-party system in West Java in which neither the NU nor the PNI were allowed to participate. Several regional commanders supportive of the radicals' position took the initiative in the second half of 1967 to ban the PNI within their jurisdictions (Feith 1968: 3; Crouch 1978: 236).

Argument over political formats between 1967 and 1969, then, saw serious tensions emerge within the New Order coalition. Clearly unprepared to conduct elections in 1968 and faced with mounting impatience among his supporters over his 'wait and see' attitude and growing criticism of corruption among his leading generals, Soeharto knew that the March 1968 session of the

MPRS would be a major test of his authority. In February he 'redressed' the MPRS, adding 67 new appointees, including 32 members of the armed forces, 11 members of functional groups and 24 other 'non-affiliated, non-mass organisation people, most of them members of the Action Fronts (Panggabean 1993: 388). At the same time he raised military representation in the MPRS from 43 to 75 and compelled the parties to replace 112 of their members of parliament with people more attuned to the spirit of the New Order. Many of the pro-democracy intellectuals appointed to the MPRS from the ranks of the New Order coalition in 1966 lost their seats in the shakeup. Come 21 March, when the session opened, assembly members had little choice but to agree behind closed doors with the pre-prepared programme of the leadership, which included appointing Soeharto as full president, endorsing a five-year development plan and postponing elections until July 1971 (Feith 1968: 4; Mas'oed 1983: Chapter 4).

The government's heavy-handed management of the 1968 MPRS signalled the beginning of a more authoritarian, intolerant and confident approach to politics on the part of the Soeharto group. Many of the pro-rule law civilian intellectuals the government had appointed to the MPRS and to bureaucratic jobs were removed from their positions in 1968, including Ismail Suny and Buyung Nasution. Students demonstrating against corruption were suppressed and the visibility of troops in the streets increased markedly. At the same time Soeharto moved decisively against his military critics, relieving Dharsono, Kemal Idris and RPKAD Commander Brigadier General Sarwo Edhie of their commands (Feith 1968: 4; Crouch 1978: 236).

Delaying the elections and cracking down on dissent dismayed many of the New Order's civilian supporters, but it gave Soeharto valuable time to consolidate his control over the military and allow the technocrats' economic stabilisation measures to take effect. By late 1968 inflation had been brought under control, agricultural and industrial production was increasing rapidly and foreign aid and investment was pouring into Indonesia (Hill 1994; Bresnan 1993: 63–72, 94). Putting off the elections also gave Soeharto time to thrash out a suitable election law.

After much haggling and arm twisting, both inside and outside of the parliament, an agreement was reached on how elections were to be conducted and how the nation's representative bodies were to be constituted. The negotiations culminated late in 1969 when the DPR passed two vital bills. The Election Bill (UU No. 15/1969) determined that elections would be carried out on the basis of proportional representation and that no parties other than the nine already represented in parliament could stand for election. The effect of this was to extend Sukarno's ban on the PSI and Masjumi and to limit participation in the elections to the nine legal parties (Pradjoto 1983: 59): the PNI, NU, the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik), the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), the Indonesian Islamic Association Party (PSII), the Islamic Educational Movement (Perti), IPKI, the resurrected Murba and the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi). In the interests of ensuring 'the victory of

New Order forces' in the election, the bill introduced tight restrictions that gave the government the power to veto any party candidate and cancelled the voting rights of former members of the PKI, members of mass organisations affiliated with the PKI and anybody deemed to have been either directly or indirectly connected with the 1965 coup attempt. More important, however, was a second bill (UU No.16 /1969), which gave the government the right to appoint one-third of the 920 seat MPR, 22 per cent of the 460-seat People's Representative Council (DPR) and 22 per cent of representative bodies at the provincial, city and district levels (Bresnan 1993: 95). The armed forces were allotted a quota of 75 seats in the MPR and 75 in the DPR and in the regional legislatures. These bills defined the basic political parameters of the New Order. Despite the fact that they were ratified by unelected politicians, the government maintained for decades that these laws were the result of a 'national consensus' (see e.g. Silalahi 1990; Notosusanto 1985b).

Notes

1 See e.g. *Berita Yudha* 5 October 1965 and *Angkatan Bersendjata* 7 October 1965. For evidence of fabrication see Anderson (1987).
2 Sutjipto was secretary of Soeharto's first kitchen cabinet, the committee for social and political affairs, formed in early October 1965 (Mas'oed 1989b: 177).
3 See e.g. *Api* 27 October 1965 and Sutjipto (1966: 63–4).
4 *Berita Yudha* 4 October 1965. The text can be found in Sutjipto (1966: 79).
5 Estimates of the number of people killed in the aftermath of the coup vary wildly. A comprehensive table of approximations is in Cribb (1990: 12). The highest estimate by a New Order government source (1,000,000) was made in a 1966 report issued by Kopkamtib. In 1976 Kopkamtib Commander Admiral Sudomo gave a figure of 450,000–500,000 (ibid.: 8, 11–14). K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the youth wing of which was involved in the killings, told *Editor* (4 September 1993) that Muslims had killed '500,000 former communists'.
6 For a half-admiring army analysis of the PKI's structures and strategies, see Sutjipto (1966: 28–54). The PKI's internal structures were closer to those of the army than were of any other parties.
7 Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia/ Komando Operasi Tertinggi No. 142/KOTI/1965 and Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia/Panglima Besar Komando Operasi Tertinggi No. 179/KOTI/1965.
8 Between 600,000 and 750,000 people were arrested for their alleged links with the coup in the period 1965–75. Most were released by the early 1970s but at least 35,000 spent up to a decade in detention without trial (Fealy 1995: 3).
9 Radiogram No. T-0265/G-V 10 October 1965 sent by the Chairman of G-V for the KOTI chief of staff (reproduced in English in Notosusanto and Saleh 1968: 223–7).
10 Decision No.KEP-1196/10/1965 dated 5 October 1965 signed by Soeharto in his (yet to be ratified) capacity as minister/commander of the army (Notosusanto and Saleh 1968: 201–5).
11 Njono claimed in court that his confession was forced, a point that Durmawel all but confirmed (*Sinar Harapan* 29 and 30 September and 1 October 1986 reported in *Tapol Bulletin* 78 December 1986: 8–9).
12 See Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 370 Tahun 1965 in Sutjipto (1966: 77–8). For an English translation see Southwood and Flanagan (1983: 244–5).

13 Sutjipto was replaced as the head of KOTI G-5 by Soenarso, but appears to have been retained on Soeharto's personal staff. In 1966 Sutjipto was part of a five-person team advising Soeharto on political affairs and on 12 May 1966 was appointed Deputy 1/General Affairs, Defence Ministry.
14 In an attempt to curb inflation Sukarno had declared on 13 December 1965 that the face value of the currency would be drastically reduced, making a Rp1,000 note worth Rp1 new rupiah. Sharp fuel price increases in January led to massive price rises. One of the key demands of KAMI, apart from banning the PKI and 'retooling' the cabinet, was that prices be lowered. See 'Janji politik 28 tahun lalu dan retorika politik kini', *Independen* 11/1995 – 31 January 1995.
15 Interview with A.H. Nasution (*Tiras* 16 March 1995). This is confirmed in Soeharto (1988: 161).
16 Jenkins (1984: 4). Nasution retained the chair of the MPRS until 1972. Even though the New Order in many ways realised his vision, his personal relationship with Soeharto was frosty.
17 Suwarto came from a middle-class family of officials and was educated at a Dutch secondary school. After joining the Student Army (*Tentara Peladjar*) in Central Java he rose rapidly through the ranks of the West Javanese Siliwangi Division in the 1950s. Singled out for his intellectual abilities but excluded from territorial positions after 1958 because of his PSI sympathies and his past links to the Zulkifli Lubis coup attempt, Nasution appointed Suwarto deputy commandant of Seskoad. There he developed the territorial warfare doctrine and was a key planner of the army's anti-PKI strategies. Much of Soeharto's subtle political manoeuvring after October 1965 has been attributed to Suwarto's advice (Sundhaussen 1982: 228). On Suwarto see Bresnan (1993: 81); McDonald (1980: 33–4); Reeve (1985: 186); Mrazek (1978: *passim*).
18 Bresnan (1993: 79–80) credits Djokosutono not only with having 'persuaded the army leadership of the desirability of training some of its younger officers in law and economics' but with using his influence with Sukarno to protect the politically vulnerable economics faculty from possible closure after Sumitro fled Jakarta. On Djokosutono's role as godfather to the future generation of technocrats, see Sadli (1984).
19 Other key technocrats included Mohammad Sadli, who studied in the US, and the Dutch-trained Frans Seda and Radius Prawiro. On the technocrats in general see Schwarz (1999: Chapters 3 and 4); Bresnan (1993: Chapter 3) and McDonald (1980: Chapter 4).
20 In recruiting functionalism to the defence of organicism, Abdulkadir was completing a circle. Talcott Parsons, the founder of American functionalism, had been strongly influenced by Pitirim Sorokin, a Russian legal philosopher and sociologist associated with the European organicist tradition. Sorokin, who established the discipline of sociology at Harvard, called his approach 'integralist' and wrote extensively about societies as sensate entities with distinguishable lifecycles. Ferdinand Tönnies was another major European purveyor of the view of society as an integrated system whose ideas inspired the American functionalists. It is not unusual to see Sorokin, and other major figures of the 'philosophy-of-history' tradition, such as Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, quoted in texts by Indonesian organicists. See for instance Soediman Kartohadiprodjo (1970: 219–25).
21 Soeharto's radio and TV speech cited in Crouch (1978: 195).
22 These included Seminar 'Ketatanegaraan', at the University of Indonesia, May 1966; Seminar Persahi, November 1966, on the theme 'Kepastian Hukum menuju stabilisasi politik dan ekonomi'; Munas Persatuan Sarjana Hukum Indonesia (Persahi) III, December 1966; Symposium Hak2 Azasi Manusia held at the Gedung Bappenas in Jakarta by the 'Lembaga Pembela Hak2 Azasi Manusia Djakarta', 14–18 June 1967; Seminar Hak2 Azasi Manusia held in Bandung, 3–5 November 1967.

23 Chaired by General Nasution, the ad hoc committee was given broad and somewhat ambiguous terms of reference, which included making use of the list of human rights prepared by the Constituent Assembly as well as the stipulation that Pancasila should be the ideological basis of human rights (Lubis 1993: 129, 136–7). Less than a year later the committee had produced a charter of human rights, citizen's rights and duties, which was seen as a major achievement by reformist lawyers and party politicians until it was sunk by a cowed MPRS in 1968. See Lubis (1993: 130–9).
24 Points 1 & 2, Resolution at the third national congress of Persahi (Persatuan Sardjana Hukum Indonesia), 3 December 1966, cited in Lubis (1993: 128).
25 See e.g. Damian (1970), a collection of papers from the 'Seminar on Human Rights' in November 1967.
26 See e.g. Angkatan Darat (1966: 55); Seskoad (1982: 310); Wandelt (1989: 115–16). Even more encyclopaedic is IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAMNAS, incorporating also 'national security and order' concerns (*Kompas*, 13 May 1982).
27 See Bonneff *et al*. (1980: 26–44, 87–169) for an excellent survey of the history of Pancasila.
28 See the papers from the 'Kembali ke Rel Pantjasila' symposium in *Kebangkitan Semangat '66* … (1966). Contributors included Fuad Hasan and David Napitupulu and the Yogyakarta Jesuit Drijarkara, an important contributor to the development of Pancasila philosophy in the 1950s.
29 See Sutjipto (1966, 1967) and *Angkatan Bersendjata*, 2–16 April 1966, 17–21 January, 9 February 1967, 24–25 February, 16–17 October, 10–17 December 1968.
30 Interview with retired Lieutenant General Sudharmono, 13 November 1997, Jakarta. In 1966 Professor Soediman Kartohadiprodjo was dean and professor of law at Parahyangan University in Bandung. His brother was Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, one of the army's leading theoreticians who rose to the position of deputy chief of staff of the armed forces in 1973. For a collection of his articles, see Soediman Kartohadiprodjo (1970).
31 Mr Raden Toemenggung Soekamto Notonagoro was professor of legal philosophy at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta. He wrote extensively on Pancasila and is credited with having developed it into a comprehensive philosophy. In the Yogyakarta Seminar on Pancasila in 1959, Notonagoro declared that as the 'absolute and objective basis of the state' there was no legal power that could alter it. See Notonagoro (1959, 1962), Nichterlein (1974: 226–41), Wandelt (1989: 97–101) and Nasution (1992: 65–6).
32 The term *Staatsfundamentalnorm* comes from the legal philosopher Hans Nawiasky, who, like his teacher Hans Kelsen, saw rights as residing in the state rather than in the individual (Turner 1993: 495; Attamimi 1990: 287–8). For an accessible summary of Notonagoro's theories about Pancasila see Suwarno (1993: 111–18).
33 For the full text see *Ketetapan-Ketetapan MPRS* (c1967: 45–62).
34 This idea is further developed in Bourchier (2008).
35 This book, called *Demokrasi Pancasila*, was first published in 1970, most likely on the basis of the author's lectures at the University of Indonesia and the Military Law Academy. It was used as a textbook in law faculties in Indonesia in the early 1970s (Nichterlein 1974: 223–4).
36 The term was first used officially in MPRS Resolution 37/1968. The term itself had been used as early as 1953 in the title of a book by Mohammad Ibnoe Sayoeti (Sayuti Melik), *Demokrasi Pantjasila dan perdjoangan ideologis didalamnja* (Pesat, Yogyakarta).
37 Hazairin's main interest was in Islamic law, but he is regarded by Holleman (1981: LXV) as belonging to van Vollenhoven's tradition of *adat* scholarship.
38 The source for this discussion of Abdulkadir Besar's views is an 'academic appraisal' dealing with procedural aspects of the MPR, which was part of the

MPRS leadership's report for the period 1966–72. The 55-page article is dated 18 April 1968, but incorporates some material written in 1969. See Besar (1972) and the translated excerpts in Bourchier and Hadiz (2003: 41–3).

39 Dutch trained *adat* lawyer Professor Mr Moh. Nasroen was another important advocate of applying the concept of 'village democracy' to the larger political stage. He spelt out his vision of a state based on the family principle in Nasroen (1971).

40 This was MPRS Resolution 37/1968. That it was intended to apply as a general principle of New Order rule is made clear in Article 6: 'This Resolution … can also be called a *resolution on the guidelines for the implementation of pancasila democracy*' (emphasis in original). See *Inventarisasi* … (1989: 229–33).

41 The Basic Law on Judicial Power No. 19/1964 declared law to be 'an instrument of the revolution' and authorised the president to interfere at any stage of the judicial process 'in the interests of the revolution'. It explicitly abolished the principle of the separation of powers.

42 The Basic Law on Judicial Authority No. 14 of 1970 cancelled the authority of the executive to interfere directly in judicial affairs that had been bestowed by Law No. 19/1964, but at the same time virtually guaranteed it by maintaining the system by which judges' careers were controlled by the justice minister. On the hard-fought campaign for a thorough reform of the judicial system between 1968 and 1970, see Lev (1978).

43 Sumrah (1970: 16) citing Soediman in *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, West Java Edition 65, Year 2, September 1967.

44 See Manembu (1967) for a good account of the political situation in 1966 and early 1967 as seen from the perspective of this group. See also Feith (1968).

45 On this group of intellectuals and their influence see Liddle (1973) and Mas'oed (1983: 172–8).

7 Engineering hegemony

Nothing illustrated the bureaucratic tone of New Order rule better than the attempts by the Soeharto government to 'domesticate' the sensuous Javanese *tayuban* dance form (Widodo 1995). Motivated by a desire to preserve the dance as a 'cultural artefact' and put an end to its licentiousness, the state's cultural bureaucracy introduced a series of regulations in the late 1980s that transformed it from a spontaneous, participatory event into a choreographed ritual in which the participants became spectators. The female dancers who once dominated the proceedings were subordinated to batik-clad male bureaucrats from the department of education and culture who officiated, provided 'guidance' to participants at the beginning of each 'performance', conducted compulsory training courses for the dancers and issued them with annual licences. Guidance, hierarchy, harmony, structure, formality, paternalism and patriarchy were all key themes in the Soeharto regime's attempt to 'order' Indonesia's social and political life.

This chapter examines the extraordinary expansion of the Indonesian state between 1968 and the early 1980s facilitated by foreign aid and, after 1973, a flood of petrodollars. The massive increase in revenue gave Soeharto considerable powers of patronage, which he used to shore up support for his rule among the military and then to reshape the domestic political environment. After describing how Soeharto consolidated his regime internally I examine the more complex process by which the regime attempted to neutralise all opposition, from political parties to factory workers.

My focus is on the two main figures Soeharto relied on to establish the hegemony of the New Order state. The first was the meticulous military lawyer Sudharmono, the main legal architect of the New Order. The second was his rival, Ali Moertopo, who was primarily responsible for reshaping the Indonesian political landscape during the first decade of New Order rule. The two figures represented different approaches that Soeharto used as required, often in tandem: Sudharmono's style was bureaucratic while Moertopo's was informal and Machiavellian. While Moertopo and his operatives used bulldozers and blowtorches, Sudharmono and his lawyers hammered in the pegs. While the New Order did not unfold according to a master plan, Soeharto's closest advisers did share an intensely 'statist' perspective that owed much to

organicist precepts, which they drew on as they responded to specific challenges to the regime. Sudharmono and his group were graduates of Djokosutono's Military Law College and were to become key advocates of Supomo's integralist ideology. Moertopo was a strong admirer of corporatist models of rule and wrote extensively about his vision of a state that encompassed all social groups.

Strengthening the president

Soeharto's emphasis on building political institutions and his insistence that political life follow an orderly cycle belied the intensely personal nature of his exercise of power. From the earliest days after the coup Soeharto ruled through a succession of small, more or less secretive, kitchen cabinets. The first of these was the social and political committee established early in October 1965 under the leadership of the army's chief of social and political affairs, Major General Basuki Rachmat and Major General Sutjipto (Mas'oed 1983: 228). In a move later identified by General Nasution as a crucial step towards the strengthening of Soeharto's executive authority, control of this committee – which deliberately kept a low profile – was shifted from army headquarters to Soeharto's own circle in mid 1966 (ibid.; Nasution 1988: 154). The committee was disbanded when Soeharto appointed Basuki Rachmat and Sutjipto as ministers of the interior and agriculture in the Ampera cabinet of July 1966, but was replaced with another group known as SPRI (Personal Staff), which functioned informally as the supreme executive body for the next two years. Coordinated by Major General Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara, a long-time associate of Soeharto's, SPRI also included KOTI G-5 head Brigadier General Soenarso and his assistant in KOTI G-5, Brigadier General Sudharmono (Crouch 1978: 229, 307).[1] Two teams of civilian experts on political and economic affairs were also attached to Soeharto's personal staff (Mas'oed 1983: 229). Public anger that Soeharto was relying too heavily on the SPRI rather than the cabinet led to its abolition in June 1968, only to be replaced by a streamlined version known as ASPRI (Personal Assistants). Several SPRI members were given cabinet positions as were some key members of its team of economic experts. Soeharto's Japanese-educated domestic intelligence adviser, Brigadier General Yoga Sugama, was appointed deputy head of the state intelligence body, Bakin, which was responsible directly to the president.

More important in the long term than Soeharto's informal kitchen cabinets was the state secretariat, which Soeharto built up from its marginal position under Sukarno to become the administrative core of the New Order. The state secretariat became the presidential office, and the state secretary the chief of the president's staff, his spokesperson and gatekeeper. Soeharto appointed the coordinator of his personal staff, Alamsjah, as his first state secretary in February 1968 (Crouch 1978: 307). It was, however, figures associated with the KOTI G-5 who were responsible for developing the state secretariat into the Soeharto regime's premier executive agency. The key figure in the presidential

office from the beginning was Sudharmono,[2] who Soeharto had come to know during his years at KOTI G-5 (Pangaribuan 1995: 44) and upon whom Soeharto came to rely on heavily for the running of the government by the mid 1970s (Sundhaussen 1978: 77). Taking Soenarso's advice, Soeharto appointed Sudharmono to the newly created position of cabinet secretary early in 1966 and the same year placed him in charge of a range of economic coordination bodies.[3] In 1968 Sudharmono took on the duties of presidential secretary and in 1972 of state secretary, a position he was to hold for the next 16 years. Under Sudharmono's guidance, the state secretariat, besides becoming the legal and administrative keep of the regime, also emerged as a stronghold of organicist ideology.

Consolidating the armed forces

Bringing the armed forces under central control was a long and fraught process. The previous chapter related to how Soeharto rid the army of sources of potential opposition, first the leftists and Sukarnoists and later the radically anti-Sukarno generals. Subordinating the other services also posed major problems. In an attempt to encourage the airforce, navy and police to keep the politically ambitious army at bay in 1962, Sukarno had elevated the chiefs of staff of the four services into commanders of their respective services responsible to himself as supreme commander of the armed forces (Crouch 1978: 52–3). This gave them considerable autonomy and strengthened their loyalty to Sukarno. Anxious to avoid a showdown with the airforce, navy and police, Soeharto reduced their independence only slowly. In late 1966 he announced the merger of the training schools of the services into a single Armed Forces Academy (Akabri) and in 1967 abolished the ministerial status of the service commanders (Sundhaussen 1978: 57). Meanwhile Soeharto gradually weakened resistance to his rule in the services by replacing Sukarnoist officers with men loyal to himself.

In late 1969, when he had largely succeeded in neutralising opposition within the armed forces, Soeharto reduced the commanders of the army, navy and airforce to 'chiefs of staff' and deprived them of operational autonomy, including control over their combat troops (Crouch 1978: 240; McVey 1972: 178–81). Most of their authority was transferred to Soeharto as commander of the armed forces and minister of defence and security. The 110,000-member police force, meanwhile, which had been incorporated as one of the armed forces in 1962, was given separate status within the department of defence and security (Crouch 1978: 240; Tanumidjaja 1971: 171–2).

Command structures within the armed forces were tightened at the same time in order to centralise control and reduce the autonomy of the regional commanders. Six regional defence commands called Kowilhan were formed, which brought all army, navy and airforce troops under a single command in each region. In addition to their operational powers, Kowilhan commanders were designated 'special agents' of Kopkamtib, the internal security command,

which had been brought under the direct authority of the president (Kopkamtib n.d.: 247–9; 1977: 2–3). This dramatically expanded Kopkamtib's writ, from 'restoring order and security' in the wake of the coup attempt to 'safeguarding the authority of the government and its organs from the central to the provincial administration in order to ensure the preservation of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution' (Kopkamtib n.d.: 247–9). Its targets now included not only communists but anybody suspected of engaging in 'extreme and subversive activities' (ibid.). The changes gave the Kowilhan commanders virtually unlimited powers and saw Kopkamtib emerge as 'the most oppressive and most feared agency of the regime, interfering in the political activities of almost every social-political organisation and arresting people at will' (Sundhaussen 1978: 64).

Militarising the bureaucracy

A third important way in which Soeharto ensured that the administration obeyed his will – and absorbed some of the army's surplus manpower – was to appoint military officers to a wide range of previously civilian positions in the administration. This process had been under way since the late 1950s, justified by the army's *kekaryaan* doctrines, but its scale increased markedly under the New Order. David Jenkins (1983b: 44) estimated that more than 20,000 officers were appointed during the early years of the New Order to serve as 'ministers, departmental heads, ambassadors, university rectors, governors, managers of state enterprises' and other administrative positions. Where military men did not head government departments, they almost invariably controlled them from such strategic posts as secretary-general, director-general or inspector-general (MacDougall 1982).

The interior ministry, which controlled the vast *pamong praja* hierarchy, became one of the most heavily militarised departments outside the defence ministry (Emmerson 1978b: 120). In 1965, military men occupied 20 per cent of positions as town mayors and district heads. This figure climbed to 54 per cent in 1969 and reached 84 per cent in some provinces in the early 1970s (Emmerson 1978a: 103). The proportion of provincial governorships in military hands rose from 48 per cent in 1965 to almost 100 per cent in the same period (ibid.).

The main mechanism by which the army maintained control of the civil administration was its elaborate territorial apparatus that mirrored, and effectively dominated, the interior ministry's hierarchy in the provinces. Established under martial law in 1957 and justified by military doctrines, the army's territorial apparatus was greatly strengthened in the early years of the New Order. Provincial governors, previously more powerful than their military counterparts, were now outranked by military region (kodam) commanders, a pattern that was replicated at lower levels of the administration. At the local level the expanded presence of the military was felt most directly by the assignment of 'Village Guidance NCOs' (Babinsa) to villages and urban

*kampung*s and the stationing of non-commissioned officers to each of the military's several hundred sub-district commands (*koramil*).

Formal coordination between the military's territorial apparatus and other elements of the administrative hierarchy at the provincial, district and subdistrict levels was, and continues, to be carried out via regional leadership councils (Muspida).[4] Introduced in 1967 on the model of similar bodies established during Guided Democracy (Ward 1974: 59), the Muspida brought together local heads of the military, *pamong praja*, police and prosecutor's office on a regular basis to discuss security issues and coordinate strategies. The leadership councils were chaired at all levels by the head of the relevant military command, who had the power to issue instructions to the other members (Jenkins 1984: 45–7). They played a crucial (albeit rarely publicised) role in ensuring that the civil administration, police and justice officials obeyed the will of the army throughout the country.[5]

The Muspida were, and remain, perhaps the most potent symbol of the structural integration of the legal system with the executive apparatus. This integration was further entrenched in 1970, when, to the dismay of the judiciary and many supporters of the New Order, the Basic Law on the Powers of the Judiciary No. 14 declared that control over the judicial appointments and promotions was to be kept under the control of the justice department. This ensured that judges remained subject to the same demands for loyalty to the government as any other civil servants (Lev 1978). Another important step towards the dissolution of the boundaries between the executive and judicial arms of government was the establishment in the mid 1980s of regular working meetings between the chair of the Supreme Court, the minister of justice, the attorney general and the police chief. Known as 'Mahkehjapol' – a classic New Order neologism – this integrative mechanism was also duplicated at the regional level (*Tapol* 1987: 52–3).

The task of supervising regional and local government on a day-to-day basis was the responsibility of two hierarchies, one military and one at least nominally civilian. The armed forces' social and political affairs apparatus, known as 'Sospol', managed the armed forces' political interests. Sospol officers at the provincial and district levels have been described as 'political commissars' sitting alongside civilian governors and *bupatis*.[6] Sharing responsibility with the military's Sospol network was the even more pervasive social and political affairs directorate (Ditsospol) within the interior ministry. Although the Ditsospol was nominally civilian it was headed by a major general nominated by the defence ministry. Ditsospol had a mandate to oversee political and ideological development nationwide (Tanter 1991: 331). At the local level the directorate was responsible for a network of about 100,000 civil defence volunteers (Hansip), which, if needed, could be brought under the control of the military's territorial apparatus. It also acted as the 'eyes and ears' of the government for monitoring local political activity (Gaffar 1992: 40).

Between 1966 and 1969, then, the Soeharto regime appointed several thousand officers to civilian positions and superimposed on the civil bureaucracy

elaborate, capillaried military-controlled political and surveillance structures. While the militarisation of the government was often justified as a means of instilling the bureaucracy with backbone and expertise, John Bresnan's study of the Indonesian political economy concluded (1993: 111) that it actually had little to do with the army's management skills but was, rather, 'the outcome of the government's failure to assure its future by other means'.

Establishing centralised military control also meant transforming existing structures in such a way as to make them incapable of independent action. This task was handled primarily by Soeharto's 'fixer', Colonel Ali Moertopo and his network of military and civilian aides.

Ali Moertopo was a brilliant strategist and a man of few scruples. He had been close to Soeharto since the mid 1950s when he was an aide to Soeharto's assistant for intelligence Colonel Yoga Sugama in Semarang, later serving as Soeharto's assistant for territorial affairs at the headquarters of the Diponegoro Division. After some months fighting against the West Sumatran rebels in 1958 under Yoga's command, he returned to become Soeharto's principal intelligence aide, first (1962) in the 'Mandala' campaign to wrest West Papua from the Dutch and then in Kostrad, which was in charge of the military side of the confrontation with Malaysia. Under Soeharto's instructions, Moertopo formed a multi-purpose 'activist military unit' called Opsus (Special Operations), the first function of which was to establish secret links between Kostrad and the government of Malaysia without Sukarno's knowledge. Opsus was to develop in the next decade into Moertopo's personal intelligence empire. In keeping with Moertopo's penchant for extra-legal and conspiratorial methods, which had included smuggling on a grand scale (Wanandi 2012: 99), Opsus was never legally recognised. Moertopo himself operated in the shadows, acting as a private adviser to the president between 1966 and 1974 and in a number of intelligence roles and maintaining a relatively low rank before being appointed information minister in 1978.[7]

Moertopo was useful to Soeharto not only for his covert activities skills but also for his wide range of civilian contacts. These included several people who had fled Jakarta to become involved in the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in the 1950s, such as economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and businessman Des Alwi, as well as many PSI-oriented students and intellectuals who had supported the army after the coup. His most intimate and enduring ties were with a network of anti-communist Catholics including Harry Tjan Silalahi, and Jusuf Wanandi and his brother Sofyan Wanandi. Forged into a tight knit group in the late 1950s under the leadership of Dutch Jesuit Josephus Beek, these three played key roles in Opsus and later became the core group within Moertopo's CSIS (Centre of Strategic and International Studies), the think tank established formally in 1971 which played a crucial role in the formulation of political policy in the first two decades of the New Order.

One of Moertopo's preoccupations between 1966 and 1971 was to work out a way in which the military could hold elections without losing power. This

involved intimidating and manipulating the existing political parties, the creation of Golkar and the management of nationwide elections in 1971.

Domesticating the parties

The largest parties in Indonesia in 1966 were the PNI and the NU. The PNI's large following in Java and its status as a counterweight to political Islam tempted Soeharto at one stage to consider using it as his government's vehicle to win elections. The party had, however, been an integral part of Sukarno's Nasakom coalition and many of Soeharto's military allies disliked it for this reason. Moertopo's solution, which was to set the pattern for future manipulations of parties, was to engineer a takeover of the party by forces willing to toe the army's line. At the PNI's first post-coup congress in April 1966, Opsus supported a rightwing faction led by Osa Maliki, forcing the party's leadership, then under veteran politician Ali Sastroamidjoyo, to 'resolve the internal difficulties of the party' by stepping aside. After Osa Maliki's death a second congress was held in April 1970 at which Moertopo's men deployed money and intimidation to ensure the chair went to Hadisubeno Sosrowerdjojo, an old acquaintance of Soeharto.

The NU was more accommodating, at least until electioneering began in 1971. Idham Chalid, the leader since 1955 and a former advocate of Nasakom, declared himself willing to work with the new government.

Politicians from Masjumi, the large and popular outer islands-based Muslim party, which Sukarno had banned in 1960, presented a greater challenge. They expected to be repaid for their long record of anti-communist politics by having Masjumi legalised, and were hurt when Soeharto refused to do so on the grounds that their party had supported the regional rebellions in the 1950s. After long negotiations with former Masjumi supporters, Soeharto agreed in February 1968 to the establishment of a new party called Parmusi on the condition that no former Masjumi politicians held office in it. When the party's first chair, Djarnawi Hadikusumo, proved politically unreliable, Moertopo's operatives destabilised the party, enabling Soeharto to step in and appoint Mintaredja, one of his ministers of state, as the new leader in October 1970 (May 1978: 252–5). Parmusi failed to win much support from the old Masjumi constituency, leaving this large group, which had comprised over 20 per cent of the electorate in 1955, politically marginalised until the early 1990s (Bresnan 1993: 93).

Opsus manipulation of the parties transformed not only their political complexion but their internal processes. Democratic decision-making structures, where they existed, gave way to administrative centralisation, reflecting a New Order preoccupation with order, obedience, patronage and a father-knows-best style of rule (Ward 1974: 187–8).

Creating an election vehicle

In 1968 the military still had little idea how it would manage to win the elections it had promised for 1971. Having rejected a partnership with PNI,

Soeharto gambled on turning the Sekber Golkar, the coalition of non-party interests that had functioned as the army's voice in parliament, into its 'non-party' election vehicle. Soeharto had been an enthusiastic supporter of Sekber Golkar since 1966, and had boosted considerably the numbers of non-party functional group representatives in the parliament with his appointees between 1966 and 1968. He had also managed leadership changes in the organisation, which saw the Sukarnoist general chairman Brigadier General Djuhartono replaced by Major General Suprapto Sukowati. By November 1967 all but one senior position in the organisation were held by military officers (Sumbogo 1995).

Despite these changes, Sekber Golkar remained a ramshackle organisation with significant sections within it still sympathetic to Sukarno, or at least to the socialist model of development and collectivist ideals he espoused. When Soeharto told Moertopo in 1969 to take control of Sekber Golkar and transform it into an election machine, Moertopo was doubtful. It was, in his view, 'infested with Sukarnoists'. Soeharto is reported to have told him, 'That is why I need you there. … This is the only vehicle acceptable to the army. If there is an election, you must be ready' (May 1978: 236). Moertopo's first gambit was to set up a group within Sekber Golkar called the Construction Movement (Gerakan Pembangunan) led by civilian intellectuals – most of them Catholics – including Jusuf Wanandi, Harry Tjan, Sumiskum, Moerdopo, Cosmas Batubara and David Napitupulu (Mas'oed 1983: 211). Many of the older members of Sekber Golkar's leadership saw these Moertopo appointees as unwelcome upstarts, but after pressure from Soeharto acceded to an overhaul of Sekber Golkar in which the Construction Movement was made one of seven umbrella bodies or Kino.[8]

The suspicions of many older Sekber Golkar leaders were confirmed when Ali Moertopo's civilian appointees, despite their lack of popular backing, effectively took over. Serious tensions developed between the older leaders such as Suhardiman (SOKSI), Sugandhi (MKGR) and Mas Isman (Kosgoro), whose ideas had largely been shaped by Guided Democracy, and the Opsus-allied figures whose rhetoric of modernisation and development had been developed in conscious opposition to it (Reeve 1985: 295–301). Both were anti-party, but while the old leaders wanted Golkar to maintain its federative character and be genuinely representative of its occupational constituencies, the new guard turned it into a tightly organised and hierarchical political machine (Ward 1974: 51–3).

In the late 1960s we see the blending of two streams of anti-party thinking within Golkar. The old guard of 'functional groupists', mainly military men who had been inspired by Djokosutono and had supported Sukarno's initiative in creating a 'guided democracy' in 1959, brought with them a vision of society organised along occupational lines. From them came the concept of the *karyawan*, the functionary who knew their place in the social order and played their allotted role without complaint for the sake of the wellbeing of the whole.

The anti-partyism of Moertopo's Opsus intellectuals, on the other hand, especially those who had been educated in the US, was inspired more by a vision of a technocratic polity described by theorists such as Daniel Bell and S.M. Lipset whose views were based on structural functionalist assumptions of society as an integrated system.[9] In this vision experts formulated policy in response to 'inputs' from different 'interest groups' in society and implemented well-planned programmes in an atmosphere free from ideological competition and inter-communal conflict. Although the old school functional groupists and Moertopo's secular modernising intellectuals differed markedly on some points, they both promoted a view of society as an integrated whole in which any kind of 'groupism' based on class, ethnicity or religion was illegitimate. Whereas the main enemy of both groups had been communism before the coup, it was a common, albeit usually unstated, fear of political Islam that underpinned their cooperation in the early Soeharto period.

Winning the elections

The critical mechanism by which Moertopo controlled Golkar, and which enabled Golkar to gain 62.8 per cent of the vote in the July 1971 elections, was the body for managing the general elections known as Bapilu. Created in September 1970, Bapilu was essentially an Opsus operation, staffed and run by Moertopo's civilian appointees. With less than a year to achieve its aims, Bapilu had to move fast. Using a combination of persuasion, money and intimidation, it managed to absorb a large number of organisations into Golkar and to extract pledges of support from many others. Many regional branches of political parties gave in to pressure to dissolve themselves and switch their loyalties to Golkar.

The success of Bapilu in bolstering the ranks of Golkar owed much to two government regulations. The first, issued on 4 December 1969 by the powerful interior minister, Lieutenant General Amir Machmud, decreed that 'all members of the functional groups designation in provincial and local legislative bodies would be replaced if they were in fact affiliated with political parties' (Ward 1974: 11). This forced many party members in regional legislatures who were concurrently members of a Golkar-linked mass organisation to abandon their party loyalties, giving Golkar at least half the seats in provincial and regional legislatures (Ward 1974: 11). Amir Machmud's decree was followed up in February 1970 with Government Regulation No.6/1970 forbidding party membership to all members of the armed forces, all civilian employees of the defence ministry, all judges and public prosecutors and 'other important office holders to be stipulated by the president' (Reeve 1985: 287).

Moves were also under way to harness the interior ministry's own nation-wide hierarchy of *pamong praja* officials to the Golkar bandwagon. In December 1966 the government had abolished the unions representing civil servants and established the interior ministry karyawan corps command (Kokarmendagri). This was a first, and only partly successful, attempt to wean the *pamong praja*

away from what many had seen as the party of the establishment during Guided Democracy, the PNI. In 1970 Moertopo introduced the concept of 'mono-loyalty', forcing all interior ministry employees to join Kokarmendagri and sever their ties with political parties (Ward 1974: 32–3; Departemen Penerangan 1983: 428). When Kokarmendagri joined Golkar later the same year, its claimed membership of 800,000 civil servants were required to give their loyalties to Golkar (Emmerson 1978a: 106). Retaining party membership while working in the government's core department came to be regarded as tantamount to treachery (Ward 1974: 34). By the time of the elections in July 1971, Amir Machmud's interior ministry had become a key bastion of Golkar.

One important means by which the *pamong praja* were able to Golkar-ise the population under their sway was through their authority as officials of the general elections institute. Formed in 1970 to organise the election process, the institute was headed by Amir Machmud, with provincial, city, district, subdistrict and village branches headed by local *pamong praja* executives (Nishihara 1972: 12–15). Due to the enormous importance the government attached to achieving a convincing Golkar victory and because a high proportion of administrative positions within the interior ministry were held by military men, one observer described the general elections institute as having 'the character of a military command with local chief executives as local commanders and election committees as their staffs' (Nishihara 1976: 13). The *pamong praja* officials whose job it was to explain the voting procedures to villagers were also given specific quotas of Golkar votes to achieve in their domains. Amir Machmud, whose tactics on behalf of Golkar earned him the sobriquet 'bulldozer', made no attempt to disguise this situation, announcing on one occasion that 'the referee should also play' (Ward 1974: 49).

The military's own territorial apparatus also played a major part in pressuring voters to choose Golkar. Though armed forces members were not allowed to campaign or vote, the military made no efforts to hide the fact that Golkar was its instrument. An active duty general headed the organisation and it was normal for officers to campaign openly for Golkar, especially in the provinces. There were numerous reports of villagers and party officials being kidnapped, tortured, beaten and terrorised by military and paramilitary operatives prior to the 1971 elections (Samsuddin *et al*. 1972; May 1978: 257–61, 267–71; Oey 1974b: 33; Ward 1974).

All candidates for the elections required the approval of the general election institute, which worked closely with Kopkamtib's central and regional screening teams.[10] This was, in Moertopo's words (1982: 183), intended 'to assess their political attitudes and their capabilities to fulfil their tasks in the MPR and the central and regional legislatures'. Of the total of 3,789 candidates, 768 were rejected by the government, most of them representing the PNI and Parmusi (Nishihara 1972: 25–6). Kopkamtib also screened voters, prohibiting about 2,000,000 former supporters of the PKI or its mass organisations from taking part in the elections (Oey 1974a: 1–2).

Determined to leave no stone unturned, the managers of this massive political operation arranged for an overwhelming security presence on election day, with widespread violations of the government's promise that the poll would be 'free, secret and fair'.

Direct coercion was only part of the explanation for the government's success. So pervasive was Golkar's presence by this stage, so lacklustre the leadership of most of the parties, and so cowed the voters – especially the millions of villagers who had previously supported the communists – that Golkar would probably have won even without violence or cheating. As it was, Golkar won 65 per cent of the 360 seats in the DPR contested in direct elections. Given that the election laws had specified that the remaining 100 seats in the assembly would be reserved for members of the armed forces and other presidential appointees, the government wound up outnumbering 'opposition' parties in parliament more than three to one (Oey 1974a; Bresnan 1993: 98).[11]

Post-election demobilisation

> Where can they run to? It's as if we were hunting deer, and fenced in the whole field. The deer wants to run to the north? It'll be shot. To the south? It'll be shot. To the west? It'll be shot there too. They have no choice but to follow us … we'll keep them as pets.
>
> (Golkar head Major General Amir Moertono speaking of the parties in the wake of the 1971 elections, *Angkatan Bersenjata* 6 June 1972 in Emmerson 1978a: 108)

Successful though the leaders of the regime had been, they were aware that their domination of politics had been achieved largely through a combination of coercion and patronage. The parties had been beaten but they still existed and provided potential focal points for resistance. The government was particularly worried by the resilience of Nahdlatul Ulama, whose network of grassroots support proved most impervious to government infiltration. New sources of opposition had also emerged in the years since 1967. Student groups that had played such an important symbolic role in legitimising the New Order's rise to power had launched stinging attacks on the leadership for allowing large-scale corruption by high officials to go unchecked. Scandals involving a range of government departments, state corporations and the first family itself were given embarrassing publicity in the still relatively free press of the time.[12] There was also resentment in the ranks of the New Order's middle-class supporters over the regime's heavy-handed tactics and disregard for democratic procedures during the MPRS session of March 1968, which marked the defeat of reformist elements within the government. Anger over this and several other issues involving the abuse of power and violations of the rule of law led to the formation in 1971 of *Golongan Putih* (Blank Group), a student led alliance that advocated boycotting the elections or casting blank votes. But it was the possibility of a Muslim resurgence that most frightened Soeharto and his generals. As one former student leader with links to Moertopo's group at

the time put it, 'no military man can stand the thought of serving under a *haji*' (confidential interview, Jakarta, February 1991).

Rather than easing the pressure on parties and other independent political organisations after the elections, therefore, the government pressed its advantage by moving to reduce the number of parties from nine to two.

The post-election fusion of the parties was foreshadowed by Soeharto's instructions to party leaders on 7 February 1970 to group themselves into two broad parliamentary fractions. With an eye to maximum blandness, he suggested that these be called the Unity Development Group and the Democracy Development Group. The four Muslim parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti) were herded into the first group. The five others, the nationalist and Christian parties (PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkindo and the Catholic Party) were obliged to gather in the second. In the immediate post-election period these groupings operated as fractions (*fraksi*) within the DPR, alongside (and theoretically in partnership with) the Golkar and armed forces fractions.

If the identity of the parties began to blur at the centre, an even worse fate befell them at the grassroots. Shortly after the elections the government announced that parties would no longer be allowed to maintain offices at the district and subdistrict levels. This prohibition applied also to Golkar but not to its constituent elements (Boileau 1983: 89), leaving Golkar, because of its intimate relationship with the civil administration and the military, with a round the clock presence in villages and the parties with none. Despite intense opposition to this effective severing of links between the parties and the majority of their supporters, they were unable to prevent it going ahead.

Following a pattern that had become a hallmark of Soeharto's political style, the 'experimental' conglomeration of the nine parties in 1970 into two separate blocs in parliament became a *fait accompli*. In early 1973 the four parties in the Muslim fraction were decanted into the PPP (United Development Party) and the remaining five nationalist and Christian parties found themselves forced to cooperate under the banner of the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party). This involuntary fusion of disparate parties was sanctioned two months later by the general session of the MPR and finally stamped into law in 1975.

Simplifying the party structure had been discussed from the earliest days of the New Order. The only reason Soeharto had not abolished the parties altogether was that he was unsure of the extent of their popular support. After the elections Soeharto saw no reason to keep them alive.

How could the suffocation of the parties be publicly justified while the government maintained the rhetoric of democracy and the rule of law? For an answer it is helpful to look at the writings of Ali Moertopo and his assistants in Opsus and CSIS.

Moertopo's corporatist strategy

Moertopo's brief was to secure Soeharto's position as president and he took his arguments where he could find them. Behind closed doors he was a

ruthless strategist who talked of the struggle of the New Order in Manichean terms. Having destroyed the PKI and Sukarno his priority from the late 1960s was to tackle the new 'enemies': political parties, Muslim activists and 'Western-minded' liberals critical of the regime's election laws, human rights violations, corruption, *dwifungsi*, inequality, the plight of indigenous business and so on (Moertopo 1970: 1–62). In public he was more measured. With the help of Harry Tjan and recent graduates of US and European universities recruited to CSIS, Moertopo constructed a rationale for depoliticisation that borrowed heavily from North American modernisation and political order theorists Bell, Lipset and Huntington. In what was to become the unofficial manifesto of the New Order, *Some Basic Thoughts on the Acceleration and Modernization of 25 Years' Development*, Moertopo asserted that political stability was the prerequisite for economic growth, or, framed differently, that free competition between democratically organised political forces was an obstacle in the early stages of industrial development. In order to rid the political sphere of primordial sentiments and foreign ideologies, a thorough reordering of the political landscape was prescribed. This required disengaging the rural population from party politics, thereby restoring traditional village 'harmony' and leaving villagers free to contribute to economic development. Farmers, in other words, should busy themselves with farming, fishers with fishing, labourers with labouring. The millions of Indonesians thus delivered from 'the shackles of practical politics' Moertopo (1982: 201) referred to as a 'floating mass'.

Moertopo (1982: 200) went beyond depicting parties as obstacles to development, calling them a 'blot on history' and the party system as a deviation from 'normality' (Moertopo 1982: 204). In so doing he was echoing the sentiments of the army and *pamong praja* detractors of the party system since the 1950s although not, as Reeve (1985: 291) claimed, of Sukarno. Although in 1956 Sukarno called for the 'burying' of the parties, he never denied the role played by parties in the independence struggle and he would certainly have had no sympathy with the concept of the 'floating masses'. Moertopo's prescriptions and his highlighting the need 'to distract the peoples' attention from political problems' (1972b: 20) had more in common with the administrators of the colonial bureaucratic state, whose concept of *rust en orde* translated smoothly into the New Order leadership's frequent injunctions to safeguard security and social order. The influential Bapilu spokesperson and Moertopo lieutenant Sumiskum emphasised the importance to the development planners of ridding the bureaucracy of party influence in the following terms: 'Bluntly put, we want to go back to the colonial period in government … In the colonial days, in villages in Magelang for instance, there was a system of personnel replacement that did not disturb the continuity of work of the governmental machine' (*Harian Kami* 4 April 1971 cited in Ward 1974: 45).

The emergence of a 'healthy climate of political development', Moertopo (1972b: 19) argued, involved switching peoples' allegiance away from parties into the broad arms of the state. As he put it, 'The people should be made

more aware that their work, function, and profession form an absolute part of the manifestation of having, and belonging to, a State' (ibid.).

In order to domesticate the hundreds of organisations aligned with the political parties, Moertopo created a range of new corporatist bodies. The pattern, which Moertopo (1982: 202) described as '*fungsionalisasi*' was repeated again and again. It involved categorising existing organisations according to their 'function' in society – for instance, women's groups, doctors' organisations, youth groups, trade unions – and attempting to group them into government-sponsored peak organisations. The point of this was to dissolve what were mostly party-controlled organisations, with ideologically defined objectives, into non-ideological, occupationally defined, corporate structures that would support the government's development programmes. In exchange for accepting government direction, and in many cases government-appointed leaders, the new corporate bodies gained privileged treatment by the authorities and monopoly status within their sphere of activity.

On one level Moertopo was simply following the corporatist logic that had informed the military's Cooperation Bodies and Sekber Golkar. But these bodies had never succeeded in winning the allegiance of more than a fraction of their occupational constituencies. Moertopo was intent on building something much bigger: a corporate state in which state-chartered functional group organisations represented (or, more accurately, symbolised) entire populations of workers, farmers, youth and so on.

Since Moertopo's application of corporatist principles was more far-reaching and ambitious than anything that had been tried in Indonesia before, it is worth looking at the sources of his formula. It has been suggested that Mexico's corporatist Partido Revolucionario Institucional, which had monopolised power since 1934 while allowing rival parties to contest elections, provided Moertopo with an attractive model (Interview, Burhan Magenda, Jakarta, January 1991). Ferdinand Marcos' drive to fuse professional and functional bodies and incorporate them into his 'New Society' in 1972 and 1973 (Agpalo 1973: 27; Stauffer 1977) may also have encouraged Moertopo, especially given the extensive Southeast Asian contacts of his CSIS staff.

A more frequently mentioned model is Japan. Moertopo was a big admirer of the Japanese model of a strong, interventionist, managerial state with close cooperation between business and government. Together with Soeharto's close adviser Sudjono Humardhani he was widely seen as a spokesperson for Japanese business interests in Indonesia (Wanandi and Djiwandono 1987).

But the model of political organisation Moertopo envisaged had more in common with pre-1945 Japan and its occupation regime in Indonesia. This observation, made by regime critics Hamka (cited in Ward 1974: 43) and Mangunwijaya (1994) is supported by the intriguing claim by key Moertopo aide Jusuf Wanandi in his 2012 memoir that Golkar owed its origins to 'the ideas of syndicalism as taught by the Japanese during World War II to Indonesian leaders in waiting' (Wanandi 2012: 104).[13] Moertopo was 17 when the Japanese landed in Java and is likely to have been drawn into one of the mass

youth organisations. In the 1950s he became a close assistant to Yoga Sugama, who had been trained in intelligence in Japan during the war and was regarded as one of the most 'fascist' and 'Japanese-minded' of Soeharto's inner circle (Tanter 1991: 463–5). There were certainly clear affinities between the New Order and the Japanese system, with its domination by the military, its subordination of party politics and unions, its use of a highly flexible state ideology as a weapon against liberalism and leftism, its repressive laws, its forced fusion of extra-state groups into artificially constructed corporatist bodies, and the amalgamation of such bodies into an all-embracing state party integrated with the administrative bureaucracy.

Given the significance attributed to Catholic doctrine in discussions of corporatist patterns of state organisation in Latin America by Stepan and others, surprisingly little attention has been given to the influence of Catholic theories of social and political organisation on Moertopo's corporatist strategy. Almost all of Moertopo's political ideas, according to those close to him, were produced by his staff of young intellectuals at CSIS, the most influential of whom were Catholics under the sway of the charismatic Jesuit Josephus Beek.[14] Many of them had been through Beek's leadership courses in the 1960s and remained loyal to him for many years afterwards. Since the CSIS (and its nefarious stepfather Opsus) was such an important 'kitchen' of social and political policy for the New Order, it is worth touching briefly here on the background of the man who, while often overlooked in accounts of the period, was very influential behind the scenes (Mount 2012: 253–63; Oei 1995: 318).

Like Moertopo, Beek was a highly political animal. Since the early 1950s he had concerned himself with developing strategies to defend Catholicism against what he saw as its two mortal enemies: Islam and Communism. With Catholics comprising only 3–4 per cent of the population, Beek feared the prospect of an Islamic government coming to power, either democratically or otherwise. Before 1966, however, he saw the PKI as an even greater threat. To combat the growing power of the PKI, Beek helped establish a number of corporate organisations that aimed to unite workers, farmers and fishermen on a non-ideological basis. The largest and most successful of these was the Pancasila Worker's League (Ikatan Buruh Pancasila), formed in December 1958.[15] The theory behind these bodies, and behind the Catholic Party-affiliated union Central Organisation of Pancasila Workers (SOB Pancasila) was derived from the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931), which encouraged cooperation between employers and employees to overcome (class) divisions in society (Sentral Organisasi 1960: 27–57). Corporate organisations inspired by the same solidaristic (and organicist) vision of the common good had been established in the 1930s by Mussolini, by Salazar's government in Portugal and advocated at the same time by the Roman Catholic State Party in Holland (Kossmann 1978: 601). While Beek cooperated closely with the Catholic Party, he was aware that it would never manage to achieve a position of real influence within a multi-party system.

Catholic interests, he believed, were best served by promoting instead a non-denominational corporatist coalition of pro-nationalist, anti-communist groups – something, indeed, very close to what Golkar was to become. Whether Beek was central to the creation of Golkar, as has been claimed (Oei 1995: 320; Mount 2012: 257), his network within Opsus and CSIS certainly played a leading role in turning Golkar into the preeminent political organisation in Indonesia. Beek's longer term strategy, according to Jusuf Wanandi, was to use Golkar to displace the military from power. 'What we and Beek's Bureau are working for', he confided to Australian agent Frank Mount in 1970, 'is that in ten to fifteen years, we, the civilians, through the Functional Groups, will be able to take over from the Army. In the meantime, we have to support the Army and work for change and restrain the present political parties' (Mount 2012: 256–7).

The second prong of Beek's strategy, familiar to students of Jesuit history, was to train a force of fiercely loyal and tough-minded cadres who could infiltrate various power centres, especially within the state apparatus. In 1957 Beek had founded the Asrama Realino, a college/boarding house on the outskirts of Yogyakarta, which he developed into a dynamic centre of Catholic activism and an important training ground for Catholic youths. Under his forceful, sometimes brutal leadership,[16] Beek assembled a large network of cadres that he placed in prominent positions in the Pancasila unions, in the Catholic Party and in the Indonesian Catholic Student Association (PMKRI).[17] He also helped build a Catholic underground movement that would resist a possible communist takeover (McDonald 1980: 102). Beek's cadres, trained at his school in Klender, east of Jakarta, gathered political intelligence from their vantage points across the country, which they supplied to their mentor in monthly reports. This 'private KGB', as a former Jesuit colleague described it (Stolk 1991: 148), and the confidential political analyses it issued, made Beek a prominent figure in the anti-communist political scene from the early 1960s.

After his move to Jakarta in about 1961, Beek became closely involved with the military and their efforts to outfox the PKI. According to Johanes Dijkstra, a Jesuit colleague, 'he played a great role in handling all sorts of subversion connected with the G30S [coup]'. Whether or not Beek had a direct hand in the coup, as has been claimed (see e.g. Oei 1995: 320), he played a key role in mobilising students to demonstrate against Sukarno immediately afterwards.

How far back Beek's relationship with Moertopo went is unknown, but it is clear that he successfully cultivated close ties with Soeharto's inner circle. One of Beek's protégés was the commando Benny Moerdani, who was closely involved with both Moertopo and Soeharto through his activities in Kostrad's operations and intelligence sections from 1964. Others, such as Harry Tjan and his group, claim to have been introduced to Moertopo by Soeharto, to whom they reported in the early days of the New Order 'to pass on information and receive instructions' (*Matra* April 1992). Harry Tjan recounted that 'When the President was too busy he would order his assistant, Moertopo, to

take his place. We would meet almost every day with Ali Moertopo, often together with fellow presidential confidantes Colonel Sudjono Humardani and Maj. Gen. Alamsyah' (ibid.)

If the basis of the cooperation between the military leadership and Beek's acolytes before 1965 had been their shared hatred of communism, what kept them together afterwards was their common fear of Islam and, of course, their love of wealth and power. Ensconced at the yawning heights of a coercive regime and at the same time vulnerable because of their religion and the fact that many of them were of Chinese extraction, they developed something of a fortress mentality. Principles took a distant second place to the imperative of helping Soeharto's generals plan and construct a political system that denied Muslim political parties any meaningful participation. As former PMKRI activist George Aditjondro (1994) has argued, the corporatist format hatched by the CSIS intellectuals was as much about de-Islamising the political arena as it was about creating the preconditions for development.

Incorporating society

The first and most important group to be herded into the Golkar corral in the wake of the elections were civil servants. In 1971 all civil servants were declared to be members of a new organisation called Korpri (Indonesian Civil Servants Corps). Whereas Kokarmendagri had been set up only within the interior ministry, membership of Korpri became compulsory for white collar workers in all government departments, agencies and state enterprises. Chaired by the interior minister, and staffed at the provincial, district and subdistrict levels by the senior (frequently military) *pamong praja* official, Korpri provided the military with a further mechanism to control the bureaucracy and helped reinforce the policing and surveillance role of interior ministry personnel over all other government employees. The most significant fact about Korpri however was its enlistment as part of Golkar. 'Overnight', as Bresnan (1993: 101) put it, 'the Corps became the ultimate functional group'. The wives of male civil servants, meanwhile, were obliged to join Korpri's women's auxiliary, Dharma Wanita, swelling Korpri's membership to well over two million.[18]

Labour was high on Moertopo's list of priorities, partly because workers had been highly politicised in the past and partly because they occupied a strategic place in the government's plans for industrialisation. Realising his stated ambition of raising Indonesia to Japan's level of development within 25 years would require the labour force to be subjected to a much higher degree of discipline.

Breaking up the old party-based unions and subordinating workers to a single, army-dominated federation, however, was no easy task in a society in which workers' rights were widely accepted as legitimate. The size and strength of the unions also made any precipitous action difficult, even after the largest workers' organisation, the communist affiliated SOBSI, had been destroyed.

The strategy of the government was therefore to build on the Sekber Golkar affiliated worker organisations such as SOKSI. Soeharto's commitment to 'functionalising' the workforce was apparent in his appointment in July 1966 of Awaloeddin Djamin and Sutjipto, both key supporters of the Golkar idea and former students of Djokosutono, as ministers in charge of workers and farmers respectively.

The first post-coup attempt to absorb party-linked labour organisations into Sekber Golkar was the formation in 1967 of the Labour Coordinating Body. This, however, succeeded in attracting only those workers groups allied with the parties already sympathetic to Golkar and the functional groups idea: the Catholic SOB Pantjasila, the Protestant Kespekri and Murba's SOBRI (Reeve 1985: 284). Other large unions, such as the NU's Sarbumusi (the Union of Indonesian Muslim Workers), were unhappy with the way in which the government was privileging Golkar-affiliated unions, both within the manpower department and in its dealings with international bodies such as the ILO and ICFTU. This pressure, and the government's wish to attract support from donor agencies such as the West German Social Democrats' Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), saw the formation in November 1969 of a federative body called the Indonesian Labour Unions Consultative Body.

Due largely to the close involvement of the FES with the planner Awaloeddin Djamin and a number of Moertopo-connected civilians, the manpower department pushed unions to restructure along industry or sectoral lines (interview, Dieter Bielenstein, Jakarta, 14 March 1991). In February 1973, a month after the party-affiliated unions were orphaned by the fusing of the parties, a number of meetings took place at the headquarters of the intelligence agency Bakin (where Moertopo had one of his many offices) resulting in the formation of the All Indonesia Federation of Workers (FBSI) (interview, labour activist, Jakarta, 7 January 1991; Moertopo 1982: 205–6; Hadiz 1997). Although the FBSI bore a superficial resemblance to the German Federation of Trade Unions after which it was patterned (Djamin 1990: 49), it in fact allowed relatively little autonomy to the 21 unions that comprised it. Government control of the FBSI was secured by appointing military officers to many of its key positions, by intensive surveillance of its activities by the intelligence and security agencies, and by incorporating it into Golkar (Mas'oed 1989a: 20). At FBSI's helm the government appointed Agus Sudono, a close ally of Moertopo who until that time had led the non-party Assembly of Islamic Trade Unions (GASBIINDO), which had been close to the military since the early 1960s (Reeve 1985: 329).

The dissolution of the old unions and the moulding of a new, single federation were justified not only in terms of doing away with the influence of the parties for the sake of stability and development, but also by a new industrial relations doctrine, Pancasila Industrial Relations, which drew directly on organicist discourse and imagery. In the past, Moertopo argued, relationships between workers and employers were influenced by Marxist notions of class struggle and historical materialism. This approach, with its emphasis on confrontational

behaviour and contradictions, had no place in a Pancasila state based on the family principle (Moertopo 1982: 210–11). The central premise of Pancasila Industrial Relations was that workers and employers were 'partners in production', with a joint responsibility for the success of the enterprise, to society and to the state as a whole.[19] As Moertopo put it succinctly in 1971, '"Workers" and "employers" must go; only one class will remain, that of the *karyawan*, executing or formulating directives' (Leclerc 1972: 77). Any differences between workers and employers, Moertopo (1982: 215) insisted, should be 'synchronised, harmonised'.

While appeals to harmony and understanding between workers and employers are a constant theme of Pancasila Industrial Relations discourse, the clear objective was the reduction of workers' rights and the prevention of strikes. Responding to objections that Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution guaranteed the right to organise, Moertopo produced the same familiar organicist arguments. The constitution, he maintained, was 'an emanation of the Pancasila', and as such had to be interpreted in the light of family principles. Ignoring Article 28, Moertopo highlighted Articles 27 and 33, the first providing for 'the right of every citizen to work and a humane, adequate livelihood', the second specifying that 'The economy is organised as a collective endeavour based on the family principle'. When Hatta wrote Article 33 in 1945, however, he had in mind an economy based on self-managing/small-scale cooperatives, not large foreign-owned enterprises. Moertopo (1982: 214) maintained that the family principle was a fundamental element of the Pancasila and therefore of all aspects of state organisation, including industrial relations.

Despite his condemnation in other contexts of the traditional mindset as an obstacle to development, Moertopo made much of the congruity between Pancasila Industrial Relations and indigenous notions of correct behaviour. After explaining how the Pancasila was 'excavated from the soil and the national character of Indonesia itself', Moertopo (1975: 19, 1982: 213–14) argued that 'If we want to get to the bottom of our industrial relations philosophy, it is to the sources of our National Culture, such as the *Tridharma*, that we must look'. The Javanese *Tridharma*, he explained, was based on the principles of 'a feeling of joint ownership' ('of the enterprise where the worker is employed', he added, parenthetically), 'a feeling of responsibility to protect' ('the aforesaid enterprise') and 'introspection on all sides'. For the workers, Moertopo (1982: 214–15) explained, this implied 'an obligation to strive for the advancement of their enterprise'.

Moertopo's attempts to give Pancasila Industrial Relations an indigenous lineage were contrived. Its main features were most likely borrowed from the orthodox Catholic social teachings well known to his key advisers. The parallels with the prescriptions of Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* encyclical are arresting. Confronted by growing industrial unrest and class conflict in Europe, Pius XI in 1931 saw an urgent need to tackle the 'grave dangers' inherent in socialism and to restore the organic unity of society (*Quadragesimo Anno* 1931: Paragraphs 90, 122).[20] To this end he prescribed the establishment of

industry-based occupational corporations and syndicates within which workers and their employers would collaborate, 'for the sake of the common good of the country' (ibid.: Paragraphs 82–95). This implied, as in Indonesia, a joint commitment on behalf of workers and employers to maintaining the wellbeing of the 'body social': strikes and lockouts were regarded as equally unacceptable in both cases.[21] There were also close parallels in the way the relationship between the corporations and the state was conceived. Like Moertopo, Pius XI spoke of the corporations as 'true and proper organs and institutions of the State'. The state had a central role to play, the encyclical stated, in 'directing, watching, urging [and] restraining' the corporations, as well as guaranteeing them monopoly rights within their professional sphere (ibid.: Paragraphs 80, 92). Where disputes could not be resolved by the corporations, 'public authority intervenes' (ibid.: Paragraph 94). Having outlined his vision of industrial relations in the 'New Social Order', Pius XI pronounced that:

> anyone who gives even slight attention to the matter will easily see what are the obvious advantages in this system … : The various classes work together peacefully, socialist organisations and their activities are repressed, and a special magistracy exercises a governing authority.
>
> (ibid.: Paragraph 95)

As well as lending papal authority to Mussolini's nascent corporate state, the *Quadragesimo Anno* also helped inspire corporatist models of industrial relations in Holland and Indonesia. The Dutch Catholic theorist J.A. Verhaart advocated, with some success, the establishment of corporatist 'industrial boards' in Holland in the 1920s, which he argued would express the 'solidarity of the classes, the unity of capital and labour, the profound calm and harmony of a society that had recovered its organic structure' (Kossmann 1978: 596–7).

These same ideas are to be found in a training manual for 'core motivators' of the SOB Pancasila published in 1960, based directly on the *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*. The language of this booklet dealing with the proper relationship between workers and employers is indistinguishable from that of Pancasila Industrial Relations (Sentral Organisasi 1960: 73–5). Exactly how far the Catholic unionists influenced other unions is unclear, but it is notable that two non-communist nationalist unions, KBKI (Democratic Workers Union of Indonesia) and KBM (Unity of Marhaenist Workers) also propagated the idea of a 'social partnership between (national) capital and labour'. SOKSI's promotion of the concept of the 'classless' *karyawan* in the 1960s followed in the same vein. The idea was further crystallised in the late 1960s by individuals including Soekarno, an Opsus operative who went on to play an important role in FBSI and its post-1985 successor (*Business Indonesia*, 12 January 1990; Capizzi 1974: 44), and Soetarto, a leading personality of the Indonesian Council of Churches (Schaarschmidt-Kohl 1988: 58).

Given the key role played by Opsus and the CSIS in the restructuring of industrial relations in Indonesia and the domination of that institution by rightwing Catholics beholden to Beek, a linkage between Catholic Social Theory and the central features of Pancasila Industrial Relations discourse is highly likely. This is of course not to argue that Moertopo faithfully followed the dictates of the Vatican. If he had, the corporations would have had far more freedom and internal democracy than he allowed them. The point is simply that Moertopo found in the anti-socialist, anti-liberal, anti-individualist arguments of the Catholics a workable, and culturally saleable, public rationale for fashioning a system of government-controlled unions in the interests of capitalist industrial development.

What Moertopo did to workers was essentially repeated for all the major occupational groupings that had formed the basis of the parties' mass organisations. Those representing peasants and farmers, who, after the destruction of the PKI's Indonesian Peasant Front and the implementation of the floating mass policy were perhaps the most politically powerless of sector of society, were all dissolved and fused to form a corporatist body called the HKTI (Cooperative Farmers' Association). Established by the authority of Moertopo in April 1973, the HKTI functioned as a figurehead organisation with no effective role in voicing the concerns and aspirations of Indonesia's tens of millions of villagers (Moertopo 1975: 53–4, 1982: 225–6; Reeve 1985: 329, 352). Fishers fared no better, with the HNSI (All Indonesia Fisher's Association) being set up in July 1973 after the amalgamation of the six surviving fisher's organisations. HNSI officials, who took their place in the 'big Golkar family' were also obediently silent about their constituency.

The professional body for journalists, the Indonesian Association of Journalists, had been formed by journalists themselves in 1946. It was only after a thorough purge of its leftwing dominated executive leadership, however, that the association was allowed by the New Order to survive. Just as Pancasila Industrial Relations committed workers to subordinating their interests to the good of development, so journalists had to abide by what the Soeharto regime termed a 'free and responsible press'. Pointing to the way in which the press under the Old Order had 'eliminated the Pancasila spirit in society through terror and other means which created social and political tensions', Moertopo (1982: 236–8) stressed the need for the New Order press to play an educational role. Newspapers in a Pancasila state should 'encourage and highlight positive factors and healthy aspects of society'.

Other groups proved more difficult to fit into the monopolistic mould. Kowani, Golkar's women's affiliate, had long existed as a federation of women's organisations, and retained some of its pluralistic character, even after most of its key positions were taken over by Golkar figures. Students and youth were the only groups in a position to thwart Moertopo's attempts to fuse them into a single organisation. Aware of their own special role in legitimising Soeharto's rise to power, the various youth organisations resisted attempts to turn the National Committee of Indonesian Youth (KNPI), which had

been created in July 1973 under the leadership of the Opsus activist David Napitupulu, into the sole representative for youths and (non-university) students. As a result, several youth groups retained voices of their own.

The same corporatist logic applied to employers, for whom the government created the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) in 1971. Not wanting to dissuade investment, however, the government trod much more lightly in its dealings with business groups. As Mas'oed (1989a: 21) wrote: 'While the government emphasised the use of the "stick" in corporatizing organised labour, to the entrepreneurs it provided "carrots" in the form of facilities'.

Oil, dissent and the strengthening of the state

By late 1973, the main institutional structures of the New Order had taken shape. Control of the armed forces had been centralised, powerful security and intelligence networks responsible to the president had been put in place, and the civil government had been thoroughly penetrated by serving military officers. Golkar had been created and proved itself as an effective election vehicle, the parties had been reduced to two lame and quarrelsome quasi-opposition groupings, and most mass organisations had been forced to dissolve themselves into Golkar-affiliated 'sole vehicles' with no life of their own. Just as the linkages between the masses and the parties were severed, so too did parliament become divorced from the real centres of decision making in the corridors of the presidential office, army headquarters and the National Development Planning Agency. Elections, parties and parliament, the regalia of popular participation, were preserved for domestic and international legitimacy purposes, but were drained of democratic content.

Underpinning the growth of state power in the 1970s was the huge increase in oil revenues in the early 1970s following the changes to production arrangements with foreign oil companies in 1971 and the sharp rise in world oil prices following the Arab–Israeli war in 1973. Oil earnings as a proportion of the state's total revenue climbed from 25 per cent in 1971 to almost half in 1974 (Hill 1994: 93). Much of this windfall the government spent on expanding the bureaucracy, adding more than a million new positions to the civil service between 1974 until the end of the oil boom in 1984 (Bresnan 1993: 105). A large proportion of these jobs were for teachers to support the massive expansion of the school system. Spending infrastructural projects, rice intensification, agricultural subsidies, rice storage and distribution systems also grew markedly. The oil boom reduced the dependence of the New Order on foreign aid, freeing the regime to some extent from the dictates of donor nations and reduced the influence in government of the Western trained technocrats who had had remarkable success in rescuing Indonesia from the economic abyss it was facing in 1966. Oil money greatly strengthened the hands of those within the government, including Soeharto and several of his closest military allies, who favoured a high level of state investment in and regulation of the economy. From about 1973 the government introduced

restrictions on foreign investment and initiated a shift towards a more nationalistic economic policy. Oil money began to be used – in a way that Sukarno may well have approved of but which the technocrats and the World Bank did not – for numerous ambitious projects to build up basic industries.

By 1974 considerable resentment had built up among groups that had supported the New Order's rise to power over a number of aspects of the government's economic management. First, and earliest, was the extent of corruption among government officials in general and among Soeharto's circle in particular. Student protests became more frequent from 1970 and criticism of government corruption and wastage in newspapers such as *Harian Kami* more strident. There was also a nationalist dimension to criticism of the government's economic policies. This was because of the government's approval of large-scale foreign investment in industries, such as textiles, that were traditionally dominated by indigenous producers. Nationalist sentiment was also stirred by the well-founded perception that the government's economic policies favoured the domestic Chinese, who had long dominated the retail and trade sectors.

Partly in response to such concerns, significant differences developed within the military elite. The main schism was between what Jenkins (1984: 30) characterised as the 'pragmatic' group close to the palace, among whom the vulpine Moertopo was a leading figure, and a group of 'principled' officers led informally by the powerful Kopkamtib chief Lieutenant General Sumitro. On one level this was simply a struggle for power, but it also reflected differing opinions about the degree to which the armed forces should dominate politics and the economy. The Sumitro group, supported by many middle-ranking officers, was especially concerned that rampant corruption, close collaboration with Chinese business and the high-handed manner in which Soeharto and Moertopo had excluded civilians from a meaningful role in the political process had brought the armed forces into disrepute. The struggle was also to some extent institutional: Sumitro's power base, Kopkamtib, represented the formal security apparatus, which relied more on rules, procedure and professionalism. Moertopo, meanwhile, who relied on his close links to the president and his freewheeling Opsus intelligence network, represented a more personal style of rule.

Civilian discontent and intra-elite tensions came to a head in January 1974 on the occasion of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Jakarta. Encouraged by anti-Tanaka protests in Bangkok, tens of thousands of young people took to the streets of Jakarta with three main demands: that Soeharto take action to curb the extravagant lifestyles of senior military officers and civil servants, that the government introduce measures to benefit indigenous business and that Soeharto sack his closest assistants. Ali Moertopo and Sudjono Humardani, two key assistants seen as responsible for the government's dictatorial style and its intimate ties with Japan, were burnt in effigy (Wanandi and Djiwandono 1987: 89). On 15–16 January, central Jakarta resembled a war zone, with several hundred vehicles burnt and over a hundred buildings torched or damaged.

The 'Malari' riots were a battleground between Sumitro and Moertopo. Sumitro, who was ultimately responsible for security in the capital, encouraged the demonstrators to vent their anger at his political rivals. Recognising the challenge to his authority from the portly general, Moertopo ordered his formidable network of underworld provocateurs to join the demonstrations, causing the mass rallies to degenerate into violent riots. This served to discredit the genuine protesters while demonstrating Sumitro's inability to control the situation.

Malari was a turning point in the history of the New Order. It was a severe shock to the regime and Soeharto's closest call. The riots highlighted the degree of civilian opposition by student and Muslim groups and the fragility of the military edifice. Indeed so determined and hostile were the forces ranged against Soeharto that some senior CSIS figures believed at the time that he would be deposed. Immediately after the riots had been quelled, however, Soeharto sacked Sumitro as head of Kopkamtib and removed many of his key allies. Soeharto took charge of Kopkamtib for the next four years, placing his trusted Catholic colleague Admiral Sudomo in day-to-day control. Yoga Sugama, intelligence aide to Soeharto since 1956, was appointed chief of Bakin. To head the intelligence staff of Kopkamtib and the defence ministry, meanwhile, Soeharto recalled Major General Benny Moerdani, a protégé of Moertopo (and Beek), from a diplomatic post in Seoul, signalling the beginning of a long partnership between the president and the astute, tough-minded commando.[22]

The crackdown on the press, the universities and the intelligentsia in the wake of Malari made the pre-1974 period seem liberal in comparison. Six daily newspapers and four weekly magazines were shut down, troops occupied the University of Indonesia, and over 800 people were detained, including several of the nation's leading intellectuals and rights activists. The common thread in the accusations against these figures was that they were linked with the former PSI, a party – and a milieu – that Soeharto and many of his closest advisers had long distrusted for their cosmopolitanism and links with the liberal establishment in the Western democracies.

In an attempt to bring student councils under tighter control, the newly appointed education minister, Sjarif Thajeb, issued a regulation forcing them to get permission from vice-chancellors for all campus activities. This unpopular 1974 decree ended the autonomy of inter-university student bodies (Effendi 1989: 154).

At the same time Soeharto went some way to address the grievances of the protesters. During 1974 the government moved to tighten restrictions on foreign investment and introduced measures designed to benefit indigenous entrepreneurs (Robison 1986: 167). Soeharto also removed Ali Moertopo and Sudjono Humardani from their formal positions as members of his personal staff. Both generals, though, retained great influence at court. Moertopo was appointed deputy head of Bakin while retaining control of his Opsus empire.

Soeharto's main response to the criticism of 1973–4 was to shorten the reins on power. A series of structural reforms saw authority further concentrated

in the hands of the president and a further undermining of the capacities for independent and extra-state organisation. Law No. 5/1974 introduced a uniform system of regional and local administration and led to a greater centralisation of political power and economic control of regional and local government (down to village level) in the hands of the central authorities.

Political parties, still reeling from the forced amalgamations of 1973, were dealt another blow in 1975 with the introduction of two bills that formalised the numerous restrictions placed on parties and party membership since the elections, and further eroded their capacity to compete with Golkar. The two bills, passed after some compromises as Law No. 3/1975 on political parties and Golkar and Law No. 4/1975 on general elections, also ruled out the possibility of any additional parties contesting the elections, setting in concrete what was essentially a one- or one-and-a-half-party system. The 1975 laws, which built on the 1969 election legislation, would come to be regarded as the foundation of the Soeharto government's political order.

By 1975, then, these key features of the New Order regime were in place: a tightly circumscribed political system, an elaborate apparatus of security and surveillance, a huge civil bureaucracy shadowed at every level by the military, and, at the centre, a presidential office with unparalleled powers of patronage and command. The degree to which the state was insulated from society, both in terms of its external sources of revenue and its reliance on the power of the armed forces to secure its authority, was illustrated by Soeharto's survival after the collapse of the state oil company Pertamina. Uncontrolled lending, investment, speculation and theft by Ibnu Sutowo led the flagship of the national economy to incur debts of around ten billion US dollars. Although the crash of Pertamina caused huge damage to the national accounts and undermined the Soeharto government's reputation for responsible economic management, the absence of accountability in the system allowed Ibnu Sutowo to keep most of his wealth and escape official blame for the disaster (McCawley 1978; McDonald 1980: Chapter 7; Bresnan 1993: Chapter 7).

It was the same concentration of power and the control over the mass media that facilitated the invasion and annexation of East Timor. Soon after the revolution in Portugal in April 1974, Ali Moertopo and a few key Opsus and Bakin assistants initiated Operasi Komodo, an intelligence operation that aimed to bring about the non-military integration of the half-island with Indonesia. When this failed, Soeharto and a handful of top generals, including Benny Moerdani, decided, with the tacit support of the US and Australian governments, to launch a full-scale assault on 7 December 1975. This was the beginning of a brutal occupation that was to result in over 150,000 Timorese deaths and a tide of condemnation of Indonesia by the international community. The main beneficiary of the occupation was the armed forces, which treated the territory as its economic fiefdom, training ground and its rationale for sharply increased levels of military spending. The resistance of the East Timorese to the occupation was often characterised by Indonesian officials as the demands of a spoilt child, 'ungrateful' to its parents.

After the turmoil and ignominy of Malari, the Pertamina collapse and the annexation of East Timor, the second half of the 1970s were relatively stable, helped in part by a second oil boom from 1978. But the stability owed more to the institutionalisation of a repressive, bureaucratic and exclusionary pattern of rule than to the popular legitimacy of the regime. Time and again the Soeharto government had to cope with the consequences of its failure to incorporate important sections of society into the political process. Malari had demonstrated the degree to which sections of the middle classes and the secular intelligentsia felt left out in the cold. For the rest of the 1970s and the early 1980s it was Muslim groups, however, that caused Soeharto his greatest anxieties.

The narrowing of the New Order

Theocratic Islam had always worried Soeharto and his predominantly *abangan* and Christian advisers and officer corps. There was a widely held assumption among the ruling group that Muslims would use any purchase on power to press for an Islamic state, or at least for the implementation of the Jakarta Charter requiring the state to enforce Muslim religious obligations on believers. Fear of Islamic aspirations had been behind the extensive measures taken in the late 1960s and early 1970s to marginalise and incapacitate the Muslim parties. But Muslims were much harder for the government to control than communists because they had deep roots in society and could not be punished simply for being Muslim. The first major showdown with Muslim groups after the amalgamations was in September 1973, when the government introduced into parliament bills that would have made all Indonesians subject to a single secular marriage law and prevented the PPP from identifying itself as a Muslim party. It was a measure of the government's poor lines of communication with the Muslim community, already angered by the proliferation of massage parlours and state-sponsored gambling, that the bills set off fierce opposition, both inside and outside parliament. For the first time Muslim politicians walked out of parliament and hundreds of Muslim youths occupied the chamber during a speech by the minister of religion, H.A. Mukti Ali (Bresnan 1993: 138, 235).

Although the government reluctantly compromised on this issue, preserving the jurisdiction of religious courts and allowing the use of the Ka'abah symbol by the PPP, there was enough frustration among Muslim politicians with the regime's insensitivity to Muslim sentiments to turn the otherwise factionalised PPP into an electoral threat to Golkar. As the 1977 elections drew closer, the government began to fear that its amalgamation of Muslim parties had been a mistake. It therefore embarked on a campaign to put Muslim leaders on the defensive and legitimise the continuation of its own heavy-handed security policies by attempting to link the PPP to Muslim fundamentalism. Once again Ali Moertopo went into action, ordering his Opsus operatives to gather together secretly a number of former members of the

banned Darul Islam and convince them that their help was needed to overcome a renewed leftist threat in the wake of the communist victory in Vietnam. Although there is no evidence that these individuals engaged in any subversive activities, their links with Darul Islam provided the government with sufficient grounds to announce the discovery of 'Komando Jihad', which it accused of aiming to establish an Islamic state. Between 1977 and 1979, close to 1,000 Muslims, most of them in the former Darul Islam strongholds of West Java and Aceh, were arrested for having links with this supposed terrorist organisation (Jenkins 1984: 56–9).

Soeharto's reported statement to a group of Catholic politicians in 1977 that 'Our common enemy is Islam!' (Jenkins 1984: 29) set the tone of the election campaign. Rallying together under the potent banner of the Ka'abah, PPP leaders flouted the prohibition on 'offending the dignity of the government and its officials' (Liddle 1978: 181) by highlighting social justice issues and attacking official corruption. Violent clashes between Muslims and the security forces were common during the campaign, and there were allegations of widespread vote rigging in Golkar's favour in several provinces. In Greater Jakarta, where flagrant cheating was more difficult, the PPP dealt Golkar a symbolically important defeat, but overall Golkar's vote was recorded as having fallen by less than a percentage point to 62.11 per cent (see Liddle 1978: 181–2).

The ten months between the elections and the MPR session in March 1978 at which parliamentarians elect the president and ratify the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) were marked by heightened political tension. Muslim groups were especially riled by the inclusion in the draft GBHN for 1978–83, drawn up by a team headed by State Secretary Sudharmono, to several paragraphs that treated mystical practices (*kepercayaan*) on par with religion (*agama*) (Sudharmono 1982: 8). This created an uproar among Muslims who saw it as a further effort on the part of Soeharto and his closest advisers – many of whom were devotees of Javanese mysticism – to further undermine the status of Islam. PPP politicians shocked the government by walking out of the tightly orchestrated MPR session in protest against the mysticism issue and the government's introduction of new legislation that led to the establishment of Pancasila indoctrination courses (discussed in the next chapter) (*Kompas* 8 April 1980; Jenkins 1984: 158; Bresnan 1993: 201). This upset, which forced the institution to a vote for the first time in its history, and another parliamentary walkout by a group of 50 PPP members in February 1980 over an election bill that would further restrict the parties, appears to have angered Soeharto intensely and strengthened his resolve to eliminate Islam as a source of opposition in the political arena (Jenkins 1984: 158). Reflecting on these events in 1982, Soeharto (1982: 13) complained that the *ulama* had been afflicted by a 'sickness' and that their refusal to compromise was an indication of their 'unwillingness to accept the Pancasila as the basis of the state'.

Soeharto was also stung in the late 1970s by an upsurge of criticism from senior military officers including Defence Minister General Mohammad

Jusuf, Army Chief of Staff Gen Widodo and several retired generals such as General Sumitro, former Deputy Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mohammad Jasin, governor of the National Defence Institute Lieutenant General Sutopo Yuwono and the army's elder statesman, General Nasution. Many professional officers with the corporate interests of the army at heart were unhappy with the extent to which the armed forces had become politicised through its intimate relationship with Golkar and with Soeharto's unwillingness to make preparations for an orderly succession (Jenkins 1984). Sentiment in senior army circles in favour of replacing Soeharto was reportedly strong. Even the conservative army newspaper *Angkatan Bersenjata*, sounded a warning, arguing that 'the moral patterns of the constitution had been brought into disrepute' and pointing to the 'deep restlessness and worry' among the people over the leadership of the nation (Jenkins 1984: 80–1). It was this kind of criticism, and perhaps his awareness that most of his trusted military colleagues were approaching retirement age, that led Soeharto, who himself retired from active service in mid 1976, to begin distancing himself politically from the mainstream military command. From 1978 Soeharto came to rely less on armed forces headquarters or on Ali Moertopo's Opsus and more on his state secretary Sudharmono and the bureaucratic-minded group of military lawyers allied with him (Effendi 1989: 124). In 1978 several key positions were controlled by members of what had come to be known as Sudharmono's Military Law Academy faction including the minister of justice (Lieutenant General Mudjono), attorney general (Lieutenant General Ali Said), general chairman of Golkar (Major General Amir Moertono) and deputy chair of the MPR/DPR (Major General Wang Suwandi). Other key Sudharmono associates to be installed in 1978 included General Awaloeddin Djamin as chief of national police and Lieutenant General Moerdiono as cabinet secretary.

Emboldened by the increasingly obvious divisions among the officer corps and by various other signs of elite disaffection with Soeharto,[23] a new generation of university students joined the fray, launching several large demonstrations. Again corruption and the gap between the rich and poor were major targets, but whereas the president's personal assistants had been the focus of the Malari demonstrations, the wave of protests in 1977 and 1978 zeroed in on Soeharto (Akhmadi 1981). Students at the University of Indonesia, a crucial support base for the New Order in 1966, threw down the gauntlet soon after the general elections by proposing that Ali Sadikin, the popular governor of Jakarta, be nominated for president.

Soeharto had never countenanced the notion that there should be a contest for the presidency or the vice presidency and moved quickly to crush the student protests and replace Sadikin with his military secretary and former intelligence assistant, Lieutenant General Tjokropranolo. As had been the case in 1974, a clutch of leading newspapers were banned in January 1978 (this time temporarily), hundreds of students were arrested and their leaders tried, and new regulations were put in place in an attempt to forestall the possibility of further outbursts. Some campuses were occupied by troops, and

student councils, which had coordinated most of the protests, were suspended. In mid 1978 Minister for Education and Culture Daoed Joesoef introduced a strict set of regulations designed to depoliticise the campuses and channel the energies of students away from activism and into scholarly and technocratic pursuits. Daoed Joesoef's so-called 'normalisation' of campus life virtually crippled the student movement by integrating universities more tightly into the state bureaucracy and making universities answerable for the activities of their students. As in 1974, Soeharto reacted to open criticism by tightening the ratchet another notch.

Soeharto's frustrations with Muslim, student and military criticism of his leadership were expressed most forthrightly in an extemporaneous speech to armed forces regional commanders in the Sumatran town of Pakanbaru in March 1980.[24] Soeharto's speech was notable for its angry tenor (the president normally delivered his speeches in a deadpan monotone) and for the provocative way in which he counterpointed the Pancasila – or, more precisely, his own exclusivist interpretation of the Pancasila – with the spectrum of ideologies that had underpinned virtually every twentieth-century political movement and party in Indonesia. Briefly surveying the nation's history, Soeharto accused 'Marxism, Leninism, communism, socialism, Marhaenism, nationalism [and] religion' of having 'submerged' the Pancasila and having inspired 'unending rebellions' (*Kompas* 8 April 1980).[25] The New Order had devoted itself to a 'total correction of deviations from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution' but had not succeeded in bringing everyone into line. In an obvious reference to the PPP, Soeharto lashed out at a certain 'party or group which does not yet trust Pancasila 100 per cent' and, with an eye to critics of the armed forces' backing of Golkar, added that for as long as 'we [in the military] do not succeed in bringing [this group] to their senses we must always step up our vigilance, choose partners, friends who truly defend Pancasila and have no doubts whatsoever in Pancasila'. Belying his professed commitment to constitutionalism and displaying what many saw as a puzzlingly paranoiac attitude towards the generally timid and subservient legislature, Soeharto also told his military audience that if critics of the government in the MPR ever achieved the two-thirds majority needed to change the 1945 Constitution (and hence, conceivably the Pancasila), the army would 'take up arms' or kidnap a parliamentarian in order to prevent them getting their way (*Kompas* 8 April 1980).

The storm of protest this speech – and a similar one three weeks afterwards – stirred up among Muslims, intellectuals and retired senior officers has been well covered elsewhere and need not detain us here.[26] The general point the speech illustrates is that even though the political framework of the New Order had been inscribed in law in 1975, Soeharto was fully aware that it rested ultimately on force, not consensus. It also highlighted Soeharto's increasing intolerance of dissent and his willingness to use Pancasila as a weapon against his critics. It is to the Soeharto regime's ambitious quest for hegemony in the realm of political discourse that I will now turn.

Notes

1 Other members of SPRI, which grew from six to 12 between July 1966, were Brigadier General Sudjono Humardhani (economy); Colonel Ali Moertopo (foreign intelligence); Brigadier General Yoga Sugama (domestic intelligence); Major General Surjo (finance); Brigadier General Abdul Kadir Prawiraatmadja (social welfare); Brigadier General Slamet Danudirdjo (economic development); Brigadier General Nawawi Alif (mass media); Brigadier General Isman (mass movements); and Brigadier General Jusuf Singadikane (national projects) (*Kompas* 13 June 1968).

2 Sudharmono kept a very low profile for most of his career. Biographical information can be found in Sudharmono (1997); Pangaribuan (1995); Bourchier (1987b); *Tempo* 12 and 19 March 1988; *Jakarta Jakarta* 88, 11–17 March 1988; *Jawa Pos* 19 October 1988; and Vatikiotis (1988, 1993: 84–8).

3 *Jakarta Jakarta* 88, 11–17 March 1988: 20–1.

4 First used in 1967, the term Muspida applies at the provincial and district (*kabupaten*) levels. At the subdistrict level (*kecamatan*) the leadership councils are called Muspika and bring together three rather than four authorities: the army, the *pamong praja* and the police. See Tanter (1991: 344–6) for further discussion. As of 2014 they had not been dismantled despite NGO demands.

5 Retired General Nasution in the early 1980s described this body as the most powerful government institution in the provinces (Jenkins 1984: 217–8).

6 For an examination of the structure and function of the social and political affairs hierarchies under the armed forces and the interior ministry, see Tanter (1991: Chapter 8: 330–4).

7 Moertopo's formal positions after 1965 included chief of staff for foreign intelligence to the chair of the Cabinet Presidium (1967); head of Section II, chief of staff, Bakin; Special Operations Command (Komando Operasi Khusus) for the management of the 'Act of Free Choice' (Pepera) with the UN, West Papua (1969); Special Operations for State Intelligence Coordination, General Elections Operation (1971); deputy head, Bakin (1974–78); information minister (1978–83).

8 In the November 1969 overhaul, over 200 independent organisations in the Joint Secretariat were fused into seven Kino. They were KOSGORO (a military-oriented cooperative organisation comprising former members of the student army of East Java), MKGR (a military-sponsored 'mutual help' association), SOKSI (the main military-created labour organisation), Ormas Hankam (mass organisation within the defence department, including veterans, army wives and civil defence volunteers), GAKARI (comprising several civil service associations), Karya Profesi (for professionals in various white-collar occupations) and the Gerakan Pembangunan (Nishihara 1972: 19).

9 Tod Jones (2013: 123–4) discusses the influence of functionalism on Moertopo in his fascinating study of cultural policy.

10 Formed by Soeharto on 18 October 1968, the Central and Regional Screening Teams (Teningpu, *Team Screening Pusat*; and Teningda, *Team Screening Daerah*) liaised with Kopkamtib's investigation and prosecution teams in the immediate post-coup years. See Kopkamtib (n.d.: 176–93). For a detailed account of pre-election screening procedures, see Nishihara (1972: 24–9).

11 The final composition of the 460-seat DPR after the 1971 elections was: 227 directly elected Golkar members, 124 directly elected political party members, 75 armed forces appointees and 25 other appointees representing functional groups (i.e. Golkar). Of the 124 seats won by political parties, the NU won 58, reflecting the comparative resilience of the party's internal structures and loyalties. The 920-seat MPR, constituted in advance of the March 1973 general session, comprised the total membership of the DPR plus 460 appointed representatives. The non-Golkar political parties comprised only 13.5 per cent of the total MPR membership.

12 The most authoritative group set up in response to criticism about high-level corruption was the Commission of Four, established in January 1970 and chaired by former prime minister Wilopo. The damning conclusions of the commission were never officially released but a leaked copy was published in the daily *Sinar Harapan* (18, 20, 22 and 24 July 1970). See also Mackie (1970).
13 Given syndicalism's leftist and anarchist associations both in Japan and elsewhere, it is only reasonable to suppose that he meant corporatism.
14 See Soedarmanto (2008) for a revealing biography, as well as Stolk (1991: 140–9), Mount (2012) and Tanter (1991: 430–2).
15 Three sister organisations were the Ikatan Tani Pancasila (1958), the Ikatan Nelayan Pancasila (1964) and the less successful Ikatan Usahawan Pancasila and Ikatan Tenaga Paramedis Pancasila for farmers, fishermen, entrepreneurs and paramedics respectively. For a first hand account of these organisations see Stolk (1991). See also Sentral Organisasi … (1960). The relationship between Beek's Ikatan Buruh Pancasila and the SOB Pancasila, set up under the auspices of the Catholic Party on 19 June 1954, appears to have been close. Their common deployment of Pancasila as an emblem of anti-communism and, implicitly, anti (Islamic) sectarianism, as early as June 1954, raises the question whether IPKI figures in fact borrowed this idea from Catholic politicians.
16 Participants in Beek's courses were reportedly beaten and degraded as a means of instilling in them discipline and loyalty to himself (Soedarmanto 2008: 177–211; Mount 2012: 255–7; Tanter 1991: 430–2).
17 Cosmas Batubara and technocrat Johannes Sumarlin were among the many PMKRI activists appointed by Beek who later rose to high office in the New Order.
18 This estimate is based on official figures cited in Bresnan (1993: 105) that there were about 1.6 million civil servants in 1974.
19 See 'Keputusan Seminar Nasional Hubungan Perburuhan Pancasila', in Sudono (1977); Moertopo (1975: 16, 1982: 212)
20 This document, issued by Pope Pius XI and subtitled 'On the Reconstruction of the Social Order', is usually mentioned together with its famous precursor, *Rerum Novarum* (1891) Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pope Leo XIII 'On the Condition of the Working Classes', issued on 15 May 1891. The latter is seen as having provided the impetus for modern Catholic social thought and is a classic of organicist theory.
21 In a speech to the DPR on 15 August 1974 Soeharto spelt out what were to become some of the key tenets of Pancasila Industrial Relations: 'In a Pancasila environment there is no place for confrontational behaviour or oppression of the weak by the strong. If these principles are adhered to, we can avoid strikes by workers and lockouts by employers caused by differences of opinion' (quoted in Moertopo 1982: 211).
22 Moerdani, a Central Javanese Catholic, had served under Soeharto's command between 1962 and 1967. As an Opsus operative, he was involved in establishing secret links with the British and Malaysian governments in the last year of Sukarno's rule. Moerdani's domination of the military intelligence apparatus after 1974 and his appointment as commander of the armed forces in 1983 was to see him emerge as the second most powerful man in Indonesia, at least until 1988.
23 These included the 1976 'Sawito Affair' in which Mohammad Hatta as well as Muslim, Protestant, Catholic and mystical leaders signed documents sharply critical of the quality of Soeharto's rule (Bourchier 2010). Another important indication of Soeharto's fading moral authority came early in 1978 when the popular Sultan of Yogyakarta declared himself unwilling to serve for a second term as vice president (Bresnan 1993: 201; Soeharto 1982: 311).

24 A transcript of this speech was published in *Kompas* 8 April 1980.
25 Jenkins (1984) provides an excellent analysis of the two speeches as well as their background and consequences.
26 See especially Jenkins (1984: 162–83). For a summary of the important episode in which a group of 50 prominent figures signed a petition in reaction to Soeharto's speeches, see Bourchier (1987a).

8 Indonesianising Indonesia

While Soeharto devoted his first decade in power to reviving the economy and overhauling the political infrastructure, the period between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s saw the president become increasingly preoccupied with staking out and policing the boundaries of legitimate ideological discourse. The centrepiece of Soeharto's ideological project was an elaborate and expensive programme of mass indoctrination to reshape not only Indonesians' views about national identity and the national past, but also their personal values. Counterbalancing the government's modernisation drive and its capitalist development programme was the emphasis in its ideological courses on 'traditional' values of harmony, consensus, hierarchy and family-ness. In emphasising these values government ideologues were valorising the very 'national characteristics' described by the Dutch colonial ethnographers and praised by a variety of pre-war nationalists and especially by Supomo and the anti-populist aristocratic politicians of the 1950s.

This chapter examines the ideological project of the New Order to the late 1980s. It straddles a period of far-reaching change, from the oil boom of the 1970s to the oil slump of the early 1980s and the export manufacturing boom of the 1980s. Each of these economic phases had multiple ramifications in the political and social spheres. The shift to export manufacturing, for instance, was accompanied by a significant tightening of political control and an intensification of repression, especially of the urban working class. The character and intensity of the regime's ideological priorities were intimately linked to its perception of the political challenges it faced at particular times. I look at these linkages here, focusing not only on the motives and aims of the regime, but also on the processes by which ideology was produced and delivered. This emphasis on the people and institutions involved in the ideology 'industry' seeks to highlight continuities that are often not apparent. Each new ideological 'assault', from its launching of the Pancasila indoctrination programme in 1978 to the 'Pancasila as the sole foundation campaign from 1983 to the revitalisation of Supomo's 'integralist state' concept in the second part of the 1980s, was, I argue, informed by the same limited stock of organicist ideas. Using the rhetoric of all-inclusiveness and unity, the government attempted to restrict the range of legitimate discourse and extend its ideological hegemony across the entire political landscape.

Pancasila indoctrination

Pancasila was the emblem and rallying cry of the Soeharto camp from the earliest days after the coup. Allies of Soeharto referred to themselves as the 'Pancasila forces' and enemies were accused of betraying the Pancasila. The day on which Soeharto's men seized control of Jakarta from the mutineers, 1 October, was sacralised as '*Hari Kesaktian Pancasila*' (Day of the Supernatural Power of the Pancasila) and celebrated with great solemnity on each anniversary. And, from at least 1968, the Soeharto government called its system of rule Pancasila Democracy.

The process of wresting Pancasila from its creator was not easy. Surveying Soeharto's speeches on the Pancasila in the late 1960s and early 1970s, C.W. Watson (1987: 37–45) highlighted their tentative quality. Most were addressed to small groups rather than to the nation, and tended to concentrate on the theme that Pancasila was the 'personality of Indonesia' and that it was the New Order that was responsible for having safeguarded it (ibid.).

Pancasila was taught as a compulsory subject in universities from the beginning of the New Order, but it was to be several years before the government embarked on a sustained campaign of centrally coordinated ideological instruction. The Soeharto government sought to distance itself from the bombast and sloganeering of the 'Old Order' and sought to present itself as 'programme-oriented' and un- or even anti-ideological. Its hesitation also reflected the fact that for at least the first decade of Soeharto's rule there was no standard interpretation of Pancasila.

Soeharto's perception of this as a problem is apparent from his appeals in the early 1970s for a 'single exegesis' of the Pancasila to be worked out (Poesponegoro *et al.* 1990: 513).[1] One of his first attempts to address the issue was the establishment of a 'Commission on the History of the Pancasila' within the defence department in early March 1968. On the initiative of this body, a 'Pancasila Laboratory' was set up under military auspices at the teacher training institute in the East Javanese city of Malang (IKIP Malang). In charge of the laboratory was Lieutenant Colonel Darji Darmodihardjo, a lawyer attached to the East Java military command,[2] aided by a team of officials from the department of education and culture.[3] Darji, who went on to become one of the New Order's leading ideologues, had been appointed vice-chancellor of IKIP Malang in 1966 after its previous head, and many of the staff, were purged or killed after the coup (Bonneff 1980: 191). The laboratory held its first major conference in August 1969, and from that date began publishing a series of books and papers on the history and interpretation of the Pancasila, the most substantial of these was *Briefings on the Pancasila: philosophical, historical and juridical-constitutional perspectives* (Bonneff *et al.* 1980: 46–7, 364; Darmodihardjo 1974).

A central, if usually unspoken, purpose of this and other officially sponsored writings on the state ideology was to de-Sukarno-ise the Pancasila. This took several forms. One, discussed in Chapter 6, was to redefine the individual tenets in such as way as to rid them of leftist connotations (associated

particularly with 'social justice' and 'internationalism').[4] Another was to stress the notion that the Pancasila was immanent within the Indonesian national character and that Sukarno's contribution had simply been to 'unearth' what was already there. A further aim of early New Order ideologues was to fix firm boundaries between Pancasila and 'atheistic' communism. Drawing on the writings of the pro-army philosophy professor Notonagoro, a 1971 defence department paper called *A Basic Guide to the Implementation of the Pantjasila for the Armed Forces* proclaimed the Pancasila to be 'hierarchical and pyramidal'. 'Belief in the One God' would from now on be regarded as the superior principle, dominating and undergirding each of the remaining four (Bonneff *et al*. 1980: 197–8).

In the early 1970s, a new, more controversial line of argument, calling into question Sukarno's authorship of the Pancasila, began to be promoted by the Pancasila Laboratory and other military-sponsored centres of ideological production. The army's star witness against Sukarno was Abdul Gaffar Pringgodigdo, Supomo's old Leiden law school colleague who had headed the BPUPK secretariat in 1945. Pringgodigdo wrote a paper in 1970 titled '*Sekitar Pancasila*' ('About Pancasila') arguing that while Sukarno, in his famous 1 June 1945 speech, was the first to use the term 'Pantja Sila', the concept had been delineated days beforehand by Muhammad Yamin and Supomo (Pringgodigdo 1974). This interpretation, first published by the East Java military command, was quickly taken up by the government. Its main promoter was Nugroho Notosusanto, a historian and short-story writer who, as the University of Indonesia's deputy dean for student affairs in the early 1960s, had worked closely with the army, earning him the titular rank of colonel.[5] In 1971, a year after Sukarno's death, the Armed Forces History Centre published a booklet titled *The Authentic Text of the Proclamation and the Authentic Formulation of the Pantjasila* in which Nugroho maintained that since most of the groundwork for the Pancasila had been carried out by Yamin and Supomo, it was inappropriate to continue to commemorate 1 June as 'Birth of the Pancasila Day' (Notosusanto 1971).

The proposal that Indonesia's second most important 'national' day – after 17 August – be scrapped, caused an outcry among nationalists, including some reluctant to call themselves Sukarnoists, who saw this as a mean-spirited and dishonest attempt to erase the late president from history. Authentic records from the 1945 debates, kept locked away by the New Order, have since confirmed that Nugroho's revised account of the birth of the Pancasila was indeed fraudulent. Supomo had in fact made no attempt to tease out a set of tenets in the way that Nugroho, and subsequent authors including Darji, maintain he did. Notosusanto was undeterred by his contemporary critics and his version became the official version.

Amid public controversy over the military's efforts to de-Sukarnoise the Pancasila, and still on the defensive after the wave of opposition that had culminated in the 1974 Malari riots, Soeharto set in train a number of initiatives, each purportedly intended to produce an authoritative and generally

acceptable interpretation of the Pancasila. In a December 1974 speech he called on academics at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta to use 'scientific methods' to work out a standard interpretation (Poesponegoro *et al*. 1990: 513). Simultaneously he set up a 'Committee to accelerate the implementation of the Pancasila', which included Lieutenant General Surono, Mohammad Hatta and Imam Pratignjo, a social scientist who had been one of the founders of Sekber Golkar. Shortly afterwards, in April 1975, he established a '17 August 1945 Foundation' charged with 'promoting, practicing and safeguarding the Pancasila'. The inclusion in this group of former members of the PNI, including Sukarno's head ideologue, Roeslan Abdulgani, suggests that Soeharto was anxious to appear responsive to nationalist sentiment. It reflected a shift towards nationalist economic policies in the wake of Malari (Bonneff *et al*. 1980: 47).

Soeharto's best publicised initiative to produce a 'definitive' interpretation of the Pancasila was his bringing together, in January 1975, of four of the 'founding fathers' of the Republic – Hatta, Subardjo, Maramis and A.G. Pringgodigdo – plus the former PNI foreign minister Sunario, in a 'Committee of Five'. Later that year the Committee produced a document called 'Explanation of Pancasila'. As had happened when Soeharto created the 'Commission of Four' in 1970 in response to public demands for an inquiry into corruption (to which Hatta had been an adviser), the 'Committee of Five' embarrassed the government. Their report, published in 1977, was highly critical of the technocrats' free market development policies, which its authors saw as having led to a decline in living standards among the poor and as a direct contravention of Article 33 of the constitution, which foreshadowed a socialist-style economy based on cooperatives. Neither did they pull their punches on the Pancasila, reprimanding the government for neglecting 'Social Justice' (the fifth tenet), and attributing the authorship of the Pancasila unambiguously to Sukarno. The moral authority of the 'elders', which the authorities had hoped to harness for their own purposes, helped instead to fuel anti-government and anti-Soeharto sentiment in the volatile build-up to the 1978 session of the MPR (Panitia Lima 1977; Bonneff *et al*. 1980: 48; Eisy 1978).

Frustrated by his inability to rid the Pancasila of its ghosts, Soeharto stopped talking about the need for a final, 'authentic' exegesis. Instead he attempted to de-historicise the state ideology and put it beyond the reach of rival political interests. One way he did this was to intensify the process of reifying and sacralising Pancasila. Like Sukarno, Soeharto had long spoken of the Pancasila as the 'personality' and 'soul' of the Indonesian people, but in the late 1970s official descriptions went further. Pancasila was declared in 1978 to be endowed with the 'truth, power and spiritual force' that provided the Indonesian nation with 'the strength to live' (Yayasan Proklamasi 1978: 9). The following year Darji, driven to extremes by the tide of his own rhetoric, wrote in a textbook that 'Pancasila IS national history and culture'.[6]

Soeharto's second, and for our purposes more significant, response to controversy over the origins of Pancasila was to begin promoting the idea of

Pancasila as a moral code. In 1975 he called on Indonesians to interiorise (*menjiwai*) the Pancasila (Watson 1987: 41), a theme that he expanded on with enthusiasm – and a certain circularity – in a speech to the Scouts Congress in 1976:

> Only a Pancasila person can build a society based on Pancasila. People who do not feel that they possess Pancasila, who do not understand Pancasila, who do not interiorise Pancasila, who do not love Pancasila, will certainly have difficulty in developing an Indonesian society and a people who are Pancasila-ist.[7]

Soeharto announced in the same speech that a manual for the interiorisation of Pancasila was being prepared. A 'Team of Eleven' headed by Sudharmono was appointed by the president to carry out this task, which involved consulting with 'virtually every university, with intellectuals, with public figures and with various layers of society' (Wahyono 1984: 20). The result was an eight-page 'Guide to the Realisation and Implementation of Pancasila', which, despite the opposition of PPP parliamentarians, was given the stamp of approval by the nation's supreme legislature, the MPR, on 21 March 1978 (see Wahyono 1984: 21–3). MPR Resolution 2/1978 claimed that the guide – which was known formally as Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa[8] and more popularly as 'P4', standing for Guide to the Realisation and Implementation of Pancasila – was 'not an interpretation of the Pancasila'. It was, rather, a code of practice, 'a directive and rule of conduct for the social and political life of every Indonesian citizen, every state official and every state and social institution throughout Indonesia' (Yayasan Proklamasi 1978: 7).

P4 was nevertheless the New Order's most authoritative pronouncement on Pancasila. The overall impression one gets from reading it is of stillness, of an overwhelming concern with preserving things rather than changing them. It placed great store on the values of harmony and balance, both for achieving individual happiness and as general principles. As a guide to behaviour, the accent was very much on self-control, on subordinating individual interests to the common good. For example the main precept it drew from both 'Indonesian unity' (tenet 3) and 'democracy guided by wisdom through deliberation/representation' (tenet 4) was that the state's interests had to be regarded as taking precedence over those of individuals and groups. The meaning of 'Indonesian unity', which had been coined to help encourage allegiance to the national idea by diverse regional groups, was thus transformed and expanded to define the proper character of the relationship of citizens to the state, i.e. unanimity. Commenting on the fourth tenet, the guide does not mention 'democracy', 'elections' or 'popular sovereignty'; it stresses instead the need for citizens to abide by the decisions made in a family atmosphere by those 'upon whom trust has been bestowed'. On 'social justice' the guide contains hardly a trace of the input by the Committee of Five. Although P4 was supposed to be a key reference point for the 1978–85 Five Year Plan – which

stresses the reduction of income inequality – there is nothing in the guide that implies that social inequality is unjust. It instead urges Indonesians:

> to reflect an attitude and atmosphere of familial relations and mutual self help … By cultivating such an attitude, an individual will not abuse his rights by acting aggressively towards others nor be wasteful, live luxuriously or engage in other activities which are in conflict with or detrimental to the public interest.
>
> (Yayasan Proklamasi 1978: 14)

The dynamic, exhortatory character that had once attached to 'social justice' had vanished. It was replaced by a vision of society in which deference was a key virtue, a society one should not disturb by displays of wealth or abuses of rights.

MPR Resolution 2 marked the end of more than a decade of government uncertainty about its ideological bearings and signalled the beginning of the largest and most sustained programme of indoctrination the nation had ever seen.

Implementing P4

> Any theory that becomes the ideology of a political movement or the official doctrine of a state must lend itself to simplification for the simple and to subtlety for the subtle.
>
> (Raymond Aron 1965: 112)

The idea that the government had a role to play in the mass propagation of Pancasila was not a new one for the New Order. Courses on Pancasila Philosophy had been a compulsory part of state university curricula since at least 1971. In 1973 the MPR had decreed that 'the curriculum at all levels of education, from kindergarten to tertiary, state or private, must include Pancasila Moral Education [PMP] and other facets adequate to transmit the spirit/soul and ideals of 1945 to the Younger Generation' (cited in Langenberg 1990: 132). This led in late 1975 to the introduction into schools of a course called Pancasila Moral Education, replacing Ethics (*Budi Pekerti*) and Civics (*Pendidikan Kewargaan Negara*) (Ensiklopedi 1988: 200; Wandelt 1989: 209). Several textbooks were published in 1976 and 1977 to service this new market, most of them written by the staff of the education ministry and universities and all of them screened by a committee of military ideologues (Thomas 1981: 390).[9]

But the P4 campaign, which began in 1978, was intended to influence a much larger audience. To plan it and prepare the indoctrination materials, Soeharto created several new bodies, the highest of which was a presidential advisory group headed by Roeslan Abdulgani called the Presidential Advisory Committee on the Implementation of the Guide to the Realisation and

Practice of Pancasila, known as P-7. The task of training the instructors and drafting indoctrination material was assigned to a second team, also headed by Abdulgani, which included the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security General Panggabean and four of Soeharto's aides from the state secretariat, Sudharmono, Moerdiono, Ismail Saleh and Hamid S. Attamimi.

Responsibility for the actual implementation of the P4 programme Soeharto gave to an organisation he created in March 1979 called the Supervisory Body for the Implementation of the Guide to the Realisation and Implementation of Pancasila or BP-7 for short. Answerable directly to the president, BP-7 was a bureaucracy in its own right, with a prestigiously located headquarters in Jakarta and branches at the provincial and sub-provincial levels. Membership of the Central BP-7 was also high powered, indicating the importance that Soeharto placed on the programme. It included Education Minister Daoed Joesoef, Information Minister Ali Moertopo as well as Panggabean, Moerdiono, Nugroho Notosusanto and University of Indonesia law professor Padmo Wahyono. Heading the organisation until 1984 was the military lawyer (and future attorney general) Major General Hari Suharto. Hari Suharto had served under Sutjipto for two years after the coup and was a close ally of Sudharmono, who was also an active member of BP-7.[10]

Like the indoctrination sessions under Guided Democracy, the principle was that the P4 courses would begin at the centre and spread through the ranks of the bureaucracy and then to society as a whole. On 1 October 1978, President Soeharto opened the first national level P4 course for senior officials. High-level officials were required to attend 'Type A' courses lasting several months. These involved listening to lectures, participating in discussions, and preparing and presenting seminar papers. Second echelon bureaucrats did the shorter, simpler 'Type B' courses, and so on down the line. Courses for low-level government employees, such as drivers and typists, consisted of only a few days of lectures (Thomas 1981: 391; Poesponegoro *et al.* 1990: 515).

The system of instruction was also hierarchically ordered. Ambassadors, vice-chancellors and other high-ranking officials received instruction directly from BP-7 members in intensive courses lasting 120 hours (Kirdi Dipoyudo 1990: 127; Poesponegoro *et al.* 1990: 515). Graduates of the courses conducted by the central and regional offices of the BP-7 were granted the Javanese title '*Manggala*' (Commander), which enabled them to conduct courses for lower ranking officials and act as ideological spokespersons for the government.[11] At each level the ten best graduates qualified to become instructors (Poesponegoro *et al.* 1990: 515). In this way, step by step, P4 reached over two million civil servants and armed forces officers by 1983.[12] By 1990, according to BP-7 head Oetojo Oesman, more than 33 million Indonesians had acquired their knowledge of Pancasila through P4, while 40 million more had acquired 'adequate knowledge and understanding' of the Pancasila through other means (*Jakarta Post*, 18 June 1990).

Several commentators have been struck by the extraordinary seriousness with which the P4 courses were taken by instructors and participants alike.

David Jenkins (1981: 31) described how civil servants, 'abandoning the practices of a lifetime, arrive punctually at a seminar hall at eight in the morning and stay there, alert and attentive, until six in the evening … day after day for two weeks'. Others have described how officials, almost too sick to walk, would insist on hauling themselves out of bed to attend the P4 courses as though their lives depended on it.[13] What prompted this degree of desperate dedication? The answer lies mainly in the strictness with which the rules governing attendance were enforced.

Attendance at all sessions of the P4 courses was compulsory. Missing even a day would mean failure. No excuses for non-attendance were accepted, not even a death in the family (Morfit 1981: 839). And it was not enough just to turn up; participants had to have the right attitude, as Watson (1987: 18) observed:

> Participants who arrived late at any of the sessions were marked down, so were participants who did not observe proper etiquette by, for example, not sitting properly or not showing due respect to a chairman or yawning. People who were too vocal in the expression of their opinions were also likely to be criticised, as were people who said nothing. Punctilious observance of correct procedures and manners, *sopan santun* in Indonesian, was expected and any lapses were penalised.

Dossiers were kept on all participants and it was made clear to participants that poor marks in the various tests and in the final exam would have a direct bearing on their chances of promotion. As Soeharto put it in his 1988 autobiography:

> Only civil servants and ABRI members who understood the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and the GBHN [all part of the P4 curriculum] would be considered capable of performing satisfactorily their functions as servants of the state and servants of society. I laid a great deal of emphasis on the importance of the courses.
>
> (1988: 315)

It was Soeharto's close personal interest in the success of the P4 programme that explains the singular zeal with which it was implemented and the readiness of the state to absorb its enormous expense, not only of producing and distributing the course materials but also of the serious disruption to government business caused by bureaucrats having to leave their desks for two weeks (Morfit 1981: 838–9).

Once the bulk of civil servants had been drilled, the campaign was widened to the broader population according to functionally defined categories. These included, Soeharto (1988: 316) wrote:

> [M]embers of political parties and Golkar, *ulama* and religious figures, youth and students, *karyawan* of private corporations, businesspeople,

> women, journalists, artists and so on. Mindful of the benefit and importance of the courses for the wider society, I regarded it as important to continue and extend the courses, especially among society leaders down to the local level.

Indonesian citizens living overseas were also obliged to take part in P4 courses at their local embassies and consulates. Special three-day Pancasila 'orientation' sessions were even set up, which some foreign businesspeople living in Indonesia were encouraged to attend (Jenkins 1981: 31).

Although participants had good reasons to want to do well in the courses, many made fun of them in private. Watson (1987: 18–19, 46–7) reports a 'very wide scepticism' about the campaign arising from the venality of some of the instructors – who would sometimes overcharge for the documentary materials – the triteness of the content of the P4 courses and the lack of opportunity for genuine discussion during the sessions.[14] Cynicism about the courses was particularly pronounced among the intelligentsia – especially among those who remembered Sukarno's expensive and widely derided Manipol-USDEK '*indoktrinasi*' project – but was also apparent among civil servants in the provinces and among *Manggala* themselves (see Watson 1987; Bresnan 1993: 243).[15]

If responsibility for indoctrinating civil servants and the society at large belonged to BP-7 – and to a lesser extent the information ministry and the social and cultural affairs section of the interior ministry – the task of 'Pancasila-ising' students and schoolchildren was in the hands of the education department. Between April 1977 and July 1978 the education department carried out several revisions to the university curriculum, leading to the introduction of lectures on the Pancasila as a compulsory part of the basic curriculum of all tertiary institutions. One circular to the heads of tertiary institutes from the director-general of higher education pointed out that the aim of the lectures was to create a belief in the Pancasila as the nation's *Volksgeist* (original in German).[16]

The nationwide centralisation of ideological propagation for adults was matched by a similar tightening of control over the production of Pancasila material for schoolchildren. Soon after Daoed Joesoef took over as education minister in 1978, Darji was appointed director-general of primary and secondary education. Responsibility for Pancasila moral education – 'PMP' was the schoolchildren's equivalent of P4 – was assigned solely to Darji and textbooks produced by Darji's team became the required texts for all schools (Thomas 1981: 390–1).

The values propagated in the New Order's post-1978 ideological campaign were stated most plainly in the PMP textbooks. Key themes of these texts were hierarchy, order, leadership and the family. One third-grade primer takes the classroom as a starting point:

> The class must be ordered so that it can fulfil its task. Therefore it needs a leader to set the rules for the group, to distribute tasks and duties and to

> control their implementation. It is the obligation of the led to obey their leaders.[17]

But the school was only a small part of a larger hierarchy:

> The teacher leads the class, the school director leads the teacher. The same principle of leadership applies for the whole social order, in villages, cities, districts, corporations, offices, the defence forces and so on up the social hierarchy until the president. The leader does his best to lead well and understands his duty to protect all those he leads.[18]

Underpinning the social order as a whole was the family and its values. Fearing, perhaps, that schoolchildren might draw on their own varied experiences of family life, the texts spelt out what a good family looked like:

> In the family there is a feeling of mutual consideration and empathy. The father works in the interests of the whole family. Your mother cares for your father and all the children. Often your father puts the needs of his family above his own needs. He postpones buying himself shoes because he has to buy you a schoolbag. It is the same with your mother. … Father and mother see you and the interests of the family as more important than their own. How happy is a household with such a mother and father.[19]

This spirit of empathy and spontaneous helpfulness was represented as the basis of *gotong royong*, the 'characteristic of our nation'.[20]

Family life was also used in the PMP texts as the point of departure for a discussion of *musyawarah*, the principle of deliberation. The main function of *musyawarah* here was not to facilitate active participation in decision making but rather to guarantee harmony. Indeed the maintenance of harmony within the family was depicted as one of the main tasks of the father and as intimately related to the preservation of stability in the state and society as a whole. As one primary school text put it: 'The father's avoidance of danger within the family is the first step in the building of the state as the big family of the Indonesian nation.'[21] Family, society and state were represented as a continuum, each of them grounded in traditional values.

Musyawarah, either in within the family, within village assemblies or within the state, was depicted as a *directed* process. The father was typically described as the 'leader of the deliberation'. Drawings in schoolbooks illustrating the process of deliberation in village assemblies or among urban groups typically showed an authoritative-looking male leader physically separated from his 'audience', usually drawn sitting facing him in orderly rows (e.g. Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1986: 18, 19, 21). The leader was on all occasions speaking, rather than listening to the audience. The MPR was depicted in the same way – a deferential village assembly writ large. In this way the

New Order state was represented as being fundamentally in harmony with indigenous *adat* practices that were manifest in the family and in villages all over the country. There was room in this vision for the audience to contribute suggestions, but not for serious debate or unresolved differences. The purpose of deliberation, as in the discussions within the PMP and P4 classes themselves according to Soeharto (1988: 316) was to reach a unanimity of opinion.

The need of individuals and groups to be prepared to subordinate their interests to the welfare of the whole was represented as a key attribute of citizenship (Sudarmadi and Sukrisno 1981: 44). In a second grade primer, a boy scout with 'UUD 45' (1945 Constitution) emblazoned across his chest and the Pancasila eagle floating halo-like over his head is depicted holding two tablets. On the tablet in his right hand the word 'duties' is inscribed in heavy letters. The tablet in his left hand bears the word 'rights', written in hollow script. Below the picture is the caption: 'I put duties before rights'.[22]

As in the P4 guide, there is a strong emphasis in the PMP texts on tolerance. One admirable aspect of this is the encouragement given to readers to accept the differences between the various religious and mystical groups.[23] At the same time, the texts were classically organicist in their plea for an acceptance of social inequality. Disparities in wealth were depicted as part of God's plan:

> There are all kinds of people in society. Some are physically normal, some are crippled. Some people are of normal intelligence, some are subnormal. Others, on the other hand, are unusually bright or special. Finally, some people are very rich while others are poor.
>
> (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1986: 97)

This was illustrated by a sketch of five characters: a one-legged man on crutches, a beggar, a gaunt-faced peasant, a ready-for-action square-jawed 'modern' youth (a familiar character in Golkar election posters) and a balding businessman in dark glasses holding a briefcase. Beneath the picture is the caption: 'God has indeed willed our different circumstances' (ibid.: 98).

The purpose of P4

> P4 is political education designed to prevent the emergence of thinking outside the framework of the system which we have tried so hard to build.
>
> (Governor of East Java retired Major General Soelarso in Hersubeno Arief 1992: 56)

There is no simple explanation why Soeharto was prepared to divert so much of the government's time, resources and energy into a ideological campaign that many saw as out of character with its accent on economic development and its rejection of Sukarno-style crusades.

Watson (1987: 48) has suggested that the P4 campaign should be understood in the context of 'an elaborate government response to public criticism

of the perceived weaknesses in the conduct of government administration', especially of corruption. He did not rule out the possibility that the government genuinely believed that it could improve the behaviour of its officials by the 'imposition of morality by decree', but argued that given the New Order's record of meeting criticism with such half-hearted initiatives as the 'live modestly' campaign in the early 1970s, it is more likely that the P4 campaign was simply an effort by the government to disarm its critics by appearing to be concerned about moral bankruptcy.

It is true that P4 had a public relations function. The government was clearly keen to be seen impressing on civil servants the importance of maintaining a high standard of morality. As the target of criticism changed, so did the focus of the P4. President Soeharto was reported in 1995, for instance, as urging senior P4 instructors to formulate 'a fundamental response' to correct the public perception that the post-1983 deregulation and liberalisation of the economy was 'capitalistic' and in contravention of Article 33 of the constitution, which prescribes a more or less socialist economy (*Kompas*, 10 January 1996).

Others have depicted the P4 campaign as a response to Muslim opposition. Muslim groups, especially those of a modernist persuasion, forced the government to compromise over its plan to revise the marriage laws in 1973 and resisted the inclusion of mysticism as an officially recognised choice on par with mainstream religions. Muslims initiated anti-vice riots in Bandung in 1976 and Muslim students, especially from the Muslim Students Association (HMI), were a major element in the anti-government demonstrations of 1977–8. More important perhaps, Muslim political parties were gaining in popularity, raising their combined vote from 27 per cent in 1971 to 29 per cent in 1977. This argument, put most clearly by Morfit (1981: 850), was not that P4 was a defensive manoeuvre designed to accommodate Muslim criticism but rather an active attempt 'to contain the political appeal of the *santri* tradition'.[24] As Morfit said, the tensions between Pancasila and Islam were sustained in Soeharto's P4. Mysticism, for instance, was explicitly legitimised in the P4 and PMP materials, and Pancasila, not religion, was hailed as the guiding principle of 'social and political life'.

P4 was indeed part of an effort to delegitimise Islam as a force in the political arena. But that was not the only reason the government devoted large resources to it. In an unscripted talk he gave at his house in July 1982 (the verbatim transcript of which was later banned), Soeharto (1982: 11) recounted to a group of Golkar youth leaders how he had struggled since the beginning of the New Order to minimise the influence of 'foreign' ideologies and to have all social and political groups accept Pancasila as the 'one and only ideology'.[25] After this goal had been finally achieved with the promulgation of the 1983 Broad Guidelines of State Policy and the 1985 Societies Law, Soeharto proclaimed in his autobiography (1988: 382) that this had been his administration's 'most important and fundamental national decision'. He believed that he had succeeded in bringing about a 'total renewal' of

Indonesian political culture, 'ideologically unifying all layers, groups, forces and generations of our nation' and doing away with 'the attitude that politics is about competition between forces, about power-building and mobilising forces to defeat other groups that are actually part of the same great national family' (Soeharto 1988: 383). It is clear from such statements that Soeharto saw his project not only as the rebuilding of political structures but also a large-scale transformation of the political culture in Indonesia. In 1969 and again in 1973 he had tried, and failed, to introduce legislation to require all social organisations and political parties to adopt Pancasila as their ideology. Perhaps the clearest statement of his disdain for imported ideologies was his controversial 1980 condemnation of 'socialism, Marhaenism, nationalism and religion' (alongside the more regular culprits communism, Marxism and Leninism) for having 'submerged' the Pancasila in the past (*Kompas*, 8 April 1980). The P4 is perhaps best understood as part of Soeharto's long-term mission to purge Indonesia of the remnants of its old political culture of conflict and competition and to replace it with a new-but-old discourse of harmony and obedience.

Exactly what aspects of the old political culture was P4 designed to counter? Clearly Islam was a major target, but the government was also concerned about the continuing hold that leftist and Sukarnoist ideas had on the population. Ali Moertopo gave a fascinating speech about the purposes of P4 to a group of his information ministry officials in May 1980.

> Indonesians have been influenced by communist thinking for so long that it came to be identified as the Indonesian way of thinking. You were not aware of the arrival of these concepts because they preceded you by two or three generations. Consequently you and your parents' generation considered them to be authentically Indonesian values, which is not the case. Information officers need to be aware of this, and to be careful. If I were not speaking to information officers I would not be delving so deeply.
>
> (Departemen Penerangan 1983: 201)

The objective of P4, according to Moertopo, was to root out these ideas, and in so doing to transform the entire way that Indonesians conceived their own identity and culture. As Moertopo (ibid.: 209) put it in the same speech: '[T]he purpose of the P4 program is none other than to Indonesian-ise Indonesians, by which I mean to make Indonesians truly Indonesian. You have not become a complete citizen until you have mastered P4'.

Once people had adopted a Pancasila 'state of mind' (English in original), or the 'way of thinking that the Pancasila requires', it would, Moertopo (ibid.: 208–9) said:

> be impossible for communist ideology to enter, impossible for other ideologies to enter. With P4 we are re-consolidating the mental, political,

> social and cultural resilience needed to face all possibilities … whether these appear in the form of infiltration from abroad or insurgency from within.

One of the central aims of the P4 campaign, then, was to reconstitute Indonesians in a new image, to create what the government came to call the Pancasila Person (*Manusia Pancasila*) or the Complete Person (*Manusia Seutuhnya*). It is here that the continuity between the indoctrination campaign and the New Order's ambitious political restructuring programme becomes apparent. Just as the government had reshaped the political landscape, so too did it attempt to reshape, in the words of the P4 Guide, 'the attitudes and behaviour of every Indonesian in social and political life' (Yayasan Proklamasi 1978: 10). The totalitarian echoes of this attempt at large-scale psychological transformation are inescapable. As Zeev Sternhell (1979: 354–5) wrote:

> [F]ascism was to be the first political system to call itself totalitarian precisely because it encompassed the whole range of human activity. It was totalitarian because it represented a way of life, because it would penetrate every sector of social and intellectual activity, because it meant to create at once a new type of society and a new type of man.[26]

It is also hard to avoid being reminded of the ideal of the 'Soviet Man' with a 'socialist type of personality', always happy to put the interests of the Party and the Motherland before his own (Smirnov 1973).

But Pancasila people, unlike their Soviet counterparts, had no universalist pretentions. They drew their sustenance from Indonesian tradition, or as Soeharto (1982: 6) put it in his talk to the Golkar youths, from 'the pearls of wisdom of our ancestors'. They had no need for 'modern ideologies' such as Marxism, communism and liberalism, which, while they may have benefited Europeans, had caused only suffering, divisions and catastrophes in Indonesia (Soeharto 1982: 6; *Kompas*, 8 April 1980). Only Pancasila, rooted, as Soeharto claimed, in Indonesia's ancient spiritual traditions, could give Indonesians 'the strength to live' and to resist the destructive influence of outside ideologies.

The New Order's instrumentalization of Pancasila was directly analogous to the use made of the *kokutai* by the pre-war government of Japan. Pancasila and the *kokutai* were each identified as the unique essence of the people and the foundation of the state. Each was the theoretical core of a familial ideology that posited an essential harmony between classes and a necessary unity of state and society. Each was counterpointed to Western ideologies in general, and to communism and liberalism in particular. Each was widely propagated in schools, often by rote learning and with the aid of elaborate diagrams. Each was very vague and flexible, while at the same time generating a large corpus of often arcane and involuted scholarly exegesis. Each was said to have been 'rescued' by a military government and then provided the ideological justification for the dismantling of democratic institutions. Each was

enshrined at the heart of Draconian laws: Japan's peace preservation law made it a crime to 'attempt to change the *kokutai*' whereas Indonesia's anti-subversion law outlawed any act that 'could … distort, undermine or deviate from the ideology of the Pancasila' (Tipton 1990: 62). And each was used to justify the suppression of leftist movements and other manifestations of social unrest in a time of rapid state-directed industrialisation.

The point here is not to demonstrate direct linkages between pre-war Japan and the New Order, but rather to place Soeharto's manipulation of the Pancasila in a larger perspective, to see it as a *formula* that was skilfully deployed for specific political and economic ends.

It is precisely this standing *outside* of Pancasila discourse that the New Order's saturation of the population with Pancasila ideology made so difficult for most Indonesians, perhaps most of all for consumers of the Indonesian media and the education system. Ali Moertopo (1975: 40) wrote that he hoped that with Pancasila the government could 'construct a single language, a single understanding of matters pertaining to social and state life'. While this goal was not achieved, Indonesian political discourse was profoundly affected by decades of Pancasila-isation. One only has to compare the language used in newspapers in the 1950s with that of the 1990s to realise that whole political vocabularies had vanished and new ones had taken over.[27] The new vocabulary of politics, the new hegemonic discourse, made it very difficult publicly to advocate liberal, leftist or Islamic positions except as minor modifications of the existing order.

The success of the government in freezing out alternative political discourses rested partly on the violent suppression of the left and the regular rehearsal of this terror through films, political trials, official speeches and ceremonies.[28] But it also owed a lot to the government's success in identifying the national ideology with a putative 'national personality'. To breach the boundaries imposed on political discourse by the government invited doubts not only about one's past associations with banned or discredited political organisations but also about one's right to a place in the Indonesian 'family'. In the early New Order period there was serious public discussion about appending the UN Declaration of Human Rights to the constitution. When the same thing was proposed in May 1990 by R.C.H. Tangkere, a professor of constitutional law at Sam Ratulangi University in Manado, it was as though a carnivore had escaped from the zoo. Soemitro (1990), a lawyer on the staff of the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, retired Admiral Sudomo, wrote that, after reading the proposal:

> I was really shocked, as if I had been woken suddenly from a peaceful sleep, dreaming in a harmonious atmosphere of social, national and state life based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Which citizen of our nation … would not be shocked to hear so unexpectedly a suggestion which could cast doubt on the truth of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution? … I reject his opinion because it is wrong-headed and because

> his statement could confuse the scholarly community, especially students, and prompt a polemic which in turn could invite opposing opinions as well as social instability which would clearly set back the political struggle of the New Order.
>
> (*Suara Pembaruan*, 28 May 1990)[29]

Soemitro went on to accuse Professor Tangkere of either misunderstanding the Pancasila or attempting 'to change the constitution or manipulate our fundamental principles'. This example highlights the dilemma in which critics of the government found themselves when they dared to step outside the confines of Pancasila discourse.[30] As in prewar Japan, certain absolute political truths had been established that no one was permitted to question in public.

There is a danger of overestimating the impact of Pancasila ideology, of treating it like an all-enveloping gas, stifling all debate and critical thought. As Douglas Ramage (1995) has shown, lively and vigorous debates were possible within the framework of Pancasila discourse. It is also clear that many Indonesians were perfectly aware of the irony inherent in government ideologues instructing them how to be genuine Indonesians. George Quinn's (1995) anecdote from Yogyakarta in the early 1970s is one of many similar stories:

> I still remember sitting with my fellow students slurping up noodles in a campus eating dive … after a particularly numbing oration that droned on for one and a half hours on the topic something like: 'Pancasila bersumber pada rakyat Indonesia' (Pancasila springs from the Indonesian people). One classmate, hunched gloomily over his noodles, said what he would never have dared say in class: 'I'm one of the rank and file of Indonesian people. If Pancasila springs from people like me why do I have to listen to these brain-dead lectures on it? Shouldn't they (the lecturers) be listening to me (one of the rakyat)?'

Over time, however, with the submersion of the old languages of politics, it became progressively more difficult for Indonesians to stand outside Pancasila discourse. While this was most obvious in the public arena, it also made significant inroads to the private sphere of language and thought. Indonesian political scientist Vedi Hadiz recalls how he and his fellow students, who belonged to the last draft at the University of Indonesia not compelled to take the P4 course, were amazed to see first-year students emerging from their course speaking like their instructors and taking on a 'Pancasila frame of mind' (personal communication, December 1992). It was precisely this cultural shift that the P4 was directed at achieving.

Loosening the economy, tightening the screws

Before saying more about ideology, it is necessary to take stock of the recession of the early 1980s, because this had far-reaching ramifications. Sharp

falls in the price of oil and other commodities forced major cutbacks in government spending and an urgent rethink of economic policy. Taking the advice of his technocrats, Soeharto slashed subsidies on basic consumer items and embarked on an accelerated programme of export-oriented industrialisation.

This set Indonesia on a new, unpredictable course. Cutting spending on subsidies and enforcing other austerity measures created real hardship for ordinary people (see e.g. Hill 1984: 36). This, the government was aware, had the potential to spark serious social unrest and undermine the legitimacy it had achieved through its economic successes. Thus, from about 1983 until the late 1980s the government security apparatus was on a heightened state of alert. Ultimate responsibility for keeping the lid on social unrest during this period belonged to General Benny Moerdani, who took over as head of Kopkamtib and commander of the armed forces in March 1983. During Moerdani's tenure (1983–88) there was a marked increase in the use of officially sponsored violence and terror against civilians. Moerdani's most notorious legacy was the 'Petrus' campaign in which incognito commandos murdered several thousand suspected criminals and gang members in Indonesia's major cities between 1983 and 1985 (Bourchier 1990).

Aware that the success of the export industrialisation programme depended on Indonesia's ability to attract highly mobile investment dollars, the government gave top priority to the prevention of industrial unrest and the maintenance of a supply of low-paid, reliable labour. Former Kopkamtib chief Admiral Sudomo was appointed as manpower minister in March 1983 and some months later former Bakin head Lieutenant General Sutopo Yuwono became director general of the same department. Together they put in place a wide range of repressive measures that saw military and intelligence organisations given an overt role in supervising workers and intervening in industrial disputes. Their most enduring achievement was the 1985 restructuring of the FBSI into the SPSI (All Indonesian Worker's Union). Whereas the FBSI was a federation of nominally autonomous industrial unions, the SPSI was organised along military lines with the emphasis on central control and hierarchy. Retired military officers were appointed to head many of its key local and regional posts (Bourchier 1994b: 53). Such were the wage pressures on industrial workers, however, that even in the face of greatly increased surveillance and intervention in industrial disputes by the military, the level of strikes climbed during the first half of the 1980s. Indonesia's new economic policy had brought into being a new social force: a young, urban, increasingly assertive industrial working class.

The massive influx of foreign investment in the 1980s was facilitated not just by cheap labour but also by a succession of deregulation packages that saw state enterprises privatised, monopolies dismantled and restrictions on borrowing and investment liberalised. As the state eased its grip on the economy, new employment opportunities opened up in the private sector for wealthy, well-connected or well-educated Indonesians. The expansion and diversification of the economy led to the rapid growth of the professional and business

classes. Although many members of these classes still relied on favours from government officials, there was a growing constituency among them, and among the broader middle classes, who wanted to see government become less arbitrary and patronage-ridden and guarantee greater procedural certainty and consultation.

Linking up with these voices were those of a new NGO community, which had arisen after the destruction of the parties and the crushing of student protests in the mid 1970s. Especially through media such as the monthly journal *Prisma*, NGOs had developed into a significant source of alternative development thinking. They also came to play an increasingly important advocacy role. The Legal Aid Foundation, for example, made a point of defending critics of the government and victims of what they referred to as 'structural injustice'. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Legal Aid Foundation figures became well known as leading spokespeople for human rights, social justice, workers rights, press freedoms, constitutionalism and the rule of law (Lev 1987).

The position of human rights advocates received a major boost in the late 1970s from the human rights emphasis of the Carter administration and the new celebrity status of Amnesty International, which was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1977. The Carter administration and Amnesty International each pressed Indonesia to release the tens of thousands of political prisoners it had held without trial since 1965–6, and some 31,000 of these were released in the 1977–9 period (Fealy 1995: 39).

Soeharto was also growing impatient with the military. He had been angered by plotting among some of his senior commanders to find a replacement president in 1977–8. He was also annoyed by the increasingly vocal criticisms of his rule by respected retired officers and by a linking up of such officers – most notably generals Nasution and Jasin – with students, former Muslim politicians, intellectuals, human rights activists and lawyers in groups such as the Institute for Constitutional Awareness. One such coalition submitted a petition to parliament in February 1980 in an attempt to head off a draft amendment to the general election law fixing the proportion of appointed seats in parliament. When the bill was pushed through the legislature, the NU bloc within the PPP infuriated Soeharto by walking out, prompting his angry Pakanbaru speech in March 1980 referred to in the previous chapter. In reaction to this speech, 50 public figures – again including very senior retired military men, respected Muslim politicians and intellectuals – signed a 'Statement of Concern', accusing the president of having 'misunderstood' the Pancasila by using it as 'a means to threaten political enemies' and of having spoken as though he was the 'personification' of the Pancasila (Jenkins 1984: 162; Bresnan 1993: 207). Soeharto's bitterness towards the 'Petition of 50 Group', led informally by former Marine General Ali Sadikin, lasted well into the 1990s.

While Soeharto remained committed to the *dwifungsi* doctrine and continued to rely on the military as the watchdogs of the regime, he further

distanced the military as an institution from the centre of power. His 1983–8 cabinet, for instance, contained only two active officers – General Benny Moerdani and General Mohammad Jusuf – who could claim a substantial support base within the army. Ali Moertopo had fallen out of favour and was not included in the cabinet. The concentration of power in Sudharmono's state secretariat continued apace. As Indonesian political scientist Tohir Effendi (1989: 127) put it, Soeharto saw Sudharmono and his group of military lawyers – who had spent a long time in the civil bureaucracy – as having a broader view of the state than the soldiers 'whose only real expertise was in using weapons, counting money and spying on people'. Since the mid 1970s Soeharto had channelled a substantial portion of the development budget through the state secretariat into high-priority projects decided on by the Secretariat. In 1980 Sudharmono's patronage powers were boosted enormously when he was given authority to screen all government purchases and services worth more than Rp500 million. At the same time Sudharmono moved to secure his group's domination of Golkar, and soon afterwards was appointed to a team of five whose task it was to 'supervise and control political developments' in the period leading up to the 1982 elections (Bourchier 1987b). In 1983 Sudharmono took over as general chairman of Golkar while retaining his position as state secretary. This put him in the extraordinary position of controlling both the bureaucratic-administrative and political arms of government at once (Effendi 1989: 124).

With the obvious blessing of Soeharto, Sudharmono used his power to weaken the military's political position and divert lucrative tenders away from the military towards his rapidly growing clientele of civilian bureaucrats and indigenous businesspeople (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 106–7). In 1982 he spoke in favour of ending the system by which the military were apportioned a quota of seats in the MPR, a change that had been canvassed by Soeharto the year before (Sudharmono 1982: 9). And as Golkar chair he worked to reduce military influence and to transform it into a cadre organisation with a mass membership and an organisational structure that depended less on military backing (see e.g. Vatikiotis 1993: 85). None of these moves endeared Sudharmono, or indeed Soeharto, to the armed forces leadership, who became increasingly preoccupied through the 1980s with defending their stake in the political system.

Renewing the ideological push

Sudharmono's moves to marginalise the military were not part of a democratic agenda. On the contrary, the state secretariat was concerned primarily with tightening bureaucratic control over potential sources of countervailing power. Sudharmono's Military Law Academy faction had used its dominance of the legal apparatus to persecute dissidents in the late 1970s and continued to do so for the next decade. It was also closely associated with moves to restrict the autonomy of professional associations such as the Bar Association

and NGOs like the Legal Aid Foundation. Perhaps most important, Sudharmono's state secretariat, in association with the interior ministry, was responsible for drafting a package of five political laws, promulgated in 1985, which were the culmination of two decades of political engineering by the New Order.

One of these laws increased the total size of the DPR from 470 to 500, and in the process raised the proportion of appointed representatives, making it next to impossible for a non-government party to achieve a majority in the legislature. Further cementing the status quo, and reflecting the government's almost obsessive fear of constitutional reform, was another law requiring any proposal to alter the constitution to receive 90 per cent support from 90 per cent of registered voters in a referendum.

As well as consolidating the existing system, the new laws extended considerably the power of the state. Especially important was the so-called 'societies law', which gave the interior minister authority to ban social or political organisations that failed to comply with a series of directives requiring them, *inter alia*, to amalgamate with 'similar' organisations to produce so-called sole vehicles, to obtain government permission before receiving any financial assistance from abroad, to accept 'guidance' by ministers of state responsible for their 'field of activity', and to avoid any activities that could discredit the government. Although the government chose not to implement all provisions of this law, it nevertheless added to the already powerful arsenal of legal weapons the government was able to apply at its discretion. It also helped reinforce the notion that all organised activity in society was essentially the state's business. NGOs decided at the time to rename themselves Social Self-Reliance Organisations (*Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat*) to escape the 'confrontational and adversarial' implications of the title 'non-governmental' organisations (Lubis 1993: 237).

The most controversial part of the societies law was the requirement that all social and political organisations adopt Pancasila as their 'sole foundation' (*azas tunggal*) within two years. For some groups this was simply a formality. The political parties, for instance, had already committed themselves to this, and most of the functional and professional organisations of women, civil servants, workers, peasants and so on had been effectively corralled into government-controlled corporatist bodies in the 1970s. Most NGOs likewise saw little problem in incorporating Pancasila into their statutes and carrying on as before. But many religious organisations saw the requirement that they formally adopt Pancasila as their *sole* foundation as a direct challenge to their integrity. In the years since August 1982, when Soeharto had called on all social–political forces to accept the state ideology as their sole foundation, representatives from all the major religions in Indonesia had strongly and repeatedly expressed their concern (Awanohara 1984; Natsir 1985: 2–3). Sections of the modernist Muslim community, perceiving Islam to be the main target of the proposed legislation, took particular exception to it. In a widely circulated letter dated 17 July 1983, the Masjumi leader and one-time finance

minister Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1984) accused Soeharto of trying 'to kill Islam with Pancasila' and of attempting to turn Pancasila into a 'comprehensive religion'. Forcing religious organisations to base themselves only on Pancasila, he warned, would turn Indonesia into 'a barren Sahara desert, consisting only of stones and undifferentiated particles of sand'. Former Masjumi prime minister Mohammad Natsir (1985) and retired General Nasution (1984: 6) also made sharp attacks on the proposed legislation, the latter claiming that 'stressing unity by making diversity disappear' would 'bring about a regimentation of state, national and social life' and work against the very principles of harmony on which Pancasila is based. Relations between the government and sections of the Muslim community deteriorated badly over the next year, the low point coming in September 1984 when troops under Moerdani's command gunned down scores of unarmed Muslim opponents of the proposed legislation in Jakarta's poverty-ridden port area of Tanjung Priok. This massacre, and the harsh sentences imposed on participants and supposed organisers of the demonstration, inspired a wave of anti-government bombings and arson attacks by Muslim activists during 1985.

The threat of outright rejection by religious organisations, including Christian groups sympathetic to the government's efforts to contain political Islam, persuaded Soeharto to adjust the societies law to apply only to private organisations made up entirely of Indonesian citizens, and which had social programmes. Many bodies such as the Catholic Church and the government-sponsored Council of Islamic Scholars were thus exempted from the need to comply with the law (Awanohara 1984). It still applied, however, to a wide range of organisations and was enforced with particular vigour among youth associations, which the government had failed to bring under its control in the 1970s. This caused serious internal rifts in many organisations, including the 150,000-strong Muslim Students Association, which adopted Pancasila as its sole foundation only after fierce argument that saw the secession of several campus chapters and the resignation of the national chair (Kaye 1985: 15; *Tempo*, 29 March 1986). Indonesian Muslim Youth (Pemuda Islam Indonesia) refused to register and was banned as a result (interview, legal aid lawyer, Jakarta, 18 March 1991).

The government's indoctrination efforts in the area of education were intensified after Soeharto gave the job of education minister to Nugroho Notosusanto in 1983. A true believer in the New Order and in the power of propaganda, Nugroho set to work at once on the students of the University of Indonesia, where he had been vice-chancellor since 1982. Nugroho cancelled the customary initiation programme, replacing it with an intensive two-week P4 course as a compulsory part of the curriculum for first-year students. Declaring the experiment a success, Nugroho extended the programme to all state tertiary education institutions the following year, generating a big demand for Pancasila instructors and a boost to the publishing industry (see e.g. *Tempo*, 6 August 1983). Discipline was enforced strictly, with students forbidden to talk to the press about the content of the courses (ibid.). There

was also an expansion of the surveillance function of the courses, with instructors in some regions required to study the backgrounds of the students and to use this intelligence when supervising discussions and simulation games (Widjaya 1985: 122–30).

Harnessing history

Another important way in which the government attempted to strengthen its ideological armoury was by stepping up the dissemination of its own version of history. No one contributed more to reconstructing the past to suit the ideological purposes of the New Order than Nugroho. In 1968 he had co-authored an official account of the 1965 coup attempt and in the early 1980s Nugroho had a major input into the preparation of the propaganda film *The Treachery of G30S/PKI*, which, between 1984 and 1998, was broadcast annually on state television on 30 September. As Ariel Heryanto (2006: 9) has argued, the film's main messages are that the PKI masterminded the 1965 coup attempt and that the military counter-attack was a 'spontaneous, heroic, and interest-free initiative to rescue the nation-state not only from a communist take-over, but also from chaos, terror and social disintegration'. So central were these messages to the New Order's self-justification that Heryanto described the film as a 'master-narrative', setting the formal boundaries for legitimate public discourse about the political history of the regime.

As education minister, Nugroho also oversaw the introduction into the curriculum – from kindergarten to university – of a new compulsory subject called History of the National Struggle (PSPB). The standard texts for PSPB were based on the official *National History of Indonesia*, as well as the illustrated four-volume *30 Years of Indonesian Independence*, both of which Nugroho had been in charge of editing. Unlike 'history', which already existed as a compulsory subject in schools, PSPB had the explicitly ideological objective of using historical episodes as a means of inculcating in students Pancasila values such as 'cooperation' and 'togetherness' as well as values such as 'heroism', 'bravery', 'willingness to sacrifice' and so on (Bourchier 1994a).

One of the most revealing aspects of the PSPB texts is their treatment of the period of parliamentary democracy. As I have argued elsewhere, the primary function of 'the 1950s' in New Order discourse has been as a symbol of the fundamental lack of fit between political liberalism – and, by extension, 'Western' political thought as a whole – and Indonesia's 'national personality'. In the language of the New Order, the Fifties stand for liberalism, Westernism, national disintegration, chronic political instability and economic backwardness, the mirror image of the New Order's accent on indigenism, national unity, political stability and development (Bourchier 1994a: 50).

Political parties and civilian politicians were given little credit for achieving anything in the revolution (rebranded the 'war of independence') and were

represented as misguided at best during the liberal era. Hatta's Decree of 3 November 1945, which paved the way for the free formation of political parties was presented as a serious mistake and as a 'dark day' in the history of the Republic (see e.g. Tugiyono and Soegiono 1991: 101). Schoolbook accounts of the democratic 1950s virtually ignore the parliamentary politics of the period, devoting almost all their space to the regional rebellions and 'security disturbances' in various parts of the archipelago. A 1989 standard Year 3 junior high school primer, for instance, required students to memorise the details of 12 different rebellions that occurred between 1950 and 1959 but mentioned the name of only one prime minister (Ananta 1989: 38–47). The heroes of the period are the military, portrayed as the saviours of national integrity.

The none-too-subtle objective of these PSPB texts, and of the broader New Order discourse about the 1950s, was to place discussion of the separation of powers, regional autonomy, parliamentarism and a free press out of bounds. Those who advocated any or all of these things could be, and were, accused of wanting to return Indonesia to the 'anarchy' of the past.

'Integralism' walks again

As Pancasila indoctrination intensified, ideologues came under pressure to define what distinguished Pancasila ideology from other ideologies. Most textbook authors were a lot clearer about what Pancasila was not than what it was. One university-level P4 textbook listed five 'characteristics' of Pancasila ideology in this way:

- Not an amalgamation of other ideologies existing in the world.
- Characterised by a creative unity in diversity.
- Pancasila is not a religion.
- None of the principles of Pancasila conflict with religion.
- Pancasila is not a rigid and frozen doctrine but rather gives room for debate and criticism.

(Widjaya 1985: 111)

The authors of the 1984 comparative study (Sosronegoro *et al*. 1984: 130–7) were just as lost when it came to describing what it was that made the 'Pancasila State' unique in the world. In a table summarising the political, social and economic characteristics of various types of state, the section on the 'Pancasila State' is comically brief and formalistic, listing only a few points such as 'The Broad Guidelines of State Policy are determined once every five years by the MPR' and 'the President is the Mandatory of the MPR'. After all the money spent on Pancasila research and development there was little clarity about what actually set Indonesia's Pancasila democracy apart from other ideologies and systems of rule. In this context of confusion and drift, and in the face of growing challenges framed in terms of human and

political rights, Soeharto's ideologues exhumed Supomo's theory of the 'integralist state'.

Simanjuntak (1989) argued that the government's incorporation of Supomo's integralist theory into P4 materials from 1984 and its subsequent adoption of integralism as Indonesia's official state concept was new and scandalous. Within the terms of the legalist conceptual framework he used, he was right on both counts. Indonesian constitutional lawyers had rarely used the term 'integralist', a fact that Simanjuntak argued signalled a consensus that Supomo's concept of the 'integralist state' had been defeated in 1945 by Hatta and his supporters (Simanjuntak 1989: 91–8, 239). But if we take a historical perspective, as I have tried to do in this book, and focus on the ideas behind Supomo's 1945 speech rather than his terminology, it is clear that Supomo's conservative organicist vision lived on in one form or another through the 1950s and 1960s among politicians and constitutional lawyers. In his capacity as secretary general of the MPRS in 1972 Abdulkadir Besar had advocated that Supomo's integralism (which he equated with the family principle) be adopted formally as the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state. Although his ideas were not then explicitly embraced by the New Order government they were incorporated in the curricula of the armed forces staff colleges, including Seskoad where Abdulkadir taught courses on ideology and constitutional law between 1972 and 1979 (Ramage 1995: 126). Proponents of the idea also taught at the Police College, the Military Law Academy and the Military Law College in the 1960s and 1970s.

A major attraction of integralist theory for staff of the military and police academies was that it could be construed as providing a constitutional rationale for *dwifungsi*. Military ideologues had indeed long maintained that the *dwifungsi* doctrine was closely entwined with the family principle. Abdulkadir, who was primarily responsible for developing this argument, put forward his thoughts in two important position papers on the *dwifungsi* doctrine in 1978 and 1979, the latter commissioned by the Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Widodo.[31] His argument, in essence, was that because Indonesia was a family state, every member of society had a responsibility for the welfare of the entire family. Armed forces members were therefore responsible not only for defending the state but for developing its economic, cultural and political life. The Indonesian family state did not recognise the principle of 'civilian supremacy' or think in terms of the notion of 'civil–military relations'. Referring to Supomo's organicist logic, Abdulkadir argued that *dwifungsi* was not only constitutionally justified, but 'a product of Indonesian culture'.[32]

Although some of Abdulkadir's ideas about *dwifungsi* – especially his proposal that the armed forces loosen their grip on Golkar – were rejected by 'pragmatic' elements in the defence ministry, his use of the integralist framework was not. Even those who had opposed Abdulkadir's proposals most fervently in 1979, such as Nugroho Notosusanto and the military lawyer and politician retired Brigadier General A.S.S. Tambunan, had, by 1983 at least,

embraced the argument that Supomo's integralism provided the 'theoretical foundation' for the armed forces' social–political role.[33]

In 1984 Abdulkadir helped supervise the production of a large *festschrift* to celebrate what would have been Djokosutono's eightieth birthday. The book contained essays by 27 prominent military and civilian lawyers, legal academics, police, judges and economists, including Abdulkadir, who was now a major-general, a senior member of the BP-7 and assistant for political affairs in the office of the coordinating minister for politics and security retired General Surono. Abdulkadir's contribution, titled 'The Unitary State: the Integralist State Concept is manifest in the 1945 Constitution' was one of the most comprehensive attempts to date by an Indonesian ideologue to define an organicist paradigm and apply it to the country's constitutional structure. After the manner of Djokosutono, Abdulkadir drew on a large and eclectic body of Western literature, from Plato to Jacques Oppenheim's 1893 'Theory of the Organic State' and American systems theorists such as Stanford Optner and John Sutherland to outline a 'philosophy of integration' according to which all people, things, ideas, principles and laws form part of an interconnected and interdependent unity. The central idea, Abdulkadir (Besar 1984: 94) argued, was that:

> the whole is paramount, supported by the parts which constitute it. … This means that every part always carries out its function within the framework of achieving goals as determined by the whole. The characteristics and function of each part flows from its location within the whole, and this requires that the way in which the parts relate to one another is regulated by the whole.

Over time, he maintained, natural and social systems change according to their own logic, becoming more complex, differentiated and hierarchical, manifesting what he called a 'neo-genetic hierarchy' (Besar 1984: 111–12). Cells develop into complex humans and human societies evolve into higher manifestations, higher wholes called states. States, in order to command the respect of their people, must embody intrinsic truths rooted in the culture of the society.

Quoting Supomo's 1945 speech, Abdulkadir argued that the essence of the Indonesian state, and indeed the guiding principle of the entire life of the Indonesian people, past, present and future, was the integralist state concept. According to Abdulkadir (Besar 1984: 114–17), Sukarno was just as committed to the integralist vision as Supomo, as was evident in the 'integralist' nature of the Pancasila, each of its principles emphasising wholeness, completeness and the responsibility of the state for protecting the welfare of the entire society. The integralist intentions of the founding fathers were also apparent, he maintained, in Supomo's description of the president as 'the embodiment of popular sovereignty' (Besar 1984: 122) and their decision that the MPR ought to be constituted along organic lines, i.e. by appointment rather than

by means of direct election.[34] Direct elections and the idea of parliamentarians representing specific constituencies, Abdulkadir argued, stemmed from an individualistic state concept and were therefore inappropriate for Indonesia. Parliamentary delegates had to be oriented not to sectional interests but to the interests of the whole because in an integralist system based on *musyawarah*, he stressed (Besar 1984: 130), there could be no such thing as 'conflict, 'give and take' or compromise, or majorities and minorities … and therefore never any need to make decisions by voting'.

Abdulkadir's BP-7 colleagues seem to have been impressed by his arguments and began referring more frequently to 'integralism' in their discussions. The first sign that integralism had seeped into the mainstream came in a 1984 P4 textbook by retired Brigadier General Suntjojo, a *Manggala* of the Central BP-7.[35] A diagram in this book represented the theory of the 'integralist state' as described by Supomo as the source of the '1945 Constitution's view of human rights'. Within three years, the integralist state concept had been fully incorporated in high-level P4 courses, the curricula of schools and universities' 'constitutional studies' courses (see e.g. Gunakaya and Surayin 1987: 22–3, 32–6) and was on the tongues of senior government officials. By the end of the decade the notion that Indonesia was an 'integralist state' had become part of New Order orthodoxy. As journalist Situmorang (1990: 36) observed: 'The "integralist state" has become … a kind of new idiom, which needs to be inserted into speeches, welcoming addresses, seminars, gatherings and even in informal occasions'. Armed Forces Commander General Try Soetrisno, whose public comments rarely deviated far from the regime's ideological centre, was fond of saying that because Indonesia was an integralist state it did not recognise opposition, did not recognise individualistic or liberalistic attitudes, did not recognise notions such as core and periphery, workers and bosses, military and civilian (*Kompas*, 20 September 1990; *Suara Pembaruan*, 15 February and 13 March 1991). These concepts were all held to belong to an alien, dichotomistic way of thinking that was both un-Indonesian and against the spirit of the constitution.

What lay behind this sudden enthusiasm for a theory that was already discredited in many quarters when Supomo had delineated it in 1945? Douglas Ramage, who interviewed several military figures in Jakarta in 1992, argued (1995: 125–30) that the promotion of integralism was essentially a military initiative to remould Pancasila discourse in such a way as to make the doctrine of *dwifungsi* an inseparable part of the state ideology and thereby preserve their privileged position in the political system.

There is no question that the military used integralism in this way, especially in the early 1990s when Soeharto's courtship of political Islam gave the military serious reason to fear not only for their own political future but for the future of the New Order's non-sectarian political formula. The fact that the BP-7 was headed between 1984 and 1987 by retired Lieutenant General Sarwo Edhie,[36] a staunch defender of *dwifungsi*, would also appear to point to strong military backing for the revival of integralism from an early stage.

But such an interpretation does not account for the broad institutional support the revival received. The BP-7, for instance, which was responsible directly to the president, could not have embarked on a campaign to reframe the basis of the Indonesian state without Soeharto's explicit support. His blessing would also have been necessary for integralism to be introduced to school and university curricula nationwide. More importantly, if the promotion of integralism was primarily a military initiative, it would be hard to explain why senior officials associated with Golkar and the state secretariat – two of the institutions that were most closely identified in the mid 1980s with advancing the interests of the civilian (as opposed to the military) arm of government – took such an active role in its promotion. The Golkar newspaper *Pelita*, for instance, pushed integralism actively from at least October 1986 (see e.g. *Pelita*, 21 October 1986). Sudharmono himself was also a keen supporter, telling social scientists in Ujung Pandang in December the same year that integralism was the driving spirit behind the constitution and relating it to all aspects of national life (*Pelita*, 16 December 1986). Sudharmono's Military Law Academy faction were of course no strangers to organicist philosophy. They were heirs to the same tradition of thinking about constitutional law that Abdulkadir had immersed himself in.

Assuming, then, that the revitalisation of Supomo's integralist state concept enjoyed the backing of the wider regime leadership, what purposes was it intended to serve? Its adoption is probably best seen as a defensive manoeuvre on the part of the New Order leadership in the face of challenges from a number of directions. One such challenge was the growing chorus of domestic and international criticism of the New Order's human rights record. The first appearance of 'integralism' in a P4 text was, after all, in the context of explaining the constitution's attitude towards human rights. Declaring the Indonesian state to be based on integralism was an attempt to exempt it from criticisms framed in the 'liberal' language of human rights.

The embrace of integralism was also intended to cut the ground from under the feet of the New Order's constitutionalist critics. A constant theme in the critiques made by the Petition of 50, the Institute for Constitutional Awareness and a range of NGOs and intellectuals throughout the 1980s was that the ground rules laid down by the Soeharto government concerning such matters as elections, political parties and the composition of parliament contravened basic constitutional rights and freedoms. The logic here is that because the state concept (*Staatsidee*) occupied the supreme position in the hierarchy of legal norms, it governed how all subordinate legal products, including the constitution, should be interpreted. With the government's jurists and ideologues declaring the 'source of all sources of law' to be integralist, it became more difficult for critics to use constitutionalist arguments to press for democratic reform.

An example of the way in which integralist precepts were used to negate potentially democratic elements in the constitution was the argument put by constitutional lawyer and Deputy Cabinet Secretary Dr Hamid S. Attamimi,

who maintained (1990: 143–6) that the constitution's differentiation between legislative, executive and regulatory powers could not be regarded as endorsing the separation of powers because, according to Supomo, this concept was not in accordance with Indonesia's integralist state concept.

The use to which the integralist state concept was put, then, was analogous to the way in which 'Pancasila' had been used in the early years of the regime, that is as a foil against pressures to move the country in a more liberal or democratic political direction. It may be that the regime's ideologues felt that, especially in the wake of the divisive and potentially explosive 'sole foundation' debates, the Pancasila had become too ineffectual a weapon to counter the increasingly sophisticated attacks on the government from critics who could be categorised neither as 'extreme leftists' nor as 'extreme rightists' (Muslim fundamentalists). The government's ideologues saw in integralism a scholarly and scientific, and yet, by virtue of Supomo's imprimatur, still congenial and 'authentic' tradition of political thought, which could help put the regime on a more secure ideological footing and provide it with arguments to fend off criticism from what came to be referred to jokingly as the 'extreme centre'.

Yet, by explicitly identifying the fundamental principle behind the Indonesian state with a European political tradition (the textbook references to integralism almost always mentioned 'Spinoza, Hegel and Adam Müller'), regime ideologues were on thin ice. First of all they were departing from their past insistence on the absolute indigeneity of Indonesian ideology. Second, by adopting Supomo's argument lock, stock and barrel (albeit minus the references to Nazi Germany, Japan and totalitarianism) they left themselves open to a reaction from critics for which they were utterly unprepared.

Notes

1 In a speech at Gadjah Mada University in 1974 he called for Pancasila to be '*disatu tafsirkan*' (literally: singly explicated).
2 Born in Blora, Central Java on 5 March 1920, retired Brigadier General Darji Darmodihardjo obtained his law degree from Brawijaya University in Malang. As a lieutenant colonel in 1966, he was on the steering committee of the Second Army Seminar at Seskoad and was appointed the same year as the dean of the IKIP Malang. From 1969–73 he was assistant for territorial affairs in the East Javanese military command, after which he was appointed dean of Brawijaya University where he took an active role in supervising higher educational institutions in East Java generally. From May 1978 to March 1985 Darji was director-general of primary and secondary education and director general of basic and secondary education in the ministry of education and culture, during which time he lectured at Seskoad and was appointed as a member of the Central BP-7. Darji was a strong defender of integralism into the 1990s.
3 Members included historian and lawyer Nyoman Dekker, law lecturer Mardojo, Masrukan, I. Ketut Sudiri Panyarikan, Mohammad Noor Syam and Krissantono, a member of Moertopo's CSIS (Darmodihardjo 1974: 236–8; Wandelt 1989: 218, 221).
4 Nugroho Notosusanto (1985c: 32–3), one of the army's leading ideologues, damned 'internationalism' as 'communist'.

5 Nugroho Notosusanto studied history at the University of London in the early 1960s and later wrote a doctoral dissertation at the University of Indonesia about the Japanese-created Peta army. He began working as a historian for the military in 1964, lecturing at several of their institutions. In 1967, while chief historian of the armed forces, Nugroho co-authored an English language account of the coup to counter claims disputing the official version (1968). He wrote several books about the military and politics in Indonesia all highly supportive of orthodox New Order doctrine (see Notosusanto 1975, 1985a, 1985b). Recognition of his position as a military ideologue came in the form of an honorary commission as an army brigadier general. See McGregor (2007: *passim*) and Jenkins (1984: 191–5).
6 Darji Darmodihardjo, 'Kerangka (Schema) Cara Memahami Pancasila' in Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Bahan Penataran Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, sesuai dengan Ketetapan MPR No.II/MPR/1978, untuk guru PMP, SD, SLTP, STLA, Jakarta, 1979 pp. 8–11 cited in Wandelt (1989: 237). Emphasis in original.
7 Presidential Address at the opening of the National Jamboree of the Scouts Movement on 12 April 1976, translated in Watson (1987: 41).
8 A Sanskrit term officially translated as 'A Single Vow in Fulfilment of the Five-fold Aspiration' (Yayasan Proklamasi 1978: 9). Watson (1987: 43) argues persuasively that this term was used to distinguish the Pancasila as a moral code from the Pancasila as the essence of the nation (cf Bonneff *et al*. 1980: 212).
9 See for instance Kansil (1976) and Idris *et al*. (1977).
10 Other members included Golkar representatives Nyoman Dekker (an education department official who had been a core member of Laboratorium Pancasila) and Krissantono (a member of Laboratorium Pancasila and CSIS) as well as H. Imam Sudarwo (a central Javanese Catholic trade unionist) and Soeprapto (an education department official). See Wandelt (1989: 221, 263).
11 In 1996 there were about 600 *Manggala* (Loren Ryter, letter, 21 February 1996).
12 The figures in Soeharto (1988: 315) are 1.8 civil servants and 150,000 armed forces members.
13 Interviews with Indonesian students and journalists, Melbourne and Jakarta (1983–91).
14 George Quinn, who attended compulsory Pancasila courses while studying at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta in the early 1970s (i.e. pre-P4) wrote of the 'semi-catatonic state' that the Pancasila lectures induced in most students and of the confusion and frustration of the brighter among them in not being able to ask serious questions (Quinn 1995).
15 On the Manipol-USDEK project see Feith (1967: 366–72).
16 Surat Edaran Direktur Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan kepada Rektor Universitas/Institut dan Kopertis No.627/D/L/1978 tanggal 5 October 1978 tentang Pedoman Perkuliahan Pancasila pada Perguruan Tinggi, cited in Wandelt (1989: 259).
17 Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, Sekolah Dasar Kelas 3, 1984: 54 (cited in Wandelt 1989: 250).
18 Ibid.: 56–8 (cited in Wandelt 1989: 250).
19 Ibid.: 79 (cited in Wandelt 1989: 251).
20 Ibid.: c.82 (cited in Wandelt 1989: 252).
21 Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, Sekolah Dasar Kelas 5, 1984: 24 (cited in Wandelt 1989: 254).
22 Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, Sekolah Dasar Kelas 2, 1984: 5 (in Wandelt 1989: 248).
23 Even here the differences were represented as concealing an underlying unity: a sixth-grade PMP text shows representatives of all five major religions together in a room praying to what is strongly implied as the same God. The caption reads 'Oh

God! Protect me' (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1986: 10). In this worldview, religions are to God what ethnic groups are to Indonesia.

24 The *santri* tradition refers to the set of beliefs associated with the orthodox Muslim community.

25 See Bourchier and Hadiz (2003: 103–9) for a translation of key passages of this speech, and Ward (2010: 27–37) for a penetrating analysis.

26 The Brazilian Integralists in the 1930s likewise sought to create a 'new order' by bringing about 'an internal revolution in each person, a transformation of everyone's way of thinking' (Williams 1974: 440).

27 Anderson (1994: 139) lists a sample: 'In place of *marhaen*, *gembong*, *ormas*, *buruh*, *trias politica*, *pentjoleng*, *tionghoa*, *kedaulatan rakjat*, *aliran*, and a hundred others have come *siskamling*, *mantan*, *kotor lingkungan*, *repelita*, *cina*, *akselerasi modernisasi*, *rawan*, *kesinambungan*, *rekayasa*, SARA'.

28 This is examined in Heryanto (2006: Chapter 1), McGregor (2002) and Sen (1988).

29 Even Sri Soemantri, a constitutional lawyer closer to the liberal Dutch school than to the German tradition of most of his colleagues, rejected his proposal on the grounds that it 'was based on individual rights and therefore clearly out of line with our national philosophy' (*Suara Pembaruan*, 28 May 1990).

30 This problem is discussed for instance in a booklet published by the Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia 1984: 13–15).

31 Detailed summaries of these papers, both titled 'Dwifungsi ABRI', in Jenkins (1984: 62–6, 113–18).

32 Jenkins (1984: 63) paraphrasing (or quoting) Abdulkadir's 1978 'Seskoad' paper.

33 Nugroho Notosusanto (1985a: 190–3), Jenkins (1984: 192). The earliest military reference to integralism I was able to find was in an 1982 internal Kopkamtib document in which Admiral Sudomo referred in passing to the 'integralist theory' as the defining characteristic of the 1945 Constitution (Sudomo 1982: 10, 14).

34 Abdulkadir was highly selective in his reading of the 1945 debates. As discussed in Chapter 4, Supomo's statement about the president was illogical and uttered in the heat of debate, and there was never an explicit rejection of direct elections.

35 This was *P4 dan UUD 1945 Dalam Bagan, Bahan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, CV Indiana, Jakarta, 1984 (cited in Simanjuntak 1994: 63).

36 Sarwo Edhie, one of the 'New Order Hawks' of 1965–7 had fewer intellectual inclinations or PSI connections than the other principal figures of this faction, the Siliwangi generals Dharsono and Kemal Idris. He had commanded the RPKAD in its murderous sweep through Central and East Java in late 1965. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono married his daughter.

9 Twilight of the ideologues

The 1980s saw authoritarian regimes give way to more democratic governments in the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Taiwan and the decade ended with the crumbling of one communist Eastern European state after another. Early in 1990 the South African government released Nelson Mandela. History's juggernaut appeared to be rolling down the road to liberal democracy and authoritarianism of any stripe began to look very old fashioned.

Trouble was also brewing at home, with the military leadership under Benny Moerdani increasingly at odds with Soeharto. Tension between the two power centres had been brewing since the mid 1980s, and had to do not only with Sudharmono's efforts to reduce military influence in Golkar but to the increasing tendency of Soeharto to ensure that lucrative state contracts were directed away from the military to rapidly expanding conglomerates controlled by his children. Moerdani and the secular nationalist mainstream of the military were also growing alarmed at Soeharto's increasingly warm relations with Muslim leaders and organisations, a trend that began around 1987 and culminated in his sponsorship of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in December 1990. Tensions between the army and the palace were manifest publically in early 1988 when Moerdani's tenure as armed forces commander was terminated early and when the military leadership openly opposed Soeharto's selection of Sudharmono as vice president.

The rising global stocks of liberal democracy in combination with the rifts within the regime helped prise open some political space in Indonesia. In April 1989 former Kopkamtib commander retired General Sumitro wrote in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*: 'Indonesians increasingly feel that political life should return towards a normal condition, in which the values and systems stemming from the 1945 Constitution and in accordance with international values and principles of democracy will be re-established'. Perhaps keen to avoid charges that Indonesia had been 'left behind' or that it was 'as bad as the communists' Soeharto struck a conciliatory note in his 1989 state address, telling officials not to worry too much about the diversity of opinion in society and referring to Pancasila as an 'open ideology' (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003: 192–5). The government began to take human rights more seriously

and eased restrictions on the press, leading to an extraordinary flourishing of political debate. Even the parliament began to twitch into life, as if awakening from a long coma. This was the season of *keterbukaan* or 'openness'.

'Openness'

It did not take long for critics of the New Order system to take advantage of the new political space. Sumitro was a key agenda setter, not least because he was still well regarded in the military. In his 1989 article, Soemitro had proposed that the integrity and the authority of the parliament be restored, that there be more than one candidate for president and that members of the MPR be allowed to vote for the presidential candidate of their choice. In July 1989 the parliament's social and political affairs commission, under the chairmanship of Moerdani ally Major General Samsuddin, invited Sumitro to present his views. Here the seasoned general went even further, calling for a major overhaul of the system of representation in Indonesia including an end to the floating mass policy, an end to Golkar's intimate ties with the civil service and the replacement of proportional representation with a district system in which people voted for local candidates. Sumitro also proposed that ministers be accountable not to the president but to the parliament, as in a parliamentary democracy (Lane 1991: 31–6).

Over the next two years intellectuals, newspaper editors and parliamentarians (including some from Golkar) expressed strong support for limiting the presidential term of office and relaxing the political laws of 1975 and 1985. A frequent theme in the criticism was the increasingly obvious disparity between the economic freedoms afforded by the government's deregulation policies and the tightly regulated political system. Some highlighted the growing gap between the rich and poor and warned of the danger of social upheaval if the poor were not afforded some means of political expression.[1] More pronounced though were demands from the middle and business classes for more say in the political process, some pointing to the government's increasing reliance on personal taxation (*Berita Buana*, 20 December 1990). Others put the argument that the diversification of the economy had generated a range of competing business interests that could only resolve their conflicts through genuine political organisations (*Kompas*, 4 and 5 September 1990). The post Cold War nostrum that 'political deregulation' was a natural and necessary partner of economic deregulation took hold among the political public.

The freer atmosphere also saw public figures express their dissatisfaction with the government's ideological programme. Umar Kayam, a professor of literature at Gadjah Mada University told a parliamentary commission hearing in October 1989 that the P4 courses had reached 'saturation point' (*Kompas*, 4 October 1989). Long time ideologue Roeslan Abdulgani agreed, saying that people were fed up with the courses and that they ought to be made more relevant to everyday life. When BP-7 head Oetojo Oesman appeared before a parliamentary hearing in February 1990 he was reportedly

'besieged by questions, remarks and suggestions' from parliamentarians (*Tempo*, 8 July 1989: 22–3). He later admitted that Pancasila instructors in urban areas found it 'not that easy' to explain problems like unemployment, land disputes and inequality (*Jakarta Post*, 18 June 1990).

Implicit in many of the criticisms of the government was a challenge to its ideological core. Sumitro's suggestion that the president be elected by a free vote in the MPR for instance, although completely uncontroversial from a constitutional perspective, contradicted the government's insistence that voting was an alien, individualistic practice, and that the natural mode of decision making in Indonesia – from the level of the family to the highest state organs – was *musyawarah*.

Some went further, targeting *musyawarah* directly. If Indonesia wanted to regard itself as a modern industrial society, the historian Sartono Kartodirdjo said, it would have to leave behind feudalistic attitudes and 'irrelevant old values' such as *musyawarah* (1989: 73). Emil Salim, the minister for population and environment appeared to agree, arguing in the context of a discussion about the growing number of disputes between farmers and polluting factories: 'The problem is that when the *musyawarah* system is used, the underprivileged parties have often been defeated by the well-to-do parties. … I want strict laws which will clarify who is right and who is wrong, not the *musyawarah* system' (*Jakarta Post*, 25 July 1989). A practice that was supposed to mark out Pancasila Democracy as more just and moral than other political systems was being targeted as a source of *injustice*. Salim's observation that *musyawarah* allowed the strong to defeat the weak was particularly pointed because it turned one of Supomo's main arguments for a family state on its head.

Even Pancasila was increasingly open to negotiation. This was partly in response to Soeharto's statements that Pancasila was an open ideology and partly the inflationary consequence of forcing diverse groups to press their interests through Pancasila discourse. Douglas Ramage (1995) has shown how the armed forces leadership used Pancasila in at least three ways in the early 1990s: to bolster their claim to a continuing political role (Pancasila as integralist), to contain the expanding influence of palace-sponsored political Islam (Pancasila as anti-sectarian) and to countervail pressures for political liberalisation (Pancasila as an expression of indigenous communalism). Meanwhile Abdurrahman Wahid, the liberal or social-democratic champion of Nahdlatul Ulama and future president, interpreted Pancasila so broadly that it faded into the ether: 'My understanding of Pancasila Democracy', he said in early 1991, 'is a democracy which is truly based on Pancasila. This does not differ from democracy with no other word attached to it' (*Jakarta Post*, 4 April 1991).

Integralism in the spotlight

If Pancasila had grown too nebulous to mean much, the government's promotion of integralism provided a clearer target for critics. Debates about

integralism's place in Indonesian law and politics during the second half of 1989 brought the issue into the public spotlight.

There were two kinds of arguments against the government's attempts to promote integralism as the underlying principle of the Indonesian state. One was that it was historically fraudulent to regard the constitution as a realisation of Supomo's integralist vision. The second was that integralism was not compatible with the diverse and globally connected society that Indonesia had become.

The first argument was made most forcefully and comprehensively by Marsillam Simanjuntak in his 1989 Master of Laws thesis. Simanjuntak argued that a close examination of the BPUPK debates reveals that Supomo was soundly defeated in 1945. Drawing on several of Supomo's statements from the 1945 debates, Simanjuntak argued that Supomo had depicted integralism as a coherent system that would be destroyed if political rights such as the right to organise and the right to free speech were incorporated in the constitution. Because Supomo was forced by Hatta and his supporters to compromise on these points, Simanjuntak (1989: 91–8, 239) concluded that Supomo's integralism had been repudiated. This, he argued, was why Supomo did not use the term again and why it was not taken up by Indonesian constitutional experts in the years after 1945.

Simanjuntak argued that the BP-7 ideologues responsible for the resurrection of integralism had not only obscured this point but also consciously concealed Supomo's equation of integralism with totalitarianism and his references to Nazi Germany and Japan. The two main figures in Simanjuntak's sights were Abdulkadir Besar and the man who assumed the mantle of chief promoter and defender of integralism in 1989, Padmo Wahyono. Padmo had studied constitutional law at the University of Indonesia in the 1950s under Djokosutono, who had a deep impact on his thinking. He joined the teaching staff of his *alma mater* and later lectured, as his mentor had, at various military and police academies, becoming dean of the University of Indonesia law faculty in 1974 and chair of the professors council at the Military Law Academy in 1987. In September 1989 *Forum Keadilan* article, written in response to earlier criticism that Supomo's integralist theory bore a resemblance to fascism and that Hatta had tempered Supomo's influence in 1945, Padmo had coined the term 'Indonesian integralism'. Indonesian integralism, he argued, was the product of the dialogue between Supomo and Hatta, and was 'not the same as integralism in Germany' (*Pelita*, 4 July 1989; Wahyono 1989).

Simanjuntak took strong exception to these points. Padmo, he said, had ignored Supomo's insistence that integralism was an internally coherent theory that could not be combined with philosophically alien elements such as political rights. Supomo had made it clear, Simanjuntak maintained, that the integralism he had described was the totalitarian political philosophy of the National Socialists and the Japanese. It was therefore illogical and dishonest for Padmo to claim, on the basis of the available historical records, that there was something called 'Indonesian integralism' as distinct from

German integralism and that this was Indonesia's legitimate state concept (Simanjuntak 1989: 96–9). Worse still, Simanjuntak argued (ibid.: 75), Padmo had wilfully misquoted Supomo as using the innocent sounding term '*totalitas*' (totalistic) rather than '*totaliter*' (totalitarian) as an analogue for 'integralist'.

A three day seminar organised by *Kompas* in November 1989 provided the critics of integralism with a rare chance to discuss the issue face to face with its ideologues. Before Padmo was due to speak at a session on the morning of the last day, Simanjuntak openly challenged his bona fides, highlighting his misquotation of Supomo (*Kompas* 1990: 188–9). Padmo responded by blithely agreeing that he had changed the quote but that the change reflected his interpretation of what Supomo had meant. This, he said, showed that the change was 'responsible'. He added that he had aimed to show that integralism was not authoritarian ('because authoritarianism is generally regarded as unacceptable') and that Hatta had been wrong to see it that way in 1945 (ibid.: 189). Like most senior New Order officials, Padmo was not used to being challenged directly, and apparently expected that to be the end of the matter. Yet his response satisfied no one, least of all Simanjuntak, who showed his displeasure by refusing to engage. Political scientist Ridwan Saidi broke the silence, saying he did not think that Simanjuntak had been concerned with Padmo's interpretation but rather with the fact that he had misquoted Supomo. '*Pak* Padmo', he said, 'has to clarify why his quote was not true to the original'. Soedjatmoko, the one-time vice-chancellor of the United Nations University of Tokyo, agreed, saying that he was disappointed with Padmo's answer, especially in the light of the fact that integralism was being referred to so often by government officials. *Kompas* editor Jakob Oetama attempted to find some middle ground by suggesting that although this was an issue that went to the heart of the political system, people were entitled to their interpretations, including Padmo. Challenged by Ridwan Saidi that he was legitimating the altering of original texts, Jakob Oetama responded – in classic *Kompas* style – that he agreed with both sides (ibid.: 190–1). But he failed to save Padmo from humiliation.

The controversy over integralism prompted considerable public interest in Supomo and his role in history. *Forum Keadilan* magazine devoted 21 pages of its August 1990 issue to the issue of integralism. The magazine's detailed lead article painted an unflattering portrait of Supomo, highlighting his tractable nature and questioning his nationalist credentials (Soempeno and Armada 1990: 20–4). Supomo's close cooperation with the Japanese was stressed, including his heading of the council of Indonesian judges advising the court martial that sentenced to death (in absentia) the famous leader of the Peta uprising against the Japanese in Blitar, Soeprijadi (ibid.: 22). The article's authors also drew attention to Supomo's signing of the 15 June 1945 petition (discussed in Chapter 4) to pre-empt the work of the BPUPK and have the Japanese set up a triumvirate that would rule Indonesia with absolute powers. On Supomo's vision of a rights-free state the article was equally cutting, suggesting that 'Supomo apparently believed strongly in the existence

of a 'Superman', a *Ratu Adil* (Just King) who would not be tainted by power' (ibid.: 24). Describing Supomo's 31 May speech as an attempt to project theories of *adat* law into the macro political realm, the authors pointed out that Supomo 'often forgot' that *adat* had undergone huge changes during the centuries of colonial rule, and that '*adat* communities were already familiar with [such concepts as] the means of production, capital and interest groups'. It was this, the article said, quoting *Tempo* editor Goenawan Mohamad, 'that Supomo did not realise, and which made Supomo's hopes for a genuine union between rulers and the people impossible to achieve' (ibid.).

In a similar vein, political scientist Arbi Sanit argued that Supomo's theory of integralism was based on mistaken assumptions about indigenous Indonesian culture. He argued that village communities in different parts of Indonesia were neither as similar to one another nor as democratic as Supomo wanted to believe. He highlighted differences between the highly centralised power structures of traditional Javanese villages and the relatively egalitarian character of Minangkabau communities in West Sumatra. In Javanese villages, Sanit said, everyone had a right to speak, but only landowners had a right to contribute to decision making (Situmorang 1990: 39).

Another argument against the promotion of integralism as Indonesia's state concept was that it attempted to negate the substantial contribution of democratic political philosophies to the shaping of the nationalist movement. The idea of popular sovereignty had been widely accepted by prewar nationalist groups, and was enshrined in the final form of the 1945 Constitution. Yet, as Simanjuntak argued in 1989, the position Supomo represented in 1945 owed much more to theories of state sovereignty than to popular sovereignty (1989: 235). In discussions of integralism from mid 1989 on, 'popular sovereignty' quickly crystallised as a counter concept to integralism, with Hatta, who had recognised the totalitarian potential of Supomo's vision of an integralist state, emerging as a new hero figure. Bambang Isti Nugroho, a student arrested in Yogyakarta during a renewed anti-communist drive, stressed in his August 1989 defence speech (1991: 10) that Hatta's ideas had become 'very significant' in the face of the government's efforts to use old cultural symbols to legitimate state repression.

Because criticism of the government's stance on integralism met no obvious resistance in the more open political atmosphere, media became bolder, publishing in September 1990, for instance, Simanjuntak's appeal for people to ignore all government restrictions on free speech, which he claimed was fully guaranteed by Article 28. Borrowing a term that Soeharto had popularised in a 1989 outburst, Simanjuntak (1990) wrote that people had an obligation to 'clobber' (*gebuk*) any attempt to 'obstruct, repress, block, hamper or impede' this constitutional right.

More nuanced were those who argued that integralism was out of step with the complex dynamics of modern states. Prominent legal aid lawyer Abdul Hakim Nusantara (1988: 93ff) wrote that integralism failed to acknowledge that in large, complex societies, conflicts of interests develop – not only

between rulers and ruled but also between groups within society. Because the behaviour of states reflects the interests of those who run them, he argued, priority should be given not to peddling a philosophy claiming that the interests of the state and society are identical but rather to establishing reliable mechanisms that prevent abuses of authority, facilitate the expression of popular political aspirations and provide impartial arbitration of conflict between individuals, groups and the state. A.E. Priyono (1991), the editor of the social science journal *Prisma*, highlighted what he saw as the lack of fit between the government's 'totalitarian' political philosophy of integralism and the economy, arguing that 'in building a complex economy which has to deal with the interaction between the state and various private or social groups it is not appropriate to set up a constitutional apparatus which guarantees hegemonic power'.

Some of the strongest condemnations of integralism were made on the grounds that the government had used it to justify its control of the judiciary. Justice Minister Ismail Saleh said as early as 1985 that 'the government is actually applying *integralistic* principles in accordance with the spirit of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in supervising the judges and emphasising a priority on togetherness and consultation between the government and the judiciary' (Lubis 1993: 88). By insisting on the indivisibility of power, many argued that the government had undermined the principle of the *Rechtsstaat*, to which it had repeatedly insisted it was committed. Sartono Kartodirdjo (1989: 73–4) argued:

> [I]n our country, the judiciary is subordinated to the executive. In this regard, I frankly take issue with the idea of the Supomo's integralist state, which legitimates the absence of the separation of powers. The integralist state concept blurs the boundaries between the three political aspects that we recognise today. So where is the integralist state idea taking this country? Are there any guarantees that law can be upheld in an integralist state?

Not surprisingly, human rights lawyers were among the most outspoken critics of integralism. Mulya Lubis (1989) argued that it was integralism's failure to draw a firm distinction between the executive, judicial and legislative powers and its legitimation of the idea that 'the state was a [higher] manifestation of society' that was responsible for the lack of freedom in Indonesia. In a book based on his Doctor of Laws thesis at the University of California in 1990 Mulya expanded on these ideas, linking a whole range of restrictive legislation, including laws on the judiciary, on parties, elections, the composition of parliament, labour relations, the press and on non-governmental organisations, to the government's commitment to the integralist state concept (Lubis 1993). He concluded (ibid.: 95–6) that it was highly unlikely that a *Rechtsstaat* would be realised in Indonesia for as long as the regime continued to adhere to the integralist philosophy.

Others took a different tack, castigating the government for failing to live up to the cooperative *ideals* of integralism and its corollary, the family principle. In theory, after all, organicism involves constant interaction between the various part of the body politic. Diagrammatic representations of Pancasila Democracy often depicted a circuit in which feedback and input from below were an important part (see e.g. Attamimi 1990: 110a). A central theme of integralist rhetoric was that the state had a responsibility to act as the protector of the whole society, justifying its all-embracing character. One of the first to use integralist arguments to criticise the government was Abdulkadir Besar, a true believer. As early as 1968 Abdulkadir had used integralist arguments to argue that the MPR should be truly inclusive and that the president should be genuinely accountable to the assembly that had appointed him (Besar 1972: 526–7). Abdul Hakim attempted to hoist the government on its own petard when he paraphrased Supomo as having argued in 1945 that the state was not an organisation of power 'to threaten and scare people', but a body to protect the entire society and all social groups (Nusantara 1988: 93). Soeharto's large-scale transfer of state assets to his children in the name of deregulation also enabled critics to poke fun at the government's 'family principle' rhetoric (see e.g. *Pelita*, 8 May 1991).

Another obvious weak spot in the government's ideological armour was its use of foreign concepts and thinkers to define a political philosophy that it insisted was thoroughly indigenous. Simanjuntak's effort to demonstrate the Hegelian heritage and fascist affinities of Supomo's integralist concept was the most significant attack on this front. Although Supomo only mentioned Hegel once in his 1945 speech, Simanjuntak (1989: 226–33) argued that his integralist concept followed an Hegelian 'contour' in emphasising 'the interests of the whole' and the 'unity of an organic society' and in glossing over the question of popular sovereignty and political rights. Simanjuntak also explored, in less detail, the political thought of the other two European thinkers Supomo had mentioned, Spinoza and Müller. In a 1990 interview, Simanjuntak's supervisor Professor Ismail Suny cleverly turned the government's indigenist rhetoric against itself by accusing Padmo Wahyono of trying to smuggle dangerous foreign concepts into the country by pretending that they were Indonesian (Situmorang 1990: 37). A confrontation over the same point took place during a law seminar at the University of Indonesia in March 1990, where Arbi Sanit took issue with the claim by the interior ministry's retired Brigadier General Harisoegiman that the integralist concept was adapted from traditional village culture in Indonesia. Arbi Sanit, who, in his capacity as a contributor to the formulation of state policy guidelines was under instructions not to make use of foreign political theories, argued against the government political philosophy on the grounds that it 'smelt of pre World War II European integralism' (interview, human rights lawyer, Jakarta, 18 March 1991; *Suara Karya*, 22 March 1990).

This kind of criticism within the parameters of the dominant discourse was telling in much the same way as Marxist analysis was in the communist states of Eastern Europe in the 1980s. It illustrates the point that ruling

ideologies (like religions) are double-edged swords: they make demands of the regimes that propagate them, requiring them to adjust and renew themselves to cope with the counter-discourses they generate.

Cracks in the edifice

How did government ideologues cope with these attacks? Some simply dug in. Dr Soemitro (1990) of the coordinating ministry of political and security affairs accused human rights advocates of raising a 'very dangerous issue' and maintaining that integralism was the fundamental guiding principle for understanding all aspects of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. More senior ideologues, such as Padmo Wahyono, adjusted their rhetoric, coining – as mentioned above – the concept of 'Indonesian integralism', which Padmo described as 'Supomo's concept as corrected by Hatta' (Wahyono 1990; Soempeno and Armada 1990: 21–2). An increased emphasis on indigeneity also saw the more culturally resonant term 'family state' (*negara kekeluargaan*) appear more often, sometimes alongside 'integralist state'.

Padmo continued to defend integralism until his death late in 1991, but admitted that much of the criticism of the integralist state idea was legitimate. In response he said he no longer agreed with Supomo's version of integralism, which 'clearly aspired towards a totalitarian state' and instead promoted the concept as an 'ideal type' that it would take a long time to realise (Soempeno and Armada 1990: 21–2; *Pelita*, 8 May 1991).

The most sophisticated response from the government side was made by Hamid S. Attamimi, a constitutional lawyer and ideologue who occupied the strategic post of deputy cabinet secretary from 1983 until 1993.[2] Attamimi had studied law at the University of Indonesia in the 1950s under Djokosutono. The same university awarded him a doctorate in 1990 for his dissertation in which he set out to defend the thesis that Indonesia was a 'village republic'. Drawing on Supomo, van Vollenhoven and other Dutch *adat* scholars, as well as Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo's 1953 book *Desa* (1965), Attamimi argued that the Indonesian state duplicated traditional village administration in its institutions, its processes and its guiding principles. The Indonesian system (like Abdulkadir, Attamimi used systems theory to support his organicist arguments) recognised no inherent conflicts of interest and rejected the separation of powers. This was manifest most clearly in the 1945 Constitution, which, in his interpretation (Attamimi 1990: 92–3, 101–9, 139–57), gave the president extensive legislative as well as executive powers.

To his credit, Attamimi made a serious, if sometimes laboured, effort to answer the critics of Supomo and integralism, addressing in particular Simanjuntak's thesis and Dutch scholar Logemann's 1962 essay (1985), which had attacked integralism as utopian and potentially anti-democratic. His main criticism of Simanjuntak was that he had focused too narrowly on one speech and on one aspect of Supomo's thought to the exclusion of all others. Scrutinising Supomo for evidence of Hegel's influence, as Simanjuntak had

done, was bound to produce a distorted image because Supomo was concerned first and foremost with *adat* law, not Hegelian philosophy. Supomo's knowledge of the philosophers whose names he mentioned as the source of integralism, Attamimi (1990: 78–9) admitted, was probably rather limited. On the basis of Supomo's previous writings, Attamimi (1990: 81) concluded that there was no evidence that Supomo had ever thought in terms of creating a state along the lines of those envisaged by Spinoza, Müller or Hegel. His aim was rather to create an independent Indonesian state as 'a large and modern village'. These were all valid points, even if they underestimated the influence of Hegelian ideas on, for instance, Supomo's 1941 speech about the relationship between the individual and society.

Attamimi was on shakier ground when attempting to refute the specific criticisms of Logemann and Simanjuntak. In answer to the accusation that Supomo's integralist system did not make any provision for popular sovereignty, Attamimi recounted Supomo's insistence that village heads were obliged to 'give shape to the people's sense of justice'. 'Did this not demonstrate', he asked, 'that the principle of popular sovereignty was a part of village life?' In a bid to rebut the charge that Supomo envisaged an all-powerful leader, Attamimi pointed to Supomo's proposal that the new state should include a system of consultative councils. On the question of whether Supomo's integralist concept had won the day in 1945, Attamimi argued that Hatta's endorsement of Supomo's rejection of human and citizen's rights (as opposed to group rights) indicated that Hatta had in fact been won over to Supomo's position rather than the other way around. 'Given all these points', Attamimi (ibid.: 81–2) asked rhetorically, 'is it not [evident that] Supomo's integralist concept was not rejected, not spurned, not defeated, but rather accepted?'

Because the terms 'integralist state concept' and 'totalitarian state concept' could give some people the wrong idea, Attamimi said he would follow Supomo's example and stop using them. In their place he said he would use the term 'family state-concept' (*staatsidee kekelurgaan*), which, after all, 'Supomo had equated and used interchangeably with the above terms anyway' (ibid.: 82–3). As if to compensate for his by now rather confused and defensive argument, Attamimi concluded with a 1989 quote from his boss, State Secretary Moerdiono, praising integralism as a 'macro conceptual framework which expresses the spirit of our people down to their smallest social units [i.e. villages]' (ibid.: 83).

The problem Attamimi had in defending Supomo reflected the greater problem he and his fellow ideologues had reconciling the organicist 'village republic' idea with the positivist tradition of legal thought, which underpins the bureaucratic–legal order and which continues to dominate formal constitutional law studies in Indonesia. Attamimi himself was very much immersed in the thought-world of German positivism. He was a stickler for detail who never tired of reminding legislators and legislative draftspeople of the positivist logic underlying the system of public law in Indonesia and stressing the importance of abiding by its dictates, i.e. orderliness, internal consistency and respect for a structured hierarchy of legal norms. But he was

also keen to defend an interpretation of the constitution that provided for an expanded concentration of power in the office of the president. That argument required him to draw on the village republic concept, to depict the president's position as analogous to that of a traditional village head, with a wide range of responsibilities, many of them unwritten (Attamimi 1990: 106–9, 126, 144–88). This led him into serious conceptual difficulties, however, partly because of his stylised vision of what constituted a 'traditional village' but mainly because he was unable to show how the strict positivist principles he espoused could be upheld when subordinated to 'village' style organicist logic.

One of the most powerful voices to join the debate about integralism in the 1990s was that of the human rights lawyer Buyung Nasution, who returned to Indonesia from the Netherlands in 1992, having completed a PhD in Utrecht. His bulky thesis on the workings of the Constituent Assembly between 1956 and 1959 was discussed widely in academic seminars and in the press. Buyung challenged the orthodox government position that 'Western style' human rights and individual rights had no genuine place in Indonesian culture or history. He found (Nasution 1992: 160–1) that there had in fact been strong support across the spectrum of parties represented in the freely elected Constituent Assembly for legal limits on government power, accountability, human rights and democratic principles in general. This showed, Buyung argued, that there was a strong, authentic tradition of support for human rights in Indonesia and that Indonesians, given the chance, would once again opt for a constitutional system that fully protected their rights. There was no inherent conflict between Indonesian culture and a fully democratic political system (see e.g. ibid.: 1–3). A prolific writer and speaker, Buyung quickly assumed a prominent profile as a strong critic of integralism and, more controversially, of the 1945 Constitution.

The New Order's ideology mill ground on, however, and integralism became more strongly entrenched than ever in official discourse. In 1994 integralism was made part of the new national school curriculum via Pancasila and Citizenship Education (PPKn) textbooks (Kalidjernih 2005: 115). Most significant was its incorporation into the Broad Guidelines of State Policy for 1993–8. According to this document, which was supposed to set the policy framework for the nation:

> The integralist outlook of the Indonesian nation and familism, which are rooted in cultural values of the nation and which were jointly agreed upon during the process of drafting the constitution, must be established as the basis of Indonesian nationalism in order to consolidate the oneness and unity of the nation within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
>
> (Sunaryo 1995)

This was the highest level of formal endorsement integralism received in Indonesia. It also served to bring integralism back into the spotlight, sparking

off a fresh round of public discussion and debate. Notable here was Buyung Nasution's appeal at a Gadjah Mada University seminar on integralism in September 1993 for:

> the abandonment of the integralist state concept – both in its original version as described by Prof. Dr. Mr. Supomo and the 'Indonesian integralism' now being developed – because it obstructs and confounds efforts to build democratic life, a *negara hukum* [*Rechtsstaat*] and respect for human rights.
>
> (cited in Soedarman 1993)

Buyung went on to call for the 1945 Constitution to be revised according to the principles of constitutional democracy.

Soon after this seminar Soesilo Soedarman, the coordinating minister for politics and security wrote a confidential letter to the education minister expressing some alarm about the effects of such critiques. Soesilo, one of the most powerful ministers in the 1993 cabinet, brought to the minister's notice 'the tendency in several seminars and scholarly discussions of late for the "integralist state concept" to be rejected … and for a Western version of human rights (liberalism) to be championed'. Noting the considerable influence that scholars enjoyed in Indonesian society, Soedarman (1993) warned that 'if this tendency is not closely monitored, it could lead the society to lose faith in the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the philosophy of the nation and the basis of the Indonesian state'. If this was to occur, Soesilo continued, demonstrating a telling lack of faith in the efficacy of Pancasila education, 'the condition of our society … would no longer be in accordance with that aspired to by our forebears'.

Quoting the above excerpt from Buyung Nasution as evidence of the ideological sabotage he was concerned about, Soesilo proposed that the education minister should 'Further develop and promote "Pancasila Philosophy" in all state and private tertiary educational institutions to include instruction about "the Pancasila-specific integralist method of thought"'. Law faculties, he proposed, 'should teach students about the "integralist state concept" as part of their politics courses, and "human rights and duties" should take the place of course material on (Western style) human rights in courses on constitutional law'. Soesilo concluded by stressing that what was at stake were 'political issues with very fundamental implications' because they were directed at 'the theory and foundation' of the constitutional order (Soedarman 1993).

Soesilo's letter supports the view that the government saw the promotion of integralism in instrumental terms as a prophylactic against human rights discourse and that it feared it was losing the ideological battle. It is evidence for the argument that the revival of integralism – like the P4 campaign – was a defensive manoeuvre, an attempt to reinforce the ramparts against the influx of democratic ideas.

Criticism, however, was taking its toll and cracks started to appear in the integralist edifice. In August 1994 a major BP-7 seminar on 'The Indonesian Integralist Outlook' brought together top ideologues including Soeprapto, who had spent at least six years in charge of the BP-7's education section before taking over the leadership of BP-7 in 1993, the veteran integralist Abdulkadir Besar, Darji Darmodihardjo, Hamid Attamimi, Tedjo Sumarto (a former information ministry official best known for his P4 broadcasts on government radio), Professor Dr Soerjanto Poespowardojo (a University of Indonesia philosopher and Sudharmono's deputy in the president's 'P-7' ideological advisory team) and State Secretary Moerdiono.

Given the title of the seminar, participants were taken aback by Moerdiono's opening address. In it he noted the close and critical attention the issue of integralism had been subjected to in society and in particular by intellectuals. This, he said, disarmingly, was quite understandable given that Supomo had referred in passing to the 'anti-democratic and frightening' examples of fascist Italy (though he had not), Nazi Germany and totalitarian Japan to illustrate his integralist concept. In an attempt to overcome this problem, Moerdiono explained, the late Padmo Wahyono had developed the concept of 'Indonesian integralism'. 'But it immediately became apparent', he said, 'that the "anti-democratic connotations" of the term integralist could not be made to disappear simply by appending the adjective "Indonesian" to it'. Upon hearing the term, 'people would instinctively be reminded of Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini or Hideki Tojo' (Moerdiono 1995: 20). As a result, Moerdiono invited the participants to come up with 'a more appropriate term which more accurately, more clearly … encapsulates our perspective on unity, oneness, togetherness and family-ness'.

Rising to the challenge, Soerjanto Poespowardojo turned the collectivistic rhetoric of the New Order to advantage by arguing that it was wrong to base the state's constitutional norms on the opinions of one individual, and that 'for the sake of standardising perceptions', the term '*negara persatuan*' (integral state) be used instead (Sunaryo 1995). Others, however, including BP-7 head Soeprapto, were unwilling to let go of integralism. Together with Saafroedin Bahar and Ismail Arianto, Soeprapto (Soeprapto *et al*. 1995) argued that integralism was the driving principle behind the New Order's transformation of the political landscape since 1966 – as well as nearly everything else in Indonesia.

The constitutional lawyers were also loath to abandon integralism. Abdulkadir stuck to his old position, maintaining that the 1945 Constitution was the 'logical deductive manifestation' of the integralist state concept. Attamimi and Darji also insisted that the concept constituted Indonesia's basic constitutional norm (*Staatsfundamentalnorm*) and was therefore enshrined firmly in the country's positive law (Sunaryo 1995). Darji emphasised the differences between Indonesian integralism and 'Western integralism', which had come to be used as a byword for fascism. After describing the undesirable characteristics of Western integralism: 'totalitarian, authoritarian,

anti-democratic, human rights abusing and so on', Darji claimed there was one feature that Indonesian integralism shared with Western integralism:

> The only meeting point between Western integralism and the integralistic outlook of the Indonesian people is in their common acceptance of the unity and oneness of the state and the people (the absence of dualism between the state and the people).
>
> (Darmodihardjo 1995: 35)

In saying so, Darji was identifying Indonesian integralism, just as Supomo had in 1945, with a defining feature of organicist philosophies, including fascism.

In an apparent attempt to establish a less tainted lineage for Supomo's ideas, some of the assembled ideologues looked for inspiration to Dutch Hegelian philosopher Bierens de Haan, known in the Netherlands for his 1900 study of Spinoza. Attamimi (1995: 122–4) argued that Supomo's contention that Indonesia's state concept had to reflect its *adat* echoed the thinking of Bierens de Haan who had made the case that a nation's *Staatsidee* was a manifestation of its unique personality. The enthusiasm shown by the convenors for yet another dead European philosopher did nothing to bolster the stocks of either Supomo or his theory of government.

While integralism remained a guiding principle of the Indonesian state until the end of the Soeharto era, it was clear that the criticism had taken its toll. Continuing official depictions of life in Indonesia as characterised by village harmony and *gotong royong*, and of the president as 'an elder who protects all citizens' (Darmodihardjo 1995), only underlined how out of touch were Indonesia's foremost ideologues with the world outside the walls of the old Volksraad which served as the headquarters of the BP-7.

The unravelling of Pancasila Democracy

It was not only the regime's ideology that had failed to keep pace with changes in Indonesian society but the entire model of rule. Soeharto's Pancasila Democracy did what it was designed to do: keep Soeharto and his group in power for the long term and subordinate societal forces and interests to the imperative of state-directed capitalist development. The construction and maintenance of this model depended on the state wielding near-absolute administrative power. As the Indonesian economy grew in both scale and diversity, however, a whole variety of pressures arose from new social forces and business interests. What once were strengths became weaknesses.

For its first two decades the New Order state derived most of its revenue from oil and foreign aid, helping create a strong and centralised bureaucracy and giving Soeharto enormous powers of patronage. Within the borders of Indonesia, political and economic power were concentrated in the hands of state officials rather than the boardrooms of private companies. Private

enterprise flourished, but largely at the discretion of state officials. The extreme concentration of power in the state and the absence of checks and balances did little to hinder the emergence of wealthy business empires.

After oil prices collapsed in the 1980s, and Indonesia was forced into direct competition with the rest of the world for investment in manufacturing, the balance of power between the government and business changed. When the government was holding all the cards, businesses were willing to keep quiet in exchange for access to lucrative opportunities, protection and a degree of certainty. The rapid growth, diversification and internationalisation of the private sector after the deregulation initiatives of 1988 created a whole new set of imperatives. Time-worn habits of relying on powerful patrons came to be seen – except by those with links to the Soeharto family – as more of an obstacle than a help. Investors, foreign and local, demanded an impartial and well-functioning legal system that could be relied upon to settle disputes quickly and ensure the enforcement of contracts.[3]

Part of the problem lay in Indonesia's archaic legal infrastructure and patchwork legal heritage. More fundamental, however, were the monistic principles that governed the exercise of power and the government's reluctance to allow the courts, or indeed any sector of the state, to operate independently of the executive. And yet independence was precisely what was needed if the regulatory and supervisory authorities, including the Central Bank, were to do their job. The ease with which Soeharto, his family and entourage influenced decisions and waived rules injected a high degree of uncertainty into the system, as was amply demonstrated in the case of the president's granting of the extremely lucrative licence to build Indonesia's 'national car' to his son Hutomo (Tommy) Mandala Putera in 1996. Anger by Indonesia's middle classes as well as organisations such as the World Bank at Soeharto's increasingly brazen nepotism illustrates well the systemic contradiction between the market's demands for predictability and a political system and ideology based on the notion of the indivisibility of state power. It also helps explain why, when Soeharto had his back to the wall in the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis, that very few were willing to defend him.

The New Order's corporatist system of representation, grounded as it was in a view of society as an organic unity, also proved incapable of accommodating the large-scale transformation of Indonesia's society. A similar pattern has been observed in other states that have tried to impose corporatism, from pre-war Europe (Landauer 1983) to Latin America (Stepan 1978). Sooner or later the control function of corporatist bodies overwhelms their representative function and their putative constituencies seek alternative ways of making themselves heard.

Moertopo's strategy had been to shoehorn occupationally defined sections of society into monopoly functional group organisations affiliated with Golkar. Key targets included the tens of millions of workers, peasants and fishermen who had constituted part of the PKI's political base. The years after 1988 saw a growing number of protests by farmers, usually in tandem

with student groups, over evictions, compensation and industrial pollution. Rather than channel their grievances through the official farmers organisation HKTI, which had no record of advocacy in land disputes, they took their protests directly to the steps of central and regional parliaments and government offices. It was the massive growth of the urban industrial workforce, however, that highlighted the failure of the corporatist system most starkly. Indonesia's industrial workforce, consisting mainly of young, single migrants from rural areas, nearly doubled in the 1980s to 8.2 million, and the number of strikes grew exponentially. Charged with implementing Pancasila Industrial Relations, the state sponsored SPSI was unable to offer its membership any support and often became the target of worker protests. Inspired by Lech Wałęsa's Solidarność, activists established Setiakawan, the New Order's first independent labour union in 1991. The following year SBSI (Indonesian Prosperity Workers Union) was formed under the leadership of Muchtar Pakpahan and quickly attracted a mass following before being banned in 1994.

Middle class and professional groups were also breaking out of their boxes. Students and lawyers had long proved difficult to contain, leading the regime to devote considerable energy to hemming them in by other means. In 1994 journalists in Jakarta formed the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) in direct defiance of the officially sponsored body.

A more serious rupture in the New Order's political fabric was the election of Sukarno's daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri, with the help of Moerdani, to the chair of the PDI in 1993. For the first time a genuinely popular politician was in charge of a political party and it took little time for her to attract mass support, both from the urban poor and from liberal intellectuals and students. Fearing that Megawati could do serious damage to Golkar in the 1997 election and possibly challenge for the presidency, Soeharto attempted to oust her, first by recognising an alternative chair, and when that failed, by organising for gangsters to storm PDI's Jakarta headquarters. The July 1996 assault resulted in several deaths and sparked riots in Jakarta, providing the regime with the pretext to hunt down, torture and in some cases execute activists. Soeharto had won, but in being compelled to used force against Megawati only succeeded in demonstrating how few political resources, and how little legitimacy, he had left.

The story of Soeharto's fall has been well told elsewhere (see e.g. Aspinall 2005; Schwarz 1999). Suffice it to say that despite his success in recruiting the support of Muslim groups who had previously been excluded from power, Soeharto found himself relying on a small coterie of cronies, former bodyguards and Muslim officers with little support among the mainstream secular nationalists in the military. Meanwhile his credentials as an economic manager were being progressively undermined by his failure to curb the greed of his children, which was starting to affect the macro economy.

Such was Soeharto's domination of the political, bureaucratic and economic patronage networks, and his success in disempowering civil society, that none of these factors in themselves threatened his rule. Even the devastation of the

Indonesian economy in the Asian Financial Crisis was not enough to prevent him organising his re-election in March 1998. It was, in the end, a combination of severe pressure from the United States acting through the International Monetary Fund, nationwide student demonstrations targeting 'corruption, collusion and nepotism', and finally the days of rioting and looting that followed the military's fatal shooting of four students at Jakarta's Triskati University on 12 May that convinced key economic ministers to withdraw from his cabinet, leaving Soeharto no option but to announce his resignation.

Notes

1 See especially the Gadjah Mada University Alumni Association's 1990 submission to the MPR concerning the Second Long Term National Development Plan (Eksponen Alumni Universitas Gadjah Mada 1990). See also Arbi Sanit's comments in *Jakarta Post*, 12 August 1989.
2 Attamimi is described here as an ideologue because at this time he was a leading member of the high-level team that trained P4 instructors and wrote indoctrination material. By the time of his death in about 1995 he had at least 25 years in the state secretariat (Attamimi 1990: 396–400).
3 This section on law and deregulation draws on Kusumohamidjojo (1988), Vatikiotis (1989, 1993: 175–8) and Gray (1986).

10 Conclusion

Given the scorn Indonesians heaped on Soeharto's New Order and its Pancasila education programmes immediately following May 1998, it is tempting to dismiss notions such as 'integralism' and the 'family state' as meaningless relicts of a bygone era. To do so would be to underestimate the importance of ideology in helping sustain the New Order regime for over three decades. It would also blind us to the continued relevance of a stream of Indonesian political thinking with roots as old as Indonesian nationalism itself.

The potency of New Order ideology stemmed largely from its success in portraying Indonesia's system of rule as grounded in Indonesia's unique cultural traditions. In a system in which the state was portrayed as a traditional village writ large and the president as a benevolent father figure presiding over his children, opposition was regarded not only as disrespectful but also un-Indonesian, making open criticism difficult and dangerous.

My contention, after an examination of the history and political uses of integralist ideology in Indonesia, is that for all its references to indigenous culture, it is best understood in the wider context of the organicist tradition of romantic nationalist thought. This tradition is a broad one, with multiple strands and ramifications. Theorists of the organic state share a rejection of the universalist premises of Enlightenment philosophy as well as egalitarianism, liberalism, social contract theory and human rights. They typically stress the primacy of communal over individual rights, the principle of corporate representation and the idea of the state as the embodiment of the interests of the entire society.

Situating Indonesia's integralism in this framework yields some important insights. Striking analogies become apparent between organicist ideologies and organisational forms propagated in Indonesia and in other parts of the world, including interwar Europe and Japan and 1970s Philippines and Latin America, all of which were influenced by the same set of assumptions, albeit via different channels.

Viewing organicist political ideologies from a world–historical perspective reveals telling parallels not only between the metaphors deployed in political discourse but also between the groups that have promoted them in various contexts. Organicist ideologies have typically been favoured by privileged

groups in times of crisis when other forms of conservatism appear incapable of staving off threats posed by the rise of new social forces or by social divisions. Highlighting the modular aspect of organicism has the further benefit of illuminating which strands of organicist thought were adopted in Indonesia and how they were utilised by particular groups for particular purposes. Ideology, as Carol Gluck (1985: 8) observed, has 'dates, names and faces'.

The genealogy of organicist thought in Indonesia is a complex and unusual one – unusual in the sense that Indonesia is outside the family of Catholic, Southern European influenced political cultures normally associated with corporatist political formulas. The main European line of influence runs from German romantic nationalists such as Adam Müller, who formulated an important theory of the organic state, through Historical School jurists such as Savigny, to Leiden University scholars including the organic state advocate Oppenheim. Although the great legal anthropologist van Vollenhoven was not an organicist in the same mould, the Leiden scholars who taught the first generation of Indonesian lawyers shared with intellectuals across interwar Europe a deep scepticism about the value of liberal democracy. They were enthusiastic about their discovery in Indonesia of indigenous systems of *adat* law, which they saw as embodying the virtues their own society lacked: spirituality, reciprocity, harmony and communalism. Their successful advocacy for *adat* had a lasting impact both on Indonesian legal culture and on how the young nationalists in their midst thought about being Indonesian. It was in dialogue with the Leiden scholars that two notions were born – first that *adat* values were at the heart of Indonesia's identity and second that Indonesia's politics and law ought to express its *adat*.

Such ideas found special favour with *pangreh pradja* and aristocratic elites within Indonesia, which had benefited from the policies promoted by the Leiden *adat* lobby. Coalescing in conservative organisations such as Budi Utomo and Parindra, these groups hoped to preserve the structures of privilege supported by the colonial system that had helped insulate them against rival Muslim and radical nationalist elites.

Japan was a second major, and more immediate, source of organicist thinking and formulas among Indonesian nationalists. Japanese cultural nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s attracted the attention of young Indonesians not only because of the status of Japan as Asia's most powerful independent state but also because of the way its ideologues combined Western organic state theories with Japanese imperial mythology to create a self-confident 'Asian' vision of politics. Most important, the Japanese cultural nationalists and their rightwing militarist allies were on the ascendant during this period and ultimately succeeded in implementing their anti-liberal, Emperor-centric family-state ideology in Japan.

Organicist ideas received a huge boost during the occupation, when the Japanese military administration encouraged the revival of indigenous Indonesian values, promoted family state ideology and remoulded the political landscape along corporatist lines. Because of the Japanese administration's

emphasis on mass mobilisation and propaganda, such notions spread well beyond the narrow circle of conservative politicians and intellectuals that had previously sympathised with them. They were especially influential in shaping the political thinking of Japanese-trained military officers who took power in Indonesia in the 1960s.

It would be wrong, however, to overestimate the dimensions of nationalist support for organicist philosophies and their nativist underpinnings. Muslim nationalist groups in general had little sympathy for organicism. They saw *adat* as something to be reformed or controlled, not made into the basis of a national legal and political system. Among secular nationalists there was widespread sympathy for collectivism, but this was linked mainly to Marxist and social democratic traditions rather than organicist imaginings. Only a small minority of nationalists conceived of collectivism as implying the erasure of the boundaries between state and society. The limits of support for organicism became apparent during the constitutional deliberations of 1945 when Supomo attempted to convince his fellow BPUPK delegates to accept 'integralism' as the philosophical basis of the independent state. Supomo's integralist state concept met considerable resistance in the BPUPK, most of whose members were committed to the democratic principle of popular sovereignty. Thanks largely to the forceful arguments of Hatta and Yamin, Supomo was forced to compromise on the question of whether citizens' rights had any place in the Indonesian constitution.

While some have maintained that Sukarno's siding with Supomo in opposing the inclusion of individual rights in the constitution indicates that he shared Supomo's political outlook, a closer scrutiny of their writings and speeches reveals that they based their positions on quite different premises and can therefore not be grouped together philosophically. Sukarno was not an organicist. He drew his inspiration from radical nationalists, not from anti-Enlightenment conservatives. Sukarno's heroes were revolutionaries such as Danton, Lenin, Garibaldi and Ataturk. It is true that both he and Supomo talked a lot about village traditions, but Sukarno emphasised the dynamic aspects of communal life – symbolised by his use of the term *gotong royong* – while Supomo saw villages as models of tranquillity and harmony between rulers and their charges.

The lack of popular support for organicist concepts of state organisation was demonstrated dramatically during the Indonesian revolution, when political leaders and administrators were exposed to the pressures of public opinion to an unprecedented degree. The strongly egalitarian and anti-feudal spirit of the times put the *pamong praja* elite and the traditional aristocracies on the defensive, leaving little space for the propagation of traditionalist political philosophies. Sjahrir's influential pamphlet *Our Struggle* (1968: 28), written in late 1945, targeted 'hierarchical feudalistic solidarism' as 'the greatest enemy of world progress'.

In the atmosphere of open competition between freely organising political parties, which prevailed between 1945 and about 1957, groups espousing

organicist ideologies remained on the margins of political life. The principal perspective of conservatives in this period was 'Hatta-ism': technocratic, social democratic, constitutionalist, pro-Western and pro-parliament.

The re-emergence of organicist ideas in the fraught political atmosphere of the second half of the 1950s can be attributed in large part to two groups that saw themselves having been disadvantaged by the system of parliamentary democracy, the *pamong praja* and the army. *Pamong praja* officials had never liked the party system and became particularly resentful when the two parties representing their interests, PIR and Parindra, were all but eliminated in the 1955 elections. Army antipathy to the party system was evident in the half-coup of 17 October 1952 and in the formation by Nasution and other officers of IPKI, an 'anti-party party' with close links to the *pamong praja* elite. IPKI's poor showing in the elections, particularly in relation to its bitter foes in the Communist Party, reinforced the army leaders' conviction that an alternative to parliamentary democracy had to be found that would give it a formal role in the system of power.

Another crucial source of dissatisfaction with the parliamentary system was of course President Sukarno, who the 1950 Constitution relegated to a figure-head role. He was frustrated with what he saw as petty bickering among the parties, the inertia of the Java-based PNI and NU, and the slow and unwieldy parliamentary process. When the 1955 elections failed to produce clear winners, and post-election cabinets continued to refuse to allow representation by the PKI, Sukarno took an increasingly aggressive stance against the party system as a whole. He was joined by former guerrillas, youth leaders and radical nationalists who, like himself, regarded themselves as the bearers of revolutionary '*semangat*' entitled to a greater role in running the country than the 'Western', rule-bound parliamentary system permitted.

Although Sukarno and the army leadership disliked parliamentary democracy for different reasons, they collaborated in the establishment of a powerful National Council based on functional rather than party representation. Functional representation had been used by the Japanese during the occupation, but its primary architect, the constitutional lawyer Djokosutono, justified it with reference to a body of European organicist theory – nurtured in civilian and military law schools through the 1940s and 1950s – indicating a supposed historical trend towards restructuring state–society relations along corporatist lines. Djokosutono's corporatist constitutional formula was embraced by Sukarno as the basis of his Guided Democracy and enthusiastically seconded by General Nasution.

The late 1950s saw the army gain significant political leverage, especially after Sukarno gave in to pressure to declare martial law in 1957 in response to the regional rebellions sponsored by mutinous military commanders in Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia. Nasution's army's quick success in crushing the rebellions, its takeover of nationalised Dutch enterprises and its purging of disloyal elements strengthened its hand further and enabled it to claim a permanent role in politics. The defeat of the regional rebellions also changed

the configuration of party politics, with the two major pro-Western, anti-communist parties, Masjumi and PSI, discredited because of their support for the rebels. Alarmed by the electoral advances of the PKI, anti-communists who had previously looked to Hatta had no option than to turn to Nasution. This switch marked an important turning point in the history of conservatism in Indonesia from a Hatta-ist social democratic version to the authoritarian, centrist and organicist variety favoured by Nasution. If it had not been for the regional rebellions and the support given to them by Masjumi and PSI leaders, conservatism in Indonesia would probably have come to resemble conservatism in Malaysia.

The late 1950s, then, saw a resurgence of organicist rhetoric and formulas as both radical and conservative opponents of parliamentary democracy heralded functional group representation as an Indonesian alternative to the divisiveness of the party system. Sukarno laced some of his 1957 speeches with classical organicist images of harmony and unanimity, but this reflected his immediate preoccupation with breaking down party loyalties and mobilising the mass followings of the parties behind his political programmes. Dominant themes in his speeches were still anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, anti-feudalism and the very un-organicist symbol of '*Revolusi*'. The army leaders gave wholehearted support to Sukarno's efforts to wind back the parties, but saw the functional groups concept primarily as means of extending army participation in government and containing the influence of the PKI. The functional groups concept soon became a battleground, with radical and conservative forces each attempting to define and use it to their own advantage. Realising by 1960 that functional groupism had benefitted the army's cause more than his own, Sukarno changed tack, encouraging a revival of the parties, especially the PKI, in support of Nasakom and his increasingly grandiose anti-imperialist campaigns. By that stage, however, functional groupism had become an integral part of military doctrine and indeed a defining part of military thinking about politics.

When Lieutenant General Soeharto seized power, he represented his 'New Order' as modern, technocratic, democratic and committed to the rule of law. But he relied heavily on the advice of military lawyers and ideologues committed to organicist notions of state organisation. For every Widjoyo, speaking the language of modernity and development, there was a Sutjipto, quoting Supomo and promoting an image of the New Order as the exemplar of Indonesian cultural tradition.

Organicist arguments were used to defend the dismantling of Sukarno's radical nationalist ideological legacy at a time when the government was reversing his economic and foreign policy strategies in a way many nationalists saw as selling out to international capitalism. Representing the New Order as authentically Indonesian was also a means of attacking Sukarno's own nationalist credentials. Sukarno was depicted not only as corrupt, licentious and a tool of the communists but also as having been 'swallowed up by Western thinking'. The Pancasila, 'cleansed' of its leftist and revolutionary accretions, was

'restored' as a symbol of organic wholeness, harmony and the family principle, and became the regime's principal ideological emblem.

Organicist arguments were also used to stave off the demands of the parties and the New Order's liberal-minded supporters for human rights, constitutionalism and the rule of law. Ideologues reinterpreted such concepts as popular sovereignty, parliamentary voting, the separation of powers and political and human rights to give the government maximum flexibility in its dealings with civil society. The 1966 resolution of the MPRS to enshrine the Pancasila as the 'source of all sources of law' provided cover for an enormous range of arbitrary measures by the government against the surviving elements of countervailing power.

Although the Soeharto government remained formally committed to multiparty democracy until 1973, corporatism emerged well before that as its preferred form of political organisation. Government operatives undermined the surviving parties and increased functional group representation in parliament in the years after 1966. In 1969 Soeharto sponsored the formation of Golkar, which became its vehicle for winning large majorities in elections. It soon became clear, though, that the New Order's corporatism was more hierarchical and authoritarian than that which had existed prior to 1965. Groups affiliated with Golkar rapidly lost their independence and found themselves part of a centrally controlled bureaucratic machine.

The chief figure behind the New Order's programme of demobilisation and corporatisation, Ali Moertopo, made some attempts to justify his policies and doctrines with reference to Indonesian tradition, but more commonly spoke of the need for political stability as a prerequisite for the 'acceleration of modernisation'. His thinking, and that of his coterie of civilian 'political technocrats', derived not from the *adat* scholars but from an eclectic mix of Japanese corporatism, American political order theory and Catholic social theory. The link with Catholic theory, little commented upon elsewhere, appears to have been especially important in shaping Moertopo's thinking about unions and in creating the doctrine of Pancasila Industrial Relations.

Initially lower profile than Moertopo, but equally important was Sudharmono, the chief architect of the New Order's legal edifice. The state secretariat where he worked from 1966, and which he controlled between 1972 and 1988, was a stronghold of organicist thinking about state organisation. Sudharmono and his faction, consisting largely of graduates of Djokosutono's Military Law Academy, presided over the drafting of a string of crucial political laws curtailing the freedom of non-state groups to organise and extending the state's penetration of civil society.

If organicist ideology helped condition the structures of the New Order, it was also used as a political weapon. Tracking the course of the Pancasila 'industry' over a quarter of a century, it is possible to see how the New Order's ideological facade was constructed, sometimes hastily and inconsistently, in response to specific challenges. Among the problems New Order ideologues were employed to deal with were Sukarnoist and leftist criticisms of the

government for selling the country off to foreign business, populist denunciations of the growing gap between the rich and the poor, Muslim anger over the marriage law of 1973, the mysticism issue and the 'sole foundation' law. For many years the government presented itself as walking a middle path between the extremisms of the ideological left and the religious right. But in the 1980s, when human rights and constitutionalist criticism came to the fore, its principal concern was with the threat posed by advocates of liberalism and human rights. The New Order's revival of integralism is best understood as an attempt to forge a response to this last set of challenges.

While recognising the contingent, reactive nature of the government's ideological campaigns, it is striking how consistent the main themes of state ideology were over the years – or, to put it another way, how limited a stock of ideas the ideologues drew on. Integralism was 'new' in the mid 1980s in the sense that the term had rarely been heard of since Supomo used it in 1945. But the organicist vision of state–society relations it expressed had been recycled many times. Supomo's ideas, and the tradition of thought on which they were based, had informed a range of conservative politicians in the 1950s and 1960s from Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo to Nasution. They were advanced again in the early New Order by figures such as Sutjipto and Abdulkadir Besar and were taught in military and police colleges. They also underpinned the social philosophies promoted in the Pancasila indoctrination programmes in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. A leitmotif of these programmes, most clearly apparent in Pancasila Moral Education texts for schoolchildren, was the continuum between family, society and the state. All were represented as embodying the harmonious, static, hierarchical values embedded in indigenous *adat* practices.

Indonesia's embrace of organicist ideology prefigured and inspired other Southeast Asian countries, most notably Malaysia and Singapore, to adopt communitarian doctrines. Malaysia's *Rukunegara* 'Articles of Faith of the State' and Singapore's 'Five Shared Values', introduced by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1988, closely reflect the emphasis on family, consensus and social harmony in Indonesia's Pancasila education campaigns. As I have argued elsewhere (Bourchier 1998), the deployment of these doctrines, and 'Asian values' rhetoric more generally, can be understood primarily as a defensive manoeuvre to stave off domestic political demands framed in the language of liberal rights. It was only later that Asian values came to be recruited, not only by some Asian governments but also by Western conservatives, to explain the success of East Asian economies.[1]

This is not the first study to trace the influence of Supomo's ideas through the post-independence period. David Reeve covered much of the same ground in his 1985 book on Golkar. His anchoring of integralism in Javanese tradition, however, made it difficult for him to account for the fact that some of the keenest promoters of integralist ideology were non-Javanese and not especially traditionalist. The concern here has been to trace the linkage between organicist ideology and Continental European legal philosophy and

to identify the central role played by lawyers, particularly constitutional and *adat* lawyers, in reproducing and promoting such ideologies in Indonesia. The most important institutional bases for organicist ideology have been the Military Law Academy (where several of these figures taught), Golkar, the post-1966 state secretariat and of course the BP-7.

This study has also portrayed the 'progress' of organicism in less teleological terms than Reeve. While it is true that organicist ideas can be traced back to the early years of the nationalist movement, they did not at any stage dominate it. Muslim, Marxist and social democratic streams of nationalist thought were each at least as important. Organicist ideas came to the surface only in situations where popular forces had least say, and were implemented as the result of calculated choices made by small elites, often in crisis situations. Arguments that depict organicism as Indonesia's 'natural' political basis should be treated as sceptically as ones that characterise Germans as congenitally authoritarian.

Organicist ideologies and formulas had been resisted in 1945 by Hatta and his supporters in the BPUPK, condemned by Sjahrir and the *pemuda* during the revolution, shunned by voters in the 1955 elections, opposed (to little effect) by party leaders in 1956–9 and opposed again by intellectuals in the first years of the New Order. The government's attempt to proclaim integralism as Indonesia's authentic state concept in the mid 1980s prompted a new and more comprehensive wave of attacks on organicist ideology by intellectuals and activists. Challenged by the government's assertion that opposition, political rights and the separation of powers had no valid place in the political system, these critics excavated much of Indonesia's suppressed, and largely forgotten, democratic past. In the process they called into question much of the conventional wisdom about Indonesian political history and culture, especially the assertion that parliamentary democracy failed in the 1950s because of a fundamental incompatibility between liberalism (and 'Western' ideologies more generally) and Indonesian culture. This revival of interest in democratic thinkers, democratic traditions and democratic experimentation also saw the concept of 'popular sovereignty', beloved of an earlier generation of democrats, emerge as an potent weapon in the hands of the opponents of the New Order.

The reaction against integralism in the late New Order – in which even sacred political concepts such as *musyawarah* were challenged – was no mere academic exercise. It expressed the deep frustration of Indonesia's burgeoning middle classes with the failure of the government to match its sweeping economic deregulation reforms with progress towards a more open and inclusive political system. The corporatist political mechanisms and the ideological formulas deployed in the 1960s and 1970s could no longer constrain the powerful new social, economic and political forces that had been unleashed by three decades of economic growth. Just how strong those pent up forces were, and just how fed up they were with Pancasila Democracy, became obvious the moment that Soeharto was forced from power.

There is no doubt that Soeharto's New Order transformed the economy of Indonesia and greatly improved life for its people. Despite the corruption, Indonesia managed its wealth far more prudently than most other oil exporting states, investing heavily in primary health, schooling, agriculture and building the country's infrastructure. Three decades of sustained economic growth saw huge reductions in poverty and improvements in life expectancy, literacy and infant mortality. While the catastrophic financial crisis of 1997/8 reversed some of these gains, the policies of the New Order made the people of Indonesia far healthier, wealthier, more secure and more educated than they had been in the mid 1960s (Hill 2000).

But Soeharto also damaged Indonesia. His extreme concentration of power within the presidential office entrenched a patrimonial culture that effectively sucked the life out of the institutions of government, including the legislature and the judiciary. The New Order bureaucracy operated like a giant patronage network in which loyalty was rewarded and predation on those outside its embrace was tolerated if not encouraged. Soeharto's exploitation of political power for personal gain provided an example that was emulated at every level of the state apparatus, institutionalising a culture of bureaucratic corruption antagonistic to principles of transparency and public service. The predictable rhythm of political life in Indonesia led many analysts to view the New Order as a strong state, much in the same way as Kremlinologists had the Soviet Union. Without its lynchpin, however, the familiar lines of command were thrown into chaos and the vulnerabilities of Soeharto's state were apparent to all.

The New Order also did lasting damage to Indonesia's political culture. In its drive to depoliticise Indonesia it killed off all independent political parties, creating a generation of 'floating' politicians without the skills to mobilise support from below. It also systematically disorganised civil society, eroding the confidence of social activists and weakening their ability to organise and articulate popular grievances. While Elson's (2001: 308) assessment that Soeharto left Indonesia 'a wasteland of political ideas' is harsh, the rigour with which the New Order patrolled the boundaries of legitimate discourse about history, culture and politics certainly provided little opportunity for robust debate and left many Indonesians ill-prepared for the outbreak of democratic freedoms after 1998.

Note

1 There is of course a large and nuanced literature on Asian values that I have not had space to do justice to in this book. Key texts include Zakaria (1994) and Chua (2004).

Epilogue
Legacies and rejuvenation

Fifteen years after the fall of Soeharto, a third of Indonesia's population have no memory of life under his New Order regime. And yet it profoundly shaped their world. This brief attempt to bring this study up to date touches on the sweeping democratic reforms post 1998 before reflecting on how organicist ideas continue to influence political and legal thinking in Indonesia. Understanding the history of this legacy can help current and future generations of democrats recognise its contours and resist its seductions.

When a bewildered Soeharto walked off stage after handing power to Vice President B.J. Habibie on 21 May 1998 it was as though a spell had been lifted on the country. Ecstatic students danced in the grounds of the parliament building they had occupied, and across the nation old taboos began to be flouted. As soon as it became clear that the armed forces – under fire for their long support of Soeharto and uncertain of their status in the new dispensation – were not going to intervene, new political parties began to be formed and the press burst into life. Newspapers exposed the military's record of human rights abuses, challenged official accounts of the 1965 coup, and gave voice to attacks on virtually all aspects of New Order policy.

The student-led *reformasi* movement demanded a complete democratic overhaul of the political system, including the immediate end of military involvement in politics, the trial of Soeharto and the resignation of Habibie who they saw as part of the problem. Latecomers to the reform movement, including the leaders of political parties and social and religious organisations with a history of cooperation with the New Order, embraced the agenda of multiparty democracy with surprising alacrity. After decades of propaganda about the lack of fit between Indonesian culture and 'Western-style' democracy, some version of multiparty democracy now appeared to offer the only way to accommodate the demands of the *reformasi* movement and the numerous political interests jostling for power. Everyone was aware that democratisation would also help restore Indonesia's credibility internationally, as it had in November 1945.

Such was the momentum of the reform movement that the politically weak Habibie had little choice but to recast himself as a committed democrat. Within months he and his energetic team of advisors had lifted restrictions on

the press, negotiated a new set of laws governing political parties and the composition of parliament and prepared for new parliamentary and presidential elections. The new laws, which reduced the role of the military, curtailed the privileges of Golkar and limited the tenure of the president, were rejected as inadequate by tens of thousands of students who converged on the national parliament in November 1998 but gained the support of high-profile social and political leaders and were passed by parliament.

Reformasi also saw Jakarta's tight grip over the country's regions challenged. East Timor was first in line, with mass protests in support of a referendum breaking out in mid 1998 quickly followed by similar demands in Aceh and West Papua. Habibie attempted to console Aceh by withdrawing troops and offering an apology for past abuses by the unpopular military. Even more unthinkable by the standards of the New Order, the mercurial president invited the UN to sponsor a referendum on the future of East Timor, which brought Indonesia's 24-year occupation to an ignominious end in August 1999.

But most regions simply wanted more autonomy and a fairer distribution of resources, leading Habibie, with the support of multilateral agencies, to initiate a far-reaching programme of decentralisation. The 1999 decentralisation bills, which gave sub-provincial parliaments the power to elect their own heads and gave provinces greater control over their natural resources, changed the political map of Indonesia. Giving the regions greater economic autonomy increased the rewards of power at the local level, greatly intensifying political contestation in the regions. One effect of this, and the creation of many new administrative regions, was to sharpen rivalries between religious or ethnic communities, leading to serious communal conflict in some areas including Ambon and Central Sulawesi.

Another sign that Indonesia had entered a new era was the marginalisation of the military from formal politics. The military had been taken aback by what Crouch (1999: 127) called the 'hurricane of public condemnation' directed at them on account of their long record of oppression during the New Order and for killing student demonstrators during the anti-Soeharto protests. Aware of their weakened position the military leadership agreed to a reduced role in parliament, a withdrawal of active personnel from civilian posts, a cutting of ties with Golkar and, in 2000, the formal renunciation of *dwifungsi*.

After being frozen solid for decades, the 1945 Constitution was also open to negotiation. The extraordinary MPR session of 1998 annulled a 1985 referendum law that had effectively made amendments impossible, setting in train a far-reaching process of constitutional reform between 1999 and 2002. Key changes over this period included making the MPR fully elected, requiring the president to be popularly elected, strengthening the powers of the parliament, embracing the separation of powers, forming a new independent Constitutional Court with powers of judicial review and introducing a comprehensive set of rights guarantees based on the United Nations

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Together with the initiatives limiting presidential tenure, instituting decentralisation and limiting military participation in government, these amendments laid the foundations for a far more democratic configuration of power in Indonesia (Lindsey 2004: 295–313). While the process of constitutional reform was patchy and sometimes ad hoc, the amendments adhered consistently to the principle that state power needed to be constrained (Cammack 2009: ix). They affirmed that the interests of the state were *not* the same as those of the society and that a regime of checks and balances was the only way to guarantee citizens' rights against violation by the state. All claims that the 1945 Constitution embodied Supomo's integralist vision were put to rest.

If the political architecture of the New Order crumbled before the tide of *reformasi*, so did aspects of its ideology. It is not perhaps surprising that references to Indonesia as an integralist state practically vanished from public discourse. What was more striking was the virtual disappearance, and in some cases the public repudiation, of the Pancasila. Numerous commentaries from the early post-Soeharto period refer to the public's 'allergy' to the Pancasila and the 'discrediting' of the Pancasila after years of hypocrisy and abuse at the hands of the New Order regime. Reflecting on the era, analyst As'ad Said Ali (2009: 49) wrote:

> In attempting to socialise Pancasila, the New Order ended up indoctrinating the population. They distorted it, sacralised it, monopolised it and used violence to defend it. And as a result, their hollowed-out Pancasila met a tragic fate; it fell flat on its face along with the New Order. Pancasila traumatised society.

Trauma was a recurring theme. 'Every time I heard the word Pancasila', wrote Trisno Sutanto (2009), 'the hairs on my neck would stand up. It was such a powerful weapon in the hands of the authoritarian New Order regime. As an ideological weapon it could silence anyone who wanted to think critically'. Humour was another. The notion of 'Pancasila Democracy' was widely lampooned, with many commentators glad to see it consigned to the dustbin of history along with New Order concoctions such as 'Pancasila Press' and 'Pancasila Football'.

Special vitriol was reserved for the New Order's Pancasila indoctrination programmes that were condemned as hypocritical and intellectually vacuous attempts to enforce conformity and obedience. 'Through the P4 program', wrote lecturer A. Chaedar Alwasilah (1998), 'the people have systematically been made uncritical, cowardly, and dependent'. As a result of incessant criticism and the evident unwillingness of Soeharto's ideologues to come to the defence of the programme, P4 was officially terminated in November 1998. President Habibie also ordered the dissolution of the New Order's premier ideological advisory body, BP-7, bringing Soeharto's pride and joy to an unceremonious end.

Some of the hostility to the Pancasila came from Islamic groups that had been affronted by the government's promotion of Pancasila as a moral code and by the law that required all organisations to adopt Pancasila as their sole foundation. With that law revoked by the 1998 parliament, ten of the 15 overtly Islamic parties that contested the 1999 elections, including the rebranded Unity Development Party (PPP), chose Islam rather than Pancasila as their ideological basis. Some Islamist groups took the initiative to press for the revival of the 1945 Jakarta Charter – the draft preamble to the constitution that obliged all Muslims to practice sharia – but leaders of mainstream Islamic organisations remembered well how this question had paralysed the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly in the 1950s and were prepared to put it aside for the sake of broader reform (Platzdasch 2009: 218).

Legacies

There is no argument that Indonesia is a freer, more dynamic, more democratic country than it was before 1998, but there were definite limits to what the *reformasi* movement was able to achieve. The most conspicuous symbol of these limits was the failure to have Soeharto brought to justice, either for presiding over the mass killings of 1965–8 or for using his position to amass a family fortune estimated at $US73.24 billion (Winters 2011: 169). Shielded from prosecution by successive governments, Soeharto spent his retirement at his leafy and well-guarded Jakarta residence until his death in 2008. Hopes for an end to 'collusion, nepotism and corruption' were also dashed. Indonesia continues to linger in the bottom half of Transparency International's corruption perceptions index and, as Robison and Hadiz (2004) have shown, the old oligarchs were not defeated in 1998. Instead, they adapted, making a more or less seamless transition to the new political dispensation, investing heavily in political parties to preserve their privileges and access to the levers of power. A decade and a half on, the political scene was still dominated by actors who were part of Soeharto's New Order.

It was common in the years after the fall of Soeharto for Indonesians to distinguish between the *reformasi* forces and the 'status quo' forces in Indonesian politics. The core status quo institution, notwithstanding its formal withdrawal from politics, was the military. While the military paid lip service to *reformasi* and played a neutral role in the 1999 election campaign, it strongly opposed efforts to bring military affairs under civilian control and to make officers accountable for corruption and crimes committed against opponents of the New Order regime. There are few signs that the military has given up any of its basic beliefs, including the notion that it has 'the right to define and defend national interests against the alleged selfishness and incompetence of civilian elites' (Mietzner 2009: 369). Organicist conceptions of the proper relationship between state and society remain strong both among serving officers and in military academies. Most important, the military resisted calls by reformers to dismantle its vast territorial apparatus,

leaving intact the infrastructure that allows it to exercise power in cities and towns throughout the archipelago. The territorial apparatus continues to provide the military not only with significant political resources but also a substantial income stream independent of the government (Mietzner 2009: 203–4).

Golkar was widely considered a pillar of the status quo forces on account of its intimate relations with Indonesia's extensive bureaucracy over three decades and, of course, because of its long association with Soeharto and the military. Its leaders projected a conservative image in the early *reformasi* period, with Marzuki Darusman, for instance, urging all parties to sit down and negotiate in the wake of the 1999 elections in order 'to avert the possibility of a new radical movement, or *people power*' (*Gamma*, 7 September 1999). That said, Golkar cautiously adapted to the new democracy by changing its name to Golkar Party, distancing itself from the military and by lending sometimes reluctant support for reformist legislation in parliament.

For the first two years after May 1998 conservative forces in Indonesia were on the defensive. As the momentum of *reformasi* petered out and disaffection with the multi-party system crept in, familiar old patterns of political discourse began to resurface. The tipping point came during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid had come to power at the head of a broad coalition of Muslim parties that had united to oppose the candidacy of Sukarno's daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) had won the general election in 1999. Despite representing a largely rural, pious constituency, Wahid was a broad-minded pluralist. In March 2000 he broadcast an apology to victims and survivors of the anti-communist pogrom of the mid 1960s and said that the 1966 ban on propagating Marxist-Leninist teachings would soon be rescinded (*Kompas*, 26 March 2000). The president's attempt at reconciliation was welcomed by human rights groups in Indonesia, some of whom had started work unearthing mass graves. But Wahid's call outraged most of the political elite and was condemned by virtually all parties, including his own minister for law and legislation, Yusril Ihza Mahendra (*Media Indonesia*, 9 April 2000). Amien Rais, the speaker of the MPR who had been one of the most influential opponents of Soeharto in 1998, stated that if the ban were lifted, the PKI would be back and there would be 'hammers and sickles everywhere' (*Kompas*, 3 April 2000). Thousands joined street protests in major cities in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi calling on the president to abandon the plan (UCA News.com, 13 April 2000).

This episode was important for two reasons. First, it provided Wahid's enemies among both the Muslim parties and the military with common cause, reducing past tensions and paving the way for future cooperation. Second, it demonstrated how successfully the New Order had propagated the notion that communism was a 'latent danger' that could return at any moment. Clearly this was an aspect of the New Order's ideational legacy that had not disappeared.

It also happened to coincide with a strong anti-party reaction in Indonesia stemming partly from public frustration with the self-serving behaviour of parties in the wake of the 1999 elections and the bickering among party leaders that had virtually paralysed the Wahid administration (Tan 2002: 485). A powerful factor in this reaction was the reservoir of anti-party sentiment inherited from the past that characterised parties as intrinsically divisive and out of tune with Indonesian culture (Tan 2002: 490–1). Both civilian and military figures drew on this discourse in their appeals to politicians to forget about partisan politics and focus on the national interest.

With the communist issue on the agenda and with anti-partyism on the rise, politicians were increasingly keen to identify themselves with national rituals and symbols, including the Pancasila. In 1999, many members of parliament had boycotted the 'Sacred Pancasila Day' ceremony that had been held every 1 October during the New Order to commemorate Soeharto's defeat of communism (*Suara Pembaruan*, 1 October 1999). In October 2000, however, the ceremony attracted Wahid's vice president Megawati and a host of dignitaries and parliamentarians keen to be photographed against the backdrop of the statues of the generals killed on the night of 30 September 1965. In doing so they were endorsing not only the foundational myth of the New Order but also the New Order version of the Pancasila with its attendant baggage. Despite some debate over the renaming of the ceremony to 'Commemorative Day for the Betrayal of the Pancasila', few questioned whose Pancasila had been 'betrayed' in 1965 or in fact why the occasion should continue to be celebrated at all in the post-Soeharto era (McGregor 2002: 63–4).

By late 2000, the euphoria of *reformasi* was well and truly over. Ongoing communal violence in Kalimantan, Ambon and Sulawesi as well as Wahid's concessions to independence advocates in Papua and Aceh gave rise to widely shared fears that Indonesia could fall apart. Wahid's erratic rule and endemic conflict within his coalition government only underscored the sense that multi-party democracy was harming Indonesia. In this atmosphere military officers spoke out with increasing confidence, calling for tougher measures to guarantee national unity. This was symbolised by their new catch cry of 'NKRI' (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), which was quickly embraced by parties across the political spectrum. As Mietzner observed, the integration of 'NKRI' into the everyday discourse of politicians, government officials and civil society organisations was 'probably the military's most successful public relations campaign after 1998' (2009: 228). Making national unity a dominant theme of political discourse elevated the status of the military, which had always represented itself as its guardian. The credentials of the military only improved when, in the dying days of Wahid's presidency, it refused to carry out the president's orders to implement a state of emergency. This gave it enough political capital to escape serious domestic or international censure for its intervention in support of Wahid's impeachment in favour of Megawati in July 2001.

Megawati had been a symbol of opposition to Soeharto in the 1990s, and the victory of her PDI-P in the 1999 elections signalled a demand for reform.

Her presidency from 2001 to 2004, though, was marked by a slowing of the wheels of reform and the return of many aspects of the New Order political culture in which she had gained her political experience. During the 1999 election campaign she famously exempted herself from a debate with rival party leaders on the grounds that debates were 'not in accordance with Eastern culture or with the 1945 Constitution' (Detik.com 1999). Megawati's attachment to monistic political norms was on display at the first congress of the PDI-P in April 2000 when she forced other contenders for the leadership to withdraw so that she could avoid a vote and be elected by acclamation. As president, Megawati put the brakes on decentralisation and placed great rhetorical emphasis on national unity and the 1945 Constitution. She allowed the military great freedom to run their own affairs and was more than willing to accept their counsel on solving regional conflicts, including the long-running guerrilla war in Aceh. It is a sign of the degree to which the political parties had united behind 'NKRI' that few objected to the military's launching of a full-scale assault on Aceh in May 2003 (Mietzner 2009: 229).

The perception that neither the Wahid nor the Megawati governments had managed to curb corruption, restimulate the economy or reign in the power of political parties led to a growing public nostalgia for the certainties of the past (Tomsa 2008: 111). Golkar capitalised on this sentiment during the 2004 election campaign, expanding its vote to become once again the largest single party in Indonesia. While the widely touted 'I miss Soeharto syndrome' should not be taken too literally, it did help open the door to increasingly explicit rejections of *reformasi* in favour of the *status quo ante*. Again it was military officers and political parties formed by retired officers who took the lead. General Hartono, the chair of the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB) led by Soeharto's eldest daughter Tutut, declared in 2004 that rejecting the New Order was the same as rejecting the Pancasila (*Tempo Interaktif*, 19 January 2004). Not to be outdone, the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI) chaired by Soeharto's former armed forces commander General Edi Sudradjat condemned the post-1998 reforms for 'weakening the foundations of the republic', calling for the restitution of Pancasila as Indonesia's sole ideology and the restoration of Pancasila indoctrination (*Jakarta Post*, 12 February 2004). Thanks to the writings of retired military intellectual Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo[1] and others it soon grew into an article of faith in military circles that the amendments to the constitution had introduced individualistic elements, which conflicted with Indonesian culture and with the familial spirit as outlined by the founding fathers in 1945. Senior military officers and their associates also blamed the introduction of culturally alien notions of democracy for separatism, frequently referring to threats to the 'body of state' by the 'sickness' or 'cancer' of separatism that had to be treated with 'shock therapy'. Familial analogies were also prominent, with Aceh often being labelled as a 'naughty child' in the context of the 'big family' of the Indonesian state (see e.g. *Sriwijaya Post*, 30 April 2003).

Rejuvenation

It was during the approach to Indonesia's first direct presidential election in 2004 that Pancasila re-entered Indonesian political discourse in a major way. Of course it had never disappeared completely. Pancasila was still almost universally accepted as the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state and had been reaffirmed as such by the MPR at the same time as it abolished P4 in 1998. It was just that few politicians wanted to associate themselves too publically with the symbolic centrepiece of Soeharto's authoritarian regime. The mainstream military had sidestepped Pancasila in its promotion of the NKRI concept and even Sukarno's daughter acknowledged that it was a sensitive topic because of the traumatic memories it evoked (*Kompas*, 16 September 2004).

The impetus for a revival of Pancasila in 2004 came from a different quarter. It originated not with diehard generals but with pluralist civil society activists and intellectuals who had been critical if not opposed to the New Order. Their primary concern was to find a way to stem the spread of deadly communal violence and religious intolerance that had become an increasingly routine part of Indonesian politics. Platzdasch (2009: 331–41) and others have discussed the 'Islamic turn' of the major political parties after 2002, including Golkar, PDI-P and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Partai Demokrat, which had hitherto been regarded as secular nationalist. This general shift toward a pro-Islamic stance on social issues was a response to a quickening of the pace of Islamisation within Indonesian society, but also to the increasingly vocal demands by Islamist parties and societal groups for the state to take a tougher stand on 'immoral and lewd behaviour'. One consequence of this was that Megawati's administration, and, after 2004, the Yudhoyono administration, were willing to permit Islamist parties who had won power at the regional level to implement sharia-friendly bylaws. These bylaws mainly targeted prostitution, gambling and public displays of affection, but in some areas enforced Muslim dress codes regardless of religion (Bush 2008: 178). President Yudhoyono's government was also increasingly ready to accommodate the opinions of the ultra conservative Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), which in 2005 issued two highly controversial fatwa, one labelling the Ahmadiyah sect as heretical and the other declaring liberalism, secularism and pluralism to be in contradiction to Islamic teachings (Platzdasch 2009: 340; Olle 2009: 101–2). Both fatwa were widely seen as legitimising a growing level of violence against religious minorities by vigilante groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).

These developments generated profound unease not only among Christians and minority sects but also among liberal-minded Muslims. Azyumardi Azra, the vice chancellor of the State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah, probably did more than anyone to encourage reformers to reclaim Pancasila as a symbol of tolerance and pluralism. In a series of articles in *Kompas* in June 2004, Azra argued that while it was hardly surprising that people were traumatised by the Pancasila because of the way in which the New Order had

used it as a political tool, the time had come to rehabilitate and rejuvenate it. In the face of ethno-nationalism and the rise of religious-based ideologies in the post-Soeharto period, Pancasila was, he said, the only feasible common ideological platform acceptable to the Indonesian people. In order for this rejuvenation to take place, it would be necessary to disentangle it from its New Order heritage, an effort, he acknowledged, that would require a lot of moral courage (*Kompas*, 17 June 2004).

The fact that Azra was a Muslim firmly within the reformist camp gave his proposal considerable authority, and it quickly attracted support from a range of critical intellectuals including human rights lawyer Mulya Lubis, senior journalist Aristides Katoppo and religious observer Franz Magnis Suseno. What distinguished this new chapter in Pancasila discourse was that it urged people to imagine a Pancasila unsullied by New Order propaganda and practice. Suseno was scathing in his assessment of the New Order and proposed that 1 October should be known as Pancasila Betrayal Day because it marked the beginning of the army's mass killing and imprisonment of their fellow Indonesians (*Kompas*, 3 October 2005). He went on to remind readers of the original purpose of the Pancasila as a historic compromise by Sukarno, emphasising at the same time its pluralist spirit: 'Pancasila represents the agreement of the Indonesian people to build a state in which all citizens are equal, with the same obligations and rights, without discrimination, without concern for religion, without concern for minority and majority status'. As the initiative gained popularity, a major symposium was held in May 2006 at the University of Indonesia attended by well-known critics of the New Order including journalist Goenawan Mohamad, political scientist Mochtar Pabottinggi and Dawam Rahardjo, as well as Azra and Soeseno. While their perspectives varied, they agreed that the family state ideology pursued by the New Order legitimised extensive state intervention in the affairs of civil society and a suppression of political rights. The new, pluralist Pancasila ideology, they argued, should divorce itself from the family state concept and embrace the right of diverse civil society groups to exist and to have a greater say in regulating their own affairs. Freedoms were not absolute, however, and it was the role of the state to enforce the rule of law 'based on the principles of the Pancasila' and to propagate Pancasila values, including the separation of religion and state, in an 'interactive' way (Song 2008: 372–87).

Readers may be puzzled by this turn of events. In seeking to explain how ideology has been used to defend conservative interests, this book has focused on the Pancasila as a mechanism of control. But this, as Seung-Won Song (2008) and others have correctly pointed out, is not the full picture. It overshadows the fact that Pancasila as a set of transcendent ideals is deeply embedded in the Indonesian national consciousness. Shared attachment to these ideals helps to explain why Pancasila was almost as much a part of opposition discourse as it was of government discourse during the New Order (Hadiz 2004: 148–9). It also helps account for the extreme sensitivity of the New Order government to criticism that it had failed to live up to the ideals of the

Pancasila, whether humanitarianism, democracy or social justice. The civil society activists who proposed a democratic revitalisation of the Pancasila were tapping into this deeper, less-politicised reservoir of affection for Pancasila in Indonesian society.

The reality was, though, that even Pancasila as an oppositional discourse was often coloured by organicist assumptions. Disentangling it from its New Order heritage and building it into a distinctive and robust set of principles to serve as the basis of a democratic Indonesia was always going to be a major undertaking. As it happened, this effort was compromised by the fact that almost as soon as the revitalisation of the Pancasila was proposed it was wholeheartedly endorsed not only by the president and his ministers but also by military figures. Sayidiman could barely contain his glee, writing that this was exactly what the military had been saying all along but nobody wanted to listen (Sayidiman 2004). The gush of official support did not kill the initiative, but it did dilute its civil-society flavour and therefore its moral authority. So while academics, civil-society figures and religious minorities – especially Christians – continued to support the resurrection of the Pancasila, government officials took an increasingly prominent role in driving the initiative from about 2005.

Among the suggestions of the reformers was that Indonesia needed to encourage the spread of Pancasila values, especially tolerance, as an antidote to communal and religious violence. After the scrapping of P4, Pancasila education had in fact remained as part of the national curriculum at both the secondary and tertiary levels. Indeed, until 2004, schoolchildren throughout Indonesia were required to take a subject called Pancasila and Citizenship Education (PPKn), which, because it had been introduced in 1994, still taught students that Indonesia was a family state based on integralist principles (Kalidjernih 2005). After a long process of debate and several legislative amendments, a new curriculum was introduced in 2004 in which this subject was replaced with Citizenship Education (PKn). Formulated with considerable input from the US-funded Center for Indonesian Civic Education, the new Citizenship Education subject gave much more emphasis to democratic rights, pluralism and political participation. Pancasila was still included, but only as a relatively minor component.

Recuperation

By the time the new *reformasi*-inspired curriculum was introduced, the political tide had already turned, and Citizenship Education in particular came in for increasing criticism for focusing too much on individual and group rights and too little on integrative factors such as Pancasila. Debate on the subject in subsequent years saw the 'US-influenced' curriculum blamed for a range of ills, from interschool violence and a fading of nationalism among young Indonesians to corruption and national disintegration. There was also concern, especially from teachers, over the increasing tendency for schools to enforce

Islamic dress rules, leading to discrimination against minority students. Numerous government-sponsored congresses and symposia on Pancasila education were held between 2006 and 2009 leading to a decision to overhaul the curriculum again. In 2013 the Yudhoyono government began the rollout of a controversial new curriculum, which gave greater weight to religion and moral education at the expense of science, social studies and English. In the 2013 curriculum, Citizenship Education was changed back to its New Order era name, Pancasila and Citizenship Education. In the new iteration, subjects on human rights, power and politics and globalisation were dropped and top billing was given to the 'four pillars of nationhood' that had been promoted by the MPR since 2009: (1) Pancasila as the basis of the state and the worldview of the nation; (2) the 1945 Constitution; (3) Unity in Diversity; (4) the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) (Balitbang Puskurbuk Kemdikbud 2012). Democracy in the new curriculum was still regarded as a positive value but only when tempered by Indonesian cultural norms and national imperatives. A core aim of the senior high school curriculum, for instance, was to 'Encourage a culture of democracy that prioritises *musyawarah* and *mufakat* and national integrity in the context of NKRI' (Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 2013). While it would be wrong to say that Pancasila education had come full circle, parts of the new PPKn were starting to look very like the old PPKn.

The appetite for old recipes for social integration was also evident in calls by a number of politicians, academics, lawyers and retired military officers that the BP-7 be re-established. 'Like it or not' wrote psychology professor Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono in 2012, the New Order's 'combination of coercion (Kopkamtib) and persuasion (BP-7) was effective' (*Kompas*, 8 November 2012). Following a paternalistic logic that was becoming increasingly commonplace in Indonesian public discourse, Sarwono wrote that without military supervision and without the enforcement of Pancasila values, Indonesians were 'free to murder each other for the sake of religion, politics and other interests'. The time had come, Sarwono concluded 'for us to revive the BP-7' (ibid.). While this has not yet happened, the government did fund the construction of a large Pancasila and Constitution Education Centre in Bogor under the auspices of the prestigious Constitutional Court with a mission to instil in citizens the values of the constitution and the state ideology.

President Yudhoyono's speech inaugurating the Pancasila education complex in February 2013 provides a vivid example of the recuperation of previously repudiated ways of talking about Indonesian politics. The president told his audience that the wisdom of Pancasila had been 'dug-up' from the 'high values' of the Indonesian nation and provided a 'third way' to the extremes of liberalism on one hand and communism on the other. It was thanks to the Pancasila, he argued, that Indonesia had survived the global financial crisis and could look forward to a better future (Cabinet Secretariat 2013). The changed tone is also apparent in government publications and school curriculum materials in which 'Pancasila Democracy' is increasingly

used to describe both the Soeharto period and Indonesia's current system of government – usually with the caveat that under Soeharto, Pancasila Democracy was implemented in an authoritarian way (Ministry of Education and Culture 2012; Materi PKn 2013). Senior career diplomat A. Agus Sriyono made this argument in an article titled 'Pancasila Democracy the right fit for every one of Indonesia's 240m', and went on to highlight, like Yudhoyono, the contrast with liberalism:

> It is almost certain that Indonesian democracy differs from liberal democracy. In terms of cultural origins, liberal democracy is rooted in Western culture while Indonesian democracy has its own roots that emphasise the harmony between individual and communal interests.
>
> (Sriyono 2012)

If the dominant 'other' in the early years of *reformasi* was Soeharto-era authoritarianism and corruption, by the last years of the Yudhoyono administration liberalism was taking its place.

The return of exceptionalist and indigenist rhetoric can be explained in part with reference to a general trend to look to the Soeharto years for solutions to Indonesia's problems. But it was also a response to nationalist criticism that the Yudhoyono government had, through its pursuit of liberal economic policies, sold Indonesia out to Western interests. As readers of this book will be aware, aversion to liberal capitalism has long been a part of Indonesian nationalist thinking. Soeharto attempted to deflect criticism that he had led Indonesia into the arms of the West by representing his regime as more authentically Indonesian than Sukarno's. Post-Soeharto governments had fewer ideological or coercive resources to fend off charges of neo-liberalism and their political rivals targeted this vulnerability.

Critiques of neoliberalism are typically associated with the left, but the most sustained attack on the nationalist credentials of the Yudhoyono government came from the rightwing Gerindra, the political vehicle of former special forces commander Prabowo Subianto, the former son-in-law of Soeharto. In 2004 Prabowo had taken over the leadership of the Indonesian Farmers Association, a corporatist relic of the Soeharto era, and, like Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra, represented himself as an advocate for agrarian reform and for farmers disadvantaged by liberal investment laws (Bolton 2009). Backed by his extremely wealthy brother, Prabowo and a group of retired generals and nationalist politicians formed Gerindra in 2008. Lavish spending on the 2009 general election campaign was repaid with 26 seats in the DPR and a high public profile for Prabowo. After a failed tilt at the vice presidency as Megawati's running mate the same year, Prabowo set his sights on replacing Yudhoyono as president in 2014.

Whatever Prabowo's future political prospects, the Gerindra phenomenon warrants some attention here. Prabowo is the grandson of Margono Djojohadikusumo, one of the founders of Parindra (discussed in some detail in Chapters 2

and 3 on account of its promotion of a paternalistic autocracy) and has referred to Gerindra as Parindra's child, motivated by the same spirit of nationalism (*Kompas*, 26 April 2009; Tribunnews.com, 13 October 2013). With no reformist credentials at all – his faction of the military sided with Soeharto and was responsible for kidnapping and killing several pro-democracy activists – Prabowo presented his party as a militant defender of authentic Indonesian nationalism. Gerindra's nationalism was anchored firmly in the past. Prabowo drew on Sukarno's rhetoric of anti-imperialism but at the same time offered a classic organicist vision of Indonesia as a nation of happy farmers living in peace under the protection of a mighty state. The clear message, aired in well-produced and high-rotation television advertisements during the 2009 election campaign, was that the only way to resolve Indonesia's problems of poverty and political instability was to abandon liberal political and economic policies and return to a political system based on strong centralised leadership and indigenous Indonesian values (Tomsa 2009).

Gerindra's manifesto presented the party as standing at the 'front line' in the defence of the principles of *gotong royong* and *musyawarah*, described as 'unique expressions of Indonesian culture' that 'prioritise the interests of the group over that of the individual' (Gerindra n.d.). Gerindra promised a comprehensive 'correction' of the political system 'to bring it into line with the 1945 Constitution and the national personality (*jati diri bangsa*)'. It was unapologetic about its plans to return to a more authoritarian style of rule, stating that Indonesia was faced with a choice of which to put first, 'the prosperity of the people' or the 'unbounded freedoms' of democracy. 'Faced with this choice' reads the manifesto, 'Gerindra opts for the prosperity of the people in accordance with the preamble of the 1945 Constitution'. Gerindra's manifesto is only one example of a new nationalist discourse in which liberal democracy is openly condemned in favour of a return to some more culturally authentic pattern of rule. While Gerindra managed to win only 5 per cent of the popular vote in 2009, it almost tripled its vote in the general elections of April 2014, making it Indonesia's third largest party. In the presidential election the same year, Prabowo won 46.8 percent of the vote, indicating that his nostalgic conservative brand of nationalism can no longer be written off as marginal.[2] Indeed, as has been suggested, it has already affected mainstream Indonesian political discourse, normalising the idea that liberal democracy is out of tune with both the constitution and Indonesian culture.

Volksgeist-ism, again

Why is it that appeals to indigenism and the national personality have been such potent weapons in the hands of successive generations of Indonesian politicians? The answer lies in the history of nationalist thought. Since its beginnings, Indonesian nationalism has been tied to the idea that Indonesians are unique. As described in this book, that sense of uniqueness is rooted historically in an idealised vision of traditional village life constructed by early

Indonesian nationalists in conversation with Dutch legal anthropologists and Japanese cultural nationalists. Not all nationalists shared the same vision of village life, but there was general agreement that traditional Indonesian culture was essentially harmonious, communalistic and spiritual. Equally important and equally deeply embedded in nationalist thought is the notion, originating with Savigny and popularised during the Japanese occupation, that Indonesia's constitutional order should express its *Volksgeist*. Sukarno and the army used this logic to justify the demolition of parliamentary democracy. Soeharto and the army used it to justify the dismantling of political parties and the outlawing of opposition. Prabowo and his allies attempted to harness the same sentiment in their attacks on the post-Soeharto democratic reforms.

However cynically these arguments may have been deployed, they gained traction thanks to the positive resonances of terms such as *musyawarah*, *gotong-royong*, *kekeluargaan* and *jati diri bangsa* in broad sections of Indonesian society. Burns wrote about *adat* as a 'sacred national myth' (2004: 249–51). I have written elsewhere (Bourchier 2007) about the 'romance of adat' in the Indonesian political imagination, making the point that many critics of the New Order government bought into a romantic vision of Indonesian identity not far removed from that promoted by the government's ideologues. W.S. Rendra's satire *The Struggle of the Naga Tribe*, for instance, tells the tale of an unspecified indigenous community whose idyllic and harmonious life-style is threatened by a rapacious foreign mining company in league with corrupt government officials. Rendra's work was influenced by theories of economic dependency theory current in the 1970s, but the way that it deals with *adat* (and liberal capitalism) places it within the romantic tradition of thinking propagated by the Leiden scholars, sustained by Indonesia's law schools and adapted to different purposes by the ideologues of the Sukarno and Soeharto eras.

NGO activists who took up the cause of *adat* in the early 1990s held a similar view of traditional culture as inherently good and wise. This initiative, which started as a response to local struggles against the expropriation of land for logging and mining, developed into a national movement with the formation of the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN). After the fall of Soeharto AMAN successfully lobbied for the recognition of *adat* rights as part of the decentralisation laws of 1999. While the revival of *adat* jurisdictions produced positive outcomes in some areas, it also sharpened distinctions between cultural insiders and outsiders, leading to the emergence of ethno-nationalisms and other, sometimes violent, manifestations of chauvinism (Bourchier 2007). The revival of *adat* institutions has also reinforced the authority of traditional elites, allowing them in some cases to exploit their power to the detriment of their own communities (Biezeveld 2007). Adverse outcomes led some activists to talk about the 'hijacking' of the *adat* rights agenda (Aditjondro 2003: 15–17) but has not led to a public rethinking of the assumption that *adat* is somehow morally superior to positive law.

The contemporary relevance of *Volksgeist* thinking is evident in debates surrounding the drafting of a new criminal code to replace the old Dutch code. The draft version drawn up by legal experts and debated by the DPR in March 2013 attracted most attention for criminalising black magic and blasphemy, but also contained two controversial articles allowing punishment by the state for acts contravening 'unwritten law' (Article 2) and 'the living law of the society' (Article 756). These articles were intended to fulfil a longstanding demand by legislators and legal academics to give greater recognition to *adat* in the formal legal system. But as jurist Joeni Arianto Kurniawan (2013) argued, including 'unwritten law' in the statue books gives enormous discretion to state officials, allowing them to exercise arbitrary power. By reducing legal certainty it also undermines the positivist basis of the Indonesian legal system. The fact that articles of this kind have been included in successive drafts of the criminal code over at least two decades indicates the continuing influence of Savigny's Historical School and confirms Takdir Alisjahbana's observation that the embrace of *adat* by Indonesia's first generation of lawyers sowed the seeds of long-term legal confusion.

So where does this leave Indonesia? Is it destined to slide once again into the embrace of would-be autocrats promising an end to conflict and a return to a more culturally authentic style of rule? There is no doubt that discourses of holism, cooperation and organic unity have become deeply embedded in Indonesian nationalist tradition and resonate with many Indonesians' sense of national identity. Opponents of democracy know this well, and exploit old tropes of harmony and family. It is a rhetoric that has led Indonesia into dictatorship not once but twice before. Political systems built on appeals to familism inevitably concentrate power in the hands of the 'parent'. If Indonesia is to avoid repeating history there needs to be a concerted effort to construct a national identity more in tune with the needs of a pluralistic, dynamic, democratic nation. A necessary first step is to look critically at romantic notions of the *Volksgeist* in both political and legal thinking. It is only with an understanding how key concepts such as *musyawarah*, *gotong-royong*, *kekeluargaan* and *adat* came to be part of Indonesian public discourse and how they have been deployed for anti-democratic ends that they will begin to lose their seductive power.

Notes

1 See the website of retired Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo for a running commentary on Indonesian politics from a military perspective from 1998 to 2013 http://sayidiman.suryohadiprojo.com/ (accessed 17 June 2014).
2 Note that this chapter was completed just prior to the 2014 general elections. These sentences were added at the galley proof stage.

Glossary of terms, abbreviations and acronyms

abangan the spiritually syncretic or 'nominally Muslim' community of Java

adat traditional customs and mores; Dutch anthropological interest in indigenous customs after 1900 led to the emergence of the concept of '*adat* law' (*hukum adat*), typically counterposed to European and Islamic law

agama formal religion, usually taken to mean Islam

AHM *Akademi Hukum Militer*, Military Law Academy

AMAN *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara,* Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago, founded in 1999

Aspri *Asisten Pribadi*, Personal Assistants; Suharto's kitchen cabinet after the Malari riots of January 1974

azas tunggal 'sole basis'; the policy formalised in 1985 that required all social and political organisations to adopt the Pancasila as their philosophical foundation

Bapilu *Badan Pengendali Pemilihan Umum*, Body for Managing the General Elections; created in September 1970 to ensure a Golkar victory in the 1971 general election

BP-7 *Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, Supervisory Body for the Implementation of the Guide to the Realisation and Practice of Pancasila; formed March 1979

BPUPK *Badan Penyelidikan Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan*, the Investigating Committee for Independence Preparations (also known as *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakaai*); Japanese-created assembly of collaborating nationalists appointed on 29 April 1945 to draft a constitution – it was abolished early August 1945 and replaced by the PPKI

CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a prominent Jakarta think-tank founded in 1971

Dai Nippon Great Japan

Dewan Nasional National Council, the advisory body inaugurated on 12 July 1957 to advise the Karya Cabinet and formulate the guidelines for Guided Democracy; it was dissolved in July 1959 and replaced by the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA)

Djawa Hōkōkai Java Service Association; a large, comprehensive political body constructed by the Japanese along corporate lines in January 1944

DPR *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, People's Representative Council; Indonesia's parliament

dwifungsi 'dual function'; the doctrine according to which the armed forces claimed a permanent right to participate in social and political affairs

fatwa ruling based on Islamic law

FBSI *Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*, All Indonesia Federation of Workers; formed 20 February 1973

FNPIB *Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat*, National Front for the Liberation of West Irian; established in January 1958 as a coordinating body for army-controlled functional group organisations and abolished in 1961

FPI *Front Pembela Islam*, Islamic Defenders Front; vigilante organisation founded in 1998 with army and police backing

Front Nasional National Front; formally established by Sukarno in August 1959 as an instrument of mass mobilisation

GBHN *Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*, Broad Guidelines of State Policy; a set of policy directives drawn up every five years

Gerindo *Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia*, Indonesian People's Party; a leftwing organisation established 24 May 1937

Gerindra *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya*, Greater Indonesia Movement Party; a militant nationalist party formed in 2008

Golkar Originally an abbreviation of '*golongan karya*' or 'functional groups'; the 'non-party' organisation established in 1969 to win New Order elections – it became Partai Golkar in 1998

gotong-royong 'popular solidarity' in Sukarno's usage, but closer to 'communal mindedness' in New Order parlance; a key symbol of indigeneity in both radical and conservative collectivist discourse

HKTI *Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia*, Cooperative Farmers' Association; established 24 April 1973

integralism The philosophy of state organisation described by Supomo on 31 May 1945 emphasising the harmony of rulers and ruled and the unity of state and society, used here synonymously with 'organicism' in the Indonesian context

IPKI *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence; established 20 May 1954 and resurrected in 1998

KAMI *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*, Indonesian Student's Action Front; the army-sponsored anti-communist students association formed 15 October 1965 in Jakarta

kampung densely populated urban settlement

karyawan 'functionary' in any enterprise, regardless of his/her position or status

kawula gusti 'servant and master'; an aristocratic Javanese concept interpreted in political terms as 'the unity of ruler and ruled' and in spiritual terms as 'the unity of man and God'; appears here in various manifestations, e.g. *manunggaling kawulo lan gusti*, *manunggalnya kawulo-gusti*

kedaulatan rakyat popular sovereignty; typically counterposed to kedaulatan negara or state sovereignty

kekeluargaan familism, family-ness or the family principle; an ostensibly indigenous principle implying concern for the wellbeing of the whole rather than of individual or group interests

keterbukaan openness; a buzzword prevalent during the temporary thaw that began in 1989

KNPI *Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia*, National Committee of Indonesian Youth; an official corporate body for youth, formed in 1973

Kokarmendagri *Korps Karyawan Kementerian Dalam Negeri*, Interior Ministry Karyawan Corps Command; corporate body for civil servants established in 1966

kokutai Japanese National Entity; a term that came into widespread political use in the late Meiji era to define the contours of 'Japanese-ness'

Kopkamtib *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, Operational Command for the Restoration of Order and Security; founded after the 1965 coup

Korpri *Korps [Karyawan] Pegawai Republik Indonesia*, Indonesian Civil Servants' Corps

Kostrad *Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat*, Army Strategic Reserve Command; formed 1963

KOTI *Komando Operasi Tertinggi*, Supreme Operations Command; formed 19 July 1963, KOTI functioned as a Sukarno's inner cabinet

Malari *Malapetaka Limabelas Januari*, Catastrophe of 15 January; anti-government riots in Jakarta 1974

Manipol *Manifesto Politik*, Political Manifesto; the name given to Sukarno's Independence Day speech of 17 August 1959, it was regarded as the ideology of the Guided Democracy period

Masjumi *Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia*, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims, first formed 1943, banned in 1960

MPR *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, People's Consultative Assembly; the superparliament comprising the DPR and other members

MPRS *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*, Provisional People's Consultative Assembly; the appointed parliament between 1966 and 1968

mufakat consensus or unanimous acceptance; ideally the outcome of *musyawarah*

MUI *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, Indonesian Ulama Council

Murba *Partai Murba*, Proletarian Party; an anti-fascist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist party established 7 November 1948 and banned in September 1965

musyawarah the principle of consultation and negotiation

negara integralistik 'integralist state'; the organicist state concept outlined by Supomo on 31 May 1945 and proclaimed as Indonesia's official philosophy of state in the mid 1980s

Nekolim *Neo-kolonialisme, Kolonialisme, Imperialisme*, Neo-colonialism, Colonialism and Imperialism; Sukarno's roster of threats facing the emerging nations of the world

NKRI *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia; military-coined term denoting national unity over all other principles

NU *Nahdlatul Ulama*, Resurgence of the Islamic Scholars; established in 1926, incorporated into the PPP in 1973, but withdrawn in 1984

OPPI *Organisasi Persatuan Pekerdja Indonesia*, United Organisation of Indonesian Workers

Opsus *Operasi Khusus*, Special Operations Unit, formed in 1964

P4 *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, Guide to the Realisation and Practice of Pancasila; an official guide to the Pancasila, but in general usage the Pancasila indoctrination courses initiated in 1978

P-7 *Tim Penasihat Presiden mengenai Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, Presidential Advisory Team on the Implementation of the Guide to the Realisation and Practice of Pancasila; a team set up in 1978 to advise Soeharto on Pancasila

pamong praja 'guides of the realm'; the post-1946 corps of territorial administrators

Pancasila The Indonesian state philosophy, consisting of five principles usually translated as belief in one supreme God; just and civilised humanity; national unity; democracy guided by the inner wisdom of unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people

Pancasila Democracy *Demokrasi Pancasila*; the official name for the New Order political system – used increasingly to refer to the post-Soeharto system also

pangreh pradja 'rulers of the realm'; the indigenous administrative elite under colonial rule (renamed *pamong praja* after 1946)

Parindra *Partai Indonesia Raja*, Greater Indonesia Party; formed first in 1936, a small party of the same name, and several of the same members, was formed in November 1949

Parkindo *Partai Kristen Indonesia*, Indonesia Christian Party; a Protestant party established 18 November 1945

Parmusi *Partai Muslimin Indonesia*, Indonesian Muslims Party; also known as PMI, it came into being in February 1968 and was dissolved into PPP in January 1973

Partai Demokrat Democratic Party; a nationalist party formed 2001 as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's election vehicle

PDI *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, Indonesian Democratic Party; created by the government in 1973 from nine Christian, nationalist and socialist parties

PDI-P *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan*, Indonesian Democratic Party – struggle, the post-Soeharto incarnation of the PDI formed by Megawati Sukarnoputri

pembangunan 'upbuilding' or 'development'

pemuda 'youth'; during the Revolution the term acquired militant, radical connotations – *pemuda*-ism suggests reckless bravery, refusal to compromise

Perhimpoenan Indonesia Indonesia Association, an association of Indonesian students studying in the Netherlands that took this name in 1925

Permesta *Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam*, Universal Struggle Charter; regional movement proclaimed on 2 March 1957 in Makassar, Sulawesi – the revolt came into the open in February 1958

Perti *Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah*, Islamic Educational Movement; founded 1930 and incorporated into the PPP in 1973

Peta *Pembela Tanah Air*, Defenders of the Homeland; a 60,000 member volunteer army formed in Java and Sumatra by the Japanese in October 1943

PIR *Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raja*, Greater Indonesia Unity Party; formed in December 1948 and split in 1954 into the Java-based PIR Wongsonegoro PIR and the Sumatra-based Hazairin PIR

PKI *Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party; established in May 1920 and banned for the last time in March 1966

PKPB *Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa,* Concern for the Nation Functional Party; a pro-New Order party formed in 2002

PKPI *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia,* Indonesian Justice and Unity Party; a nationalist party dominated by former New Order generals originally formed in 1999

PMKRI *Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia*, Indonesian Catholic Student Association

PMP *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, Pancasila Moral Education; that part of the primary and secondary school curriculum that deals with Pancasila

PNI *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*, Indonesian Nationalist Party; established in 1927, re-formed 1945 and incorporated into the PDI in 1973

PPKI *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (also called *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Iinkaai*); formed 9 August 1945 to complete and ratify the constitution drafted by the BPUPK

PPKn *Pancasila dan Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan*; Pancasila and Citizenship Education; a curriculum component between 1994 and 2004 and in revised form from 2013

PPP *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party; a broad Islamic coalition created by the government in January 1973 and rebranded in 1998 as an Islamist party

prijaji see *priyayi*

priyayi petty aristocracy, integrated into the colonial civil service

PRRI *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia; a counter government proclaimed in February 1958 in Padang, West Sumatra

PSI *Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, Indonesian Socialist Party; established February 1948 under the leadership of Soetan Sjahrir, and banned in August 1960

PSII *Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia*, Islamic Association Party of Indonesia; split from Masjumi in April 1947

PTHM *Perguruan Tinggi Hukum Militer*, Military Law College

Rechtsstaat State governed by laws; closer to 'rule by law' than the Anglo–American ideal of 'rule of law'

reformasi the reform movement associated with the toppling of Soeharto and subsequent democratisation initiatives

rust en orde tranquillity and order

Sekber Golkar *Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*, Joint Secretariat of Golkar Organisations; set up in October 1964

semangat 'spirit'; usually used in the political context to refer to the spirit of revolution, militant nationalism

Seskoad *Sekolah Staf dan Komando TNI-AD*, Army Staff and Command School in Bandung

Siliwangi army division based in West Java

SOB Pancasila *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Pancasila*, Central Organisation of Pancasila Workers; Catholic Party affiliated union

SOBSI *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*, All Indonesia Central Workers Organisation; founded 29 November 1946

SOKSI *Serikat Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia*, Union of Indonesian Socialist Karyawan Organisations; formed 31 May 1961 as an umbrella body for anti-communist trade unions and military-controlled functional groups – absorbed into Golkar in the late 1960s

Spri *Staf Pribadi*, Personal Staff; kitchen cabinet of presidential advisers formed in 1966

SPSI *Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia*, All Indonesian Workers Union; formed in 1985

Staatsidee 'State concept'; in positivist legal philosophy, the 'supreme principle' governing the entire hierarchy of laws, including the constitution, within a given jurisdiction

Staatspartij state-party; refers here to the one-party-state party called PNI-Staatspartij which Sukarno attempted to set up in late August 1945

trias politica the separation of powers: legislative, judicial and executive; sometimes written *trias politika*

Volksgeist the essential and unique character of a people

Volksraad People's Council; the parliament of the late colonial era

Volksrecht law emerging from the people rather than jurists

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Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia charts the origins and development of organicist ideologies in Indonesia from the early twentieth century to the present. In doing so, it provides a background to the theories and ideology that informed organicist thought, traces key themes in Indonesian history, examines the Soeharto regime and his 'New Order' in detail, and looks at contemporary Indonesia to question the possibility of past ideologies making a resurgence in the country.

Beginning with an exploration of the origins of the theory of the organic state in Europe, this book explores how this influenced many young Indonesian scholars and 'secular' nationalists. It also looks in detail at the case of Japan, and identifies the parallels between the process by which Japanese and Indonesian nationalist scholars drew on European romantic organicist ideas to forge 'anti-Western' national identities and ideologies. The book then turns to Indonesia's tumultuous history from the revolution to 1965, the rise of Soeharto, and how his regime used organicist ideology, together with law and terror, to shape the political landscape and consolidate control. In turn, it shows how the social and economic changes wrought by the government's policies, such as the rise of a cosmopolitan middle class and a rapidly growing urban proletariat, led to the failure of the corporatist political infrastructure and the eventual collapse of the New Order in 1998. Finally, the epilogue surveys the post-Soeharto years to 2014, and how growing disquiet about the inability of the government to contain religious intolerance, violence and corruption has led to an increased readiness to re-embrace not only more authoritarian styles of rule but also ideological formulas from the past.

This book will be welcomed by students and scholars of Southeast Asia, politics and political theory, as well as by those interested in authoritarian regimes, democracy and human rights.

David Bourchier is Associate Professor of Asian Studies at The University of Western Australia and an Associate of the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University, Australia.

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ISBN 978-1-138-23672-1